Colo. R. Evid. 801
The following definitions apply under this article:
(Federal Rule Identical.)
(Federal Rule Identical.)
(Federal Rule Substantially Identical, Except as to Rule 801(d)(1)(A) )
CRE 801
Committee Comment to (a)
The change reflected in the Colorado rule was necessary, in the minds of the Committee members, because the Committee believed that the word "assertion" was extremely unclear; the change is felt to be more precise.
Committee Comment to (d)
The last sentence of this Rule was added to track a corresponding change in F.R.E. 801(d)(2).
.Annotation Law reviews. For article, "Hearsay in Criminal Cases Under the Colorado Rules of Evidence: An Overview", see 50 U. Colo. L. Rev. 227 (1979). For article, "Admissibility of Prior Testimony", see 11 Colo. Law. 398 (1982). For article, "Confrontation and Co-conspirators in Colorado", see 14 Colo. Law. 385 (1985). For article, "Mythological Rules of Evidence", see 16 Colo. Law. 1218 (1987). For article, "Prior Inconsistent Statements", see 17 Colo. Law. 1977 (1988). For article, "Rules 801 and 613: Evidentiary Uses of Pleadings Filed in Other Cases", see 21 Colo. Law. 2389 (1992). For article, "Impeachment", see 22 Colo. Law. 1207 (1993). For article, "Rules 801 and 804: The Admissibility of Out-of-Court Statements Made by Present and Former Employees", see 26 Colo. Law. 77 (September 1997). For article, "Rule 801(c): Admissibility of a Testifying Witness's Extra-Judicial Statements", see 30 Colo. Law. 57 (May 2001). For article, "Tips for Working With Evidence in Domestic Relations Cases", see 31 Colo. Law. 87 (June 2002). Purpose of hearsay rule. The constitutional right of confrontation and the hearsay rule stem from the same roots, and are designed to protect similar interests based on the premise that testimony is much more reliable when given under oath at trial, where the declarant is subject to cross-examination and the jury may observe his demeanor. People v. Dement, 661 P.2d 675 (Colo. 1983); People v. Nunez, 698 P.2d 1376 (Colo. App. 1984), aff'd, 737 P.2d 422 (Colo. 1987). Electronically stored information on cellular telephone is not hearsay, and trial court properly admitted telephone into evidence. Stored information on cellular telephone is not considered hearsay because it is neither a "declarant" nor a "statement", as specified within the meaning of this rule. People v. Buckner, 228 P.3d 245 (Colo. App. 2009). Testimonial hearsay is admissible only upon a showing of the unavailability of the declarant and a prior opportunity for cross-examination of the declarant by the defendant. Compan v. People, 121 P.3d 876 (Colo. 2005). Test for admission of nontestimonial hearsay. Courts should continue to determine whether admission of hearsay deemed to be nontestimonial under the United States supreme court's decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), comports with the constitutional right of confrontation by applying the two-part test established in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), and applied in Colorado in People v. Dement, 661 P.2d 675 (Colo. 1983). That test requires that, for hearsay admitted in a trial to be constitutionally compliant, (1)the prosecution must either produce the declarant or show that the declarant is unavailable for trial, and, (2)if the declarant is unavailable, the out-of-court statements must bear sufficient indicia of reliability. People v. Compan, 100 P.3d 533 (Colo. App. 2004), aff'd, 121 P.3d 876 (Colo. 2005); People v. Garrison, 109 P.3d 1009 (Colo. App. 2004). Victim's nontestimonial statements are inadmissible where prosecution fails to show victim's unavailability. People v. Couillard, 131 P.3d 1146 (Colo. App. 2005). Where statements by victim were not testimonial, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) does not require defendant to have an opportunity to cross-examine victim. People v. Gash, 165 P.3d 779 (Colo. App. 2006). Translation as hearsay. An interpreter serves as a language conduit for the declarant. Hence, admission of translated testimony is appropriate when the circumstances assure its reliability. Relevant factors include: (1) Whether actions after the translated conversation were consistent with the translated statements; (2) whether the interpreter had qualifications to interpret and language skill; (3) whether the interpreter had any motive to mislead or distort; and (4) which party supplied the interpreter. People v. Hinojos-Mendoza, 140 P.3d 30 (Colo. App. 2005), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 169 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2007). Hearsay statements are presumptively unreliable since the declarant is not present to explain the statement in