Use of Supplemental Restraint Systems

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms Frequently Used in This Document

IRFA—Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

LOA—Letter of Authorization

NAICS—North American Industry Classification System

NPRM—Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

NTSB—National Transportation Safety Board

OEM—Original Equipment Manufacturer

OMB—Office of Management and Budget

PIC—Pilot in Command

RFA—Regulatory Flexibility Act

SBA—Small Business Administration

SPRS—Supplemental Passenger Restraint System(s)

SRS—Supplemental Restraint System(s)

STC—Supplemental Type Certificate

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary

A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action

B. Summary of the Rule

II. Authority for This Rulemaking

III. Background

A. General Overview of Comments

B. Differences Between the NPRM and the Final Rule

IV. Discussion of Comments and the Final Rule

A. Prohibitions Applicable to SRS and Doors Opened or Removed Flight Operations (§ 91.108(a) and (b))

B. Harness and Lanyard (§ 91.108(c)(1) and (2))

C. Impede Egress in an Emergency After Being Released (§ 91.108(c)(3))

D. Quick Release Requirements (§ 91.108(c)(4))

E. Who May Provide the SRS (§ 91.108(d))

F. Attachment Points (§ 91.108)(e)(1)(i)—(iii))

G. Sizing Criteria (§ 91.108(e)(2))

H. SRS Function (§ 91.108(e)(3))

I. Pilot in Command (§ 91.108(f)(1) Through (5))

J. Passenger Briefing (§ 91.108(g)(1) and (2))

K. Passenger Demonstration (§ 91.108(h)(1) and (2))

L. Individuals Unable To Meet the Demonstration Requirements of the Enhanced Safety Briefing (§ 91.108(i)(1))

M. Individuals Under the Age of 15 (§ 91.108(i)(2))

N. Individuals Seated in the Flightdeck (§ 91.108(i)(3))

O. Passengers Who Occupy or Use an Approved Child Restraint System (§ 91.108(i)(4))

P. Lap-Held Child (§ 91.108(j)(1) and (2))

Q. Excluded Operations (§ 91.108(k)(1) Through (3))

R. Definition (§ 1.1)

S. Miscellaneous Amendments

V. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

A. Summary of the Regulatory Impact Analysis

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

C. International Trade Impact Assessment

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment

E. Paperwork Reduction Act

F. International Compatibility

G. Environmental Analysis

VI. Executive Order Determinations

A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism

B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use

C. Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation

VII. Additional Information

A. Electronic Access and Filing

B. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

I. Executive Summary

A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action

This final rule addresses the use of supplemental restraint systems (SRS) in civil aircraft operations. An SRS is a device used to secure an individual inside an aircraft when that person is not secured by an FAA-approved safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, or an approved child restraint system. SRS are not installed on the aircraft pursuant to a Type Certificate, Supplemental Type Certificate, approved major alteration, or other FAA approval. An SRS consists of a harness secured around the torso of the individual using the SRS and a lanyard that connects the harness to an FAA-approved airframe attachment point inside the aircraft.

On March 11, 2018, five passengers drowned when the open-door helicopter in which they were traveling ditched on the East River in New York, New York. They were unable to exit the aircraft because the harness/tether system each used hindered their egress. As a result of preliminary information discovered during the investigation of this accident, on March 19, 2018, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued Urgent Safety Recommendation A-18-012, which recommended that the FAA prohibit all open-door aircraft operations using passenger harness systems unless the harness system allows passengers to rapidly release the harness with minimal difficulty and without having to cut or forcefully remove the harness. On March 22, 2018, the FAA issued an Emergency Order of Prohibition titled “Operators and Pilots of `Doors Off' Flights for Compensation or Hire” to all operators and pilots of flights for compensation or hire with the doors opened or removed in the United States or using aircraft registered in the United States for doors-off flights. The Emergency Order of Prohibition prohibits the use of supplemental passenger restraint systems (SPRS) that cannot be released quickly in an emergency. At the time of the accident, no rules specifically addressed aircraft operations conducted with the use of SRS, including during operations with doors opened or removed.

B. Summary of the Rule

On November 21, 2023, the FAA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) proposing to prohibit civil aircraft operations conducted with SRS unless operators meet certain requirements for ensuring passenger and crewmember safety during all phases of the operation. After the comment period closed January 22, 2024, the FAA reviewed the ten comments to the NPRM. This rule finalizes the NPRM as proposed, with a few revisions for clarity as discussed throughout this preamble.

This final rule addresses recommendations from the NTSB and the Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General. Additionally, this final rule codifies, with updates, an Emergency Order currently in effect addressing safety concerns regarding the use of supplemental restraints.

