Facilitating Implementation of Next Generation 911 Services (NG911); Location-Based Routing for Wireless 911 Calls

AGENCY:

Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION:

Final rule.

SUMMARY:

In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (the FCC or Commission) adopted a Report and Order to advance the nationwide Next Generation 911 (NG911) transition rules that define the responsibilities and set deadlines for originating service providers (OSPs) to implement NG911 capabilities on their networks and deliver 911 calls to NG911 systems established by 911 authorities. In addition, the rules preserve the authority of state, territorial, regional, Tribal, and local government to adopt alternative approaches to the configuration, timing, and cost responsibility for NG911 implementation within their jurisdictions.

DATES:

Effective date: November 25, 2024.

Compliance date: Compliance will not be required for §§ 9.31(a) through (c) and 9.34(a) and (b) until a document is published in the Federal Register announcing a compliance date and revising or removing §§ 9.31(d) and 9.34(c).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

This is a summary of the Commission's Report and Order in PS Docket Nos. 21-479 and 18-64, FCC 24-78, adopted on July 18, 2024, released on July 19, 2024, and corrected via an Erratum released on September 5, 2024. The full text of this document is available for public inspection at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-78A1.pdf. To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an email to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice).

Congressional Review Act

The Commission has determined, and the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, concurs, that this rule is major under the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 804(2). The Commission will send a copy of the Report and Order to Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).

Synopsis

I. Introduction

This document is a summary of the Commission's Report and Order (Order). In the Order, we take steps that will advance the nationwide transition to Next Generation 911 (NG911). Like communications networks generally, dedicated 911 networks are evolving from Time Division Multiplexing (TDM)-based circuit-switched architectures to internet Protocol (IP)-based architectures. With the transition to NG911, legacy 911 networks will be replaced by IP-based technologies and applications, which provide new capabilities and improved interoperability and system resilience. Most states have begun to invest significantly in NG911, but some have experienced delays in communications providers connecting to these IP-based networks. As a result of these delays, state and local 911 authorities incur prolonged costs because of the need to maintain both legacy and IP networks during the transition. Managing 911 traffic on both legacy and IP networks at the same time may also result in increased vulnerability and risk of 911 outages.

To facilitate the NG911 transition, we adopt rules that will require wireline providers, Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS) providers, covered text providers, providers of interconnected Voice over internet Protocol (VoIP) services, and providers of internet-based Telecommunications Relay Service (internet-based TRS) (collectively “originating service providers” or “OSPs”) to take actions to start or continue the transition to NG911 in coordination with 911 Authorities. The rules create a consistent NG911 transition framework at the national level, while also affording flexibility to 911 Authorities to modify the transition framework at the State, regional, local, territorial, or Tribal level.

We implement a two-phased approach to guide the transition to NG911. Each phase is initiated by a 911 Authority submitting a valid request to OSPs within the jurisdiction where the 911 Authority is located for the OSPs to comply with NG911 requirements, including:

• Phase 1: Upon receiving a valid Phase 1 request from a 911 Authority, an OSP must commence delivery of 911 traffic in IP-based Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) format to one or more in-state NG911 Delivery Points designated by the 911 Authority. Phase 1 will enable 911 Authorities to deploy Emergency Services IP Networks (ESInets) in a cost-effective manner by selecting convenient delivery points to receive 911 traffic; will improve 911 reliability by using an IP-based format, rather than legacy format, to deliver 911 traffic; and will establish the transmission platforms necessary for upgrading to Phase 2.
• Phase 2: Upon receiving a valid Phase 2 request from a 911 Authority, an OSP must commence delivery of 911 traffic to the designated in-state NG911 Delivery Point(s) in an IP-based SIP format that complies with NG911 commonly accepted standards identified by the 911 Authority, including having location information embedded in the call signaling using Presence Information Data Format—Location Object (PIDF-LO) or the functional equivalent. In Phase 2, the OSP must install and put into operation all equipment, software applications, and other infrastructure, or acquire all services, necessary to use a Location Information Server (LIS) or its functional equivalent for the verification of its customer location information and records. Phase 2 will facilitate use of the functional elements of Next Generation 911 Core Services (NGCS), which can deliver dynamic information to Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs), enabling them to use policy routing functions to dynamically reroute 911 traffic to avoid network disruptions, thus reducing the impact of outages on 911 continuity.

