Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 303
Committee Comments
(March 16, 2007)
Rule 303(a)(2) is intended to address concerns raised in cases such as John G. Phillips & Assoc. v. Brown, 197 Ill. 2d 337 (2001). Subparagraph (a)(2) protects the rights of an appellant who has filed a "premature" notice of appeal by making the notice of appeal effective when the order denying a postjudgment motion or resolving a still-pending separate claim is entered. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i), (a)(4)(B)(ii). The question whether a particular "claim" is a separate claim for purposes of Rule 304(a) is often a difficult one. See Dewan v. Ford Motor Co., 343 Ill. App. 3d 1062 (2003); In re Marriage of King, 208 Ill. 2d 332 (2003); Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church of Hinsdale, 138 Ill. 2d 458 (1990); Physicians Insurance Exchange v. Jennings, 316 Ill. App. 3d 443 (2000); F.H. Prince & Co., Inc. v. Towers Financial Corp., 266 Ill. App. 3d 977 (1994); Servio v. Paul Roberts Auto Sales, Inc., 211 Ill. App. 3d 751 (1991). Subparagraph (a)(2) protects the appellant who files a notice of appeal prior to the resolution of a still-pending claim that is determined to be a separate claim under Rule 304(a). Note that under subparagraph (a)(2), there is no need to file a second notice of appeal where the postjudgment order simply denies the appellant's postjudgment motion. However, where the postjudgment order grants new or different relief than the judgment itself, or resolves a separate claim, a second notice of appeal is necessary to preserve an appeal from such order.