Generally, this final rule prohibits civil aircraft operations when individuals are secured by SRS except as provided in § 91.108. In addition, flight operations with doors opened or removed are prohibited when individuals are using SRS except under two scenarios. The first scenario is when each individual occupies an FAA-approved seat or berth with a safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, properly secured about them or occupies a properly secured and approved child restraint system during the entire flight. The second scenario is if each individual occupies an FAA-approved seat or berth with a safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, properly secured about them during movement on the surface, takeoff, and landing; during other phases of flight, if permitted by the pilot in command (PIC), the individual may use an SRS that meets all requirements in this rule. The operator generally will provide the SRS to individuals who seek to use the SRS during the flight, but in some cases, an individual may opt to provide their own SRS if it meets the requirements of this rule and the PIC approves use of the SRS.

This final rule requires the SRS to have a release mechanism that can be operated quickly by the passenger using the SRS with minimal difficulty. The release mechanism must be located on the front or side of the harness in a place easily accessible to and visible by the individual using the SRS and must prevent inadvertent release. Also, the release mechanism cannot require the use of a knife to cut the restraint, the use of any other additional tool, or the assistance of any other individual to release the SRS. This final rule also requires the SRS to not impede egress from the aircraft in an emergency after being released.

This final rule requires the SRS to be connected to an FAA-approved airframe attachment point or points rated equal to or greater than the combined weight of all the individuals using an SRS attached to that same point, but it cannot be connected to any airframe attachment point located in the flightdeck. Additionally, the rule requires that the SRS lanyard secures around the torso of the individual using the SRS and ensures the torso of the individual remains inside the aircraft at all times. The rule also prohibits the SRS from connecting to any seatbelt or shoulder harness attachment point unless the attachment point is FAA-approved, and nothing may attach to the SRS that is not relevant to its function. In addition, the SRS must fit the individual using it based on the sizing criteria for which the SRS is rated.

This final rule also requires operators conducting flight operations where passengers use an SRS to provide an enhanced passenger safety briefing. Further, this rule requires passengers who seek to use an SRS during flight operations to demonstrate their ability to use, secure, and release the FAA-approved safety belts and, if installed, shoulder harnesses, as well as their ability to release quickly the SRS with no assistance and with minimal difficulty. A passenger who cannot meet the demonstration requirements of the rule is prohibited from using an SRS; however, they would be permitted to participate in the flight if they occupy an FAA-approved seat or berth with a safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, properly secured about them during operations when the doors are opened or removed or when otherwise required by regulations. Only those passengers who have reached their fifteenth birthday can use an SRS during flight operations, and no individual using an SRS can occupy a seat in the flightdeck. In addition, this final rule prohibits individuals who occupy a child restraint system from also using an SRS. It also prohibits a child who is less than two years old from being held (1) by an adult who is using an SRS or (2) when the aircraft doors are opened or removed even if the adult is properly secured by an FAA-approved safety belt.

Finally, the rule outlines the responsibilities of the PIC, including determining whether an SRS complies with the requirements of the rule and whether SRS may be used during flight operations.

II. Authority for This Rulemaking

The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in Title 49 of the United States Code (49 U.S.C.). Subtitle I of 49 U.S.C., specifically section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII of 49 U.S.C., Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's authority.

The FAA promulgates this rulemaking under the authority described in 49 U.S.C. 106(f), which establishes the authority of the Administrator to promulgate regulations and rules, and 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5), which requires the Administrator to promote safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations and setting minimum standards for other practices, methods, and procedures necessary for safety in air commerce and national security.

III. Background

A. General Overview of Comments

The FAA received and considered 10 comments on the NPRM, four of which were from organizations: Condon & Forsyth, Helicopter Association International (HAI), the NTSB, and Tuckamore Aviation. Four of the commenters supported the rule with no changes, five commenters expressed support but also proposed changes, and one commenter opposed the proposed rule in its entirety.

B. Differences Between the NPRM and the Final Rule

This rule finalizes the NPRM as proposed with a few revisions to maximize clarity or after consideration in response to comments. The FAA is updating § 91.108 paragraphs (b)(2), (c)(2), (e)(1)(i), and the definition of “supplemental restraint system” to include “FAA-approved” airframe attachment point to ensure that the SRS can only be attached to an airframe attachment point when the FAA has determined that point complies with the applicable part 21 approval requirements. The FAA is also adding a prohibition that the SRS cannot be connected to any seatbelt or shoulder harness attachment point(s) unless the attachment is FAA-approved as described in § 91.108 paragraph (e)(1)(i). The FAA is amending the proposed regulatory text to prohibit anything from attaching to the SRS that is not relevant to its function. The FAA also is moving the SRS definition from § 91.108 to § 1.1. Finally, the FAA made some grammatical changes to the regulatory text that are technical in nature and that do not substantively change the previous intent of the provisions.

IV. Discussion of Comments and the Final Rule

A. Prohibitions Applicable to SRS and Doors Opened or Removed Flight Operations (§ 91.108(a) and (b))

The FAA proposed in § 91.108(a) that, except as provided in this rule, no person may conduct a civil aircraft operation in which any individual on board is secured with an SRS. The FAA also proposed in § 91.108(b) that no person may operate a civil aircraft with the doors opened or removed unless (1) each individual on board occupies an approved seat or berth with a safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness during all phases of flight or (2) each individual occupies an approved seat or berth with a safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness during movement on the surface, takeoff, and landing and is secured for the remainder of the flight by an SRS. As part of the proposal, the FAA applied some of the requirements to all “individuals” using an SRS, not just passengers.