For both Phase 1 and Phase 2, 911 Authorities must meet specific readiness criteria in order to make a valid request for OSP delivery of NG911 traffic. For Phase 1, the 911 Authority must certify that it has all the necessary infrastructure installed and operational to receive 911 traffic in SIP format and to transmit such traffic to the PSAPs connected to it. The 911 Authority must also identify the NG911 Delivery Points that it has designated and notify the OSP(s) of these delivery points via a registry or direct written notification. For Phase 2, the 911 Authority must certify: (1) that it has all of the necessary infrastructure installed and operational to receive 911 traffic in SIP format that complies with NG911 commonly accepted standards and to transmit such traffic to the PSAPs connected to it; and (2) that its ESInet is connected to a fully functioning NGCS network that can provide access to a Location Validation Function (LVF) and interface with the LIS or functional equivalent provided by the OSP.

Nationwide CMRS providers, covered text providers, interconnected VoIP providers, and wireline providers other than rural incumbent local exchange carriers (RLECs) will have six months following a 911 Authority's valid Phase 1 request to comply with Phase 1 requirements, and six months following a valid Phase 2 request to comply with Phase 2 requirements. RLECs, non-nationwide CMRS providers, and internet-based TRS providers will have one year following a 911 Authority's valid Phase 1 request to comply with Phase 1 requirements, and one year following a valid Phase 2 request to comply with Phase 2 requirements. Completion of Phase 1 is a prerequisite to commencement of Phase 2; however, if Phase 1 has already been achieved or an OSP completes Phase 1 in less than the allotted six-month or one-year period, the Phase 2 implementation period can commence immediately, provided the 911 Authority has met the Phase 2 readiness criteria. To facilitate collaboration between 911 Authorities and OSPs, we also permit 911 Authorities and OSPs to enter into mutual agreements that modify the Phase 1/Phase 2 terms and timelines, and our rules presumptively do not alter or invalidate such agreements that already exist.

The rules presumptively address cost allocation between OSPs and 911 Authorities for implementation of NG911. In the absence of an alternative cost arrangement implemented by a 911 Authority at the state or local level, OSPs will be financially responsible for the costs of transmitting 911 traffic to the NG911 Delivery Points designated by 911 Authorities starting at Phase 1. Thus, by default, our rules establish NG911 Delivery Points as the demarcation points where the OSP's responsibility for the cost of transmitting 911 traffic ends and the 911 Authority's responsibility begins. In addition, in both Phase 1 and Phase 2, OSPs will be presumptively responsible for the costs associated with translating 911 traffic into the required IP-based format, including associated routing and location information.

The rules are intended to expedite the NG911 transition and help ensure that the nation's 911 system functions effectively and reliably, with advanced capabilities. In addition, the rules respond to the petition filed in 2021 by the National Association of State 911 Administrators (NASNA), which urged the Commission to take actions to resolve uncertainty and disputes between OSPs and state 911 Authorities regarding the NG911 transition. The rules create a consistent framework for ensuring that OSPs take the necessary steps to implement the transition to NG911 capabilities in coordination with 911 Authorities. At the same time, we recognize and do not preempt the long-standing authority of State and local government over the provision of 911 service. Thus, 911 Authorities at the State, local, and Tribal level remain free to establish alternative provisions within their jurisdictions for the implementation of NG911, definition of demarcation points, and allocation and recovery of costs.

II. Background

911 service is a vital part of our nation's emergency response and disaster preparedness system. Since the first 911 call was placed in 1968, the American public has increasingly come to depend on 911 service. The National Emergency Number Association (NENA) estimates that some form of 911 service is available to over 98 percent of the population and to over 97 percent of the counties in the United States, and data collected in our annual 911 fee report indicate that over 217 million calls are made to 911 in the United States each year. The availability of this critical service is due largely to the dedicated efforts of State, local, territorial, and Tribal authorities and providers, who have used the 911 dialing code to provide access to increasingly advanced and effective emergency service capabilities.

A. 911 Implementation

The Universal Emergency Number. In 1999, Congress amended section 251(e) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (the Act), and directed the Commission to designate “911” as the nationwide abbreviated dialing code for wireline and wireless voice services in order to obtain public safety and emergency services. In 2000, the Commission designated 911 as the national emergency telephone number to be used for reporting emergencies and requesting emergency assistance. In 2001, the Commission established a period for wireline and wireless carriers to transition to routing 911 calls to a PSAP in areas where one had been designated or, in areas where a PSAP had not yet been designated, either to an existing statewide default point or to an appropriate local emergency authority.

