Mass. Dist. Ct. & Mun. Ct. R. 6
Such an admission and waiver shall not be accepted by the court subject to any condition regarding the disposition of such violation or the disposition of any other probation violation or any pending criminal charge. A probationer shall not be entitled to withdraw an admission as of right after it has been accepted by the court.
Mass. Dist. Ct. & Mun. Ct. R. 6
Commentary to District Court Rule 5-2000
Probation revocation hearings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and for this reason a probationer need not be provided with the full panoply of constitutional protections applicable at a criminal trial. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973). Indeed, case law has sought to preserve the flexible, informal nature of probation revocation hearings. See Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606 (1985).
On the other hand, the probationer's liberty is potentially at stake in violation. proceedings, and therefore certain due process protections are required. As set forth for parole revocation in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and made applicable to probation revocation by Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), there are six such fundamental due process requirements: (1) written notice of the claimed violations of probation; (2) disclosure to the probationer of the evidence against him; (3) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (4) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless a hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (5) a neutral and detached hearing body, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (6) a written statement by the fact finder as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking probation.
This rule is intended to provide an orderly, relatively informal and flexible procedure for probation violation hearings, but one in which all required and appropriate due process safeguards are ensured.
General Requirements
Section (a) requires several fundamental procedural elements: a judicial procedure in open court, testimony under oath and the creation of a record. With regard to the record, Rule 211 of the Special Rules of the District Courts of Massachusetts, "Recording of Court Proceedings," requires that such proceedings be electronically recorded. Any District Court judge may conduct the hearing; the original sentencing judge is not required.
One of the six fundamental due process requirements for probation violation hearings, as provided in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), is "a neutral and detached hearing body." This requirement would appear to preclude the model by which a judge would take the initiative in the proceeding, as in an inquest, and the probation officer remain essentially passive in the role of a witness. Accordingly, the rule requires the probation officer, who is the "accuser," to present the case, with the judge remaining in the traditional neutral role. This does not prevent the judge from asking appropriate questions, nor is it inconsistent with the role of the probation officer as witness. The probation officer must provide evidence under oath and is subject to cross-examination.
It should be noted that in probation violation hearings the exclusionary rule does not apply if the police were unaware that the defendant was a probationer. Commonwealth v. Olsen, 405 Mass. 491 (1989) (evidence seized in violation of Fourth Amendment was admissible in probation violation proceeding, where police who seized evidence neither knew nor had reason to know of probationary status of person whose property was seized). There is no Massachusetts decision on whether the exclusionary rule applies in these proceedings where police are aware that the person is on probation.
Regarding the right to counsel, the rule goes beyond current law by providing the right to counsel regardless of whether the probationer faces the possibility of imprisonment if probation is revoked. See Commonwealth v. Faulkner, 418 Mass. 352 (1994) (probationer at probation violation hearing has right to counsel if revocation might result in imprisonment).
Two-step Proceeding
Section (b) imposes the critical requirement of a two-stage proceeding. As observed by the Supreme Court of the United States,
| the decision to revoke probation typically involves two distinct components: (1) a retrospective factual question whether the probationer has violated a condition of probation; and (2) a discretionary determination by the sentencing authority whether violation of a condition warrants revocation of probation. |
Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611 (1985), as quoted in Commonwealth v. Marvin, 417 Mass. 291, 295 (1994) (Liacos, C.J., dissenting).
| This dichotomy is further reflected in Massachusetts law: |
| At the revocation hearing, the judge must determine, as a factual matter, whether the defendant has violated the conditions of his probation. If the judge determines that the defendant is in violation, he can either revoke the probation and sentence the defendant or, if appropriate, modify the terms of his probation. |
Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 111 (1990).
This distinction is an important one. The factual decision that a probation violation has occurred in no way compels an order of revocation. The court has wide dispositional latitude if a violation is found. See Rule 7(d) [now Rule 8(d) ]. However, even if an alleged violation is relatively minor and, in all likelihood will not warrant revocation, it is important that it be adjudicated. It is essential for effective probation that a record of compliance and noncompliance with probation orders be maintained.
