Section 310.29 - Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) exemptions(a)General information. The Secretary of Defense designates those Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) systems of records which will be exempt from certain provisions of the Privacy Act. There are two types of exemptions, general and specific. The general exemption authorizes the exemption of a system of records from all but a few requirements of the Act. The specific exemption authorizes exemption of a system of records or portion thereof, from only a few specific requirements. If an OSD Component originates a new system of records for which it proposes an exemption, or if it proposes an additional or new exemption for an existing system of records, it shall submit the recommended exemption with the records system notice as outlined in § 311.6 . No exemption of a system of records shall be considered automatic for all records in the system. The systems manager shall review each requested record and apply the exemptions only when this will serve significant and legitimate Government purpose.(b)General exemptions. The general exemption provided by 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) may be invoked for protection of systems of records maintained by law enforcement activities. Certain functional records of such activities are not subject to access provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974. Records identifying criminal offenders and alleged offenders consisting of identifying data and notations of arrests, the type and disposition of criminal charges, sentencing, confinement, release, parole, and probation status of individuals are protected from disclosure. Other records and reports compiled during criminal investigations, as well as any other records developed at any stage of the criminal law enforcement process from arrest to indictment through the final release from parole supervision are excluded from release. (1)System identifier and name. DWHS P42.0, DPS Incident Reporting and Investigations Case Files.(i)Exemption. Portions of this system that fall within 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) are exempt from the following provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a , Sections (c)(3) and (4); (d)(1) through (d)(5); (e)(1) through (e)(3); (e)(5); (f)(1) through (f)(5); (g)(1) through (g)(5); and (h) of the Act.(ii)Authority.5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) .(iii)Reasons. The Defense Protective Service is the law enforcement body for the jurisdiction of the Pentagon and immediate environs. The nature of certain records created and maintained by the DPS requires exemption from access provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974. The general exemption, 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) , is invoked to protect ongoing investigations and to protect from access, criminal investigation information contained in this record system, so as not to jeopardize any subsequent judicial or administrative process taken as a result of information contained in the file.(16)System identifier and name. DWHS E06, Enterprise Correspondence Control System (ECCS). (i)Exemption. During the staffing and coordination of actions to, from, and within components in conduct of daily business, exempt materials from other systems of records may in turn become part of the case record in this document control system. To the extent that copies of exempt records from those "other" systems of records are entered into this system, the Office of the Secretary of Defense hereby claims the same exemptions for the records from those "other" systems that are entered into this system, as claimed for the original primary system of which they are a part.(ii)Authority.5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2) and (k)(1) through (k)(7) .(iii)Reasons. Records are only exempt from pertinent provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a to the extent such provisions have been identified and an exemption claimed for the original record and the purposes underlying the exemption for the original record still pertain to the record which is now contained in this system of records. In general, the exemptions were claimed in order to protect properly classified information relating to national defense and foreign policy, to avoid interference during the conduct of criminal, civil, or administrative actions or investigations, to ensure protective services provided the President and others are not compromised, to protect the identity of confidential sources incident to Federal employment, military service, contract, and security clearance determinations, to preserve the confidentiality and integrity of Federal testing materials, and to safeguard evaluation materials used for military promotions when furnished by a confidential source. The exemption rule for the original records will identify the specific reasons why the records are exempt from specific provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a .(c)Specific exemptions: All systems of records maintained by any OSD Component shall be exempt from the requirements of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d) pursuant to subsection (k)(1) of that section to the extent that the system contains any information properly classified under Executive Order 11265, `National Security Information,' dated June 28, 552a(d) pursuant to subsection (k)(1) of that section to the extent that the system contains any information properly classified under E.O. 11265, `National Security Information,' dated June 28, 1979, as amended, and required by the Executive Order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. This exemption, which may be applicable to parts of all systems of records, is necessary because certain record systems not otherwise specifically designated for exemptions may contain isolated information which has been properly classified. The Secretary of Defense has designated the following OSD system of records described below specifically exempted from the appropriate provisions of the Privacy Act pursuant to the designated authority contained therein: (3)System identifier and name. DGC 04, Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Case Files. (i)Exemption. All portions of this system which fall under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5) are exempt from the following provisions of title 5 U.S.C. 552a : (c)(3); (d).