Tuckamore Aviation commented that the rule should only apply to passengers and not crewmembers because it introduces conflicting definitions and requirements to existing safety guidance, established equipment use, and practices and procedures established by other government agencies for crewmembers. Further, Tuckamore Aviation commented that all public aircraft operations need to be exempt from proposed 14 CFR 91.108.

The FAA disagrees with Tuckamore Aviation's assertion that the rule should only apply to passengers and not crewmembers. Applying the rule to all individuals on board the aircraft will help mitigate the risks associated with using SRS, particularly during operations with doors opened or removed, and will ensure the highest level of safety when conducting such operations. The safety risks involved in operations using SRS do not apply only to passengers—they apply to all individuals on board, including the crew. As a result, to ensure the safety of all individuals secured by an SRS during civil aircraft operations, the FAA finalizes the language as proposed and applies the requirements of the rule (with the exception of the passenger briefing and demonstration) to all individuals, not just passengers onboard the aircraft.

The FAA agrees with Tuckamore that all public aircraft operations (PAO) should be exempt from the rule, but it disagrees with Tuckamore's characterization of PAO. The status of an aircraft operation is either civil or public. If an aircraft is operating under public status, § 91.108 would not apply. If an aircraft is operating under civil status, § 91.108 would apply unless the operator applies for an exemption. Contrary to Tuckamore's assertion, operations conducted by civil aircraft under contract with a valid government entity do constitute PAO as long as the contracting entity has filed a declaration letter with the local Flight Standards District Office (FSDO). Otherwise, the FAA considers the operator to be operating under civil status. Moreover, operations by a PAO contractor are, and must be, distinguishable from their civil aircraft operations. There is no mixed status of both civil and public aircraft operations. PAO status is determined on a flight-by-flight basis, and the operator should determine the nature of the flight prior to the operation to determine the applicability of § 91.108 to its operation. As a result of the foregoing, the FAA adopts the language as proposed and applies § 91.108 to civil aircraft operations, thereby excluding public aircraft operations. The FAA removed the word “registered” from proposed § 91.108(a) and (b)(1) as it is redundant to the rule's application to civil aircraft—this revision does not change the applicability of this section.

Finally, the FAA notes that it amended the language in § 91.108 paragraphs (a) and (b)(2). In paragraph (a), the FAA made a technical amendment by adding a cross-reference to the definition of “supplemental restraint system” under § 1.1, further highlighting that the term is formally defined under § 1.1. The FAA also amended paragraph (b)(2) by adding a reference to an “FAA-approved” airframe attachment point. This change reflects a similar change made in paragraph (e)(1)(i) in response to comments, and it highlights the fact that an SRS can only be attached to an airframe attachment point when the FAA has determined that point complies with the applicable part 21 approval requirements. As a result, the FAA is adopting the language in paragraphs (a) and (b)(2) as amended.

B. Harness and Lanyard (§ 91.108(c)(1) and (2))

The FAA proposed that each SRS have a harness that secures around the individual's torso and a lanyard that connects the harness to an airframe attachment point or points, ensuring that the individual's torso remains inside the aircraft at all times. The FAA did not receive comments on this proposed provision; however, as with paragraph (b)(2), the FAA has included “FAA-approved” in reference to the attachment points for the same reasons cited previously. Therefore, the FAA is adopting the language in paragraph (c)(1) as proposed and the language in paragraph (c)(2) as amended.

C. Impede Egress in an Emergency After Being Released (§ 91.108(c)(3))

The FAA proposed that an SRS must not impede egress from the aircraft in an emergency after being released. The FAA did not receive comments on this proposed provision and adopts the language as proposed.

D. Quick Release Requirements (§ 91.108(c)(4))

As part of the SRS design requirements, the FAA proposed an SRS have a release mechanism that (1) an individual can quickly operate with minimal difficulty, (2) is attached to the front or side of the harness in a location easily accessible to and visible by the individual using it, (3) prevents inadvertent release, and (4) requires that the supplemental restraint system can be released without the use of a knife to cut the restraint, any other additional tool, or the assistance of any other individual to release the SRS.

The NTSB commented that the final rule should include standards that are specific to the operational environment in which an SRS is intended to be used to prevent certain quick release mechanisms from being susceptible to inadvertent release by neighboring occupants if they are seated close to each other.

