The judicial officer shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion. Whether or not a motion to suppress has been made initially in the District Court, the motion to suppress may be made in the Superior Court after an indictment has been returned or an information filed or an appeal has been filed from the District Court and the Superior Court will not be bound by any prior determination of the District Court. The motion shall be made before trial in the Superior Court unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, but the court in its discretion may entertain the motion at the trial or hearing.
In no event shall property which is otherwise subject to lawful detention be ordered returned.
R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 41
1972 Notes
This rule, which is fashioned in large part upon Federal Rule 41, is similar to existing Rhode Island statutory provisions governing search warrants. G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment), §§ 12-5-1 through 12-5-9.
Subdivision (a) is essentially the same as G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment),s 12-5-1 (Supp.1970). A 1969 amendment to this provision abolished the authority of clerks of the District Court to issue search warrants.
Subdivision (b) differs from both the federal rule and G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment), § 12-5-2 by the addition of paragraph (4) which permits a warrant to issue for the search of property "which is evidence of the commission of a crime." This additional ground for issuance of a warrant reflects the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967), which overruled the long standing line of cases prohibiting searches for and seizure of "mere evidence."
Subdivision (c), which is essentially the same as the federal rule, alters Rhode Island practice by permitting in all cases the affidavit in support of an application for a warrant to be made by any person having knowledge of the facts, rather than requiring a statement under oath from a law enforcement officer only. See G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment), § 12-5-3 (Supp.1970). Under the rule only those persons who are authorized by law may apply for a warrant and it may be directed only to those officers authorized to execute it. This continues existing practice under G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment), § 12-5-3 (Supp.1970). The final sentence of this subdivision, permitting a warrant to be executed at "any time of day or night" upon a showing of good cause, is a variation from the federal rule.
Subdivision (d) departs from the federal rule by requiring the warrant to be executed within seven days rather than ten; this conforms to G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment), § 12-5-5. The subdivision departs from the Rhode Island provision by requiring the return to be made "promptly" rather than within seven days from the date of service. Id.
Subdivision (e) is essentially the same as subdivision (f) of the federal rules; it is basically the same as G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment), § 12-5-6.
Subdivision (f), which provides for a motion to suppress, varies considerably from its federal counterpart. The significant difference is the authorization for the motion to suppress to be made either in the District Court or, after indictment or appeal, in the Superior Court, or in both courts. Where the motion is made initially in the District Court, that court's decision will not be binding on the Superior Court in the event the motion is made again in the latter court. This procedure reflects current practice which is necessitated by the concurrent criminal jurisdiction of the District and Superior Courts.
The rule also differs from its federal counterpart by the addition of subdivision (g) governing return of illegally seized property. Instead of providing for immediate return after entry of an order to suppress, the rule provides different requirements for return based upon which court enters the order and at what stage of the proceeding. Paragraph (1) of this subdivision restricts return by the District Court until either six months have elapsed without an indictment being returned, or the grand jury has reported its failure to return an indictment. By permitting the State to retain the property during this period and to use it in seeking an indictment, it assures the State a means of review of an adverse order of the District Court. At present, stenographic records of District Court proceedings are not made. Consequently, if the seized property were ordered returned upon entry of an order to suppress, the prosecution would be denied any effective review of that determination. On the other hand, a defendant who is unsuccessful on a motion to suppress in the District Court is able to renew his motion when the case reaches the Superior Court after indictment. The rule is designed to preserve the State's right to a determination of this issue in a court of record by allowing it to seek indictment and then have the defendant move again in the Superior Court. If, however, the State chooses not to pursue the matter, or the grand jury fails to indict, then the District Court may order return of the property.
Under paragraph (2) the Superior Court is to defer ruling on an application for return of property which, in pre-trial proceedings, it determines was illegally seized if the State pursues an interlocutory appeal under G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment), §§ 9-24-32 and 9-24-33. Under paragraph (3), however, if the Superior Court orders suppression during the trial it may order the property returned immediately.
In no event, whether before, during or after trial, is a court authorized to order return of property which is subject to forfeiture or which otherwise may be detained.
Finally, subdivision (h), which is identical to subdivision (g) of the federal rule, leaves in effect all special statutory provisions regulating search and seizure. These include, e.g., G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment), §§ 12-5.1-1 through 12-5.1-16 (Supp.1970) (interception of wire and oral communications); G.L.1956 (1968 Reenactment), § 19-26-13 (Supp.1970) (pawned property); G.L.1956 (1968 Reenactment), § 20-34-6 (wild birds or animals).
The proposed rule does not contain a provision comparable to G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment), § 12-5-4, which deals with surety for costs by the person seeking a warrant and exemption therefrom for law enforcement officers. The statutory requirements remain in effect.
1975 Notes
Rule 41 has been amended to add the term "information" where appropriate in subdivisions (f) and (g). In addition, paragraph (iii) has been added to subdivision (g) to provide for the return of property found to have been illegally seized when the Attorney General decides not to file an information or to seek an indictment.
See also 1975 Notes to Rule 7.