(ii)Authority.5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5) .(iii)Reasons. This system of records is exempt from subsections (c)(3) and (d) of section 552a of 5 U.S.C. which would require the disclosure of investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining access to classified information, but only to the extent that the disclosure of such material would reveal the identity of a source who furnished information to the Government under an expressed promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence, or prior to September 27, 1975, under an implied promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence. A determination will be made at the time of the request for a record concerning whether specific information would reveal the identity of a source. This exemption is required in order to protect the confidentiality of the sources of information compiled for the purpose of determining access to classified information. This confidentiality helps maintain the Government's continued access to information from persons who would otherwise refuse to give it.(6)System identifier and name. DODDS 02.0, Educator Application Files. (i)Exemption. All portions of this system which fall within 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5) may be exempt from the following provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a : (c)(3); (d).(ii)Authority.5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5) .(iii)Reasons. It is imperative that the confidential nature of evaluation and investigatory material on teacher application files furnished the Department of Defense Dependent Schools (DoDDS) under promises of confidentiality be exempt from disclosure to the individual to insure the candid presentation of information necessary to make determinations involving applicants suitability for DoDDS teaching positions.(9)System identifier and name. JS004SECDIV, Joint Staff Security Clearance Files. (i)Exemption. Portions of this system of records are exempt pursuant to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5) from subsections 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1) through (d)(5) .(ii)Authority.5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5) .(iii)Reasons. From subsections (d)(1) through (d)(5) because the agency is required to protect the confidentiality of sources who furnished information to the Government under an expressed promise of confidentiality or, prior to September 27, 1975, under an implied promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence. This confidentiality is needed to maintain the Government's continued access to information from persons who otherwise might refuse to give it. This exemption is limited to disclosures that would reveal the identity of a confidential source. At the time of the request for a record, a determination will be made concerning whether a right, privilege, or benefit is denied or specific information would reveal the identity of a source.(10)System identifier and name. DFMP 26, Vietnamese Commando Compensation Files. (i)Exemption. Information classified under E.O. 12958, as implemented by DoD 5200.1-R, may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) .(ii)Authority.5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) .(iii)Reasons. From subsection 5 U.S.C. 552a(d) because granting access to information that is properly classified pursuant to E.O. 12958, as implemented by DoD 5200.1-R, may cause damage to the national security.(11)System identifier and name. DUSP 11, POW/Missing Personnel Office Files. (i)Exemption. Information classified under E.O. 12958, as implemented by DoD 5200.1-R, may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) .(ii)Authority.5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) .(iii)Reasons. From subsection 5 U.S.C. 552a(d) because granting access to information that is properly classified pursuant to E.O. 12958, as implemented by DoD 5200.1-R, may cause damage to the national security.(14)System identifier and name. DHRA 02, PERSEREC Research Files. (i)Exemption.(A) Investigative material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for federal civilian employment, military service, federal contracts, or access to classified information may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5) , but only to the extent that such material would reveal the identity of a confidential source.(B) Therefore, portions of this system may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5) from the following subsections of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), and (e)(1) .(ii)Authority.5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5) .(iii)Reasons.(A) From subsection (c)(3) and (d) when access to accounting disclosures and access to or amendment of records would cause the identity of a confidential source to be revealed. Disclosure of the source's identity not only will result in the Department breaching the promise of confidentiality made to the source, but it will impair the Department's future ability to compile investigatory material for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment, Federal contracts, or access to classified information. Unless sources can be assured that a promise of confidentiality will be honored, they will be less likely to provide information considered essential to the Department in making the required determinations.(B) From (e)(1) because in the collection of information for investigatory purposes, it is not always possible to determine the relevance and necessity of particular information in the early stages of the investigation. In some cases, it is only after the information is evaluated in light of other information that its relevance and necessity becomes clear. Such information permits more informed decision making by the Department when making required suitability, eligibility, and qualification determinations.