The FAA has determined that the language in the rule is appropriately scoped to encompass any type of inadvertent release and in any type of operational environment. “Prevents inadvertent release” includes inadvertent release by the occupant of the SRS as well as any people proximate to the occupant of the SRS. The FAA amends § 91.108(c)(4)(iv), which previously set forth the requirement in the negative. This paragraph now states that an SRS must have a release mechanism that “can be released without the use of a knife to cut the restraint, and without any additional tool or the assistance of any other individual.” This grammatical change is only technical in nature and does not substantively change the previous intent of the provision. The FAA did not make any other changes to paragraph (c)(4) and adopts the language as amended.

E. Who May Provide the SRS (§ 91.108(d))

The FAA proposed to allow an individual to provide an SRS for use during a flight. The FAA explained that, in some cases, an individual ( e.g., professional photographer, fire suppression technician, wildlife net gunner, etc.) may have access to an SRS and want to use it on different operators' aircraft. For an individual providing their own SRS, the FAA proposed that they must confirm with the PIC, either verbally or in writing, as determined by the PIC, the SRS's continued serviceability and readiness for its intended purposes. In addition, the FAA proposed to require that each individual providing their own SRS complies with the sizing criteria for which the SRS is rated.

Two commenters, including Tuckamore Aviation, commented that individuals providing their own SRS for a flight should be required to present written confirmation of their SRS's serviceability, readiness, and size rating compliance. The commenters stated it is reasonable to expect an individual to have a written record of the inspection or an authorized release certificate under a maintenance release and that it is unreasonable to expect the aircraft operator or PIC to accept a verbal confirmation.

The FAA disagrees with the commenters. The rule is intended to provide the PIC flexibility in determining what method they will use for confirmation of the system's continued serviceability and readiness for its intended purposes. If a PIC determines written confirmation is necessary, they have the discretion to require that type of confirmation before the individual can occupy the SRS during flight operations.

The FAA also received a comment from Tuckamore Aviation stating that verification of continued serviceability and readiness of an SRS should be the responsibility of whoever is providing the SRS, whether it is the owner/operator or the individual.

The FAA agrees with Tuckamore Aviation. An individual providing their own SRS should be responsible for ensuring the system's continued serviceability and readiness for its intended purpose. That requirement is outlined in § 91.108(d)(1). The FAA also agrees that an operator that provides any SRS for their aircraft operations should be responsible for ensuring the SRS's serviceability and readiness because they are in the best position to make these determinations. As mentioned in the NPRM, one way to determine the SRS's serviceability and readiness is by ensuring the SRS is inspected and maintained in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. It would be unreasonable to place this onus on the PIC, who is not responsible for maintaining and inspecting SRS that an operator or individual provides.

The same rationale for paragraph (d)(1) also applies to paragraph (d)(2). The FAA determined that, in addition to an individual providing their own SRS, an operator that provides an SRS should be the responsible entity for ensuring that the individual who will occupy the SRS complies with the sizing criteria for which the system is rated. Whoever provides the SRS is ultimately in the best position to know an SRS's sizing criteria and to determine whether the individual who will occupy the system meets those criteria. As a result, the FAA will require an operator and an individual providing their own SRS to (1) confirm with the PIC, either verbally or in writing, that the system is serviceable and ready for its intended purpose, and (2) ensure the individual who will occupy the SRS complies with the sizing criteria for which the system is rated. The FAA therefore amends the language in paragraphs (d)(1) and (2) as described to ensure responsibility is placed on the appropriate entity.

F. Attachment Points (§ 91.108)(e)(1)(i) Through (iii))

The FAA proposed under § 91.108(e)(1)(i) requiring a qualified individual to attach the SRS lanyard to an airframe attachment point(s) with a rated strength equal to or greater than the total weight of the occupant (or the combined weight if there is more than one occupant attached to an attachment point). The FAA received four comments regarding attachment points, how they are identified, and if they are FAA-approved.

Two commenters, including Tuckamore Aviation, commented that an approved airframe attachment point should be limited to existing hard points or mooring points identified by aircraft original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), a Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) hard point, or approved through engineering analysis. The commenters noted that weight of passengers considers only static loading and that the FAA should use the limit load requirements of either 14 CFR part 27 or part 29.

Another commenter stated that specific language defining exactly what type of anchor point may be used with an SRS would be beneficial. The commenter recommended that the FAA only allow “hard points” or “anchor points” specifically designed for restraint systems to be used in conjunction with an SRS and to not allow seat mounts, seat frames, etc., to be used with an SRS.

