Colo. R. Evid. 201
(Federal Rule Identical.)
CRE 201
Committee Comment
This rule is identical to Rule 201 F.R.E. and generally codifies prior Colorado case law. See Nicholls v. Barrick, 27 Colo. 432, 62 P. 202 (1900) courts take judicial notice of those matters which may be designated as "common knowledge" ; Finnerty v. Cook, 118 Colo. 310, 195 P.2d 973 (1948) judicial notice of facts which are "universally known" ; Israel v. Wood, 93 Colo. 500, 27 P.2d 1024 (1933) courts take judicial notice of matters of common knowledge in the community where they sit ; Bieser v. Stoddard, 73 Colo. 554, 216 P. 707 (1923) well recognized natural and physical laws are judicially known and may not be put in issue by denial of their inevitable effect ; Winterberg v. Thomas, 126 Colo. 60, 246 P.2d 1058 (1952) appellate courts will not hesitate to take judicial notice of the unquestioned laws of mathematics . However, the mandatory nature of subsection (d) is a departure from existing practice.
In this rule judicial notice is limited to adjunctive facts which are those facts that can be readily determined by resort to accurate sources, such as a calendar date, Sierra Mining Company v. Lucero, 118 Colo. 180, 194 P.2d 302 (1948); term of public office, People, ex rel. Flanders v. Neary, 113 Colo. 12, 154 P.2d 48 (1944); or statistical charts, Good v. A.B. Chance Co., 39 Colo. App. 70, 565 P.2d 217 (1977).
.Annotation Law reviews. For note, "Rule 201: The Use of Hearsay In Establishing Facts Sufficient for Judicial Notice", see 22 Colo. Law. 2535 (1993). For article, "The Google Knows Many Things: Judicial Notice in the Internet Era", see 39 Colo. Law. 19 (November 2010). This rule is a codification of existing case law. Prestige Homes, Inc. v. Legouffe, 658 P.2d 850 (Colo. 1983). This rule does not broaden the scope of judicial notice. Larsen v. Archdiocese of Denver, 631 P.2d 1163 (Colo. App. 1981). This rule has traditionally been used cautiously in keeping with its purpose to bypass the usual fact-finding process only when the facts are of such common knowledge that they cannot reasonably be disputed. Prestige Homes, Inc. v. Legouffe, 658 P.2d 850 (Colo. 1983). The court may take judicial notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute because they are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to resources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. A court may take judicial notice of the contents of court records in a related proceeding. People v. Sa'ra, 117 P.3d 51 (Colo. App. 2004). Court may take notice without hearing. Under sections (c) and (f), the court may take judicial notice while the case is under advisement without first giving the parties an opportunity to be heard. People ex rel.Danielson v. Amity Mut. Irrigation Co., 668 P.2d 1368 (Colo. 1983). Scientific propositions accepted as valid in the appropriate scientific community may be judicially noticed by an appellate court, acting on its own initiative. Legouffe v. Prestige Homes, Inc., 634 P.2d 1010 (Colo. App. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 658 P.2d 850 (Colo. 1983). Classification of defendant's past offense is a question of law, and the court is justified in taking judicial notice when the facts upon which the legal conclusion is based are unchallenged. Massey v. People, 649 P.2d 1070 (Colo. 1982). Conditions presenting risk not an adjudicative fact. Whether certain conditions in a negligence action present more than an ordinary risk of harm depends upon the circumstances of each case, and is not an adjudicative fact. Larsen v. Archdiocese of Denver, 631 P.2d 1163 (Colo. App. 1981). Meaning of terms within context of constitution not subject to notice. In making its final legal conclusion about the meaning of terms within the context of the constitution, the court should be free to accept or reject several relevant "legislative facts", such as the dictionary definitions of these terms, the use of these words in other cases, and the probable intent of the drafters of the constitution as indicated by any historical facts. These items, therefore, are not subject to the judicial notice rule. Conrad v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662 (Colo. 1982). For a court to be required to take judicial notice under this rule, it must, of necessity, be supplied with specific information that is the subject of the request. Otherwise, it is discretionary whether a court takes judicial notice. Durbin v. Bonanza Corp., 716 P.2d 1124 (Colo. App. 1986); Martinez v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 832 P.2d 1060 (Colo. App. 1992). Administrative law judge (ALJ) was not required to take judicial notice of the fact that doctor almost always testified for the defendant, based on a summary of court decisions in which same doctor had been a witness, even if court records were subject to judicial notice, unless the tribunal has been supplied with the specific facts, records, or documents that are the subject of the request. Martinez v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 832 P.2d 1060 (Colo. App. 1992). Rules published in the code of Colorado regulations are a fit subject for judicial notice. Westfall v. Town of Hugo, 851 P.2d 299 (Colo. App. 1993). Pleadings, minutes, testimony, and verdict of a case in which defendant's friend was tried and acquitted is not a matter subject to judicial notice pursuant to this rule as it would require the trial court to second guess the fact finder in the other case as to its reasons for finding the person not guilty. People v. Phillips, 732 P.2d 1226 (Colo. App. 1986). Judicial notice of municipal court order was proper. The fact that the court issuing the order was a municipal court was a matter of general knowledge within the district court's jurisdiction and it was capable of accurate confirmation through sources known to the district court. People v. Merklin, 80 P.3d 921 (Colo. App. 2003). Rule regarding fact judicially noticed applies only to adjudicative facts and therefore the classification of a criminal defendant's offense which is a question of law, did not require instruction pursuant to this rule. People v. Hampton, 857 P.2d 441 (Colo. App. 1992), aff'd, 876 P.2d 1236 (Colo. 1994). Trial court erred in taking judicial notice of presentence report prepared by the probation department in determining whether defendant was previously convicted of a felony. People v. Cooper, 104 P.3d 307 (Colo. App. 2004). The court did not err by taking judicial notice of defendant's probation status after determining the status from the state computer system. Since § 13-1-119 and Crim. P. 55 expressly approve of records kept and maintained in a state computer system, the court may take judicial notice of the court records contained in the system. People v. Linares-Guzman, 195 P.3d 1130 (Colo. App. 2008). Magistrate in kinship adoption proceeding erred in taking judicial notice of guardian ad litem's report in mother's dissolution proceeding because mother did not have the opportunity to cross-examine guardian ad litem in the kinship proceeding. A court may not take judicial notice of facts on the issue the parties are litigating. However, a court may take judicial notice of its own records and adopt factual findings from a previous case involving the same parties and the same issues. In re C.A.B.L., 221 P.3d 433 (Colo. App. 2009). Court did not err in not taking judicial notice of the dismissal of a previous sexual assault case when the defendant failed to comply with paragraph (d) of this rule and there was uncontroverted testimony that the case was dismissed. People v. Marsh, __ P.3d __ (Colo. App. 2011). Applied in Lovato v. Johnson, 617 P.2d 1203 (Colo. 1980); In re House Bill 91S-1005, 814 P.2d 875 (Colo. 1991).