Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-92
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-92
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 93, 94; P.A. 73-137, S. 5; P.A. 92-260, S. 36.)
Cited. 173 Conn. 165; 197 Conn. 436; Id., 588; 198 Conn. 671; 200 Conn. 268; 201 Conn. 276; 211 Conn. 672; 212 Conn. 31; 225 Conn. 347; 227 Conn. 677; 235 Conn. 711; 236 C. 112. Court's failure to instruct jury in accordance with 287 Conn. 509 was harmless because restraint of victim was not incidental to additional offenses. 293 C. 435. Cited. 8 Conn.App. 177; 24 Conn.App. 13; 39 Conn.App. 632; 46 Conn.App. 691; Id., 741. Subsec. (a): Subdiv. (2)(A): Language sufficiently warns ordinary person in clear and concise terms of prohibited conduct intended. 173 Conn. 165. Cited. 185 C. 339; 189 Conn. 346; 194 Conn. 114; Id., 692; 198 Conn. 147; Id., 285; Id., 405; 199 C. 399; 200 Conn. 586; 201 C. 517; Id., 559; 202 Conn. 259; Id., 509; 203 Conn. 385; 204 Conn. 1; Id., 240; Id., 714; 205 C. 132; Id., 673; 206 Conn. 40; 209 Conn. 416; Id., 733; 210 Conn. 110; Id., 199; Id., 315; 211 Conn. 18; 213 Conn. 388; Id., 422; 214 Conn. 38; Id., 89; 215 Conn. 173; Id., 716; 216 Conn. 647; 217 Conn. 243; 219 C. 93; Id., 160; Id., 269; Id., 283; Id., 489; 220 Conn. 270; Id., 345; Id., 487; Id., 698; 221 Conn. 264; 222 Conn. 556; 224 Conn. 397; 225 Conn. 450; Id., 519; 226 Conn. 618; 227 Conn. 1; Id., 153; 228 Conn. 582; 229 C. 557; 231 Conn. 195; 233 Conn. 403; 235 Conn. 145. Subdiv. (2)(A): Determined to be not unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of the case. 237 Conn. 284. Cited. Id., 694; 238 Conn. 389. Subdiv. (2)(C): Section not unconstitutionally vague on its face. Id., 784. Cited. 239 Conn. 235; 242 C. 445. Where defendant also charged with sexual assault, restriction of movement alone can be basis of kidnapping if defendant, by violent actions, restrained victim with intent to prevent liberation. 262 C. 179; judgment reversed, see 299 C. 740. Legislature intended to exclude from scope of the more serious crime of kidnapping and its accompanying severe penalties those confinements or movements of a victim that are merely incidental to and necessary for the commission of another crime against that victim. 287 Conn. 509. Subdiv. (2)(A): Since there was no evidence that defendant restrained victim to any greater degree than that necessary to commit the sexual assault, his conviction of kidnapping in the first degree cannot stand. Id., 608. Holding in 287 Conn. 509 that to commit a kidnapping, defendant must intend to prevent the victim's liberation for a longer period of time or to a greater degree than that which is necessary to commit the other crime, applies retroactively to petitioner's habeas corpus proceeding in which he challenges his kidnapping conviction. 299 C. 740. Where defendant was also charged with robbery and there was no evidence that victim was bound or moved physically, and victim was restrained for five minutes and released immediately after robbery was complete, the restraint alone cannot support kidnapping charge. 301 C. 77. Subdiv. (2)(A): Subpara. not unconstitutionally vague since defendant had fair warning when he committed sexual assault in 1988 that his movement of victim could support an independent kidnapping conviction. 306 C. 718. Retroactive relief is available, as long as the evidence warrants such relief, for all collateral attacks on judgments rendered final prior to the holding in 287 Conn. 509, irrespective of whether the kidnapping instruction was challenged in the criminal proceeding, and such challenges are not subject to the procedural default rule; omission of a Salamon instruction not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 321 C. 56. Cited. 25 CA 428; 28 CA 195; 33 CA 457; 34 Conn.App. 276; 36 Conn.App. 190; Id., 216; Id., 641; Id., 718; Id., 774; 37 CA 360; Id., 464; 38 Conn.App. 777; 39 Conn.App. 579; 41 CA 317; judgment reversed, see 242 Conn. 445; 43 Conn.App. 715; 44 Conn.App. 307; 46 CA 810. Holding witnesses at gunpoint prior to firing fatal shot into a murder victim was kidnapping with intent to advance or accomplish the murder. 47 CA 134. Unlawful restraint as a lesser included offense, discussed. Id., 159. Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction under section. 55 Conn.App. 447. Subdiv. (2): Under kidnapping statute, the state had to prove that defendant had abducted and restrained alleged victim with the intent to inflict physical injury or to sexually attack her. 81 Conn.App. 320. Kidnapping in the first degree statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of defendant's case. 91 CA 47. Abduction requirement under kidnapping statute was satisfied by testimony showing that defendant, in an effort to prevent victim from leaving his apartment, took her by the leg and placed his arm around her neck in a headlock and thereby restricted her movement with the intent to prevent her liberation. 96 CA 155. Kidnapping conviction reversed and matter remanded so jury could be instructed re holdings in 287 Conn. 509 and 288 C. 418 that it could not find defendant guilty of kidnapping unless he intended to prevent the victim's liberation for a longer period of time or to a greater degree than that necessary to commit the underlying crime. 115 CA 166. Subdiv. (2)(A): When assessing whether a kidnapping charge is merely incidental to and necessary for another crime, trial court must make a specific factual finding whether defendant intended to restrain the victim to a greater degree than what was necessary to commit the other crime; where defendant is charged with kidnapping pursuant to Subdiv. (2)(A), and no evidence is presented at trial re defendant's intention to inflict physical injury subsequent to related sexual assault, court's analysis of the kidnapping charge is limited to defendant's conduct up to the completion of the sexual assault. 118 CA 140. Subdiv. (2)(A) is a lesser offense included within the kidnapping charge of Subdiv. (2)(B) and thus conviction of both offenses for the same act constituted double jeopardy. Id., 831. Subdiv. (2): 287 Conn. 509 does not control burglary and larceny case because restraint of victim was not necessary to accomplish those crimes and restraint occurred after defendant took jewelry. 127 CA 181. Subdivs. (2)(A) and (2)(B) are separate offenses for double jeopardy purposes. 180 Conn.App. 371. Subdiv. (2)(B): In order to prevail on habeas claim that the absence of a Salamon instruction did not constitute harmless error, petitioner is not required to establish that there was insufficient evidence to convict him or that a properly instructed jury likely would find him guilty; commissioner bears burden of demonstrating that the omission of a Salamon instruction on incidental restraint did not contribute to the verdict; test to be applied by appellate court is whether there is a reasonable possibility that a properly instructed jury would reach a different result. 184 CA 101. Cited. 43 Conn.Supp. 46.