(16)System identifier and name. DMDC 15 DoD, Armed Services Military Accession Testing. (i)Exemption. Testing or examination material used solely to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in the Federal service or military service may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(6) , if the disclosure would compromise the objectivity or fairness of the test or examination process. Therefore, portions of the system of records may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(d) .(ii)Authority.5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(6) .(iii)Reasons.(A) An exemption is required for those portions of the Skill Qualification Test system pertaining to individual item responses and scoring keys to preclude compromise of the test and to ensure fairness and objectivity of the evaluation system.(B) From subsection (d)(1) when access to those portions of the Skill Qualification Test records would reveal the individual item responses and scoring keys. Disclosure of the individual item responses and scoring keys will compromise the objectivity and fairness of the test as well as the validity of future tests resulting in the Department being unable to use the testing battery as an individual assessment tool.(19)System identifier and name. DA&M 01, Civil Liberties Program Case Management System.(i)Exemption. Records contained in this System of Records may be exempted from the requirements of subsections (c)(3); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1) and (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I); and (f) of the Privacy Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) . Records may be exempted from these subsections or, additionally, from the requirements of subsections (c)(4); (e)(2), (3), and (8) of the Privacy Act of 1974 consistent with any exemptions claimed under 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2) or (k)(1), (k)(2), or (k)(5) by the originator of the record, provided the reason for the exemption remains valid and necessary. An exemption rule for this system has been promulgated in accordance with the requirements of 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(1), (2), and (3), (c) and (e) and is published at 32 CFR part 311.(ii)Authority.5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2), (k)(1), (k)(2), or (k)(5) .(iii)Reasons.(A) From subsections (c)(3) (accounting of disclosures) because an accounting of disclosures from records concerning the record subject would specifically reveal an intelligence or investigative interest on the part of the Department of Defense and could result in release of properly classified national security or foreign policy information.(B) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3) and (4) (record subject's right to access and amend records) because affording access and amendment rights could alert the record subject to the investigative interest of law enforcement agencies or compromise sensitive information classified in the interest of national security. In the absence of a national security basis for exemption, records in this system may be exempted from access and amendment to the extent necessary to honor promises of confidentiality to persons providing information concerning a candidate for position. Inability to maintain such confidentiality would restrict the free flow of information vital to a determination of a candidate's qualifications and suitability.(C) From subsection (e)(1) (maintain only relevant and necessary records) because in the collection of information for investigatory purposes, it is not always possible to determine the relevance and necessity of particular information in the early stages of the investigation. It is only after the information is evaluated in light of other information that its relevance and necessity becomes clear. In the absence of a national security basis for exemption under subjection (k)(1), records in this system may be exempted from the relevance requirement pursuant to subjection (k)(5) because it is not possible to determine in advance what exact information may assist in determining the qualifications and suitability of a candidate for position. Seemingly irrelevant details, when combined with other data, can provide a useful composite for determining whether a candidate should be appointed.(D) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) (publication of procedures for notifying subject of the existence of records about them and how they may access records and contest contents) because the system is exempted from subsection (d) provisions regarding access and amendment, and from the subsection (f) requirement to promulgate agency rules. Nevertheless, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has published notice concerning notification, access, and contest procedures because it may, in certain circumstances, determine it appropriate to provide subjects access to all or a portion of the records about them in this system of records.(E) From subsection (e)(4)(I) (identifying sources of records in the system of records) because identifying sources could result in disclosure of properly classified national defense or foreign policy information, intelligence sources and methods, and investigatory techniques and procedures. Notwithstanding its proposed exemption from this requirement the Office of the Secretary of Defense identifies record sources in broad categories sufficient to provide general notice of the origins of the information it maintains in this system of records.(F) From subsection (f) (agency rules for notifying subjects to the existence of records about them, for accessing and amending records, and for assessing fees) because the system is exempt from subsection (d) provisions regarding access and amendment of records by record subjects. Nevertheless, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has published agency rules concerning notification of a subject in response to his request if any system of records named by the subject contains a record pertaining to him and procedures by which the subject may access or amend the records. Notwithstanding exemption, the Office of the Secretary of Defense may determine it appropriate to satisfy a record subject's access request.(21)System identifier and name. DWHS E05, Mandatory Declassification Review Files.