Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-151
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-151
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 153; P.A. 03-259, S. 52.)
Cited. 193 C. 526; 196 C. 242; 197 C. 369; 200 Conn. 664; 204 Conn. 330; 228 Conn. 147; Id., 918; 230 C. 686; Id., 698. Cited. 1 Conn.App. 647; 12 Conn.App. 74; 26 CA 758; 30 Conn.App. 95; judgment reversed, see 228 Conn. 147; 33 Conn.App. 143; 46 Conn.App. 741. Defendant's claim that statute is so vague and indefinite that it violates the due process clause of Art. I, Sec. 8 of the state constitution and the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution because it did not clearly define his conduct-telephoning victim despite police warnings not to contact her and instructing her to tell police that "nothing ever happened"-is without merit; language of statute plainly warns potential perpetrators that statute applies to any conduct that is intended to prompt witness to testify falsely or to refrain from testifying in an official proceeding that the perpetrator believes to be pending or imminent; legislature's unqualified use of word "induce" clearly informs persons of ordinary intelligence that any conduct, physical or verbal, can potentially give rise to criminal liability. 74 CA 473. Supreme Court made clear that liability under section hinges on mental state of the perpetrator in engaging in the conduct at issue, not on whether he must overcome by coercive means the will of a witness reluctant to do so; as interpreted in our case law, section provides fair warning of the conduct that it prohibits. 83 CA 672. Section can be violated even if witness may be independently willing to provide false testimony; person became a "witness" who may be summoned to testify in an official proceeding once defendant began discussing defendant's case with the person. 138 Conn.App. 420. Defendant may not avoid liability by inducing a witness' false testimony through the use of an intermediary instead of communicating directly with the witness. 143 CA 438. Cited. 39 CS 428; 41 Conn.Supp. 525; 43 Conn.Supp. 46. Subsec. (a): Subsec. applies whenever defendant believes that an official proceeding will probably occur, even if the police are only at the investigation stage and regardless of whether an official proceeding is actually pending or about to be instituted; "about to be instituted" signifies probability rather than temporal proximity; section does not apply when defendant believes that only an investigation, but not an official proceeding, is likely to occur; the jury may consider defendant's attempt to prevent a potential witness from speaking with the police as evidence of his intent to induce the witness to engage in conduct prohibited by section. 312 C. 551. Cited. 41 Conn.App. 584. The "pending or about to be instituted" element may be satisfied when facts support the inference that defendant reasonably could have contemplated that an official proceeding was likely to arise; it is enough under statute to satisfy required belief that an official proceeding is "about to be instituted" and is therefore imminent if defendant, knowing he has been implicated in a crime, threatens a likely witness to that crime to withhold evidence from the police; it is sufficient to qualify as tampering that defendant attempted to discourage the witness from speaking to the police, as opposed to testifying at trial, when there was evidence that defendant believed an official proceeding was imminent. 110 CA 608.