Legacy 911 Call Routing. In legacy E911 systems, 911 calls are typically routed through the use of a wireline network element—called a selective router—to a geographically appropriate PSAP based on the caller's location. The selective router serves as the entry point for wireline 911 calls originated from competitive and incumbent Local Exchange Carrier (LEC) central offices over dedicated trunks, as well as 911 calls originated by wireless and interconnected VoIP callers that are delivered by wireless and interconnected VoIP networks to the selective router. In legacy architectures, PSAPs are connected to telephone switches in the selective router by dedicated trunk lines. Historically, the selective router and connecting trunk lines have been implemented, operated, and maintained by a subset of incumbent LECs and largely paid for by state or local 911 authorities through state tariffs or contracts. Network implementation has varied from carrier to carrier and jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but legacy E911 has typically been based on traditional circuit-switched architecture and implemented with legacy components that place significant limitations on the functions that can be performed over the network. Below is a simplified diagram that demonstrates legacy 911 architecture.

Legacy Demarcation Point. Although the Commission has not previously set a cost demarcation point for wireline, interconnected VoIP, or internet-based TRS providers in the E911 environment, the Commission has set a demarcation point for purposes of the wireless transition to E911. Early in the implementation of E911 Phase I by wireless carriers, King County, Washington sought clarification of the demarcation point for costs in wireless E911 Phase I implementation. In 2001, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (WTB) issued a decision (King County Letter) identifying the input to the 911 selective router maintained by the incumbent LEC as the “proper demarcation point” for allocating wireless E911 Phase I information delivery responsibilities and costs in instances when CMRS providers and 911 authorities could not agree on an appropriate demarcation point. In 2002, the Commission issued an Order on Reconsideration (King County Order on Reconsideration) affirming WTB's decision. The Commission affirmed that for a wireless carrier to satisfy its obligation to provide E911 Phase I information to the PSAP under section 20.18(d) (now section 9.10(d)), the wireless carrier must deliver and bear the costs to deliver E911 Phase I information to the equipment in the existing 911 system that “analyzes and distributes it,” i.e., the 911 selective router. The Commission also affirmed that PSAPs were required to bear E911 Phase I costs for delivery beyond the 911 selective router. Finally, the Commission extended this determination to apply to CMRS providers' delivery of wireless E911 Phase II information to selective routers. Together, these decisions provided guidance to facilitate implementation of E911 in TDM networks. However, the Commission has not previously sought to address the demarcation of service providers' cost responsibilities in the NG911 environment.

Interconnected Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP). Regarding interconnected VoIP, the Commission has recognized that consumers expect certain types of emerging voice technology to have the same ability to reach emergency services when dialing 911 as traditional wireline and wireless services. This recognition resulted in the 2005 VoIP 911 Order, in which the Commission imposed 911 service obligations on providers of interconnected VoIP. The Commission declined to establish an E911 demarcation point for interconnected VoIP service, but it stated that “[t]o the extent that it becomes a concern, we believe that the demarcation point that the Commission established for wireless E911 cost allocation would be equally appropriate for VoIP.”

911 Parity. By 2008, Congress recognized that the nation's 911 system was “evolving from its origins in the circuit-switched world into an IP-based network” and that for interconnected VoIP providers to fulfill their 911 service obligations to subscribers, they must have access to the same emergency services capabilities and infrastructure as other voice providers. Congress passed the New and Emerging Technologies Improvement Act of 2008 (NET 911 Act) to facilitate the rapid deployment of VoIP 911 services and encourage the transition to a national IP-enabled emergency network. The NET 911 Act extended critical 911 service-related rights, protections, and obligations to VoIP service providers, and mandated parity for VoIP providers vis-à-vis other voice providers subject to 911 obligations with respect to the rates, terms, and conditions applicable to exercising their rights and obligations to provision VoIP 911 service.

