HRS § 706-666
COMMENTARY ON § 706-666
Section 706-666 is addressed to the problems of the definition and proof of former convictions. The Code takes the position that, in determining whether the defendant is a persistent offender, conviction per se is sufficient provided the time for appeal has expired and the defendant has not been pardoned on the ground of innocence. The fact that the disposition of the defendant resulted in a suspended sentence or a suspended execution of a sentence should not be held material for purposes of extended terms.
Subsection (2) provides for a non-restrictive approach to admitting evidence on prior convictions. Since (1) the evidence relied upon is largely official records, (2) the issue is tried to the court, and (3) the court is not compelled to find the defendant a persistent offender, or to impose an extended term even if the minimal requirements are established, no sound purpose would be served by adopting a restrictive evidentiary approach.
SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTARY ON § 706-666
Act 246, Session Laws 1982, clarified the definition of a conviction by providing that an adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction that the defendant committed a crime constitutes a conviction.
In State v. Kamae,56 Haw. 32,526 P.2d 1200 (1974), the court held that an appeal in forma pauperis was not frivolous when it sought to raise the question of whether the trial court's reliance on a pre-sentence diagnosis and report was sufficient under § 706-666(2) to establish that the defendant was a multiple offender warranting an extended term under § 706-662(4). The court did not reach the ultimate question. Pre-sentence report held insufficient evidence of prior conviction.56 Haw. 628,548 P.2d 632. Evidence of defendant's prior conviction reasonably satisfied the court. 9 H. App. 583,854 P.2d 238.