(i)Exemption. Information classified under E.O. 13526, as implemented by DoD 5200.1-R, may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) .(ii)Authority.5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) .(iii)Reasons. From subsection 5 U.S.C. 552a(d) because granting access to information that is properly classified pursuant to E.O. 13526, as implemented by DoD 5200.1-R, may cause damage to the national security.(22)System identifier and name. DPFPA 05, Computer Aided Dispatch and Records Management System (CAD/RMS).(i)Exemption. Portions of this system that fall within 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and/or (k)(2) are exempt from the following provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a , section (c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1) through (e)(3); (e)(4)(G) through (I); (e)(5); (e)(8); (f) and (g) of the Act, as applicable.(ii)Authority.5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(2) .(iii)Reasons.(A) From subsections (c)(3) and (4) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosure from records concerning him or her would specifically reveal any investigative interest in the individual. Revealing this information could reasonably be expected to compromise ongoing efforts to investigate a known or suspected offender by notifying the record subject that he or she is under investigation. This information could also permit the record subject to take measures to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid or impede the investigation.(B) From subsection (d) because these provisions concern individual access to and amendment of certain records contained in this system, including law enforcement and investigatory records. Compliance with these provisions could alert the subject of an investigation of the fact and nature of the investigation, and/or the investigative interest of law enforcement agencies; compromise sensitive information related to national security; interfere with the overall law enforcement process by leading to the destruction of evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, fabrication of testimony, and/or flight of the subject; could identify a confidential source or disclose information which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of another's personal privacy; reveal a sensitive investigative or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential informants, and witnesses. Amendment of these records would interfere with ongoing law enforcement investigations and analysis activities and impose an excessive administrative burden by requiring investigations, analyses, and reports to be continuously reinvestigated and revised.(C) From subsections (e)(1) through (e)(3) because it is not always possible to determine what information is relevant and necessary at an early stage in a given investigation. Also, because DoD and other agencies may not always know what information about a known or suspected offender may be relevant to law enforcement for the purpose of conducting an operational response.(D) From subsections (e)(4)(G) through (I) (Agency Requirements) because portions of this system are exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).(E) From subsection (e)(5) because the requirement that records be maintained with attention to accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness would unfairly hamper the criminal investigative process. It is the nature of criminal law enforcement for investigations to uncover the commission of illegal acts at diverse stages. It is frequently impossible to determine initially what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and least of all complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significant as further investigation brings new details to light.(F) From subsection (e)(8) because the requirement to serve notice on an individual when a record is disclosed under compulsory legal process could unfairly hamper law enforcement processes. It is the nature of law enforcement that there are instances where compliance with these provisions could alert the subject of an investigation of the fact and nature of the investigation, and/or the investigative interest of intelligence or law enforcement agencies; compromise sensitive information related to national security; interfere with the overall law enforcement process by leading to the destruction of evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, fabrication of testimony, and/or flight of the subject; reveal a sensitive investigative or intelligence technique; or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential informants, and witnesses.(G) From subsection (f) because requiring the Agency to grant access to records and establishing agency rules for amendment of records would compromise the existence of any criminal, civil, or administrative enforcement activity. To require the confirmation or denial of the existence of a record pertaining to a requesting individual may in itself provide an answer to that individual relating to the existence of an on-going investigation. The investigation of possible unlawful activities would be jeopardized by agency rules requiring verification of the record, disclosure of the record to the subject, and record amendment procedures.(H) From subsection (g) for compatibility with the exemption claimed from subsection (f), the civil remedies provisions of subsection (g) must be suspended for this record system. Because of the nature of criminal investigations, standards of accuracy, relevance, timeliness and completeness cannot apply to this record system. Information gathered in criminal investigations if often fragmentary and leads relating to an individual in the context of one investigation may instead pertain to a second investigation.(24)System identifier and name. DPFPA 06, Internal Affairs Records System. (i)Exemption. Portions of this system that fall within 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and/or (k)(2) are exempt from the following provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a , section (c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1) through (e)(3); (e)(4)(G) through (I); (e)(5); (f) and (g) of the Act, as applicable.