Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8-8
(1949 Rev., S. 844; 1951, 1955, S. 379d; 1959, P.A. 460, S. 2; 1963, P.A. 45; February, 1965, P.A. 622, S. 3; 1967, P.A. 348; 712; 1971, P.A. 870, S. 9; P.A. 74-183, S. 179, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 158, 681; P.A. 77-470; P.A. 78-280, S. 1, 127; P.A. 81-165; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29, S. 13, 82; P.A. 84-227, S. 1; P.A. 85-284, S. 3; P.A. 86-236, S. 2; P.A. 88-79, S. 1, 4; P.A. 89-356, S. 1; P.A. 90-286, S. 1, 2, 9; P.A. 91-219; P.A. 92-249, S. 8; P.A. 99-238, S. 5, 8; P.A. 00-84, S. 3, 6; 00-108, S. 2; P.A. 01-47, S. 1; 01-110; 01-195, S. 112, 181; P.A. 02-74, S. 2; P.A. 04-78, S. 1; P.A. 07-60, S. 1; P.A. 12-146, S. 1; P.A. 15-85, S. 2.)
Right of appeal under section is from decision of zoning board of appeals under zoning laws contained in chapter and does not extend to decisions of board under another statute. 116 C. 555. Power of court to modify or revise does not include power to substitute its own discretion for that of board; must find that board acted illegally or abused discretion. 120 C. 455. Cited. 123 C. 263. Appeal from zoning board is not an action within meaning of Sec. 54-131 which permits a new action when writ abated. 126 C. 603. Under same language in New Haven charter, right of appeal held not to be contingent upon restraining order; no vested right acquired by applicant by virtue of fact no such order was obtained when opponent appealed. 127 C. 309. Recognizance without surety is insufficient; failure to file bond sound ground for abatement of appeal. 131 C. 657. No appeal from zoning commission under former statutes. 133 C. 248. Cited. 135 C. 305. Reasons for decision and transcript of evidence both constitute "proceedings" before board. 136 C. 1. Finding should contain only facts which court finds on basis of evidence taken by it. Id., 452. Cited. 138 Conn. 500. Plaintiff held an aggrieved person. 139 C. 463. Competitors are not aggrieved persons but owners of residential property in vicinity are. Id., 577. "Any person aggrieved" includes any landowner or resident within city whose situation is such that decision may adversely affect him in use or occupancy of his property. 140 C. 65. Prayer for relief to effect that decision of board of zoning appeals be modified or reversed is not necessary. 142 C. 277. Cited. Id., 415; Id., 659; 143 Conn. 280; 144 C. 61. If sole basis of plaintiff's grievance was that new business would create competition, he would not be an aggrieved person; any taxpayer of a town who feels aggrieved at granting of license for sale of liquors therein has right of appeal. Id., 160. On an appeal from zoning board of appeals, record made before board should be annexed to, and incorporated by reference in, answer of board; where there is an incompleteness in summary of evidence, court must take evidence to determine what facts and considerations were presumptively in minds of members of board when they acted. Id., 332. Cited. Id., 425, 493. Admissibility of evidence outside of record; wide and liberal discretion in board. Id., 560. Finding that plaintiff is not an aggrieved person divests court of jurisdiction. 145 Conn. 136. Admissibility of evidence not on record and of evidence not presented at hearing. Id., 218. Change in comprehensive plan, though not change in zone itself, may adversely affect parties outside immediate vicinity. Id., 237. Cited. Id., 325, 416, 435. Considerations authorizing variance are not identical with those justifying an outright change of zone. Id., 468. Zoning commission cannot appeal unless ruling or order of its own is in issue. Id., 655. To be an aggrieved person, where traffic in intoxicating liquor is not involved, one must be found to have been specially and injuriously affected in his property or other legal rights. Id.; 149 C. 284. On appeal, court cannot conduct a trial de novo and substitute its findings and conclusions for decision of board. 146 C. 27. Denial of motion to present evidence in addition to record held indicative that additional testimony was not necessary for equitable disposition of appeal. Id., 547. When building met zoning requirements, building inspector exceeded his authority in imposing additional conditions for certificate of occupancy. Id., 570. Scope of authority of committee appointed to take evidence. Id., 588. Action of board held an abuse of discretion since facts did not warrant granting of variance. Id., 595. Aggrievement from which one may appeal does not arise until board has acted. Id., 665. Former statute: On appeal, admission of testimony not presented to commission is within discretion of court; evidence of former applications admissible only when subsequent application seeks substantially same relief. 