Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-730
Paragraphs (b) and (c) shall not be construed to prohibit practitioners licensed under chapter 453 or 455 from performing any act within their respective practices.
HRS § 707-730
The 2009 amendment is retroactive to April 3, 2008. L 2009, c 11, §76(2).
Defendant's right to a fair trial was violated where counselor of victim-witness was allowed to place hands upon victim's shoulders while victim was testifying. 70 H. 472, 777 P.2d 240. Act of cunnilingus is an act of sexual penetration. 71 H. 127, 785 P.2d 615. Trial court did not commit plain error when it gave a single instruction encompassing two counts of sexual assault in first degree; a consent instruction may be given separately and need not be included as an element of sexual assault.75 Haw. 152,857 P.2d 579. Sexual assault in the first degree, in violation of subsection (1)(b), is not, and cannot be, a "continuing offense"; each distinct act in violation of this statute constitutes a separate offense under the Hawaii Penal Code.84 H. 1, 928 P.2d 843. As a precondition to convicting a person of first degree sexual assault, in violation of subsection (1)(b), the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person committed an act of "any penetration, however slight," as mandated by the plain language of the definition of "sexual penetration" contained in § 707-700.102 Haw. 391,76 P.3d 943. A specific unanimity (jury) instruction is not required where (1) the offense is not defined in such a manner as to preclude it from being proved as a continuous offense and (2) the prosecution alleges, adduces evidence of, and argues that the defendant's action constituted a continuous course of conduct; thus, a specific unanimity instruction was not required where prosecution alleged a continuous course of conduct with respect to defendant's kidnapping charge under § 707-720, but was required for defendant's attempted first degree sexual assault charge under this section.121 Haw. 339,219 P.3d 1126. Trial court must instruct jury as to what specific facts jury must find before it decides whether defendant is guilty of attempted sexual assault in first degree.77 Haw. 177 (App.),880 P.2d 1224. Placement of the elemental attendant circumstances after the state of mind in the enumerated elements instruction was not error; when read and considered as a whole, the instructions adequately informed the jury of the prosecution's burden to prove that complainant did not consent to the acts alleged and was not married to defendant at the time, and that defendant was aware of both circumstances when defendant acted. 97 H. 140 (App.), 34 P.3d 1039. Where there was no evidence, independent of defendant's extrajudicial confession, of the corpus delicti of attempted sexual assault of victim by defendant, defendant's conviction reversed.103 Haw. 490 (App.),83 P.3d 753. Although criminal sanctions are clearly directed only at adult conduct under subsection (1)(b) and § 707-732(1)(b), there is no legislative history that supports a conclusion that only adults were intended to be prohibited from the proscribed sexual conduct; when the legislature amended subsection (1) and § 707-732(1) in 2001, and could have, but did not include language allowing consensual sexual conduct between, for example, two thirteen year olds, the legislative intent was to maintain the existing prohibitions against such conduct. 121 H. 92 (App.), 214 P.3d 1082. Section 707-732(1)(b) and subsection (1)(b), as applied to private consensual acts between two persons, including minors, did not violate minor's right to privacy as the State has at least a significant interest in regulating the sexual activities of children under the age of fourteen; in addition, there is no fundamental personal privacy right for minors under the age of fourteen to engage in sexual activities with other children under the age of fourteen; this applies to young boys, as well as to young girls, and is not strictly dependent on an age differential between the children.121 Haw. 92 (App.),214 P.3d 1082. State's exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the case was not constitutionally infirm where defendant failed to meet the burden of demonstrating that defendant was prosecuted based on an arbitrary classification; defendant was prosecuted under § 707-732 and this section based on allegations that defendant was significantly older than child #1, had initiated the prohibited sexual activities with child #1 and child #2, and had engaged in multiple instances of prohibited sexual contact with more than one child.121 Haw. 92 (App.),214 P.3d 1082. Prior law. Attempted rape.56 Haw. 664,548 P.2d 271. Defendant may be found liable as accomplice.61 Haw. 475,605 P.2d 75. Prior law, applying to males only, did not violate the equal protection guarantees or the ERA. 62 H. 120, 612 P.2d 526. Sufficiency of evidence of "forcible compulsion."62 Haw. 120,612 P.2d 526. Evidence of forcible compulsion held sufficient. 62 H. 572, 617 P.2d 1214. Sexual abuse is a lesser included offense of rape and sodomy.64 H. 1, 635 P.2d 560. Facts sufficient to support finding of forcible compulsion. 64 H. 470, 643 P.2d 536. Cited:56 Haw. 343,537 P.2d 724.
Testing of charged or convicted person for human immunodeficiency virus status, see § 325-16.5 .