Wis. Stat. § 893.53
An action to recover damages for an injury to the character or rights of another, not arising on contract, shall be commenced within 3 years after the cause of action accrues, except where a different period is expressly prescribed, or be barred.
Wis. Stat. § 893.53
This section applies to legal malpractice actions that sound in tort. Acharya v. Carroll, 152 Wis. 2d 330, 448 N.W.2d 275 (Ct. App. 1989). The application of the discovery rule to legal malpractice actions is discussed. Hennekens v. Hoerl, 160 Wis. 2d 144, 465 N.W.2d 812 (1991). This section and the discovery rule apply to engineering malpractice actions. Milwaukee Partners v. Collins Engineers, 169 Wis. 2d 355, 485 N.W.2d 274 (Ct. App. 1992). This section is the state's general and residual personal injury statute of limitations and is applicable to 42 USC 1983 actions. Hemberger v. Bitzer, 216 Wis. 2d 509, 574 N.W.2d 656 (1998), 96-2973. A party's deficient performance of a contract does not give rise to a tort claim. There must be a duty independent of the contract for a cause of action in tort. Atkinson v. Everbrite, Inc., 224 Wis. 2d 724, 592 N.W.2d 299 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-1806. Even though a plaintiff might plead and testify to having suffered emotional distress on account of a lawyer's malpractice, that fact does not convert the claim into one seeking redress for injuries to the person. The underlying injuries in a legal malpractice claim are to rights and interests of a plaintiff that go beyond, or at least are different from, injuries to his or her person under s. 893.54. Hicks v. Nunnery, 2002 WI App 87, 253 Wis. 2d 721, 643 N.W.2d 809, 01-0751. The residual or general personal injury statute of limitations applies to 42 USC 1983 actions. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 109 S. Ct. 573, 102 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1989). While the court borrows the state's limitations period for an action under 42 USC 1983, federal law determines the action's accrual date. Because habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, any section 1983 action challenging the fact or length of confinement does not accrue until the underlying confinement has been invalidated through a direct appeal, post-conviction relief, or some other means. Huber v. Anderson, 909 F.3d 201 (2018). This section applies to actions under Title II of the federal Americans With Disabilities Act. Doe v. Milwaukee County, (1995).