In addition, the distinction between the factual determination and the disposition must be maintained because different legal requirements are invoked. For example, the factual issue of whether an alleged violation has occurred must be decided based on a preponderance of the evidence, Commonwealth v. Holmgren, 421 Mass. 224 (1995), while the dispositional decision is a matter of judicial discretion. McHoul v. Commonwealth, 365 Mass. 465, 469-70 (1974). Similarly, the "seriousness" of the alleged violation is irrelevant to whether it occurred, while it is relevant to the question of appropriate disposition.
Adjudication of Violation
Section (c) sets out the basic requirements for how the first step of the hearing, adjudication of the alleged violation, should proceed. It ensures both parties the right to present evidence and cross-examine adverse witnesses. The court has some discretion in limiting crossexamination involving irrelevant or redundant questioning. See Commonwealth v. Odoardi, 397 Mass. 28, 34 (1986). Section (c) also entitles both parties to make a closing statement. In Commonwealth v. Marvin, 417 Mass. 291, 295 (1994), the court declined "to impose a universal due process requirement that a defendant in a probation revocation hearing has an absolute right to make a closing argument." However, that case goes onto state that it would be a "better practice" to permit a probationer to present at least a brief closing argument. The provision in this rule is intended to ensure that this better practice is provided for both parties.
Disposition
Section (d) provides that both parties maybe heard regarding disposition, assuming the court finds that one or more alleged violations was committed. The court's dispositional options are provided in Rule 7 [now Rule 8 ]. The probationer's right to be heard and present evidence regarding disposition implicate due process considerations. See Commonwealth v. Odoardi, 397 Mass. 28 (1986).
Continuances
Section (e) sets out certain requirements for continuances. It expressly eliminates "tracking," i.e., continuing a probation violation hearing to await disposition of the criminal case involving the charge that is also the alleged probation violation. The reason for this rule is that, on the one hand, there is no basis in law or in terms of fairness to the probationer for such a continuance, and, on the other hand, proceeding without delay on the alleged violation is of great importance in terms of the primary goals of probation, which are rehabilitation of the probationer and protection of the public. Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 402 Mass. 789, 795 (1988) (citations omitted). The rule does provide for continuances where good cause is shown and the reason for the continuance is stated by the judge and set forth on the record.
The Supreme Judicial Court has long made clear that there is no prerequisite that the probationer be convicted of a criminal charge to permit that criminal conduct to be used as the basis of a probation revocation.
| If the act alleged to be a violation of probation is made the subject of a criminal complaint, the commencement of the criminal prosecution does not preclude the revocation of the earlier probation nor does it require that the revocation proceedings be deferred until the completion of the new criminal proceeding. |
Rubera v. Commonwealth, 371 Mass. 177, 181 (1976), and cases cited.
After analyzing the federal constitutional law relevant to the point and the precedents from other states, the Court in Rubera went on to explain the policy reasons that favor proceeding with revocation proceedings and not awaiting the outcome of the criminal case:
| We are aware that the practice which was followed in revoking the petitioner's probation in this case was not in accord with the procedure suggested by the ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Probation §5.3, at 62-63 (Approved Draft 1970), that "[a] revocation proceeding based solely upon commission of another crime ordinarily should not be initiated prior to the disposition of that charge." [citation omitted] That standard seems to impose an unreasonable and unfair burden on law. enforcement authorities by placing them in the dilemma of having to decide between (a) having to forgo criminal prosecution of a person who is on probation and who appears to have committed another offense until they have first pursued steps to revoke his probation on the basis of his conduct in ordinary proceedings without reliance on any subsequent criminal conviction, or (b) having to start criminal prosecution promptly on the later offense and then being prevented from trying to revolve his earlier probation until after the later prosecution has run its full course which, in the present state of our criminal dockets, would amount to arming the defendant with the weapon of potential delay with which he could forestall termination of the proceeding by endless appeals. We decline to impose the burden of such a choice on either probation officers or prosecutors. |
Rubes v. Commonwealth, 371 Mass. at 184-85 (1976).
See also, Commonwealth v. Holmgren, 421 Mass. 224 (1995), which held that a probation violation hearing may proceed on a charge of a new crime, even if the defendant has been acquitted of that crime, because the standard of proof at a probation hearing is lower than the standard at a criminal trial. In other words, an acquittal, or the possibility of an acquittal, is irrelevant to a probation violation proceeding because failure to convict under the "reasonable doubt" standard neither precludes nor is inconsistent with a finding of a probation violation under the "preponderance of the evidence" standard.