context nor subjected to cross examination. Blecha v. People, 962 P.2d 931 (Colo. 1998). Statement not excluded where relevance goes to fact that statement made, not its truth. Where it is the fact that the statement was made, and not its truth or falsity, that is relevant, it is error to exclude the statement. Conrad v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662 (Colo. 1982); Hansen v. Lederman, 759 P.2d 810 (Colo. App. 1988). Prior statements admissible to create fact dispute. Where the record indicates that a party would be available as a witness at the trial of the matter and would be subject to cross-examination, her prior statements would be admissible to create a fact dispute to be resolved by the trier of fact. People in Interest of K.A.J., 635 P.2d 921 (Colo. App. 1981). Entire statement not admitted to rehabilitate testimony where only portion relevant. The trial court does not err in refusing to admit an entire tape recording of a statement made by the defendant after his arrest for the purpose of rehabilitating his testimony, when only a portion of the recording was relevant to rebut the prior inconsistent statement used by the prosecution for impeachment purposes. People v. DelGuidice, 199 Colo. 41, 606 P.2d 840 (1979). However, when victim is impeached with respect to credibility, all prior consistent statements are admissible, not just those that are directly related to specific facts in question. People v. Tyler, 745 P.2d 257 (Colo. App. 1987); People v. Halstead, 881 P.2d 401 (Colo. App. 1994); People v. Elie, 148 P.3d 359 (Colo. App. 2006). Colorado permits an extrajudicial identification of a defendant as substantive evidence and as an exception to the hearsay rule. Kurtz v. People, 177 Colo. 306, 494 P.2d 97 (1972). Furthermore, this exception is extended to extrajudicial identifications heard or observed by third person. Kurtz v. People, 177 Colo. 306, 494 P.2d 97 (1972). Reasonable to expect person hearing accusatory statement to deny same. Underlying the adoptive admission exemption from normal hearsay concepts is the general assumption that it would be reasonable to expect any person who hears a statement accusing him or her of misconduct to deny such statement. People v. Green, 629 P.2d 1098 (Colo. App. 1981); People v. Pappadiakis, 705 P.2d 983 (Colo. App. 1985), aff'd sub nom. Peltz v. People, 728 P.2d 1271 (Colo. 1986). Prerequisites to admission of adoptive admission statement. Before admitting any adoptive admission statement into evidence, a trial court must determine preliminarily, normally by means of an in camera hearing, that the party offering the statement can produce evidence to support the factual conclusions that the defendant heard and understood the statement, had knowledge of the contents thereof, and was free from any emotional or physical impediment which would inhibit an immediate response. People v. Green, 629 P.2d 1098 (Colo. App. 1981). Adoption of accusatory statement through silence closely scrutinized. The assumption that a defendant adopts an accusatory statement through his silence is a weak one, and evidence of such statements must be scrutinized with special concern in criminal cases, where there are constitutional limits to the permissible inferences from a defendant's silence. People v. Green, 629 P.2d 1098 (Colo. App. 1981). Remarks by any accomplices in presence of defendant are admissible, an analogous situation being a coconspirator's exception to the hearsay rule. Fernandez v. People, 176 Colo. 346, 490 P.2d 690 (1971). A statement by a party's coconspirator made during the course and furtherance of the conspiracy is admissible hearsay, if it is shown the declarant and the party were members of the conspiracy and the statement was made in the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. People v. James, 40 P.3d 36 (Colo. App. 2001). The prosecution, as the proponent of a co-conspirator's statement, bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a conspiracy, that the defendant and declarant were members of the conspiracy, and the declarant made the statement during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. The assistant manager's statements were in furtherance of the assistant manager's role in the conspiracy to conceal defendant's identity and, thus, admissible. People v. Dunlap, 124 P.3d 780 (Colo. App. 2004). Codefendant's declaration made during joint adventure. A trial court may consider the statement of an alleged coconspirator in determining whether the prosecution has established the evidentiary conditions for admissibility so long as the statement itself is not the sole basis for establishing those foundational requirements. People v. Montoya, 753 