(ii)Authority.5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(2) .(iii)Reasons.(A) From subsections (c)(3) and (4) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosure of investigations concerning him or her would specifically reveal an investigative interest in the individual. Revealing this information would reasonably be expected to compromise open or closed administrative or civil investigation efforts to a known or suspected offender by notifying the record subject that he or she is under investigation. This information could also permit the record subject to take measures to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid or impede the investigation.(B) From subsection (d) because these provisions concern individual access to and amendment of open or closed investigation records contained in this system, including law enforcement and investigatory records. Compliance with these provisions would provide the subject of an investigation of the fact and nature of the investigation, and/or the investigative interest of the Pentagon Force Protection Agency; compromise sensitive information related to national security; interfere with the overall law enforcement process by leading to the destruction of evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, fabrication of testimony, and/or flight of the subject; could identify a confidential informant or disclose information which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of another's personal privacy; reveal a sensitive investigative or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential informants, and witnesses. Amendment of investigative records would interfere with open or closed administrative or civil law enforcement investigations and analysis activities and impose an excessive administrative burden by requiring investigations, analyses, and reports to be continuously reinvestigated and revised.(C) From subsections (e)(1) through (e)(3) because it is not always possible to determine what information is relevant and necessary in open or closed investigations.(D) From subsections (e)(4)(G) through (I) (Agency Requirements) because portions of this system are exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).(E) From subsection (e)(5) because the requirement that investigative records be maintained with attention to accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness would unfairly hamper the criminal, administrative, or civil investigative process. It is the nature of Internal Affairs investigations to uncover the commission of illegal acts and administrative violations. It is frequently impossible to determine initially what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and least of all complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significant as further investigation brings new details to light.(F) From subsection (f) because requiring the Agency to grant access to records and establishing agency rules for amendment of records would compromise the existence of any criminal, civil, or administrative enforcement activity. To require the confirmation or denial of the existence of a record pertaining to a requesting individual may in itself provide an answer to that individual relating to the existence of an on-going investigation. The investigation of possible unlawful activities would be jeopardized by agency rules requiring verification of the record, disclosure of the record to the subject, and record amendment procedures.(G) From subsection (g) for compatibility with the exemption claimed from subsection (f), the civil remedies provisions of subsection (g) must be suspended for this record system. Because of the nature of criminal, administrative and civil investigations, standards of accuracy, relevance, timeliness and completeness cannot apply to open or closed investigations in this record system. Information gathered in criminal investigations is often fragmentary and leads relating to an individual in the context of one investigation may instead pertain to a second investigation.(25)System identifier and name. DPFPA 07, Counterintelligence Management Information System (CIMIS).(i)Exemption. Portions of this system that fall within 5 U.S.C. 552a (k)(2) are exempt from the following provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a , section (c)(3); (d); (e)(1); (e)(4)(G) through (I); and (f) of the Act, as applicable.(ii)Authority.5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2) .(iii)Reasons.(A) From subsections (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosure from records concerning him or her would specifically reveal any investigative interest in the individual. Revealing this information could reasonably be expected to compromise ongoing efforts to investigate a known or suspected offender by notifying the record subject that he or she is under investigation. This information could also permit the record subject to take measures to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid or impede the investigation.(B) From subsection (d) because these provisions concern individual access to and amendment of certain records contained in this system, including counterintelligence, law enforcement, and investigatory records. Compliance with these provisions could alert the subject of an investigation of the fact and nature of the investigation, and/or the investigative interest of agencies; compromise sensitive information related to national security; interfere with the overall counterintelligence and investigative process by leading to the destruction of evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, fabrication of testimony, and/or flight of the subject; could identify a confidential source or disclose information which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of another's personal privacy; reveal a sensitive investigation or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential informants, and witnesses. Amendment of these records would interfere with ongoing counterintelligence investigations and analysis activities and impose an excessive administrative burden by requiring investigations, analyses, and reports to be continuously reinvestigated and revised.