Conn. R. Evid. 2-1
Conn. Code. Evid. 2-1
COMMENTARY
(a) Scope of section.
Section 2-1 addresses the principle of judicial notice, which relieves a party from producing formal evidence to prove a fact. E.g., Beardsley v. Irving, 81 Conn. 489, 491, 71 A. 580 (1909); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Napert-Boyer Partnership, 40 Conn. App. 434, 441, 671 A.2d 1303 (1996). Section 2-1 deals only with judicial notice of "adjudicative'' facts. Adjudicative facts are the facts of a particular case or those facts that relate to the activities or events giving rise to the particular controversy. See Moore v. Moore, 173 Conn. 120, 122, 376 A.2d 1085 (1977); K. Davis, "Judicial Notice,'' 55 Colum. L. Rev. 945, 952 (1955).
This section does not deal with judicial notice of "legislative'' facts, i.e., facts that do not necessarily concern the parties in a particular case but that courts consider in determining the constitutionality or interpretation of statutes or issues of public policy upon which the application of a common-law rule depends. See Moore v. Moore, supra, 173 Conn. 122; K. Davis, supra, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 952. The Code leaves judicial notice of legislative facts to common law.
(b) Taking of judicial notice.
Subsection (b) expresses the common-law view that "[c]ourts are not bound to take judicial notice of matters of fact.'' DeLuca v. Park Commissioners, 94 Conn. 7, 10, 107 A. 611 (1919).
(c) Kinds of facts.
Subsection (c) is consistent with common-law principles of judicial notice. See, e.g., West Hartford v. Freedom of Information Commission, 218 Conn. 256, 264, 588 A.2d 1368 (1991); State v. Tomanelli, 153 Conn. 365, 369, 216 A.2d 625 (1966).
Both the fact that raw pork must be cooked thoroughly to kill parasites; see Silverman v. Swift & Co., 141 Conn. 450, 458, 107 A.2d 277 (1954); and the fact that the normal period of human gestation is nine months; Melanson v. Rogers, 38 Conn. Sup. 484, 490-91, 451 A.2d 825 (1982); constitute examples of facts subject to judicial notice under category (1). Examples of category (2) facts include: scientific tests or principles; State v. Tomanelli, supra, 153 Conn. 370-71; geographical data; e.g., Nesko Corp. v. Fontaine, 19 Conn. Sup. 160, 162, 110 A.2d 631 (1954); historical facts; Gannon v. Gannon, 130 Conn. 449, 452, 35 A.2d 204 (1943); and times and dates. E.g., Patterson v. Dempsey, 152 Conn. 431, 435, 207 A.2d 739 (1965).
Within category (2), the court may take judicial notice of the existence, content and legal effect of a court file, or of a specific entry in a court file if that specific entry is brought to the attention of the court, subject to the provisions of Section 2-2. Judicial notice of a court file or a specific entry in a court file does not establish the truth of any fact stated in that court file. The rules governing hearsay and its exceptions determine the admissibility of court records for the truth of their content. See Fox v. Schaeffer, 131 Conn. 439, 447, 41 A.2d 46 (1944); see also O'Connor v. Larocque, 302 Conn. 562, 568 n.6, 31 A.3d 1 (2011).
Although a judicially noticed fact is one not subject to reasonable dispute, the trier of fact in a criminal case is not required to accept the fact as conclusive. State v. Tomanelli, supra, 153 Conn. 369; cf. Fed. R. Evid. 201(f). Other parties may offer evidence in disproof of a fact judicially noticed in a criminal case. See State v. Tomanelli, supra, 369. In a civil case, the jury must accept the noticed fact as conclusive. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(f). The effect of this rule is to reject the dicta to the contrary found in Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Napert- Boyer Partnership, supra, 40 Conn. App. 441, and to bring the rule into harmony with the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Connecticut Civil Jury Instructions.
(d) Time of taking judicial notice.
Subsection (d) adheres to common-law principles. Drabik v. East Lyme, 234 Conn. 390, 398, 662 A.2d 118 (1995); State v. Allen, 205 Conn. 370, 382, 533 A.2d 559 (1987). The Code does not govern the taking of judicial notice on appeal.