P.2d 729 (Colo. 1988); People v. Esch, 786 P.2d 462 (Colo. App. 1989); People v. Taylor, 804 P.2d 196 (Colo. App. 1990); People v. Rivera, 56 P.3d 1155 (Colo. App. 2002). A statement made by a party is admissible hearsay when offered against the party making it. People v. James, 40 P.3d 36 (Colo. App. 2001). Admission by a party opponent held not to be hearsay. South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 698 P.2d 1369 (Colo. App. 1984). Since certain of the defendant's statements regarding the rental of VCR items, the failure to return them, and the method of payment were admissions by a party-opponent and therefore not hearsay, the non-hearsay evidence in the trial court record was of sufficient quantity and strength to satisfy the prosecutor's responsibility to establish probable cause. People v. Horn, 772 P.2d 108 (Colo. 1989). Attorney's response to a request for investigation in a disciplinary proceeding was an admission by a party-opponent and was not hearsay. The fact that part of the attorney's response was inconsistent with the attorney's testimony at trial is not a consideration under subsection (d)(2). People v. Meier, 954 P.2d 1068 (Colo. 1998). Statements made by attorney concerning a matter within the course of attorney's employment may be admissible against the party who retained the attorney. In re Amich, 192 P.3d 422 (Colo. App. 2007). Passenger's statement that juvenile had exclaimed that he intended to "outrun the cop" was not hearsay and was admissible as an admission of a party opponent. People v. T.R., 860 P.2d 559 (Colo. App. 1993). Guidelines in insurance contract not admissible under subsection (d)(2). Although defendant signed an insurance contract for malpractice insurance containing risk management guidelines as a condition of obtaining coverage, such guidelines are not admissible as an adoption by defendant as the applicable legal standard of professional care owed to his patients where plaintiff sought to show that defendant did not adhere to such standards. Quigley v. Jobe, 851 P.2d 236 (Colo. App. 1992). The documents could not have been admitted under subsection (d)(2). People v. Gilmore, 97 P.3d 123 (Colo. App. 2003). Statement made by defendant to expert witness offered to establish the basis for the expert's opinion is not hearsay and it is error to exclude it. People v. Drake, 748 P.2d 1237 (Colo. 1988). Statements offered to demonstrate the defendant's state of mind rather than the truth of the matter asserted would have substantiated defendant's affirmative defense that he had taken his daughter from the custody of his ex-wife because he believed his daughter was being abused. People v. Mossmann, 17 P.3d 165 (Colo. App. 2000). Defendant's own statement held admissible. People v. Berger-Levy, 677 P.2d 351 (Colo. App. 1983). Former testimony admissible at subsequent trial. Defendant's testimony from prior trial at which he was acquitted does not constitute hearsay and is admissible under this rule as defendant's statement in his individual capacity. People v. Arrington, 682 P.2d 490 (Colo. App. 1983). Under subsection (d)(1)(B), a statement is not hearsay if: (1) The declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination; (2) the statement is consistent with the declarant's testimony; and (3) it is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. People v. Segura, 923 P.2d 266 (Colo. App. 1995). Subsection (d)(1)(B) encompasses only those statements made by the victims prior to when the opportunity to fabricate similar stories allegedly arose. People v. Segura, 923 P.2d 266 (Colo. App. 1995). While the victims' prior consistent statements rebutted a charge of fabrication and were made before the alleged fabrication, the statements were properly admitted under subsection (d)(1)(B). People v. Segura, 923 P.2d 266 (Colo. App. 1995). Subsection (d)(1)(B) allows admission of sexual assault victim's prior consistent statements in police report when defense is consent, thus calling into question victim's credibility. People v. Tyler, 745 P.2d 257 (Colo. App. 1987). Subsection (d)(1)(B) allows admission of recalled witness's prior consistent statements to investigating officer when defendant's attorney, on cross-examination, has called into question witness's credibility. People v. Salazar, 920 P.2d 893 (Colo. App. 1996). Subsection (d)(1)(B) allows admission of two statements by the defendant, where the defendant first introduced the statements and thereby waived any objection to the introduction of the rest of the statements by the prosecution as explanatory material. People v. Espinoza, 989 P.2d 178 (Colo. App. 1999). Prior consistent statements of child-victim of sexual assault may be used for