Section 192 - ManslaughterManslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of three kinds:
(a) Voluntary-upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.(b) Involuntary-in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection. This subdivision shall not apply to acts committed in the driving of a vehicle.(c) Vehicular- (1) Except as provided in subdivision (a) of Section 191.5, driving a vehicle in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, and with gross negligence; or driving a vehicle in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence.(2) Driving a vehicle in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, but without gross negligence; or driving a vehicle in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, but without gross negligence.(3) Driving a vehicle in connection with a violation of paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 550, where the vehicular collision or vehicular accident was knowingly caused for financial gain and proximately resulted in the death of any person. This paragraph does not prevent prosecution of a defendant for the crime of murder.(d) This section shall not be construed as making any homicide in the driving of a vehicle punishable that is not a proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, or of the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner.(e)(1) "Gross negligence," as used in this section, does not prohibit or preclude a charge of murder under Section 188 upon facts exhibiting wantonness and a conscious disregard for life to support a finding of implied malice, or upon facts showing malice, consistent with the holding of the California Supreme Court in People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290.(2) "Gross negligence," as used in this section, may include, based on the totality of the circumstances, any of the following:(A) Participating in a sideshow pursuant to subparagraph (A) of subparagraph (2) of subdivision (i) of Section 23109 of the Vehicle Code.(B) Engaging in a motor vehicle speed contest pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 23109 of the Vehicle Code.(C) Speeding over 100 miles per hour.(f)(1) For purposes of determining sudden quarrel or heat of passion pursuant to subdivision (a), the provocation was not objectively reasonable if it resulted from the discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim's actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted nonforcible romantic or sexual advance towards the defendant, or if the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic or sexual relationship. Nothing in this section shall preclude the jury from considering all relevant facts to determine whether the defendant was in fact provoked for purposes of establishing subjective provocation.(2) For purposes of this subdivision, "gender" includes a person's gender identity and gender-related appearance and behavior regardless of whether that appearance or behavior is associated with the person's gender as determined at birth.Amended by Stats 2023 ch 311 (SB 883),s 3, eff. 1/1/2024.Amended by Stats 2022 ch 626 (SB 1472),s 3, eff. 1/1/2023.Amended by Stats 2014 ch 684 (AB 2501),s 1, eff. 1/1/2015.Amended by Stats 2006 ch 91 (AB 2559),s 2, eff. 1/1/2007.Stats 2022 ch 626 (SB 1472), which amended this section, shall be known, and may be cited, as Ryan's Law.