Colo. R. Crim. P. 6.2
Annotation Law reviews. For comment, "Reporter's Privilege: Pankratz v. District Court", see 58 Den. L.J. 681 (1981). Grand jury secrecy remains important to safeguard a number of different interests to preserve its proper functioning. Hoffman-Pugh v. Keenan, 338 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2003). Justifications for grand jury secrecy are several: (1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to prevent disclosure of derogatory information presented to the grand jury against someone who has not been indicted; (3) to encourage witnesses to come before the grand jury and speak freely with respect to a commission of crimes; (4) to encourage grand jurors in uninhibited investigation of and deliberation on suspected criminal activity. In re P.R. v. District Court, 637 P.2d 346 (Colo. 1981). Colorado secrecy rules do not violate the first amendment by prohibiting the disclosure of matters a witness learned from her participation in the grand jury process, at least so long as the potential remains for another grand jury to be called to investigate an unsolved murder. Hoffman-Pugh v. Keenan, 338 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2003). Disclosure of grand jury materials to federal prosecutors without prior approval, in violation of § 16-5-204 , did not violate federal constitutional or statutory rights. United States v. Pignatiello, 628 F. Supp. 68 (D. Colo. 1986). Disclosure that testimony of other grand jury witnesses contradicted current witness' testimony did not violate grand jury secrecy rule where identities of witnesses were not disclosed. People v. Rickard, 761 P.2d 188 (Colo. 1988). A line should be drawn between information the witness possessed prior to becoming a witness and information the witness gained through her actual participation in the grand jury process. Hoffman-Pugh v. Keenan, 338 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2003). Disclosure of information the witness already had independently of the grand jury process does not violate this rule. Drawing the line here protects the witness's first amendment right to speak while preserving the state's interest in grand jury secrecy. Hoffman-Pugh v. Keenan, 338 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2003). Breach of secrecy by prosecution does not warrant dismissal of indictment absent factual findings that defendant is prejudiced. People v. Rickard, 761 P.2d (Colo. 1988). Jurors and witnesses should be protected vigorously from outside influences. People v. Zupancic, 192 Colo. 231, 557 P.2d 1195 (1976). Any effort to tamper is reprehensible. Any effort to tamper with or obstruct the due administration of a grand jury's function is reprehensible. People v. Zupancic, 192 Colo. 231, 557 P.2d 1195 (1976). The jury tampering statute, section 18-8-609 , is implemented by this rule. People v. Zupancic, 192 Colo. 231, 557 P.2d 1195 (1976). Despite defendant's contention that unauthorized persons were allowed in grand jury room and proceedings were not kept secret, the alleged violations did not affect defendant's substantial rights. Petit jury's subsequent guilty verdict made alleged error in grand jury proceeding harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Cerrone, 867 P.2d 143 (Colo. App. 1993), aff'd on other grounds, 900 P.2d 45 (Colo. 1995). Applied in People ex rel. Losavio v. J.L., 195 Colo. 494, 580 P.2d 23 (1978); Pankratz v. District Court, 199 Colo. 411, 609 P.2d 1101 (1980).