Colo. R. Evid. 611
CRE 611
Annotation Law reviews. For article, "Hearsay in Criminal Cases Under the Colorado Rules of Evidence: An Overview", see 50 U. Colo. L. Rev. 277 (1979). For article, "Common Evidentiary Mistakes", see 18 Colo. Law. 1129 (1989). For article, "Impeachment", see 22 Colo. Law. 1207 (1993). Court may limit right to cross-examination. The constitutional right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is tempered by the trial court's authority to prohibit cross-examination on matters wholly irrelevant and immaterial to issues at trial. People v. Loscutoff, 661 P.2d 274 (Colo. 1983); People v. Hernandez, 695 P.2d 308 (Colo. App. 1984); People v. McKeehan, 732 P.2d 1238 (Colo. App. 1986), cert. denied, 753 P.2d 243 (Colo. 1988). Trial judge has discretion to determine the scope and the limit of cross-examination. People v. Homan, 185 Colo. 56, 521 P.2d 1262 (1974); People v. Fresquez, 186 Colo. 146, 526 P.2d 146 (1974). Limits of cross-examination of a witness concerning general credibility is within the sound discretion of the trial court. People v. Evans, 630 P.2d 94 (Colo. App. 1981). Absent abuse, judge's rulings not disturbed on review. The scope and limits of cross-examination are determined by the trial judge, and absent an abuse of discretion his rulings will not be disturbed on review. McCune v. People, 179 Colo. 262, 499 P.2d 1184 (1972); People v. Lucero, 677 P.2d 370 (Colo. App. 1983), cert. dismissed, 706 P.2d 1283 (Colo. 1985). In the absence of an abuse of discretion in ruling on the scope of cross-examination, a trial judge's ruling will not be disturbed on review. People v. Homan, 185 Colo. 56, 521 P.2d 1262 (1974); People v. Fresquez, 186 Colo. 146, 526 P.2d 146 (1974). The scope and limits of cross-examination are within the sound discretion of the trial court and absent an abuse of that discretion, the rulings of the court will not be disturbed on review. People v. Raffaelli, 647 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1982); Jackson v. Harsco Corp., 653 P.2d 407 (Colo. App. 1982). Although the scope of the cross-examination is within the trial court's discretion, its decision will be reversed on appeal if that discretion is abused. People v. Diaz, 644 P.2d 71 (Colo. App. 1981). Cross-examination into witnesses' motives. Cross-examination should be liberally extended to permit a thorough inquiry into the motives of witnesses. People v. Peterson, 633 P.2d 1088 (Colo. App. 1981). Any evidence tending to show bias or prejudice, or to throw light upon the inclinations of witnesses, should be permitted on cross-examination. People v. Peterson, 633 P.2d 1088 (Colo. App. 1981). Whether leading questions are permissible is a question within the trial court's discretion. Bruce Hughes, Inc. v. Ingels & Assocs., 653 P.2d 88 (Colo. App. 1982); People v. Gillis, 883 P.2d 554 (Colo. App. 1994). Section (c) enlarges class of adverse witnesses. The purpose of section (c) is to enlarge that class of witnesses recognized as adverse, or identified with a party adverse, to one of the parties. This intent is demonstrated by the elimination of specific classes of adverse parties, including officers, directors, or managing agents of a public or private corporation, from section (c). Bruce Hughes, Inc. v. Ingels & Assocs., 653 P.2d 88 (Colo. App. 1982). If a witness may be characterized as adverse under the more stringent C.R.C.P. 43(b), it follows that section (c) of this rule would most certainly include him as either an adverse party or a witness identified with an adverse party. Bruce Hughes, Inc. v. Ingels & Assocs., 653 P.2d 88 (Colo. App. 1982). Trial court has discretion to limit cross-examination without probative force. While adhering to the general rule that a defendant should be allowed wide latitude to cross-examine a prosecution witness for the purpose of showing bias or undue interest, the trial court has some discretion in limiting such cross-examination where it is without probative force. People v. Simmons, 182 Colo. 350, 513 P.2d 193 (1973). Court did not deny defendant due process by requiring defendant to testify on the first day of trial. The order of proof at trial is a matter within the court's discretion. Court required defendant to testify in order to make use of jury's time. Defendant had previously expressed his intent to testify, and court permitted defendant to testify again, following the testimony of his expert witness. People v. Walden, 224 P.3d 369 (Colo. App. 2009). The court may terminate cross-examination altogether, if it is clear further testimony would not advance the truth-seeking function of the trial. When defense counsel continued baseless cross-examination, termination of cross-examination was warranted where the court believed defense counsel had no further line of inquiry. People v. James, 40 P.3d 36 (Colo. App. 2001). Recross-examination may embrace those matters testified to on redirect examination. People v. Ciari, 189 Colo. 325, 540 P.2d 1094 (1975). Whether to allow late indorsement of witness is within discretion of trial court, and absent an abuse of such discretion, the ruling will not be disturbed on review. People v. MacFarland, 189 Colo. 363, 540 P.2d 1073 (1975). No reversible error where trial court permitted prosecutor to ask leading questions on redirect to develop and clarify witness's testimony. People v. Gillis, 883 P.2d 554 (Colo. App. 1994). Section (b) does not limit cross-examination to the same acts and facts to which a witness has testified on direct examination. The rule must be liberally construed to permit cross-examination on any matter germane to the direct examination, qualifying or destroying it, or tending to elucidate, modify, explain, contradict, or rebut testimony given by the witness. People v. Sallis, 857 P.2d 572 (Colo. App. 1993); People v. Scarlett, 985 P.2d 36 (Colo. App. 1998). Section (b) should be liberally construed to permit cross-examination on any matter germane to the direct examination. People v. Marion, 941 P.2d 287 (Colo. App. 1996). If a defendant makes a general denial of the offense charged or as to a matter of ultimate fact, the prosecutor is not limited to a mere categorical review of the evidence testified to on direct examination. The prosecutor must be permitted to examine the defendant in detail as to matters directly referred to during direct examination. People v. Sallis, 857 P.2d 572 (Colo. App. 1993). Trial court erred in denying cross-examination of a wife as to the fraudulent nature of her spouse's personal injury claim against his employer where the wife testified during direct examination only as to the effect of the spouse's injuries on his family. The scope of cross-examination includes the subject matter of direct examination and matters affecting witness credibility. Admissions by the wife's spouse was related directly to the wife's direct testimony concerning the spouse's injuries. Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Hood, 802 P.2d 458 (Colo. 1990). No reversible error where administrative hearing officer permitted testimony on cross examination as to whether petitioner believed that complaining witness was telling the truth where petitioner did not object and record did not reflect that such testimony affected the result of hearing. Knowles v. Bd. of Educ., 857 P.2d 553 (Colo. App. 1993). Trial court may not place excessive limitations on defendant's cross-examination of witness especially regarding bias, prejudice, or motive for testifying. People v. Griffin, 867 P.2d 27 (Colo. App. 1993). Trial court neither abused its discretion nor violated defendant's right to confrontation where defendant was prohibited from revealing to jury through cross-examination that witness was in custody in another state on unrelated charges where such testimony would have been cumulative and of little or no probative value and where defendant was otherwise provided with ample opportunity to impeach the witness's credibility by showing ulterior motive. People v. Griffin, 867 P.2d 27 (Colo. App. 1993). Applied in Danburg v. Realties, Inc., 677 P.2d 439 (Colo. App. 1984); People v. Mandez, 997 P.2d 1254 (Colo. App. 1999).