Tenn. R. Evid. 901
Advisory Commission Comments.
Section (a) makes the trial judge arbiter of authentication issues, as does the common law.
Subsection (b)(3) lets the trier of fact or an expert compare exemplars and questioned documents. The proposed draft corrects the mistake in Franklin v. Franklin, 90 Tenn. 44, 16 S.W. 557 (1891), where the Supreme Court construed T.C.A. § 24-7-108 to disallow purported forger's exemplar. See Amburn v. State, 553 S.W.2d 922 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977 ), criticizing Franklin.
Subsection (b)(4) simply makes common sense. Without drawing the boundaries of practical possibilities, the rule allows proof to the court of a myriad of distinctive characteristics that may convince the judge that a questioned document is authentic enough to let the jury consider it.
Subsection (b)(9) treats authentication of computer documents. All that the lawyer need do is introduce evidence satisfying the court that the computer system produces accurate information.