Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-37
When multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a person at the same time, or when a person who is subject to any undischarged term of imprisonment imposed at a previous time by a court of this state is sentenced to an additional term of imprisonment, the sentence or sentences imposed by the court shall run either concurrently or consecutively with respect to each other and to the undischarged term or terms in such manner as the court directs at the time of sentence. The court shall state whether the respective maxima and minima shall run concurrently or consecutively with respect to each other, and shall state in conclusion the effective sentence imposed. When a person is sentenced for two or more counts each constituting a separate offense, the court may order that the term of imprisonment for the second and subsequent counts be for a fixed number of years each. The court in such cases shall not set any minimum term of imprisonment except under the first count, and the fixed number of years imposed for the second and subsequent counts shall be added to the maximum term imposed by the court on the first count.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-37
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 37; P.A. 73-639, S. 4.)
Cited. 178 C. 427. Statute provides for three sentencing options where multiple sentences are imposed at same time. Id., 634. Section authorizes multiple sentences with consecutive minimum and maximum terms. 179 C. 381. Cited. 184 C. 366; Id., 434; 185 Conn. 473; 190 Conn. 327; 192 C. 471; 197 Conn. 413; Id., 485; 206 C. 40; Id., 685; 207 Conn. 270; Id., 276; 208 Conn. 420; 217 C. 568. Does not impose limits on trial court's common law inherent sentencing power to stay execution of a criminal sentence. 225 Conn. 46. Cited. 228 C. 384. Court was not prohibited from imposing a term of incarceration consecutive to a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release. 249 C. 645. Cited. 7 Conn.App. 131; Id., 367; 9 CA 365; Id., 686; 17 CA 307; 20 Conn.App. 572; 26 CA 10; 34 CA 503. Application of section is limited to "offenses" and since criminal contempt is not a criminal offense, it is not a matter within section's scope; however, legislature did not intend to change existing common law in enacting section and therefore trial court had inherent authority to impose criminal sentence that ran concurrently with previous sentence for criminal contempt. 59 CA 145. Cited. 30 CS 71; 36 CS 168.