(C) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to determine what information is relevant and necessary at an early stage in a given investigation. Also, because Pentagon Force Protection Agency and other agencies may not always know what information about a known or suspected offender may be relevant to for the purpose of conducting an operational response.(D) From subsections (e)(4)(G) through (I) (Agency Requirements) because portions of this system are exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).(E) From subsection (f) because requiring the Agency to grant access to records and establishing agency rules for amendment of records would compromise the existence of any criminal, civil, or administrative enforcement activity. To require the confirmation or denial of the existence of a record pertaining to a requesting individual may in itself provide an answer to that individual relating to the existence of an on-going investigation. Counterintelligence investigations would be jeopardized by agency rules requiring verification of the record, disclosure of the record to the subject, and record amendment procedures.(26)System identifier and name. DMDC 16 DoD, Identity Management Engine for Security and Analysis (IMESA).(i)Exemption. To the extent that copies of exempt records from JUSTICE/FBI-001, National Crime Information Center (NCIC) are entered into the Interoperability Layer Service records, the OSD hereby claims the same exemptions, (j)(2) and (k)(3), for the records as claimed in JUSTICE/FBI- 001, National Crime Information Center (NCIC). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a portions of this system that fall within (j)(2) and (k)(3) are exempt from the following provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a , section (c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1) through (3); (e)(4)(G) through (I); (e)(5) and (8); (f); and (g) (as applicable) of the Act.(ii)Authority.5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(3) .(iii)Reasons.(A) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosure from records concerning him or her would specifically reveal any investigative interest in the individual. Revealing this information could reasonably be expected to compromise ongoing efforts to investigate a known or suspected terrorist by notifying the record subject that he or she is under investigation. This information could also permit the record subject to take measures to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid or impede the investigation.(B) From subsection (c)(4) because portions of this system are exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).(C) From subsection (d) because these provisions concern individual access to and amendment of certain records contained in this system, including law enforcement, counterterrorism, investigatory, and intelligence records. Compliance with these provisions could alert the subject of an investigation of the fact and nature of the investigation, and/or the investigative interest of intelligence or law enforcement agencies; compromise sensitive information related to national security; interfere with the overall law enforcement process by leading to the destruction of evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, fabrication of testimony, and/or flight of the subject; could identify a confidential source or disclose information which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of another's personal privacy; reveal a sensitive investigative or intelligence technique; or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential informants, and witnesses. Amendment of these records would interfere with ongoing counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence investigations and analysis activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations, analyses, and reports to be continuously reinvestigated and revised.(D) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to determine what information is relevant and necessary to complete an identity comparison between the individual seeking access and a known or suspected terrorist. Also, because DoD and other agencies may not always know what information about an encounter with a known or suspected terrorist will be relevant to law enforcement for the purpose of conducting an operational response.(E) From subsection (e)(2) because application of this provision could present a serious impediment to counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence efforts in that it would put the subject of an investigation, study, or analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct designed to frustrate or impede that activity. The nature of counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence investigations is such that vital information about an individual frequently can be obtained only from other persons who are familiar with such individual and his/her activities. In such investigations, it is not feasible to rely upon information furnished by the individual concerning his own activities.(F) From subsection (e)(3) to the extent that this subsection is interpreted to require DoD to provide notice to an individual if DoD or another agency receives or collects information about that individual during an investigation or from a third party. Should this subsection be so interpreted, exemption from this provision is necessary to avoid impeding counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence efforts by putting the subject of an investigation, study, or analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct intended to frustrate or impede the activity.(G) From subsection (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency Requirements) because portions of this system are exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).(H) From subsection (e)(5) because the requirement that records be maintained with attention to accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness could unfairly hamper law enforcement processes. It is the nature of law enforcement to uncover the commission of illegal acts at diverse stages. It is often impossible to determine initially what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and least of all complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further details are brought to light.