"Quasi-judicial functions are those which lie midway between the judicial and ministerial ones. The line separating them...[is] necessarily indistinct; but, in general terms, when the law, in words or by implication, commits to any officer the duty of looking into facts, and acting upon them, not in a way which it specifically directs, but after a discretion in its nature judicial, the function is termed quasi-judicial...."
"Where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of a judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of the functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, the expression used is generally "quasi-judicial.... The officer may not in strictness be a judge; still, if his powers are discretionary, to be exerted or withheld according to his own view of what is necessary and proper, they are in their nature judicial. Id., at page 483."
The Krivec court declared that "when an attorney seeks to influence a public official exercising a quasi-judicial function who is acting in a matter or field in which the public official has discretion, such an attorney is not engaged in lobbying under the terms of the Initiative" (Id., at p. 484). The court went on to recognize that legislators are public officials under 5-7-102(13), MCA, but the quasi-judicial function exemption does not prevent the reporting of lobbying expenditures to support or oppose the introduction or enactment of legislation under 5-7-102(6) (a), MCA, (Id.). Based on Krivec, it is difficult if not impossible to discern what actions fall "midway between the judicial and ministerial ones" and do not involve some exercise of discretion. It appears that most lobbying activities, except for the practice of promoting or opposing the introduction or enactment of legislation before the legislature or legislators, are exempt from reporting under Krivec.
Mont. Admin. r. 44.12.101A
Sec. 5-7-111, MCA; IMP, Sec. 5-7-101, MCA;