147 C. 65. Limits of court's power in reviewing refusal of board to grant variance. Id., 469. Cited. 148 Conn. 33, 299. Plaintiff's property bordered defendant's land which had received a zoning variance; plaintiff held to be an aggrieved person. Id., 492. Inferentially requires stenographic transcript or mechanical recording to be filed with court with return of board's proceedings. Id., 599. Inadequate summary required trial court to hear evidence. Id., 600. Evidence to prove plaintiff aggrieved admissible. Id., 602. One cannot qualify as aggrieved person solely because zone change may permit operation of business in competition with him. 149 Conn. 284. Motion for permission to offer additional evidence on appeal called for decision, in exercise of court's discretion, as to whether additional evidence was necessary for equitable disposition of appeal. Id., 413; 150 C. 285. Where court does not hear evidence, but decides appeal on record returned by zoning commission, no finding should be made. 149 C. 414. Cited. Id., 681. Plaintiffs were aggrieved persons within meaning of statute if board's decision affected them directly or in relation to a specific, personal interest, as distinguished from a general interest, in the subject matter. Id., 698. Although plaintiff could not, in its appeal from denial of permit, attack constitutionality of regulations under which it sought permit, it could attack their constitutionality in an independent proceeding. Id., 712. Under New Haven charter, person aggrieved by decision of zoning enforcement officer may appeal to board of zoning appeals which shall hear and determine reasonableness of decision; in such case, function of court on appeal from board of appeals is to decide whether board correctly interpreted ordinance and applied it with reasonable discretion to facts. 150 Conn. 113. Plaintiff has burden of proving that it is aggrieved; this burden requires that it establish that it was specially and injuriously affected in its property rights or other legal rights; it is not sufficient to show that action complained of would permit the operation of business in competition with its business. Id., 285. History discussed; reversal of decision in 23 Conn.Supp. 6; failure of board of appeals to comply with mandate of Sec. 8-7a renders action voidable at option of an aggrieved person. Id., 411. Party claiming aggrievement must show he is specifically and injuriously affected, mere generalities and fears are not enough. Id., 696. Right of appeal begins to run from effective date of decision which is controlled by Sec. 8-7. 151 C. 378. Cited. Id., 510; 646. Time for taking appeal from zoning board controlled by Sec. 8-7 rather than this section. Id., 646. Although applicant has burden of proving board acted in abuse of its discretion, board must show justification on record for denial of variance. 152 C. 247. Building inspector is authorized to take appeal from board's action in granting variance since he is "charged with the enforcement" of the decision of the board. Id., 311. Cited. Id., 660, 661. To be an "aggrieved" person, in a case in which traffic in intoxicating liquor is not involved, one has to be specially and injuriously affected in his property or other legal rights. 153 C. 37. Plaintiff, as a taxpayer, is an aggrieved person in a case in which traffic in liquor is involved without having to show that he has an interest peculiar to himself. Id., 117. Where transcript of board hearing was incomplete and plaintiff raised constitutional issue of confiscation, he should have been permitted to introduce additional evidence. Id., 343, 344. Cited. Id., 433, 437. In order to qualify as aggrieved persons under section, plaintiffs must show that the value of their property would be lessened or that their legal rights would be injuriously affected. 154 C. 46, 47. Right to produce evidence under section may be waived by stipulation of a party. Id., 393. Plaintiffs did not qualify as aggrieved persons to appeal granting of variance where only claim to aggrievement was that their property adjoined that for which variance was granted. 