The FAA agrees with the commenters that clarification on the type of airframe attachment point is necessary. In order to ensure that an SRS will provide restraint to the user when in use, pilots and operators need to know how to identify an approved airframe attachment point. The FAA has revised the regulatory text to only allow an SRS to be connected to an FAA-approved airframe attachment point or points rated equal to or greater than the weight of the individual using the supplemental restraint system (or the combined weight if there is more than one supplemental restraint system attached to an attachment point). Adding “FAA-approved” ensures that the SRS can only be attached to an airframe attachment point when the FAA has determined that point complies with the applicable part 21 approval requirements. The FAA removed the word “strength” from paragraph (e)(1)(i) and instead focuses on the weight of the individual. Focusing on the weight of the individual reflects the fact that attachment point ratings are developed for all possible load conditions as long as the weight of the individual does not exceed the weight for which the attachment point is rated. Ultimately, the FAA has determined that any FAA-approved attachment point that is rated for a given individual's weight may be safely used for all load conditions in accordance with the airworthiness requirements ( e.g., applicable part 21 approval requirements). Thus, the attachment point will have sufficient strength to safely restrain the individual using an SRS for all flight load conditions. The FAA acknowledges that the commenter suggested that SRS only be allowed to attach to hard points or anchor points specifically designed for SRS. The FAA has determined that adding “FAA-approved” to the rule language achieves the same objective by specifying that the attachment points must have been evaluated by the FAA to allow an SRS to be attached to it. As a result of the foregoing, the FAA finalizes the language in paragraph (e)(1)(i) as amended.

The FAA proposed under § 91.108(e)(1)(ii) that no SRS may be connected to any airframe attachment point located in the flightdeck. The FAA did not receive comments on this specific proposed provision; however, it did receive comments regarding prohibiting individuals seated in the flightdeck from using an SRS. For a discussion of those comments, see section IV.N. of this preamble. Because the FAA did not receive comments regarding airframe attachment points in the flightdeck, the FAA is adopting the language as proposed.

In the final comment pertaining to attachment points, the NTSB expressed concern that operators may use seat belt attachment points for SRS unless specifically prohibited, which may increase loads on seat belt and shoulder harness attachment points during emergency landing conditions. The NTSB urged the FAA to prohibit SRS from being attached to seat belt attachment points on the airframe.

The FAA agrees. In response to the NTSB's concern about attaching an SRS to a seatbelt or shoulder harness attachment point, the FAA added a requirement for FAA approval under § 91.108(e)(1)(iii) prohibiting an SRS from attaching to any seatbelt or shoulder harness attachment point(s) unless the attachment point is FAA-approved, meaning the attachment point or points is rated equal to or greater than the weight of the individual using the supplemental restraint system (or the combined weight if there is more than one supplemental restraint system attached to an attachment point). This change ensures that an SRS is attached only to attachment points that the FAA has determined comply with the applicable part 21 approval requirements. Therefore, the FAA finalizes the new language in paragraph (e)(1)(iii) as amended.

G. Sizing Criteria (§ 91.108(e)(2))

The FAA proposed that the SRS must fit the individual using it based on the sizing criteria for which the SRS is rated. The FAA did not receive comments on this proposed provision. Therefore, the FAA is adopting the language as proposed.

H. SRS Function (§ 91.108(e)(3))

In addition to the other points raised by the NTSB, the NTSB commented that the proposed rule did not address whether operators and individuals may secure additional items to the SRS that are not relevant to its function. The NTSB believed the final rule should prohibit any items that are not relevant to the function of the SRS from being secured to it.

The FAA agrees with the NTSB. Any items attached to the SRS that are not relevant to its function could inhibit proper function of the SRS, could prevent quick release of the SRS, and could impede egress. As a result, the FAA has added a new paragraph (e)(3) that states, “Nothing may attach to the supplemental restraint system that is not relevant to its function as defined under § 1.1 of this chapter.” Adding this paragraph will help ensure that nothing is attached to the SRS that interferes with the system's proper function or interferes with an individual's ability to quickly egress the aircraft.

I. Pilot in Command (§ 91.108(f)(1) Through (5))

The FAA proposed that regardless of who provides the SRS, the PIC has the overall responsibility to ensure that the SRS meets the requirements of § 91.108, and the PIC cannot permit an individual to use an SRS that does not meet the requirements of the rule. The FAA also proposed that the PIC must ensure the SRS's continued serviceability and readiness for its intended purpose (if provided by the operator or PIC) and ensure any individual using an SRS provided by the operator or PIC complies with the SRS sizing criteria. Finally, the FAA proposed that the PIC has final authority regarding whether the SRS may be used during flight operations and whether to authorize an individual to release the FAA-approved safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness and remain secured only by the SRS.

As mentioned in section IV.E of this preamble, Tuckamore Aviation commented that the operator/owner or individual providing the SRS should be responsible for ensuring its continued serviceability and readiness for its intended purpose. The FAA agrees for the reasons cited previously and has revised paragraph (f)(2) accordingly, which mirrors the amendments in paragraph (d)(1). The FAA amends that paragraph to indicate that before each takeoff, the PIC must receive confirmation from the operator or any individual providing an SRS of the system's continued serviceability and readiness for its intended purpose. The PIC would no longer be responsible for ensuring the SRS is adequately maintained and inspected; instead, the PIC is simply responsible for receiving confirmation from the operator or any individuals that their SRS are serviceable and ready for use. The FAA did not receive comments on paragraphs (f)(1), (3), (4), or (5). As a result of the foregoing, the FAA is adopting the language in paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(3) through (5) as proposed and is adopting the language in paragraph (f)(2) as amended.