(I) From subsection (e)(8) because the requirement to serve notice on an individual when a record is disclosed under compulsory legal process could unfairly hamper law enforcement processes. It is the nature of law enforcement that there are instances where compliance with these provisions could alert the subject of an investigation of the fact and nature of the investigation, and/or the investigative interest of intelligence or law enforcement agencies; compromise sensitive information related to national security; interfere with the overall law enforcement process by leading to the destruction of evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, fabrication of testimony, and/or flight of the subject; reveal a sensitive investigative or intelligence technique; or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential informants, and witnesses.(J) From subsection (f) because requiring the Agency to grant access to records and establishing agency rules for amendment of records would unfairly impede the agency's law enforcement mission. To require the confirmation or denial of the existence of a record pertaining to a requesting individual may in itself provide an answer to that individual relating to the existence of an on-going investigation. The investigation of possible unlawful activities would be jeopardized by agency rules requiring verification of the record, disclosure of the record to the subject, and record amendment procedures.(K) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.(28)System identifier and name. DMDC 18 DoD, Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker Enterprise Suite (SPOT-ES) Records. (i)Exemption. Information classified under E.O. 13526, as implemented by DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5200.01 and DoD Manual (DoDM) 5200.01, Volumes 1 and 3, may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) .(ii)Authority.5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) .(iii)Reasons. From subsection 5 U.S.C. 552a(d) because granting access to information that is properly classified pursuant to E.O. 13526, as implemented by DoD Instruction 5200.01 and DoD Manual 5200.01, Volumes 1 and 3, may cause damage to the national security.(29)System identifier and name. AARO-0001, All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) Report System.(i)Exemptions. This system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1); (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I); and (f) .(ii)Authority.5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) .(iii)Exemption from the particular subsections. Exemption from the particular subsections of the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, pursuant to exemption (k)(1) is justified for the following reasons: (A)Subsections (c)(3) and (d)(1) and (2). Records in this system of records may contain information concerning individuals that is properly classified pursuant to executive order. Application of exemption (k)(1) for such records may be necessary because access to and amendment of the records, or release of the accounting of disclosures for such records, could reveal classified information. Disclosure of classified records to an individual may cause damage to national security and reveal sensitive sources and methods. Accordingly, application of exemption (k)(1) may be necessary.(B)Subsections (d)(3) and (4). These subsections are inapplicable to the extent an exemption is claimed from (d)(2).(C)Subsection (e)(1). Records within this system may be properly classified pursuant to executive order. In the collection of information for AARO reporting and analysis purposes, it may not always be possible to conclusively determine the relevance and necessity of particular information in the early stages of these types of activities. Additionally, disclosure of classified records to an individual may cause damage to national security and reveal sensitive sources and methods. Accordingly, application of exemption (k)(1) may be necessary.(D)Subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) and subsection (f). These subsections are inapplicable to the extent exemption is claimed from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d). Because portions of this system are exempt from the individual access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) for the reasons noted in paragraphs (c)(29)(iii)(A) and (B) of this section, DoD is not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with respect to such access or amendment provisions. Providing notice to individuals with respect to the existence of records pertaining to them in the system of records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which individuals may access, view, and seek to amend records pertaining to themselves in the system would potentially undermine national security and the confidentiality of classified information. Accordingly, application of exemption (k)(1) may be necessary.(E)Subsection (e)(4)(I). To the extent that this provision is construed to require more detailed disclosure than the broad information currently published in the system notice concerning categories of sources of records in the system, an exemption from this provision is necessary to protect national security and the confidentiality of sources and methods, and other classified information.(iv)Exempt records from other systems. In the course of carrying out the overall purpose for this system, exempt records from other systems of records may in turn become part of the records maintained in this system. To the extent that copies of exempt records from those other systems of records are maintained in this system, the DoD claims the same exemptions for the records from those other systems that are entered into this system, as claimed for the prior system(s) of which they are a part, provided the reason for the exemption remains valid and necessary.84 FR 14730, Apr. 11, 2019, as amended at 86 FR 26672, May 17, 2021; 86 FR 31431, June 14, 2021; 87 FR 37999, June 27, 2022; 88 FR 42237, June 30, 2023 84 FR 14730, 5/13/2019; 86 FR 26672, 6/16/2021; 87 FR 37998, 9/6/2022; 88 FR 42237, 9/8/2023; 89 FR 37128, 7/15/2024