Conn. R. Evid. 7-1
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness may not testify in the form of an opinion, unless the opinion is rationally based on the perception of the witness and is helpful to a clear understanding of the testimony of the witness or the determination of a fact in issue.
Conn. Code. Evid. 7-1
COMMENTARY
Section 7-1 sets forth standards for the admissibility of nonexpert opinion testimony. Section 7-1 is based on the traditional rule that witnesses who did not testify as experts generally were required to limit their testimony to an account of the facts and, with but a few exceptions, could not state an opinion or conclusion. E.g., Robinson v. Faulkner, 163 Conn. 365, 371-72, 306 A.2d 857 (1972); Stephanofsky v. Hill, 136 Conn. 379, 382, 71 A.2d 560 (1950); Sydleman v. Beckwith, 43 Conn. 9, 11 (1875). Section 7-1 attempts to preserve the common-law preference for testimony of facts but recognizes there may be situations in which opinion testimony will be more helpful to the fact finder than a rendition of the observed facts only.
In some situations, a witness may not be able to convey sufficiently his or her sensory impressions to the fact finder by a mere report of the facts upon which those impressions were based and, instead, may use language in the form of a summary characterization that is effectively an opinion about his or her observation.See State v. McGinnis, 158 Conn. 124, 130-31, 256 A.2d 241 (1969). As a matter of practical necessity, this type of nonexpert opinion testimony may be admitted because the facts upon which the witness' opinion is based "are so numerous or so complicated as to be incapable of separation, or so evanescent in character [that] they cannot be fully recollected or detailed, or described, or reproduced so as to give the trier the impression they gave the witness . . . .'' Atwood v. Atwood, 84 Conn. 169, 173, 79 A. 59 (1911); accord State v. Spigarolo, 210 Conn. 359, 371, 556 A.2d 112, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 933, 110 S. Ct. 322, 107 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1989); Stephanofsky v. Hill, supra, 136 Conn. 382; Sydleman v. Beckwith, supra, 43 Conn. 12.
Some of the matters upon which nonexpert opinion testimony has been held admissible include: the market value of property where the witness is the owner of the property; Misisco v. LaMaita, 150 Conn. 680, 684, 192 A.2d 891 (1963); the appearance of persons or things; State v. McGinnis, 158 Conn. 124, 130-31, 256 A.2d 241 (1969); MacLaren v. Bishop, 113 Conn. 312, 313-14, 155 A.2d 210 (1931); sound; Johnson v. Newell, 160 Conn. 269, 277-78, 278 A.2d 776 (1971); the speed of an automobile; Acampora v. Asselin, 179 Conn. 425, 427, 426 A.2d 797 (1980); Stephanofsky v. Hill, supra, 136 Conn. 382-83; physical or mental condition of others; Atwood v. Atwood, supra, 84 Conn. 172-74; and safety of common outdoor objects, such as a fence, or the state of repair of a road. See Czajkowski v. YMCA of Metropolitan Hartford, Inc., 149 Conn. App. 436, 446-47, 89 A.3d 904 (2014) (citing cases). In other contexts, however, nonexpert opinion testimony has been held inadmissible. See, e.g., Pickel v. Automated Waste Disposal, Inc., 65 Conn. App. 176, 190, 782 A.2d 231 (2001) (trial court properly excluded lay opinion regarding cause of accident).
Whether nonexpert opinion testimony is admissible is a preliminary question for the court. See Section 1-3(a); see also, e.g., Turbert v. Mather Motors, Inc., 165 Conn. 422, 434, 334 A.2d 903 (1973) (admissibility of nonexpert opinion testimony within court's discretion).