J. Passenger Briefing (§ 91.108(g)(1) and (2))

The FAA proposed to require a passenger briefing on how to use, secure, and release an SRS during a flight. The FAA also proposed to require that each passenger has been briefed on means of direct communication and notification between crewmembers and passengers. The FAA did not receive comments on this proposed provision. Therefore, the FAA is adopting the language as proposed.

K. Passenger Demonstration (§ 91.108(h)(1) and (2))

The FAA proposed a requirement that all passengers using an SRS demonstrate to the PIC, a crewmember, or other qualified person designated by the operator their ability to use, secure, and release the FAA-approved safety belts and, if installed, shoulder harnesses, as well as their ability to release the SRS quickly without assistance and with minimal difficulty. The FAA did not receive comments on this proposed provision. Therefore, the FAA is adopting the language as proposed.

L. Individuals Unable To Meet the Demonstration Requirements of the Enhanced Safety Briefing (§ 91.108(i)(1))

The FAA proposed that if an individual cannot demonstrate that they are able to use, secure, and release the FAA-approved safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, and able to release quickly the SRS with no assistance and with minimal difficulty, the individual would be prohibited from occupying or using an SRS during the flight. The FAA did not receive comments on this proposed provision; however, the FAA intended paragraphs (i)(1)(i) and (ii) to be required separately rather than together and therefore amends the conjunction between (i)(1)(i) and (ii) from “and” to “or.” The failure to meet either of the two conditions is grounds for prohibiting the use of an SRS by that individual. The FAA therefore amends the regulatory text and is adopting the language in paragraph (i)(1) as amended. In addition, because the FAA has moved the definition of SRS from § 91.108 to § 1.1, the FAA revised the introductory text under § 91.108(i) to reference § 1.1 instead of paragraph (l) and adopts the revised text as final.

M. Individuals Under the Age of 15 (§ 91.108(i)(2))

In § 91.108(i)(2), the FAA proposed prohibiting anyone less than 15 years of age from using an SRS. Condon & Forsyth recommended that paragraph (i)(2) be deleted in its entirety because Condon & Forsyth believed it is arbitrary, overly broad, and unnecessary due to the requirements of proposed § 91.108(h) ( Passenger demonstration) and § 91.108(e)(2), which requires an SRS to fit the individual using it based on the sizing criteria for which the SRS is rated.

The FAA disagrees with the commenter. Evacuation in an emergency landing is a highly stressful event. The purpose of the age restriction is to ensure that occupants of an SRS are able to release themselves in an emergency as well as not impede egress from the aircraft for themselves or the other occupants. In the Exit Row Seating rule, the FAA determined that 15 years of age is sufficient to perform the complex task of opening an emergency exit in an exit row and that younger individuals cannot be relied upon to perform a complex task in an emergency. In that final rule, the FAA cited a study entitled “Survival in Emergency Escape from Passenger Aircraft,” which reviewed human factors relating to survival and the behavior of the passengers. The final rule also cited a memorandum based on the Civil Aerospace Medical Institute's (CAMI) “Accident/Incident Bio-Medical Data Reports” containing over 3,000 entries. The study concluded that survival depends largely on the ability of the passenger to exit the aircraft, and the memorandum stated that extreme youth is a factor that generally impedes rapid evacuation.

The FAA determined that the scenarios and analysis in the Exit Row Seating final rule are applicable to the release of an SRS in emergency conditions. The FAA has ample data from CAMI showing that children may not have the capacity to act quickly in an emergency, further supporting the FAA's position that children under 15 years of age should not be encumbered by an SRS when needing to escape during an emergency. The inability of a child to egress in an emergency as a result of an SRS would not only endanger the child, it could also endanger other individuals in the aircraft. In addition, since the Exit Row Seating rule took effect over thirty years ago, there have been no data showing that 15 years of age is an inappropriate metric for aircraft emergencies. The FAA therefore responds to the commenter that its determination of 15 years of age was not arbitrary, overly broad, or capricious because it was based on previous studies, data, and observations. Moreover, there is no precedent for individuals younger than 15 to act in an emergency and in a high-stress environment where critical decisions must be made in a matter of seconds. Because the FAA does not have other data supporting the proposition that children at any age younger than 15 possess the capacity to act quickly in an emergency, prescribing a rule that allows children of any specific age below 15 years to use an SRS would be arbitrary and capricious.

N. Individuals Seated in the Flightdeck (§ 91.108(i)(3))

The FAA proposed prohibiting anyone sitting in the flightdeck from using an SRS. The FAA received three comments regarding these prohibitions. Condon & Forsyth recommended that proposed § 91.108(i)(3) be deleted in its entirety since Condon & Forsyth believed it is arbitrary, overly broad, and fails to adequately address the very narrow and specific issue of flight/engine control interference for civil aircraft/rotorcraft that utilize floor-mounted engine controls. Alternatively, Condon & Forsyth proposed § 91.108(i)(3) should be limited in scope to any aircraft/rotorcraft that utilize floor-mounted engine controls like those found in the AS350B series helicopter.

