Except where different meanings are expressly specified, the following terms have the following meanings when used in this title:
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-3
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 3; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 1; 1972, P.A. 188, S. 3; P.A. 73-295; 73-639, S. 1; P.A. 74-180; 74-186, S. 8, 129; P.A. 75-283; 75-380, S. 1; P.A. 76-111, S. 9; P.A. 77-604, S. 38, 84; 77-614, S. 486, 610; P.A. 80-308; 80-394, S. 8, 13; P.A. 85-602, S. 3, 4; P.A. 86-280, S. 2; 86-287, S. 2; P.A. 90-157, S. 1; P.A. 91-171 , S. 1 ; May 25 Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-1 , S. 98 , 130; P.A. 95-79 , S. 182 , 189 ; 95-277 , S. 13 , 19 ; P.A. 96-243 , S. 7 , 16 ; P.A. 00-99 , S. 5 , 154 ; 00-149 , S. 1 ; P.A. 01-84 , S. 9 , 26 ; P.A. 02-132 , S. 29 ; P.A. 07-123 , S. 6 ; P.A. 11-51 , S. 134 ; P.A. 13-170 , S. 3 ; P.A. 15-211 , S. 18 .)
Court correctly charged jury on definition of dangerous instrument. 173 C. 91 . Subdiv. (3) compared to Subdiv. (4). 175 C. 204 . Cited. 182 C. 501 ; 197 C. 574 ; 201 Conn. 505 ; 211 Conn. 258 ; 226 C. 514 ; 231 C. 545 . Offense of carrying a dangerous weapon is not constitutionally overbroad in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution; defendant's threatened use of a table leg to inflict serious bodily injury against victim, in the event that victim continued to bother him, constitutes a violation of this section and Sec. 53-206 if the threat is found to be a true threat not protected by the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 287 C. 237 . Evidence re use of pepper spray causing temporary blindness, chemical conjunctivitis and chemical burns constituted sufficient evidence of "serious physical injury" and "dangerous instrument" under section. 292 C. 533 . Cited. 8 CA 545 ; 9 CA 686 ; 11 Conn.App. 665 ; 12 CA 221 ; Id., 225; 14 CA 1 0; Id., 67; 37 CA 338 . Earlier jury instruction in earlier related case defining assault as the reduced ability to act as one would have otherwise acted did not prejudice jury. 71 CA 190 . Cited. 35 CS 519 ; 37 CS 661 ; 38 CS 619 ; 39 CS 494 ; 40 CS 498 ; 43 CS 46 . Subdiv. (1): "Human being" construed for purposes of murder statute in accordance with long-standing common-law principle that the term includes a fetus that has been born alive. 296 C. 622 . Cited. 17 CA 326 ; 25 CA 586 ; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 492. Subdiv. (3): Cited. 171 C. 276 ; 197 C. 602 . Cited. 3 CA 353 ; 5 CA 612 ; 10 CA 330 ; 14 CA 586 ; 17 CA 226 ; Id., 391; 23 CA 160 ; 26 CA 641 ; 28 CA 581 ; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 ; Id., 612; 37 CA 733 ; 41 CA 255 ; Id., 565; 43 CA 76 ; 45 CA 591 . Subdiv. (4): Cited. 172 C. 275 ; 173 C. 389 ; 174 C. 604 ; 181 C. 406 ; 182 C. 66 ; 186 C. 654 ; 189 C. 303 ; 197 Conn. 602 ; 202 C. 463 ; 211 C. 441 ; 213 C. 593 ; 225 C. 450 ; 231 C. 115 ; 237 C. 748 . Cited. 5 CA 590 ; Id., 612; 6 CA 667 ; 8 CA 496 ; 10 Conn.App. 330 ; Id., 462; 11 CA 499 ; 14 CA 657 ; 15 CA 531 ; 16 CA 346 ; 17 Conn.App. 226 ; 19 CA 654 ; Id., 674; 21 CA 688 ; 23 CA 502 ; 25 CA 734 ; 26 Conn.App. 641 ; 28 CA 81 ; Id., 402; Id., 581; judgment reversed, see 226 Conn. 601 ; Id., 612; 29 CA 679 ; 30 CA 232 ; 33 CA 782 ; 34 CA 261 ; 38 CA 20 ; 39 CA 18 ; judgment reversed, see 237 Conn. 748 ; 41 CA 565 ; 42 CA 307 ; 45 CA 270 ; Id., 591. "Disfigurement" defined as that which impairs or injures beauty, symmetry or appearance of a person or which renders unsightly, misshapen or imperfect or deforms in some manner. 82 CA 684 . Victim's testimony and medical records re injury that required surgical treatment, left victim with impairment to the use of her dominant hand and left victim's hand visibly scarred was sufficient to establish proof of serious physical injury. 116 CA 196 . The jury reasonably could have concluded that scars constituted serious physical injury because they negatively affected the appearance of skin on face and abdomen. 118 CA 831 . Subdiv. (5): Cited. 