155 C. 241, 242. In light of record and express allegations of impropriety and illegality, additional testimony of what occurred at executive session of board was necessary and permitted. Id., 245. Where plaintiff appealed claiming amendments were an unconstitutional denial of due process since they were confiscatory and would put him out of business, trial court should have permitted introduction of additional evidence limited to question of constitutionality of ordinance, complete transcript of hearings before commission being insufficient evidence in the case. Id., 265. Cited. 155 C. 365. Order of reference for a finding of facts on the issue of aggrievement and to take additional evidence to complete the record is not final judgment from which appeal lies under Sec. 52-263. Id., 617. While plaintiffs were not "aggrieved persons", appeal was considered because of unusual circumstances of trial below. 157 C. 520. When construction of new building under zoning variance sought would affect use of plaintiff's parking facilities, plaintiff is an aggrieved person entitled to appeal from zoning board's decision. 158 C. 187. New evidence may be introduced only on a direct appeal from action of board, not in action to enjoin successful applicants for a zoning variance. Id., 202. Limit of time for appeal prevented retroactive application of procedural amendment giving abutting landowners statutory right to appeal. Id., 331. Appeals must be taken under this section and Sec. 8-9 rather than any city charter sections; aggrievement means plaintiffs were specially and injuriously affected in their property or other legal rights by board's decision. 159 C. 1. Trial court may not substitute its judgment for that of town council in granting a change of zone for special development district. Id., 212. When zoning authority gives reasons for action it takes, question for court to determine on appeal is whether reasons assigned are reasonably supported by the record and pertinent to considerations which must be applied under applicable zoning regulations. Id., 534, 540. Abutting landowners have standing to appeal a zoning commission's decision. 160 C. 239. Cited. 161 Conn. 32; 162 C. 45, 74, 238; 163 Conn. 379, 615. Abutting landowner who successfully opposed application is not entitled to notice of appeal. 164 C. 187. Record of board proceeding, including exhibits, may be reconstructed by evidence in court. Id., 215. Cited. 165 Conn. 185; 166 C. 102; Id., 112. A resident taxpayer of a town is an "aggrieved person" with standing to appeal decision of town's zoning board to extend a nonconforming liquor store use. 167 C. 596. There is no aggrievement which is prerequisite to right of appeal when a "floating zone" is designated without attachment to particular property or area in the town. 168 C. 285. Cited. 171 C. 480; 172 C. 286; 173 C. 408; 174 C. 493; 176 C. 475; 177 C. 440; 178 Conn. 364; 179 Conn. 250; Id., 650; 180 C. 296; 181 Conn. 230; Id., 556; 185 Conn. 135; 186 C 32; Id., 106. Provisions of statute which are inconsistent with provisions of Sec. 51-197d(11) are repealed by implication. 188 C. 555. Cited. 190 C. 746; 195 Conn. 276; 196 C. 623. Life tenant has sufficient ownership to be entitled to recognition as a "person owning land" with right of appeal. 203 C. 317. Cited. 205 C. 413; Id., 703; 206 C. 374; 208 Conn. 146; Id., 476; Id., 480; 209 C. 652; 211 Conn. 78; Id., 85; Id., 416; Id., 662; 212 Conn. 375; Id., 471; Id., 628; 213 Conn. 604; 214 Conn. 400; 217 Conn. 588; 219 C. 511; 220 Conn. 584; Id., 929; 221 Conn. 374; 222 Conn. 262; Id., 380; Id., 541. Upon judicial appeal from zoning board of appeals pursuant to section, trial court must focus on decision of the board because it is the subject of the appeal. Judgment of Appellate Court in 28 Conn.App. 256 affirmed in part and modified in part. 226 Conn. 80. Cited. Id., 230; Id., 314; Id., 757; 228 C. 476; 229 C. 178; 232 Conn. 122; Id., 270; 234 Conn. 498; 236 C. 681; 237 C. 184; 239 C. 515. Where applicant denied for hardship, plaintiff not required to submit alternative plans before submitting claim for inverse condemnation. 247 C. 196. Cited. 1 CA 285; 2 Conn.App. 384; Id., 506; Id., 595; 3 CA 172; Id., 496. A coholder of a life interest in property is a "person owning land" entitled to appeal under statute. Id., 550. Cited. Id., 556; Id., 576; 4 Conn.App. 205; Id., 271; Id., 500; 5 Conn.App. 455; Id., 520; 6 Conn.App. 110; Id., 317; Id., 715; 8 CA 556; 9 CA 538; 13 CA 699; 15 Conn.App. 729; 16 CA 281; Id., 604; judgment reversed, see 212 Conn. 628; 17 Conn.App. 150; 18 CA 69; Id., 85; Id., 159; Id., 195; Id., 488; Id., 549; Id., 722; 20 Conn.App. 302; Id., 474; Id., 561; 21 CA 340; Id., 421; 22 CA 407; Id., 606; 23 CA 75; Id., 232; Id., 256; Id., 258; 24 CA 172; 25 Conn.App. 199; 27 CA 297; Id., 590; 28 CA 344; 29 Conn.App. 402; 32 CA 799; 34 CA 685; 35 CA 204; Id., 317; Id., 599; 37 CA 105; 43 Conn.App. 545; Id., 563; 45 CA 653. Zoning board required to hold a hearing on plaintiff's zoning application. 