HRS § 92-5
Attorney General Opinions
Subsection (a)(1) is applicable only when a specific individual is involved. Att. Gen. Op. 75-11.
Even if there is no quorum, meeting to discuss official business may be prohibited unless sunshine law followed. Att. Gen. Op. 85-27.
Subsection (a)(2) and § 92-9 read together permit board and commission members to disclose some matters deliberated or decided in executive session, but they cannot disclose matters which would be inconsistent with subsection (a)(2), i.e., matters affecting privacy of individuals under consideration for hire, and they must maintain this confidentiality for as long as disclosure would defeat purpose of convening the executive meeting. Att. Gen. Op. 94-1.
Although § 92-2.5(a) does not expressly preclude city council members from engaging in serial one-on-one conversations, when council members engaged in a series of one-on-one conversations relating to a particular item of council business, under subsection (b), the spirit of the open meeting requirement was circumvented and the strong policy of having public bodies deliberate and decide its business in view of the public was thwarted and frustrated.117 H. 1 (App.),175 P.3d 111. In a suit deciding whether disclosure of county council executive session minutes was required, circuit court properly found that both chapter 92F and this chapter applied; if the meeting met an exception to the open meeting requirements put forth in this chapter, such as an exception enumerated in this section, the council was not required to disclose the minutes of that meeting to the public; if the meeting did not fall under such an exception, the council was required to disclose the minutes pursuant to § 92-9 and § 92F-12.120 Haw. 34 (App.),200 P.3d 403. Where it was clear from the county council executive session minutes that the county attorney consulted with the council consistently and at length throughout the executive session regarding the procedure to follow in conducting an investigation of the county police department and that the council's consultation with the attorney largely concerned the ramifications of the sunshine law on the council's investigation -- a legal question, the council was justified in closing the meeting to the public in executive session.120 Haw. 34 (App.),200 P.3d 403. Where the county council executive session conversation consisted of either direct communication between the council members and the county attorney or communication among council members that flowed from consultation with the county attorney, the attorney-client portions of the executive session were so intertwined with other portions of the executive session that redacting the privileged portions and disclosing the remainder of the minutes was impractical.120 Haw. 34 (App.),200 P.3d 403.