Me. R. Evid. 801
The statement must be considered but does not by itself establish the declarant's authority under (C), the existence or scope of the relationship under (D), or the existence of the conspiracy or participation in it under (E).
Me. R. Evid. 801
Maine Restyling Note [November 2014]
Maine Rule 801 is substantially similar Federal Rule 801, except that the Maine Rule is structured somewhat differently with respect to the admissibility of prior consistent statements. Also, Maine excludes from Rule 801(b)(2) "in-house" statements made by an agent, employee, or authorized person. These distinctions have been carried over as part of the restyling process.
Federal Committee Restyling Note
The language of Rule 801 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.
Statements falling under the hearsay exclusion provided by Rule 801(d)(2) are no longer referred to as "admissions" in the title to the subdivision. The term "admissions" is confusing because not all statements covered by the exclusion are admissions in the colloquial sense-a statement can be within the exclusion even if it "admitted" nothing and was not against the party's interest when made. The term "admissions" also raises confusion in comparison with the Rule 804(b)(3) exception for declarations against interest. No change in application of the exclusion is intended.
Advisory Committee Note - August 2018
This amendment affects both the admissibility and the probative effect of a prior consistent statement. It is designed to bring Maine Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) into conformity with the corresponding federal rule as amended in 2014. With the change, a fact-finder can now consider an admissible prior consistent statement both for its rehabilitative and substantive effect.
Under former Maine Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1), a prior consistent statement could be admitted only to rebut an express or implied attack on witness credibility based on "recent fabrication or improper influence or motive." Under the new rule language, a prior consistent statement is admissible when relevant to rehabilitate a declarant's credibility when attacked on any ground.
In the past, a Maine jury could consider a prior consistent statement only as evidence of the credibility of the witness, and not as evidence of the truth of the underlying substantive matter. See M.R. Evid. 801 Advisers' Note to former M.R. Evid. 801 (February 2, 1976). On the other hand, Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) has been construed to allow prior consistent statements to be considered as substantive evidence as well as rehabilitative of credibility.
The existing requirement that a prior consistent statement offered to rebut an attack on credibility based on recent fabrication or improper influence or motive must have been made prior to the time of the asserted fabrication or improper influence or motive is not affected by this change. On the other hand, if the prior consistent statement is relevant to rebut an attack on credibility on some other ground, there is no absolute requirement that it antedate a prior inconsistent statement in order to be admissible under this Rule. It would be admissible under the amended Rule under any circumstances in which it would be relevant to rehabilitate the credibility of the witness.
The following excerpt from the Advisory Committee Note to the 2014 amendment to the Federal Rule also applies to the revised Maine rule:
Though the original Rule 801(d)(1)(B) provided for substantive use of certain prior consistent statements, the scope of that Rule was limited. The Rule covered only those consistent statements that were offered to rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper motive or influence. The Rule did not, for example, provide for substantive admissibility of consistent statements that are probative to explain what otherwise appears to be an inconsistency in the witness's testimony. Nor did it cover consistent statements that would be probative to rebut a charge of faulty memory. Thus, the Rule left any prior consistent statements potentially admissible only for the limited purpose of rehabilitating a witness's credibility. The original Rule also led to some conflict in the cases; some courts distinguished between substantive and rehabilitative use for prior consistent statements, while others appeared to hold that prior consistent statements must be admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) or not at all.
The amendment retains the requirement set forth in Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995): that under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), a consistent statement offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication o[r] improper influence or motive must have been made before the alleged fabrication or improper influence or motive arose. The intent of the amendment is to extend substantive effect to consistent statements that rebut other attacks on a witness-such as the charges of inconsistency or faulty memory.
The amendment does not change the traditional and well-accepted limits on bringing prior consistent statements before the factfinder for credibility purposes. It does not allow impermissible bolstering of a witness. As before, prior consistent statements under the amendment may be brought before the factfinder only if they properly rehabilitate a witness whose credibility has been attacked. As before, to be admissible for rehabilitation, a prior consistent statement must satisfy the strictures of Rule 403. As before, the trial court has ample discretion to exclude prior consistent statements that are cumulative accounts of an event. The amendment does not make any consistent statement admissible that was not admissible previously-the only difference is that prior consistent statements otherwise admissible for rehabilitation are now admissible substantively as well.