69 Conn.App. 230. Plaintiff's failure to appeal imposition of required "sidewalk fund" contribution did not meet exceptions to rule against collateral attacks on zoning commission actions and thus was properly dismissed. 85 CA 606. Wide discretion in board. 1 CS 89. Compared with number 305 of special acts of 1931. 10 Conn.Supp. 194. Superior Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from board. 11 CS 489. Mode of service on board discussed; notice to chairman sufficient compliance; time for appeal excludes day of act. 17 CS 116. Officer of corporation which would be affected by variance is not "person aggrieved". 15 CS 362. Building inspector is. 19 CS 349. Resident landowner of town not living in borough is "aggrieved person" in action by borough zoning board. Id., 446. In an appeal from granting of variance for sale of liquor, a "person aggrieved" held to include any landowner, resident or taxpayer of municipality affected. 21 Conn.Supp. 102. History discussed; where, due to mechanical failure of the recording machine no transcript is available, court may not remand case for rehearing, but it may permit introduction of additional evidence to determine what considerations were presumptively in minds of board members. 23 Conn.Supp. 6; judgment reversed, see 150 Conn. 411. Cited. 25 Conn.Supp. 276. This section and Secs. 8-3 and 8-9 are not so linked that the date of publication of notice must be considered as the date the decision was rendered. 26 Conn.Supp. 88. Part owner of property is not precluded, merely because her co-owners have not joined with her, from showing that she, as an aggrieved person, has the right to appeal to the court. Id., 170. Circumstances under which board's decisions should be overruled discussed. Id., 256. Equitable relief outside the framework of appeal procedure set up by statute might be granted in the presence of allegations of fraudulent connivance or collusion on the part of local zoning board of appeals; plaintiffs have been granted equitable relief when the zoning authority lacked the jurisdiction to take the action which plaintiff was challenging; equitable relief by way of an injunction will not be granted if the court finds that the legal remedy afforded by statute has not been exhausted. Id., 334, 335. Chairman of town planning and zoning commission is aggrieved person within section and may appeal variance granted defendant by zoning board of appeals of town. 28 Conn.Supp. 278. Cited. 29 CS 5; 30 Conn.Supp. 157; 31 CS 197; 32 CS 104; Id., 223; Id., 625; 33 CS 175; Id., 607; 35 Conn.Supp. 246. Portion of section in conflict with amendment to Sec. 51-197d is repealed by implication. 38 CS 356. Cited. Id., 492; 39 Conn.Supp. 426; Id., 523; 41 Conn.Supp. 218; Id., 398; 42 Conn.Supp. 256; 43 Conn.Supp. 373. Claim re denial of permit to establish a public parking lot does not require recognition of a state Bivens action because plaintiff's existing remedy under section is appropriate. 51 CS 636. Subsec. (a): Failure to allege publication provisions is not a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal of appeal. 211 Conn. 78; Id., 416; Id., 662. Cited. 212 Conn. 628; 214 C. 407; 218 Conn. 65; Id., 265; Id., 438; 225 Conn. 1; 230 C. 140; 233 Conn. 198. Court reaffirmed long-standing interpretation of "aggrieved person" that provides that any taxpayer has automatic standing to appeal decisions involving the sale of liquor in community. 262 C. 393. When zoning decision affects a single property within a zone, "land involved in the decision of the board," as used in Subdiv. (1), does not include the entire zone of which the affected property is part. 271 Conn. 152. Party was not "aggrieved" because he did not own the property that was subject to zoning application and did not own land abutting or within 100 feet of the property. 285 C. 381. Party was aggrieved under Subdiv. (1) because "land involved" language refers to the entire property abutted, even when the parcel at issue is distinct in terms of its use within a multiuse development and in terms of the application to commission. 290 C. 313. The phrase "any person" includes persons who own land in another state. 