If a defendant appears in Superior Court without an attorney, the court shall advise the defendant of the defendant's right to an attorney and assign an attorney to represent the defendant at every stage of the proceeding unless the defendant is able to obtain the defendant's own counsel or elects to proceed without an attorney.
R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 44
1972 Notes
This rule differs somewhat from its federal counterpart; it is, however, essentially the same as existing Rhode Island practice. Under G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment), § 12-15-3, the court, in the ordinary situation, is to appoint the Public Defender to represent an indigent defendant. Where, however, appointment of the Public Defender is inappropriate or not feasible, the court has the authority under this rule to appoint other counsel for the defendant.
Federal Rule 44(a) assures a defendant's right to counsel at every stage of the proceeding, including initial appearance before the Commissioner. The Rhode Island rule deals with assignment in the Superior Court only, even though a defendant has a right to counsel in a felony case at every stage, including preliminary proceedings in the District Court. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961). However, since these rules deal principally with proceedings in the Superior Court, and since the statutory provision (G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment), § 12-15-3 ) for representation of indigent defendants by the Public Defender does not specifically apply to proceedings in the District Court, the matter of appointment of counsel in the District Court is dealt with by the rules of that court.
Subdivision (b) of the federal rule, governing procedure for assignment of counsel, was added in 1966 to reflect the procedures contained in the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. A similar provision is unnecessary in the Rhode Island rule.
The rule changes existing law in one material respect: it authorizes appointment of counsel not only where a defendant is indigent, but also where he is unable to obtain counsel even though he can afford to hire an attorney. This latter situation might arise because of the unpopularity of a defendant or the cause with which he is identified. In that circumstance the court would be obligated to assign counsel, but the defendant would not be entitled to receive the services free.
Although the Supreme Court of the United States has not dealt with the question of whether due process requires the appointment of counsel for indigents charged with non-felony offenses (see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963)), the Rhode Island Supreme Court recently held that all indigent defendants, other than those charged solely with petty offenses, are entitled to appointment of counsel. State v. Holliday, 109 R.I. 93, 280 A.2d 333 (1971). Under this rule all indigent defendants are entitled to appointment of counsel in the Superior Court--including appeals from the District Court in non-felony cases. This is consistent with current practice. See G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment), § 12-15-3.