Section 939.46 - Coercion(1) A threat by a person other than the actor's coconspirator which causes the actor reasonably to believe that his or her act is the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm to the actor or another and which causes him or her so to act is a defense to a prosecution for any crime based on that act, except that if the prosecution is for first-degree intentional homicide, the degree of the crime is reduced to 2nd-degree intentional homicide.(1m) A victim of a violation of s. 940.302(2) or 948.051 has an affirmative defense for any offense committed as a direct result of the violation of s. 940.302(2) or 948.051 without regard to whether anyone was prosecuted or convicted for the violation of s. 940.302(2) or 948.051.(2) It is no defense to a prosecution of a married person that the alleged crime was committed by command of the spouse nor is there any presumption of coercion when a crime is committed by a married person in the presence of the spouse.(3) A petitioner under s. 813.12 or 813.122, or an individual whose parent, stepparent, or legal guardian filed a petition under s. 813.122 on behalf of the individual as a child victim, as defined in s. 813.122(1) (c), has an affirmative defense for an offense under s. 175.35(2e) that is punishable under s. 175.35(3) (b) 2, or for an offense under s. 941.2905, if the person prohibited from possessing a firearm was the respondent in the action under s. 813.12 or 813.122.Amended by Acts 2018 ch, 145,s 11, eff. 3/30/2018.1975 c. 94; 1987 a. 399; 2007 a. 116. The state must disprove an asserted coercion defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Moes v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 756, 284 N.W.2d 66 (1979). The coercion defense is limited to the most severe form of inducement. It requires finding that the actor believed he or she was threatened with immediate death or great bodily harm with no possible escape other than the commission of a criminal act. A defendant seeking a coercion defense instruction must meet the initial burden of producing evidence to support giving an instruction. That the defendant reasonably believed that a companion would attempt to harm him or her if he if he or she did not comply with the companion's orders only suggests that the safest course was to comply with companion's orders, not that it was the only course. State v. Keeran, 2004 WI App 4, 268 Wis. 2d 761, 674 N.W.2d 570, 01-1892.