297 C. 414. Subsec. does not afford statutory aggrievement in historic district commission appeals brought pursuant to Sec. 7-147i. 325 C. 765. Cited. 4 CA 633. Statutory aggrievement and classical aggrievement discussed. 7 Conn.App. 632. Cited. 18 CA 99; 19 CA 357; 30 CA 511; 31 Conn.App. 643; 45 Conn.App. 653. Since zoning is meant to protect the public at large, without some particular harm, such as the maintenance of a nuisance affecting the land of plaintiff or a statute allowing the maintenance of plaintiff's lawsuit, plaintiff can have no standing. 49 Conn.App. 669. Court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear appeal. 87 CA 277. Plaintiff, as town's zoning enforcement officer, was statutorily aggrieved and had standing to bring appeal challenging approval of a variance granted by town's zoning board of appeals. Id., 533. Plaintiff's access easement did not give plaintiff undisturbed possession of the land or a right to the profit of the land; accordingly, plaintiff did not fit into the category of an owner of land, for purposes of determining standing, because his rights and privileges did not confer a sufficient benefit. 109 CA 777. Plaintiff's failure to state factual basis for statutory aggrievement in complaint deprived court of subject matter jurisdiction. 113 CA 502. Subdiv. (1): Text amendment created a defined, bounded zoning district, and landed plaintiff is statutorily aggrieved because his property falls within the particular zone to which the text amendment pertained, regardless of his ability to opt out of amendments because his decision to opt out does not affect whether his neighbors opt out. 127 CA 87. Plaintiffs' allegations that they own property in the country residential zone and that defendant redefined buildable area solely in the country residential zone is sufficient to establish statutory aggrievement. 130 CA 587. When a zoning commission, as part of its sua sponte application to amend its zoning regulations or zoning map, refrains from taking action to alter in any manner the zoning classification of a particular property that is not specified in the application as the subject thereof, that property is not "land involved in the decision" of the commission pursuant to Subdiv. (1). 150 CA 489. Cited. 41 CS 593. The trustee of a revocable trust has a sufficient ownership interest to be considered an owner for statutory aggrievement purposes. 51 Conn.Supp. 190. Subsec. (b): Failure to name statutorily mandated necessary party in citation is a jurisdictional defect. 205 Conn. 413. Mandates that clerk of municipality be properly cited and served as a necessary party. 206 Conn. 374. Cited. 207 C. 67. Clerk of fire district is a clerk of municipality required to be served. 212 Conn. 375. Cited. Id., 471; Id., 628; 218 Conn. 438; 220 Conn. 455; 222 Conn. 374; 224 C. 823; 225 Conn. 1; Id., 691; Id., 731; 227 Conn. 71; 228 Conn. 785; 232 C. 419; 235 C. 448. Planning commission's decision to settle pending appeal by entering into a stipulated judgment is not a "decision" within meaning of Subsec., and therefore is not appealable. 259 C. 607. Does not shorten legislatively prescribed time period within which plaintiff must serve process on the commission and the municipality, when fifteenth day falls on a day when municipal offices are closed, since to do so would deny plaintiff any remedy and leave it without recourse for what may be an otherwise meritorious appeal. 270 C. 42. Plain language of Subsec. clearly provides that any person statutorily aggrieved may take an appeal; thus, there was no merit to planning and zoning commission's claim that J Co. must be an applicant or partner in proposed project in order to be aggrieved by commission's denial of M's applications. 278 C. 660. Cited. 13 CA 165; 18 Conn.App. 99; 24 Conn.App. 172; 29 CA 28; 31 Conn.App. 643; 35 CA 646; judgment reversed, see 235 Conn. 448; 45 Conn.App. 89; Id., 653. Trial court improperly held that special permit was not supported by substantial evidence in the record, substituted its interpretation of town's regulations and its judgment for those of the commission. 53 CA 636. Plaintiff appealing planning and zoning commission decision did not fail to exhaust his administrative remedies where he had no actual or constructive notice of commission's findings that defendant complied with town's zoning regulations. 66 CA 508. Court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear appeal. 87 Conn.App. 277. Subsec. (f): Cited. 