Wis. Stat. § 948.075

Current through Acts 2023-2024, ch. 272

Section 948.075 - Use of a computer to facilitate a child sex crime

(1r) Whoever uses a computerized communication system to communicate with an individual who the actor believes or has reason to believe has not attained the age of 16 years with intent to have sexual contact or sexual intercourse with the individual in violation of s. 948.02(1) or (2) is guilty of a Class C felony.

(2) This section does not apply if, at the time of the communication, the actor reasonably believed that the age of the person to whom the communication was sent was no more than 24 months less than the age of the actor.

(3) Proof that the actor did an act, other than use a computerized communication system to communicate with the individual, to effect the actor's intent under sub. (1r) shall be necessary to prove that intent.

Wis. Stat. § 948.075

2001 a. 109; 2003 a. 321; 2005 a. 433; 2007 a. 96.

Defendant's admission to driving to the alleged victim's neighborhood for an innocent purpose combined with computer communications, in which the defendant told the alleged victim that he drove through her neighborhood for the specific purpose of meeting her, and his confession to the police that he went to the area so he could "get her interested in chatting with him again," showed that the non-computer-assisted act of driving through the area was to effect his intent to have sex with the alleged victim and satisfied the requirement in sub. (3). State v. Schulpius, 2006 WI App 263, 298 Wis. 2d 155, 726 N.W.2d 706, 06-0283. Defendant's use of a webcam to transmit video of himself was, under the circumstances of this case, nothing more than the use of his computer to communicate and thus not an act "other than us[ing] a computerized communication system to communicate" as required under sub. (3). State v. Olson, 2008 WI App 171, 314 Wis. 2d 630, 762 N.W.2d 393, 08-0587. The element use of a "computerized communication system" in sub. (1r) was satisfied when the defendant used his flip-style cellphone to exchange texts with, and receive picture messages from, the 14-year-old victim. There is no doubt that modern cellphones today are in fact computers. The defendant used his cellphone as a computer to send communications to the victim over the computer system used by their cellphones so that he could have sexual contact with her. State v. McKellips, 2016 WI 51, 369 Wis. 2d 437, 881 N.W.2d 258, 14-0827. This section is not unconstitutionally vague because a person of ordinary intelligence would understand that using a cellphone to text or picture message with a child to entice sexual encounters violates the statute, and this section is capable of objective enforcement. State v. McKellips, 2016 WI 51, 369 Wis. 2d 437, 881 N.W.2d 258, 14-0827. The legislature had reasonable and practical grounds for making a conviction for using a computer to facilitate a child sex crime under sub. (1r) subject to a mandatory minimum sentence. Thus, there was a rational basis for the penalty enhancer in s. 939.617(1) and s. 939.617(1) was not unconstitutional as applied to the defendant. State v. Heidke, 2016 WI App 55, 370 Wis. 2d 771, 883 N.W.2d 162, 15-1420.