Wis. Stat. § 801.15
A court has no authority to enlarge the time in which to file a complaint. Pulchinski v. Strnad, 88 Wis. 2d 423, 276 N.W.2d 781 (1979). Error based on late service and filing of an affidavit was waived by the failure to object at a hearing. In re Spring Valley Meats, Inc. 94 Wis. 2d 600, 288 N.W.2d 852 (1980). Notice of entry of judgment was "given" under s. 806.06(5) when it was mailed. Sub. (5) was inapplicable. Bruns v. Muniz, 97 Wis. 2d 742, 295 N.W.2d 112 (Ct. App. 1980). The trial court abused its discretion in enlarging the time to file an answer when the answer was served 9 days after the deadline. Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co. 109 Wis. 2d 461, 326 N.W.2d 727 (1982). Time computations under ss. 32.05(10) (a) and 32.06(10) are controlled by s. 801.15(1), not s. 990.001(4). In Matter of Petition of Electric Power Co. 110 Wis. 2d 649, 329 N.W.2d 186 (1983). Service of an answer was timely under the terms of a courtesy agreement. Oostburg Bank v. United Savings, 130 Wis. 2d 4, 386 N.W.2d 53 (1986). Time periods under s. 805.16 may not be enlarged by showing excusable neglect under s. 801.15(2) (a). Brookhouse v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. 130 Wis. 2d 166, 387 N.W.2d 82 (Ct. App. 1986). The trial court lost jurisdiction to decide motions after verdict by consecutively extending the time for its decision under sub. (2) (b). Ford Motor Co. v. Lyons, 137 Wis. 2d 397, 405 N.W.2d 354 (Ct. App. 1987). Because a courtesy agreement was made after default, the court did not abuse its discretion by insisting on compliance with sub. (2) (a). Clark County v. B.T.U. Structures, 144 Wis. 2d 11, 422 N.W.2d 910 (Ct. App. 1988). The trial court had discretion to allow a jury trial when fees under s. 814.61(4) were not timely paid. Chitwood v. A. O. Smith Harvestore, 170 Wis. 2d 622, 489 N.W.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1992). While clerical error is not always excusable, it is not as a matter of law inexcusable neglect. Sentry Insurance v. Royal Insurance Co. 196 Wis. 2d 907, 539 N.W.2d 911 (Ct. App. 1995), 94-3428. Trial courts have discretion to shorten the 5-day notice requirement for motions. Schopper v. Gehring, 210 Wis. 2d 208, 565 N.W.2d 187 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-2782. Sub. (2) (a) is applicable to excusable neglect by a trial judge. State v. Elliot, 203 Wis. 2d 95, 551 N.W.2d 850 (Ct. App. 1996), 96-0012. Excusable neglect is conduct that might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances. A court must look beyond the cause of the neglect to the interests of justice, considering both the need to afford litigants a day in court and to ensure prompt adjudication. Whether the dilatory party acted in good faith, whether the opposing party was prejudiced, and whether prompt remedial action took place are factors to consider. An attorney who relied on an oral courtesy agreement whose terms were not disputed and promptly filed for an extension acted with excusable neglect. Rutan v. Miller, 213 Wis. 2d 94, 570 N.W.2d 54 (Ct. App. 1997), 97-0547. Under sub. (1) (b) the last day is included in determining time periods unless it is "a day the clerk of courts office is closed." Whether or not the day is a "holiday" under sub. (1) (a) is not relevant. Klingbeil v. Perschke, 228 Wis. 2d 421, 596 N.W.2d 488 (Ct. App. 1999), 99-0488. A courtesy extension agreement is not required to be in writing, but a court may consider the lack of documentation in making a determination as to whether an agreement existed. Connor v. Connor, 2001 WI 49, 243 Wis. 2d 279, 627 N.W.2d 182, 99-0157. The trial court erroneously exercised its discretion by entering default judgment without hearing offered testimony on the question of whether an oral courtesy agreement existed and, if so, what the agreement provided. Johnson Bank v. Brandon Apparel Group, Inc. 2001 WI App 159, 246 Wis. 2d 828, 632 N.W.2d 107. The trial court was not required to find excusable neglect for failing to file a timely answer due to a process server's failure to endorse and date the summons and complaint as required under s. 801.10(2) when the failure to answer in a timely manner amounted to nothing more than carelessness and inattentiveness on the part of the parties involved. While prompt remedial action after the expiration of the statutory time limit is a material factor bearing on whether relief should be granted, it does not eliminate the requirement that a dilatory party demonstrate excusable neglect for its initial failure to meet the statutory deadline. Williams Corner Investors, LLC v. Areawide Cellular, LLC, 2004 WI App 27, 269 Wis. 2d 682, 676 N.W.2d 168, 03-0824. In the absence of excusable neglect, the court is not obligated to address the interests of justice. Estate of Otto v. Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc. 2007 WI App 192, 305 Wis. 2d 198, 739 N.W.2d 599, 06-1566. Affirmed on other grounds. 2008 WI 78, 311 Wis. 2d 84, 751 N.W.2d 805, 06-1566. The excusable neglect standard set forth in sub. (2) (a) does not apply to untimely motions to enlarge scheduling order deadlines. Rather, s. 802.10 provides the applicable standards and procedures courts apply to such motions. Parker v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 2009 WI App 42, 317 Wis. 2d 460, 767 N.W.2d 272, 07-1542. Sub. (1) is not a proper vehicle for a criminal defendant to seek a new trial in the interest of justice. During the appellate process under ss. 809.30 and 974.02, defendants may also appeal to the discretionary power of the court of appeals to order a new trial in the interest of justice under s. 752.35 and to the supreme court in an appeal under s. 751.06. State v. Henley, 2010 WI 97, 328 Wis. 2d 544, 787 N.W.2d 350, 08-0697. Precedent has set an extremely high bar to reverse excusable neglect determinations. A court cannot reject out-of-hand the possibility that a packet was actually "lost in the mail," although courts should be skeptical of glib claims that attribute fault to the United States Postal Service. Courts should carefully scrutinize what steps an organization has taken to avoid such mishaps, how quickly the organization responds when it discovers its delinquency, and whether its delay has caused prejudice to the plaintiffs. Casper v. American International South Insurance Company, 2011 WI 81, 336 Wis. 2d 267, 800 N.W.2d 880, 06-1229. Sub. (1) (b) is not applicable to an appeal before an administrative agency. Baker v. Department of Health Services, 2012 WI App 71, 2012 WI App 71, 342 Wis. 2d 174, 816 N.W.2d 337, 11-1529. Avoiding and obtaining relief from default judgments. Parlee, WBB April, 1985.