Two commenters also stated that in certain aircraft, the flightdeck (cockpit) is well separated from the PIC position, either by a console or an aftermarket supplemental type certificated separation barrier that is designed to ensure no interference with flight or other controls in the flightdeck. The commenters further noted if there are no flight controls and/or if they are locked out in the area of the flightdeck (cockpit), the SRS should be permitted to be attached to an attachment hard point in this area.

The FAA disagrees with the commenters. In the NPRM, the FAA specifically stated that the flightdeck prohibition is based on a review of past accidents and incidents where unsecured items, including those with straps and lanyards, have a history of interfering with flight and engine controls. In the Liberty Helicopters accident, a tether caught on and activated the floor-mounted engine fuel shutoff lever, resulting in the in-flight loss of engine power and subsequent ditching. Further, airworthiness standards codified at 14 CFR parts 23, 25, 27, and 29, which require that flight and engine controls not be subject to inadvertent operation, do not address circumstances when carry-on objects, tethers, or straps would inadvertently move a control. Consequently, crewmembers or passengers in the flightdeck should not be attached to or carry equipment that could snag on controls. Inadvertent activation of the fuel shutoff lever is only one type of accidental interference with flight controls that warrants concern. Additional examples are discussed in the NPRM preamble. Modifications to provide separation for a specific instrument or flight control have not been shown to protect from interference with all flight instruments or controls. With an SRS, an individual in the flightdeck has a greater range of motion, allowing many more potential actions that could interfere with the controls as compared to an individual restrained only by the FAA-approved safety belt. The FAA has determined that allowing any seating of an individual occupying an SRS in the flightdeck imposes an unacceptable level of risk to the aircraft operation and the individuals on board the aircraft, and it would not prevent an accident similar to the Liberty Helicopters accident. As a result, the FAA maintains the prohibition and adopts § 91.108(i)(3) as final.

O. Passengers Who Occupy or Use an Approved Child Restraint System (§ 91.108(i)(4))

The FAA proposed to prohibit anyone occupying or using a child restraint system from also using an SRS. The FAA did not receive comments on this proposed provision. Therefore, the FAA is adopting the language as proposed.

P. Lap-Held Child (§ 91.108(j)(1) and (2))

The FAA proposed prohibiting a child who has not reached their second birthday from being held by an adult during civil aircraft operations when the adult uses an SRS or during any operation in which the doors are opened or removed. The FAA did not receive comments on this proposed provision. Therefore, the FAA is adopting the language as proposed.

Q. Excluded Operations (§ 91.108(k)(1) Through (3))

The FAA proposed excluding certain operations from complying with § 91.108. First, under paragraph (k)(1), the FAA proposed excluding operations conducted under part 105 (“Parachute Operations”) or part 133 (“Rotorcraft External-Load Operations”). Second, under paragraph (k)(2), operators that are subject to the requirements of this rule, particularly paragraph (b)(1)—which requires each individual on board to be properly secured by either a safety belt/shoulder harness or an SRS—may operate an aircraft with the doors opened or removed even with flightcrew members on board who are subject to the requirements of § 91.105 (“Flight crewmembers at stations”) or § 135.171 (“Shoulder harness installation at flight crewmember stations”). Third, under paragraph (k)(3), the FAA proposed that the requirements under paragraph (b)(2), requiring an individual to be properly secured by an SRS before releasing their safety belt/shoulder harness, would not apply to flightcrew members subject to the requirements of §§ 91.105 or 135.171 to the extent they need to unfasten their shoulder harnesses in accordance with those sections.

An individual commented that consideration needs to be made for rotorcraft external load operations (part 133) where a crewmember is working with an open or removed door, i.e., essential crewmember, e.g., spotter, or winch operator for Class D or Class B human external cargo rotorcraft-load combination (RLC). The FAA intentionally excluded part 133 from this rulemaking because that part has its own unique certification and operating rules. As a result, changes to part 133 are not within the scope of this rulemaking.

Another commenter mentioned that for certain parachute operations, the rule needs to be considered for personnel working unseated and not belted into a seat or berth if the door is removed or opened. As with part 133, the FAA intentionally excluded part 105 from this rulemaking because that part has its own unique operating rules. As a result, changes to part 105 are not within the scope of this rulemaking.

The FAA makes technical amendments to paragraphs (k)(2) and (k)(3). Specifically, the FAA determined the regulatory text should state “§§ 91.105 or 135.171” instead of “§§ 91.105 and 135.171” (emphasis added). The intent of this provision is to allow an operator to conduct a flight with doors opened or removed under § 91.108(b)(1) even if there are flight crewmembers on board who are subject to either § 91.105 or § 135.171—not just those flight crewmembers who would be subject to both regulations. This grammatical change is only technical in nature and does not substantively change the previous intent of the provisions. The FAA did not make any other changes to paragraph (k). As a result of the foregoing, the FAA adopts the language in paragraphs (k)(1) through (3) as amended.