186 Conn. 654 ; 188 C. 653 ; 213 Conn. 593 . Cited. 8 CA 667 ; 16 Conn.App. 346 ; 25 Conn.App. 734 ; 30 CA 406 ; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 335 ; 31 CA 58 . Subdiv. (6): Cited. 169 C. 683 ; 171 C. 277 ; 175 C. 569 ; 177 C. 379 ; 179 C. 576 ; 182 C. 262 ; Id., 533; 185 C. 473 ; 189 C. 268 ; 190 C. 822 ; 195 C. 567 ; Id., 651; Id., 668; 197 C. 507 ; 203 C. 506 . If a weapon from which a shot may be discharged is designed for violence and is capable of inflicting death or serious physical injury, it is a deadly weapon regardless of whether the shot is discharged by gunpowder. 278 C. 113 . Cited. 7 CA 445 ; 19 CA 111 ; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 ; 21 CA 299 ; 25 CA 104 ; 29 Conn.App. 679 ; 31 CA 614 ; 33 CA 468 ; 39 CA 579 ; 45 Conn.App. 591 . Trial court did not invade jury's fact-finding province when it ruled as a matter of law that BB gun in evidence was a deadly weapon under Subdiv. in this case. 110 CA 263 . Subdiv. (7): Cited. 169 Conn. 683 ; 171 Conn. 277 . Tire iron used to break into apartment is not a dangerous instrument per se; potential for injury considered only in conjunction with circumstances of actual or threatened use. 177 C. 140 . Cited. 182 C. 533 ; 190 Conn. 822 ; 195 C. 668 ; 202 C. 629 ; 218 C. 432 . A fist or other body part is not a dangerous instrument under definition. 307 C. 115 . Cited. 5 CA 40 ; 6 Conn.App. 667 ; 7 CA 27 ; Id., 445; 10 Conn.App. 330 ; 14 Conn.App. 586 ; Id., 657; 15 CA 586 ; 17 Conn.App. 226 ; 21 Conn.App. 299 ; 25 CA 171 ; 28 CA 612 ; 29 CA 262 ; Id., 679; 33 Conn.App. 468 ; 38 CA 868 ; 45 Conn.App. 270 . Jury reasonably could have found that defendant's "feet and footwear" were a "dangerous instrument" in the manner in which they were used because of defendant's above average size, the age and delicate health of the elderly victim, the continual kicking of such victim in the area of several vital organs and the force of the kicks which was intensified by the weight of the footwear. 74 CA 545 . Dangerous instrument as defined in Subdiv. is "any instrument, article or substance which, under the circumstances in which it is used ... or threatened to be used, is capable of causing death or serious physical injury". 81 CA 367 . Evidence was sufficient to prove that a knife or similar instrument was used thereby constituting a dangerous instrument. 98 CA 13 . Jury reasonably could have concluded that being stabbed with a hypodermic syringe potentially contaminated with a blood-borne pathogen constituted a dangerous instrument. 161 CA 379 . Jury reasonably could have found that a PVC pipe, under the circumstances in which it was used, was a dangerous instrument capable of causing serious physical injury. 176 CA 807. Subdiv. (11): Cited. 171 C. 271 ; 178 C. 448 ; 180 C. 382 ; 182 C. 449 ; 184 C. 121 ; 186 C. 414 ; Id., 555; Id., 574; Id., 654; 188 C. 515 ; 189 C. 383 ; 190 C. 219 ; 194 C. 258 ; Id., 376; 195 C. 166 ; 198 C. 92 ; 199 C. 1 ; 201 C. 489 ; 202 C. 520 ; Id., 629; 204 C. 1 ; 209 C. 290 ; 214 C. 77 ; 216 C. 585 ; 219 C. 16 ; Id., 363; Id., 489; 220 C. 285 ; 223 C. 595 ; Id., 674; 225 C. 55 ; Id., 114; 227 C. 456 ; 228 C. 62 ; Id., 118; Id., 281; 229 C. 328 ; 231 Conn. 115 ; 233 C. 215 ; 235 C. 274 ; Id., 477; 236 C. 189 ; 237 Conn. 748 ; 238 C. 253 . Cited. 5 CA 599 ; 7 CA 180 ; 9 CA 111 ; Id., 373; 11 CA 24 ; 16 CA 455 ; 19 CA 674 ; 24 CA 598 ; 27 CA 103 ; 28 Conn.App. 81 ; 34 CA 223 ; 35 CA 51 ; 36 CA 41 7; 39 Conn.App. 18 ; judgment reversed, see 237 Conn. 748 ; 40 CA 643 ; 41 CA 361 ; 45 CA 297 . Provision dealing with intent to engage in proscribed conduct is irrelevant to a murder prosecution pursuant to Sec. 53a-54a . 48 CA 677 . Meaning of acting "intentionally". 51 CA 345 . Portion of the definition of "intent" relating to intent to engage in proscribed conduct is not relevant to charge of assault in the second degree. 