rehabilitation when a witness's credibility has been attacked, as such statements are admissible outside of this rule. Prior consistent statements were found to be admissible where they were relevant to the jury's determination of whether the impeaching statements really were inconsistent with the child-victim's trial testimony, where the defense attempted to discredit the child-victim's testimony in its entirety, where there was no evidence that the prosecution relied upon the child-victim's prior consistent statement as substantive support for its case thereby implicating subsection (d)(1)(B) of this rule, and where the content of the witness's testimony regarding the child-victim's statement was merely repetitive of her own testimony. People v. Eppens, 979 P.2d 14 (Colo. 1999). One requirement for admitting hearsay statement of a coconspirator is that the prosecution must first establish, by independent evidence, that a conspiracy exists and that the defendant is a participant. People v. Gable, 647 P.2d 246 (Colo. App. 1982); People v. Nunez, 698 P.2d 1376 (Colo. App. 1984), aff'd, 737 P.2d 422 (Colo. 1987); People v. Lewis, 710 P.2d 1110 (Colo. App. 1985); People v. Reyher, 728 P.2d 333 (Colo. App. 1986). Joint participant is considered coconspirator even where no conspiracy has been charged. People v. Small, 631 P.2d 148 (Colo. 1981). Testimony properly admissible. People v. Graham, 678 P.2d 1043 (Colo. App. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216, 104 S. Ct. 2660, 81 L. Ed. 2d 366 (1984). Statements by joint participants in a conspiracy are admissible against all its members if made in furtherance of and during the course of the illicit relationship. People v. Small, 631 P.2d 148 (Colo. 1981); People v. Best, 665 P.2d 644 (Colo. App. 1983). But proponent of the evidence must establish to the trial court's satisfaction that the statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy as well as in the course of the conspiracy. Willams v. People, 724 P.2d 1279 (Colo. 1986); People v. Esch, 786 P.2d 462 (Colo. App. 1989); People v. Taylor, 804 P.2d 196 (Colo. App. 1990). Coconspirator exception does not apply to statements made after conspiracy has ended. People v. Armstrong, 704 P.2d 877 (Colo. App. 1985). Court erred in prohibiting defendant, on hearsay grounds, from eliciting evidence of what he and an alleged coconspirator said to one another. Nonhearsay verbal act evidence is admissible on the issue of whether a conspiratorial agreement existed because the statement is admitted merely to show that it was actually made, not to prove the truth of what was asserted in it. People v. Scearce, 87 P.3d 228 (Colo. App. 2003). Adoption of subsection (d)(2) relating to the admissibility of defendant's confession does not supercede the corpus delicti doctrine, which is a substantive rule of law. The doctrine holds that a conviction cannot be based upon the uncorroborated confession of a defendant. People v. Robson, 80 P.3d 912 (Colo. App. 2003). No further need under C.R.E. 901 to authenticate documentary evidence that satisfied requirements of subsection (d)(2)(B). Based upon witness testimony, ALJ committed no abuse of discretion in admitting record of request for purchase of political time and an agreement form for non-candidate issue advertisements as having been sufficiently authenticated under C.R.E. 901(b)(1). As to admissibility of affidavit of performance used to indicate dates, airtimes, and the district in which the advertisements were broadcast, ALJ correctly held that political committee's agent would not have authorized payment of invoices if he doubted advertisements aired during relevant time period and in relevant legislative district. There was no need to further authenticate affidavit of performance because agent's conduct manifested "belief in its truth" under subsection (d)(2)(B). Collectively, these documents support ALJ's findings that during relevant time period political committee arranged to broadcast television advertisements opposing legislative candidate to voters in candidate's district. Colo. Citizens for Ethics in Gov't v. Comm. for the Am. Dream, 187 P.3d 1207 (Colo. App. 2008). Statement admissible under subsection (d)(2)(D). A statement by an employee made during the term of his employment concerning a subject matter within the scope of employment is admissible. Halliburton v. Pub. Serv. Co., 804 P.2d 213 (Colo. App. 1990). Independent insurance adjuster's statement tending to show that equipment had been vandalized, hence damage would be covered under policy, admissible notwithstanding that adjuster was not formally empowered to make coverage determinations. South Park Aggregates, Inc. v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 