The only legal relationship between a probation violation hearing and a criminal prosecution for the same alleged criminal conduct is that, if the criminal case does go forward before the probation hearing and results in a conviction, that conviction will be evidence of a probation violation and no independent finding of the underlying facts is required of the judge. Commonwealth v. Maggio, 414 Mass. 193 (1993).
District Attorney Participation
Section (f) addresses the subject of participation by the District Attorney. Rules 3 and 4 require the court to provide a copy of every Notice of Probation Violation and Hearing to the District Attorney. Section (f) of this rule is intended to clarify the involvement of the District Attorney in those cases where he or she decides to participate, consistent with the statutory provisions of G.L. c. 279, § 3.
It should be noted that as a constitutional matter, probation functions are within the judicial branch, and the office of the District Attorney is considered within the executive branch. Commonwealth v. Tate, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 446, 447-48 (1993), and cases cited. Under the Massachusetts Constitution, pt. 1, art. 30, the branches must maintain a separation of governmental powers.
| That separateness does not, however, lead to the conclusion that a district attorney's office may not assist the probation service in presenting evidence in support of a position that the probation service had decided upon. |
| * * * |
| [P]robation officers are only aided, not interfered with, when district attorneys, upon invitation, conduct examination of witnesses and present evidence. |
Id. at 448, and cases cited.
Thus the right of District Attorneys to present evidence and witnesses, and to examine and cross-examine witnesses at these proceedings would appear to be constitutionally acceptable as long as it does not fundamentally interfere with probation.
Commentary to District/Municipal Courts Rule 6-2015
Section (a) differs from its antecedent, 2000 District Court Rule 5, in the deletion of the last portion of the first sentence. This provision referred to the permissible "flexibility and informality" of violation hearings. While accurate, this reference was deemed unnecessary and the possible source of inappropriate informality.
Section (a) also contains a requirement that a waiver by a probationer of the right to counsel at a probation violation hearing requires a judicial determination that such waiver is being made knowingly and voluntarily.
Section (e) contains a different last sentence than the 2000 District Court Rule. The new sentence is meant to clarify and emphasize the prohibition in the rule against "tracking," i.e., the delay of a probation violation proceeding in order to await the disposition of a criminal charge when the criminal behavior involved constitutes the alleged probation violation. The disposition of an underlying criminal case is irrelevant to the issue at the probation violation hearing, that is, whether a violation can be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The rationale for this prohibition and the case law on which it is based are set forth in the original commentary to this rule. The rule also has been amended to expressly prohibit "tracking" as a means of delaying dispositions as well as hearings. See also Rule 8(d). The caption of section (e) also is different.
Section (f) is modified from the 2000 District Court Rule to clarify its meaning.
Section (g) is new. It addresses the procedure whereby a probationer offers to admit to an alleged violation. The rule refers to the two components of such an admission. First, the probationer must admit. to the commission of one or more of the violations charged in the notice of violation, and second, the probationer must waive the right to a violation hearing. See Commonwealth v. Sayyid, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 479, 489, rev. denied, 470 Mass. 1103 (2014). Although the term "stipulation" is commonly used, the rule uses the term "admission" because it more accurately and appropriately describes this legal event.
Section (g) also provides that, unlike a guilty plea or admission to sufficient facts to a criminal charge, an admission to a probation violation may not be accompanied by conditions which, if not accepted by the court, would allow the probationer to withdraw the admission. In other words, there is no equivalency to the "defendant-capped plea" which can be tendered in the context of a criminal proceeding. The court may allow a probationer to withdraw a probation violation admission based on the court's intended disposition as a matter of its discretion. The probationer may not withdraw an admission as a matter of right once an admission is submitted and accepted by the court. A defendant would be entitled to withdraw an admission that was not made knowing and voluntarily. Sayyid, 86 Mass. App. Ct. at 490-92.
The prohibition in section (g) against "conditioned" probation violation admissions also precludes admissions conditioned by proposed dispositions "agreed to" by the probation department or by a prosecutor. Such an agreement does not bind the court or permit the withdrawal of the admission if the court's disposition is other than that "agreed upon" by a probation officer or prosecutor. The court may consult with probation regarding the disposition after finding a probation violation. See Rule 8(d). But for probation violation admissions there is no equivalent to the tender of criminal guilty pleas which may include dispositional terms agreed to by the prosecution.