70 CA 855 . State sufficiently proved defendant had conscious objective to cause victim's face to be scarred where defendant butted victim's face with his head, bit her face, struck her on the head with a hairdryer, kicked her and attempted to choke her, resulting in scars to victim's face. 74 CA 633 . Although court improperly instructed jury on entire definition re attempted murder and kidnapping charge, it properly instructed that jury had to find that defendant intended to cause the death of another or intended to abduct and restrain another. 97 CA 837 . Definition embraces both specific intent to cause a result and general intent to engage in proscribed conduct, and it is improper for court to refer in its instruction to entire definitional language, including the intent to engage in conduct, when the charge relates to a crime requiring only the intent to cause a specific result. 99 CA 230 . Although court instructed jury regarding intent by using the full statutory definition including portion relating to general intent crimes, it was not reasonably possible that jury was misled by court's instructions because court gave numerous proper instructions regarding proper intent required for crime of attempt to commit assault in the first degree. 107 CA 517 . Subdiv. (12): Cited. 182 Conn. 449 ; 203 C. 682 ; 223 Conn. 595 ; 235 C. 477 . Cited. 5 Conn.App. 599 ; 11 Conn.App. 24 ; 13 CA 288 ; 16 Conn.App. 455 ; 40 Conn.App. 643 . Subdiv. (13): Cited. 171 Conn. 271 ; 180 Conn. 382 ; 182 Conn. 66 ; Id., 449; 184 C. 400 ; 185 C. 63 ; 186 C. 265 ; 187 C. 6 ; 193 C. 632 ; 195 C. 232 ; 198 Conn. 92 ; Id., 454; 199 Conn. 1 ; 202 Conn. 629 ; 212 C. 593 ; 213 C. 579 ; 214 C. 57 ; 216 Conn. 585 ; 219 Conn. 16 ; 222 C. 444 ; 225 Conn. 55 ; 226 C. 20 ; 228 C. 147 ; 231 Conn. 115 ; 233 C. 174 . Cited. 5 Conn.App. 40 ; Id., 571; 7 Conn.App. 180 ; 11 Conn.App. 24 ; Id., 473; 17 CA 502 ; judgment reversed, see 213 Conn. 579 ; 19 Conn.App. 674 ; 26 CA 331 ; Id., 448; 27 CA 73 ; Id., 322; 30 CA 95 ; judgment reversed, see 228 Conn. 147 ; 34 CA 807 ; 35 Conn.App. 51 ; 41 CA 333 . Statute applies an objective yardstick to measure the nature and degree of the risk and a subjective yardstick to measure defendant's awareness of the risk. 35 CS 570 . Subdiv. (14): Cited. 171 C. 112 ; 176 C. 451 ; 180 Conn. 382 ; 182 Conn. 449 ; 187 Conn. 6 ; 195 Conn. 232 ; 201 C. 174 ; 202 Conn. 520 ; Id., 629; 204 C. 410 ; Id., 429; 212 Conn. 593 ; 213 Conn. 579 ; 214 Conn. 57 ; 222 Conn. 444 ; 226 Conn. 20 ; 228 Conn. 147 ; 231 Conn. 115 ; 238 Conn. 253 ; 242 C. 211 . Cited. 5 Conn.App. 40 ; 11 CA 473 ; Id., 499; 17 Conn.App. 502 ; judgment reversed, see 213 Conn. 579 ; 23 CA 720 ; 26 CA 448 ; 29 CA 825 ; 30 Conn.App. 95 ; judgment reversed, see 228 Conn. 147 . Subdiv. (18): Cited. 195 C. 651 ; 196 C. 395 ; 197 Conn. 507 ; 205 C. 370 ; 231 C. 235 . Cited. 7 CA 726 ; 9 CA 169 ; judgment reversed, see 205 Conn. 370 ; Id., 330; 19 CA 48 ; Id., 111; 36 CA 805 ; 37 CA 672 ; 39 CA 502 . Subdiv. (19): Cited. 175 Conn. 569 ; 190 C. 715 ; 196 Conn. 395 . "Firearm" includes BB. gun; legislature could have restricted the term "firearm" to guns that use gunpowder to discharge their shots, and the fact that legislature elected not to do so is strong evidence that it did not intend to limit the term in that manner. 294 C. 151 . Cited. 3 CA 289 ; 19 Conn.App. 48 ; Id., 111; 21 Conn.App. 299 ; 34 CA 751 ; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 ; 38 CA 481 ; 39 CA 82 ; Id., 502; 45 Conn.App. 591 . Subdiv. does not require state to establish that ammunition recovered with handgun was capable of being discharged from the handgun, and use of other ammunition was permitted to establish that handgun was a weapon from which a shot may be discharged. 127 CA 377 . Although gun was not operable at time of testing, that responding officer was able to dry fire it at time of seizure and observe that firing mechanism was functional was sufficient to prove operability. 146 CA 844 . Replica antique pistol that propelled via gunpowder a shot that mortally wounded defendant's spouse constituted a pistol, revolver or other weapon from which a shot could be discharged, as defined by Subdiv. 49 CS 248 .