Sup. Ct. R. D.C. 23
COMMENT TO 2019 AMENDMENTS
This rule incorporates the 2018 federal amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, but maintains the local distinction in section (f) addressing appeals.
COMMENT TO 2017 AMENDMENTS
This rule is identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, as amended in 2007 and 2009, except that 1) language in subsection (c)(2)(B)(v) clarifies that there is a deadline for requesting exclusion from the class; and 2) in accordance with Ford v. ChartOne, 834 A.2d 875 (D.C. 2003), section (f) has been modified to indicate that the filing of an appeal is governed by D.C. Code § 11-721(d) (2012 Repl.) and the appellate rules. The provisions allowing the court to shift the cost of notice, which were unique to the Superior Court rule, have been deleted.
If a class action is settled and residual funds remain after all identified members of the class have received their proper distribution, the court may turn to conventional principles of equity to resolve the case. Traditionally, there are four ways by which a court may distribute the residual funds: 1) pro rata distribution to the class members; 2) reversion to the defendant; 3) escheat to the government; and 4) cy pres distribution. See, e.g., Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 119 F.3d 703, 706 (8th Cir. 1997). It is generally understood that "neither party has a legal right to the unclaimed funds." Id. See also Diamond Chem. Co. v. Akzo Nobel Chems. B.V., 517 F. Supp. 2d 212, 217 (D.D.C. 2007) . When determining which method of distribution is most appropriate, the court's choice "should be guided by the objectives of the underlying statute and the interests of the silent class members." Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1307 (9th Cir. 1990).
In the case of a cy pres distribution of the residual funds, the court should first consider whether the funds can be distributed in a manner that is closely related to the original purpose. See Superior Beverage Co. v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 477, 477-80 (N.D. Ill. 1993) . If no such distribution is possible, the court may use its equitable powers to consider "other public interest purposes by educational, charitable, and other public service organizations," including "charitable donations... to support non-profit provision of pro bono legal services." Jones v. Nat'l Distillers, 56 F. Supp. 2d 355, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Superior Beverage Co., 827 F. Supp. at 478-79) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court may solicit applications for cy pres grants by public notice and, if necessary, hold hearings to give the applicants a chance to be heard. Alternatively, the court may allocate some or all of the residual funds to an organization such as the D.C. Bar Foundation or other local bar associations that have already implemented procedures for the distribution of funds to public service organizations.
COMMENT
Rule 23 is identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 except for certain changes in subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2) which specifically authorize the judge to shift the costs of notice to the defendant, in whole or in part, under limited circumstances. In order to make this determination relating to costs of notice, the judge is further authorized to conduct a hearing, pursuant to Rule 23 -I(c)(3), at which all relevant factors, including the likelihood of success on the merits, can be considered. The amendment, while essentially retaining the previous Superior Court procedure, was made necessary by Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974) which held that under the language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, the costs of notice could not be shifted to the defendant, except perhaps in cases involving a fiduciary, and, the Court could not make a preliminary determination of the merits of a case. The specific changes are the deletion of the phrase, "As soon as practicable..." in the 1st sentence of subsection (c)(1) and the addition of the last sentence in subsection (c)(2).