It should also be noted that section (g) does not require the conduct of a specific colloquy as the means by which the court is to determine that a probationer's admission to a violation is being made knowingly and voluntarily. The colloquy required for the acceptance of a guilty plea to a criminal charge is not required for the acceptance of a probation violation admission. See Sayyid, 86 Mass. App. Ct. at 488-89, 492-93. Rather, the court is left to conduct such questioning of the probationer and his or her counsel as it deems adequate for this determination. See Sayyid, 86 Mass. App. Ct. at 489, 492-93.
Section (g) does not require that a probationer's admission to a violation and waiver of the right to a hearing be set forth on a particular form. However, an approved form is available for this purpose on the Internet at www.mass. gov/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/districtcourt/forms.html. At a minimum, the court's questioning of a probationer on this issue and the probationer's responses should be memorialized on the audio recording of the proceedings, and the facts that the questioning occurred and that the court accepted the admission and waiver should be entered on the court's written record.
Section (h) is new. It refers to the court's authority to secure the presence of a probationer pending the commencement and completion of a probation violation hearing. This rule addresses the problem of a probationer who, having arrived in court for a violation hearing while not in custody (in response to a notice of violation or otherwise), simply decides to exit the courtroom and the court house. This can occur if a probationer, while awaiting his or her hearing, observes a hearing that results in a finding of violation, revocation, and immediate execution of sentence.
The basis of the court's authority to secure the presence of a probationer, which includes custody, if necessary, pending the conduct of his or her hearing is threefold:
1. First, as a matter of constitutional law, a person on probation has a conditional liberty interest. The restricted scope of this liberty interest is perhaps best illustrated by the statutory authority of a probation officer to issue an arrest warrant or to arrest a probationer without a warrant to bring him or her before the court to answer to a possible probation violation. G.L. c. 279, § 3. If a probationer maybe arrested by a probation officer without a warrant to be brought to court on an alleged violation, then it would appear to follow that a probationer charged with a violation may be held by the court for good cause upon his or her non-custodial arrival in court for a hearing on that alleged violation.
2. Such a custody order merely enforces the existing order requiring the probationer's presence at the court. A probationer who has arrived in court in response to a notice of violation has been formally accused in that notice of one or more specific probation violations and ordered to appear in court. The notice informs the probationer that he or she is "HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: YOU MUST APPEAR IN THIS COURT" on a specific date at a specific time. Thus, the probationer is under court order to be in court for the conduct of the violation hearing. He or she is not free to leave. Custody of the probationer pending the conduct and completion of the hearing ensures compliance with that court order.
3. The authority of the court to secure the presence of a probationer for the conduct of a scheduled hearing also has a constitutional basis in the court's inherent power. "Of necessity, a judge's inherent power must encompass the authority to exercise `physical control over his courtroom.' " Commonwealth v. O'Neil, 418 Mass. 760, 764 (1994) (quoting Chief Admin. Justzce of the Trial Ct. v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 404 Mass. 53, 57 (1989)); see id. (" `[t]he power of the judiciary to control its own proceedings, the conduct of participants, the actions of officers of the court and the environment of the court is a power absolutely necessary for a court to function effectively and do its job of administering justice' ") (quoting Chief Admin. Justice of the Trial Ct., 404 Mass. at 57). Perhaps nothing could be viewed as more fundamental or essential to the court's ability to function than the power to prevent a probationer who has been ordered to appear for a hearing on an alleged violation from simply leaving the .court prior to the conduct of that hearing.
In order to secure the presence of the probationer, the rule requires that the court have "good cause," that is, some reason to believe that the probationer may attempt to leave the courtroom to avoid the proceeding (e.g., the probationer's in-court behavior, history of defaults, and history of previous probation violations; the seriousness of the underlying crime; the potential sentence if revocation is ordered; etc.).
The custody provision in this rule is relevant only when the violation hearing will proceed that same day. If a probationer arrives at court and is seen as a flight risk, but the actual hearing will be scheduled for a later date, the probation department may immediately request a detention hearing under Rule 5 (formerly Rule 8 ). That rule also provides for custody of a probationer prior to the conduct of such a hearing. If detention is ordered, it will result in the probationer's continued custody until the conduct and completion of the violation hearing.
.