215 C. 58. Trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's zoning appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction reversed; right to appeal decision of zoning board to Superior Court and procedure prescribed in section shall be liberally interpreted in any case where strict adherence to these provisions would work surprise or injustice; although plaintiffs' zoning appeal citation should have named town clerk, plaintiffs had in fact served citation on town clerk, thus plaintiffs' failure to so name town clerk is not a defect that deprived trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. 278 C. 751. In passing P.A. 04-78, legislature clearly and specifically provided that for any zoning appeal taken prior to October 1, 2004, process was to be served in accordance with Subsec. only; since appeal was served on July 15, 2003, and plaintiffs' marshal followed the service requirements of Sec. 52-57(b)(5), leaving two copies of appeal papers with town clerk, plaintiffs did not comply with service requirements of this Subsec. which sets forth exclusive method for service of process in zoning appeals taken before October 1, 2004, and plaintiffs failed to make proper service of process for their zoning appeal. 279 C. 672. Where marshal filed one copy of process on town clerk, actual service was made and failure to file two copies of process on town clerk constituted formal defect that could be corrected pursuant to Subsec. (p). 297 Conn. 414. Cited. 43 CA 606. Subsec. (i): Nothing in the language of section explicitly indicates that filing the record with the court was intended to be the only requirement placed on zoning authorities regarding service or that, having authorized appeals to the Superior Court, the legislature intended that the court's normal procedural rules as to service were not to be operative. 50 CS 453. Subsec. (k): Cited. 218 Conn. 438; 233 Conn. 198. Cited. 25 CA 137; 40 CA 840; 43 CA 105; Id., 512. Statute does not say that trial court is required to hold evidentiary hearing. 78 CA 561. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing additional evidence to be presented in zoning appeal where plaintiff was specific in spelling out the nature of his claim and who was a pro se individual objecting to a petition before the commission. 110 CA 349. Subsec. (l): Court reiterated previous holdings that based on evidence presented at trial, the judgment of a planning and zoning commission denying site plan application can be affirmed, reversed, modified or revised where there is no evidence or basis to support commission's decision re qualification as permitted basic neighborhood store and re evaluation of provision of parking that met zoning regulations. 287 C. 746. Subsec. (m): Hearing held pursuant to Subsec. serves to protect the public interest by guarding against any attempt by settling parties to evade judicial review and scrutiny by potentially aggrieved landowners. 259 Conn. 607. Subsec. (n): Purpose of hearing is to protect public interest and neither a pretrial conference nor a court hearing to enforce a settlement met the statutory requirement. 247 C. 732. Plaintiff's appeal was moot since remand hearing was the proper forum for plaintiff to challenge the proposed settlement based on alleged negative environmental impact. 133 CA 173. Subsec. (o): Cited. 220 Conn. 61; 222 Conn. 374; 224 Conn. 823; 225 Conn. 1; Id., 691; Id., 731; 228 C. 498. Requirement of certification by Appellate Court held applicable to affordable housing land use appeals. 245 C. 257. Failure to make service of process on clerk of the municipality is fatal jurisdictional flaw not remedied by savings clause. 257 C. 604. Cited. 25 CA 572; 35 Conn.App. 646; judgment reversed, see 235 Conn. 448. Subsec. (q): Plaintiff's failure to serve the borough clerk was not a technical defect in form but a substantive defect in service that could not be cured by the savings provision of Subsec.; it is the duty of plaintiff rather than the marshal to identify who must be served. 285 C. 240. Subsec. (r): Legislature specifically intended the limitation period to apply only to challenges of failures of notice postdating January 1, 1999, as expressed in P.A. 00-84. 98 CA 213. Subsec. prohibits an appeal made more than 1 year from an action of the commission claimed to have been made without proper notice. 120 CA 50. One year appeal period is triggered only when the commission itself, not defendant applicants, fails to comply with notice requirement. 165 Conn.App. 488.