Cal. R. 8.528
After review, the Supreme Court normally will affirm, reverse, or modify the judgment of the Court of Appeal, but may order another disposition.
(Subd (b) amended effective January 1, 2018; previously amended effective January 1, 2017.)
If it decides fewer than all the issues presented by the case, the Supreme Court may remand the cause to a Court of Appeal for decision on any remaining issues.
After ordering review, the Supreme Court may transfer the cause to a Court of Appeal without decision but with instructions to conduct such proceedings as the Supreme Court orders.
After transferring to itself, before decision, a cause pending in the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court may retransfer the cause to a Court of Appeal without decision.
Any supplemental briefing in the Court of Appeal after remand or transfer from the Supreme Court is governed by rule 8.200(b).
(Subd (f) amended effective January 1, 2007.)
Cal. R. Ct. 8.528
Advisory Committee Comment
Subdivision (a). Subdivision (a) serves two purposes. First, it declares that the Supreme Court's normal disposition of a cause after completing its review is to affirm, reverse, or modify the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Second, the subdivision recognizes that, when necessary, the Supreme Court may order "another disposition" appropriate to the circumstances. Subdivisions (b)-(e) provide examples of such "other dispositions," but the list is not intended to be exclusive.
As used in subdivision (a), "the judgment of the Court of Appeal" includes a decision of that court denying a petition for original writ without issuing an alternative writ or order to show cause. The Supreme Court's method of disposition after reviewing such a decision, however, has evolved. In earlier cases the Supreme Court itself denied or granted the requested writ, in effect treating the matter as if it were an original proceeding in the Supreme Court. (E.g., City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 58 ["The alternative writ of mandate is discharged and the petition for a peremptory writ of mandate is denied."].) By contrast, current Supreme Court practice is to affirm or reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal summarily denying the writ petition. (E.g., People v. Superior Court (Laff) (2001) 25 Cal.4th 703, 742-743 ["The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed with directions to vacate its order denying the petition, and to issue a writ of mandate. . . ."]; State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 930, 944 ["The judgment of the Court of Appeal summarily denying the petition for writ of mandate is affirmed and the order to show cause . . . is discharged."].) As the cited cases illustrate, if the Supreme Court affirms such a judgment it will normally discharge any alternative writ or order to show cause it issued when granting review; if the court reverses the judgment it will normally include a direction to the Court of Appeal, e.g., to issue the requested writ or to reconsider the petition.
Subdivision (b). An earlier version of this rule purported to limit Supreme Court dismissals of review to cases in which the court had "improvidently" granted review. In practice, however, the court may dismiss review for a variety of other reasons. For example, after the court decides a "lead" case, its current practice is to dismiss review in any pending companion case (i.e., a "grant and hold" matter under rule 8.512(c) ) that appears correctly decided in light of the lead case and presents no additional issue requiring resolution by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court may also dismiss review when a supervening event renders the case moot for any reason, e.g., when the parties reach a settlement, when a party seeking personal relief dies, or when the court orders review to construe a statute that is then repealed before the court can act. Reflecting this practice, the Supreme Court now dismisses review- even in the rare case in which the grant of review was arguably "improvident"-by an order that says simply that "review is dismissed."
An order of review ipso facto transfers jurisdiction of the cause to the Supreme Court. By the same token, an order dismissing review ipso facto retransfers jurisdiction to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal has no discretion to exercise after the Supreme Court dismisses review: the clerk/executive officer of the
Supreme Court must promptly send the dismissal order to the Court of Appeal; when the clerk/executive officer of the Court of Appeal files that order, the Court of Appeal decision immediately becomes final.
If the decision of the Court of Appeal made final by (b)(2) requires issuance of a remittitur under rule 8.272(a), the clerk/executive officer must issue the remittitur; if the decision does not require issuance of a remittitur-e.g., if the decision is an interlocutory order (see rule 8.500(a)(1) )-the clerk/executive officer must take whatever action is appropriate in the circumstances.
Subdivision (d). Subdivision (d) is intended to apply primarily to two types of cases: (1) those in which the court granted review "for the purpose of transferring the matter to the Court of Appeal for such proceedings as the Supreme Court may order" (rule 8.500(b)(4) ) and (2) those in which the court, after deciding a "lead case," determines that a companion "grant and hold" case (rule 8.512(c) ) should be reconsidered by the Court of Appeal in light of the lead case or presents an additional issue or issues that require resolution by the Court of Appeal.
Subdivision (e). Subdivision (e) is intended to apply to cases in which the Supreme Court, after transferring to itself before decision a cause pending in the Court of Appeal, retransfers the matter to that court without decision and with or without instructions.