R. Definition (§ 1.1)

The FAA proposed under § 91.108(l) to define an SRS as any device that is not installed on the aircraft pursuant to an FAA approval, used to secure an individual inside an aircraft when that person is not properly secured by an FAA-approved safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, or an approved child restraint system. A supplemental restraint system consists of a harness secured around the torso of the individual using the SRS and a lanyard that connects the harness to an approved airframe attachment point inside the aircraft.

The FAA did not receive comments on this proposed provision; however, to reflect a similar change made in paragraph (e)(1)(i) in response to comments, the FAA has added “FAA-” in front of “approved airframe attachment point” to highlight the fact that an SRS can only be attached to an airframe attachment point that the FAA has determined complies with the applicable part 21 approval requirements. In addition, the FAA has moved the definition from § 91.108 to § 1.1 (“General definitions”) because “supplemental restraint system” is also referenced in parts 135 and 136. Placing the definition in § 1.1 will make it easier to find and will clarify that the definition applies to other parts that use the term, not just part 91. Therefore, the FAA is adopting the language as amended and placing it within § 1.1.

S. Miscellaneous Amendments

Tuckamore Aviation commented that there are many unique missions conducted by helicopters that may require waiver of this proposed rule and that the proposed regulations should not apply to all SRS being used in different operations.

The FAA disagrees. As explained in the NPRM, the FAA has determined that waivers are inappropriate in this rule. The waiver process does not allow the FAA to conduct the same level of analysis as the exemption process, which allows the FAA to analyze in more detail whether a proposed operation outlined in a petition for exemption would not adversely affect safety or provides an equivalent level of safety compared to the regulatory requirement. Moreover, the FAA did not receive comments providing information that would support allowing this rule to be waivable. As a result, the FAA will not add § 91.108 to the list of waivable regulations under § 91.905.

The FAA received a comment from an individual proposing the withdrawal of the proposed rule and not allowing individuals to move about the aircraft. The commenter instead suggested adding a new paragraph to existing § 91.107 to prohibit SRS operations.

The FAA disagrees with the commenter. Section 91.108(a) prohibits persons from conducting a civil aircraft operation with individuals on board secured with an SRS unless the other requirements of the section have been met. The FAA has determined that these requirements help mitigate the identified safety risks during operations when SRS are used. Under this rule, operations with an SRS will be conducted with an acceptable level of safety. Finally, a blanket prohibition of SRS would be overly broad, arbitrary, and capricious because the FAA has already determined through the Emergency Order of Prohibition that some aircraft operations may be safely conducted while individuals are using SRS. As a result, the FAA is finalizing § 91.108 as amended, allowing operations conducted with SRS under certain circumstances as long as the requirements in the rule are met.

V. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

Federal agencies consider the impacts of regulatory actions under a variety of executive orders and other requirements. First, Executive Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563, as amended by Executive Order 14094 (“Modernizing Regulatory Review”), direct that each Federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify the costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) requires agencies to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and Tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year. The current threshold after adjustment for inflation is $183 million using the most current (2023) Implicit Price Deflator for the Gross Domestic Product. The FAA has provided a detailed Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) in the docket for this rulemaking. This portion of the preamble summarizes the FAA's analysis of the economic impacts of this final rule.

In conducting these analyses, the FAA has determined that this rule: will result in benefits that justify costs; is not an economically “significant regulatory action” as defined in section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866, as amended; will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities; will not create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States; and will not impose an unfunded mandate on State, local, or Tribal governments, or on the private sector.

A. Summary of the Regulatory Impact Analysis

The FAA estimates that for safety benefits to equal or exceed the costs of the final rule, based on a 20-year analysis, two accidents of the same severity as the Liberty Helicopters accident would need to be mitigated. The estimated safety benefit in present value, from mitigating one part 91 and one part 135 helicopter accident ( i.e., an accident in year 10 and an accident in year 20 of the analysis period) will range from $26.8 million to $40.2 million at a 7 percent discount rate, from $45.4 million to $68.0 million at a 3 percent discount rate, and from $52.2 million to $78.3 million at a 2 percent discount rate.

The cost of the rule to operators, pilots, and passengers comes from purchasing harnesses and lanyards that meet specific requirements as set forth in this rule, conducting a pre-flight safety briefing on the use of the SRS, and requiring passengers to demonstrate their ability to remove the SRS in the event of an emergency. The FAA will also incur costs for periodic surveillance of parts 91 and 135 SRS operations. The estimated present value cost to the FAA over 20 years is $1,240 at a 7 percent discount rate, $1,263 at a 3 percent discount rate, and $1,449 at a 2 percent discount rate. The estimated present value total cost to industry and the FAA for these requirements over 20 years is $22.3 million at a 7 percent discount rate, $31.7 million at a 3 percent discount rate, and $34.9 million at a 2 percent discount rate. Estimated safety benefits and costs are shown in the table below.