847 P.2d 218 (Colo. App. 1992). Interrogatory response and report of subcontractor's employee on city's ventilation system was admissible under subsection (d)(2)(D) in city's action against contractor and subcontractor for defects in design and construction of city hall building. Response and report qualified as statement offered against a party made by that party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment during the existence of the relationship. City of Westminster v. MOA, Inc., 867 P.2d 137 (Colo. App. 1993). Testimony of two nurses was sufficient to show that a statement made by agent of hospital was within the scope of subsection (d)(2)(D). Stevens v. Humana of Delaware, Inc., 832 P.2d 1076 (Colo. App. 1992). Statements admissible under subsection (d)(2)(E) as statements of coconspirator do not satisfy confrontation rights. A showing of reliability is also required. Nunez v. People, 737 P.2d 422 (Colo. 1987); People v. Taylor, 804 P.2d 196 (Colo. App. 1990). Evidence held properly admitted as a statement of a coconspirator. People v. Watson, 668 P.2d 965 (Colo. App. 1983). Statements concerning the furtherance of the planned deception of the insurance companies was in furtherance of the conspiracy to commit third degree arson. People v. Peltz, 701 P.2d 98 (Colo. App. 1984), aff'd, 728 P.2d 1271 (Colo. 1986). Statements made after the purpose of the conspiracy has been accomplished are inadmissible under subsection (d)(2)(E) unless they are so connected with the purpose of the conspiracy as to be a part of the res gestae. For such statements, there must be specific evidence of a plan of concealment to demonstrate that the conspiracy is pending when the statements are made. People v. Blecha, 940 P.2d 1070 (Colo. App. 1996), aff'd, 962 P.2d 931 (Colo. 1998). Coconspirator statements made after the conspirators attain the object of the conspiracy are not admissible under this hearsay exception unless the proponent demonstrated an express original agreement among the coconspirators to continue to act in concert in order to cover up, for their own self protection, traces of the crime after its commission. Blecha v. People, 962 P.2d 931 (Colo. 1998). Secrecy plus overt acts of concealment do not establish an express agreement to act in concert in order to conceal the crime. Blecha v. People, 962 P.2d 931 (Colo. 1998). Evidence held hearsay. People v. Mann, 646 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1982); People in Interest of O.E.P., 654 P.2d 312 (Colo. 1982). Defendant's inconsistent statement on relevant matter held admissible. People v. Christian, 632 P.2d 1031 (Colo. 1981). Witness' statement to detective was not properly admitted under subsection (d)(1)(A) since the witness refused to answer the prosecutor's questions at trial and therefore gave no testimony with which any prior statement could be inconsistent. People v. Newton, 940 P.2d 1065 (Colo. App. 1996), aff'd, 966 P.2d 563 (Colo. 1998). Generally, a witness' out-of-court statements cannot be used to bolster his trial testimony. However, a prior consistent state may be admitted for the purpose of rehabilitation after a witness has been impeached by a prior inconsistent statement. People v. Andrews, 729 P.2d 997 (Colo. App. 1986). If credibility of a witness is at issue, the jury should have access to all relevant facts, including consistent and inconsistent statements and the reasons for possible fabrications. People v. Andrews, 729 P.2d 997 (Colo. App. 1986). Trial court properly concluded that videotaped statements were admissible under subsection (d)(1)(B) as non-hearsay prior consistent statements and to the extent that the evidence was cumulative, there was no abuse of the trial court's discretion under the circumstances. People v. Rodriguez, 888 P.2d 278 (Colo. App. 1994). Admission of prior consistent statement not limited to those made prior to the inconsistent statement. People v. Andrews, 729 P.2d 997 (Colo. App. 1986). Statements held not hearsay. Statements are admissable where such statements were not admitted for the purpose of establishing their veracity, but rather, to provide background necessary to understand conversation between witness and defendant. People v. Huckleberry, 768 P.2d 1235 (Colo. 1989). Accident reports are admissible where they are offered to prove the manufacturer's notice of prior incidents and not for their veracity. Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 819 P.2d 522 (Colo. App. 1991). There is no right of confrontation and no hearsay preclusion when the utterances are not offered for their truth, but are offered to provide the context in which the defendant's statements were made. People v. Arnold, 826 P.2d 365 (Colo. App. 1991). Statements in report of independent medical examiner were admissible for the purpose of establishing that an automobile insurance company had a reasonable basis for refusing to reimburse plaintiff's claimed medical expenses. Klein v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 948 P.2d 43 (Colo. App. 1997). Taped statement of ALJ during parole hearing was not hearsay where it was offered to prove notice to defendant and not the truth of the matter asserted. People v. Taylor, 74 P.3d 396 (Colo. App. 2002). Statement includes non-verbal conduct intended to be communicative. People v. Bowers, 773 P.2d 1093 (Colo. App. 1988), aff'd, 801 P.2d 511 (Colo. 1990). Refusal to allow defendant to call her cellmate to testify as to statements defendant made to her during course of trial was proper where defendant was not available to prosecutor for cross-examination concerning possibility of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. People v. Avery, 736 P.2d 1233 (Colo. App. 1986). Child's use of anatomically correct dolls and gestures were part and parcel of hearsay statements and are inadmissible without independent corroborative evidence. People v. Bowers, 773 P.2d 1093 (Colo. App. 1988), aff'd, 801 P.2d 511 (Colo. 1990). Use of mannequin by prosecution to demonstrate how the victim was tied was not a "statement" but was an illustration of trial testimony. People v. Richardson, 58 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2002). Statement by a husband to his wife about the fraudulent nature of his personal injury claim against his employer was an admission not subject to the hearsay exclusion. Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Hood, 802 P.2d 458 (Colo. 1990). Trial court erred in denying, as hearsay, cross-examination of a wife as to her prior inconsistent statements regarding admissions by the wife's spouse as to the fraudulent nature of his personal injury claim against his employer. Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Hood, 802 P.2d 458 (Colo. 1990). Court erred in barring prior consistent statement. Wife's prior consistent statement to attorney should have been admitted to rebut prosecution's implication that defendant's wife's testimony was the result of a recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. People v. Ambrose, 907 P.2d 613 (Colo. App. 1994). News article offered for truth of its assertions is inadmissible hearsay. People v. Morise, 859 P.2d 247 (Colo. App. 1993). Court erred in admitting inadmissible hearsay evidence from prosecution's expert witness who bolstered her testimony by stating her work had been subject to peer review. People v. Griffin, 985 P.2d 15 (Colo. App. 1998). Prosecution satisfies minimum requirements for use of hearsay at preliminary hearing if it: (1)Presents some competent nonhearsay evidence that addresses an essential element of the offense; and (2)presents the hearsay evidence through a witness who is connected to the offense or its investigation rather than someone merely reading from a report. In this case, the prosecution satisfied the status elements of the offense through nonhearsay testimony and produced the victim's testimony (hearsay) through the investigating officer who was familiar with the case. People v. Huggins, 220 P.3d 977 (Colo. App. 2009). Court's failure to apply correct standard for use of hearsay at preliminary hearing was abuse of discretion. Applying the correct standard, the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing established probable cause to believe the defendant committed the charged offenses. People v. Huggins, 220 P.3d 977 (Colo. App. 2009). Applied in Sims v. Indus. Comm'n, 627 P.2d 1107 (Colo. 1981); Nat'l Sur. Corp. v. Citizens State Bank, 651 P.2d 460 (Colo. App. 1982); People v. Handy, 657 P.2d 963 (Colo. App. 1982); People in Interest of R.L., 660 P.2d 26 (Colo. App. 1983); Banek v. Thomas, 697 P.2d 743 (Colo. App. 1984), aff'd, 733 P.2d 1171 (Colo. 1986); People v. Johnson, 701 P.2d 620 (Colo. App. 1985); People v. Fueston, 717 P.2d 978 (Colo. App. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 749 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1988); People v. Koon, 724 P.2d 1367 (Colo. App. 1986); Jacob v. Com. Highland Theatres, Inc., 738 P.2d 6 (Colo. App. 1986); People v. Bowman, 738 P.2d 387 (Colo. App. 1987); People v. Pinkey, 761 P.2d 228 (Colo. App. 1988); Bayless v. Milstein, 765 P.2d 1069 (Colo. App. 1988); People v. Halstead, 881 P.2d 401 (Colo. App. 1994); People v. Mandez, 997 P.2d 1254 (Colo. App. 1999); People v. Candelaria, 107 P.3d 1080 (Colo. App. 2004), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 148 P.3d 178 (Colo. 2006).