B. Transition to Next Generation 911

1. Legal and Policy Landscape

Like communications networks generally, 911 networks are evolving from TDM-based architectures to IP-based architectures. With the transition to NG911, the circuit-switched architecture of legacy 911 will eventually be entirely replaced by IP-based technologies and applications that provide all of the same functions as the legacy 911 system, as well as new capabilities. In its end state, NG911 will facilitate interoperability and system resilience, improve connections between 911 call centers, and support the transmission of text, photos, videos, and data to PSAPs by individuals seeking emergency assistance.

Congress has recognized the Commission's role in facilitating the transition to NG911. As part of the 2010 National Broadband Plan, the Commission recommended that Congress consider developing a new “legal and regulatory framework for development of NG911 and the transition from legacy 911 to NG911 networks.” Also in 2010, Congress enacted the Twenty-First Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act (CVAA), which authorized the Commission to implement regulations necessary to achieve reliable and interoperable communication that ensures access to an IP-enabled emergency network by individuals with disabilities, where achievable and technically feasible. In 2012, Congress enacted the Next Generation 9-1-1 Advancement Act of 2012 (NG911 Act) as part of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, and directed the Commission to prepare and submit a report to Congress on recommendations for the legal and statutory framework for NG911 services. In 2013, the Commission submitted that report, recommending among other things that Congress: (1) facilitate the exercise of existing authority over NG911 by certain federal agencies (including the Commission); and (2) consider enacting legislation that would ensure there is no gap between federal and state authority over NG911. The Commission stated that “[t]he Commission already has sufficient authority to regulate the 911 and NG911 activity of, inter alia, wireline and wireless carriers, interconnected VoIP providers, and other IP-based service providers.”

The technological and regulatory landscape underlying 911 has evolved significantly since 2013. The Commission has adopted requirements for text-to-911, real-time text, wireless indoor location accuracy, and dispatchable location. In addition, the Commission has updated 911 outage and reliability rules, including establishing reliability requirements for covered 911 service providers. With respect to technology, E911 Phase II is now widely implemented, and many state and local jurisdictions have deployed ESInets and taken other transitional steps towards NG911. Although the NG911 transition remains ongoing and there are no fully enabled NG911 systems yet operating, the technical architecture of NG911 systems has been developed in detail and is well-established, and one service provider—Verizon—states that it has achieved end-to-end readiness with two local jurisdictions based on the NENA i3 standard.

2. Standards Work and Federal Advisory Committee Reports

NENA i3 Transitional and End State NG911. The public safety community has recognized the need to evolve to NG911, and industry associations and standards bodies have worked toward defining standard architectures and protocols for NG911. For example, NENA's “i3” standard describes a system architecture for NG911 that standardizes the structure and design of the software services, databases, network elements, and interfaces needed to process multimedia emergency calls and data for NG911. The i3 standard is intended to “support[ ] end-to-end IP connectivity,” while using “gateways . . . to accommodate legacy wireline and wireless originating networks that are non-IP as well as legacy PSAPs that interconnect to the i3 solution architecture.” In addition, NENA i3 addresses the concept of the ESInet, “an IP-based inter-network (network or networks) that can be shared by all public safety agencies that may be involved in any emergency,” and identifies “a set of core services that process 9-1-1 calls on that network (NGCS-NG9-1-1 Core Services).” The i3 standard envisions that NG911 will reach a mature “end state” after all PSAPs have migrated from legacy E911 systems based on TDM circuit-switched telephony to all-IP systems that operate over ESInets and provide the full array of NGCS. The standard also recognizes that achieving end state NG911 will take time and that significant intermediate and transitional mechanisms are needed in the interim. Accordingly, the i3 standard provides for Legacy Network Gateways (LNGs) and other transitional network elements to ensure that TDM-based OSPs can originate 911 calls and that legacy PSAPs can receive them while the NG911 transition is ongoing.

Task Force on Optimal PSAP Architecture. In 2014, the FCC established the Task Force on Optimal PSAP Architecture (Task Force or TFOPA) to provide recommendations regarding actions that PSAPs can take to optimize their security, operations, and funding as they implement NG911. In its Final Report, TFOPA noted that the transition to NG911 requires comprehensive changes across the “Originating Service Environment (OSE),” which includes originating service providers as part of a broader environment that provides the 911 caller's location as part of the call setup. This environment includes IP call set-up, location determination, validation, and delivery to ESInets across the country. In addition, the three TFOPA Working Groups issued supplemental reports in 2016 concerning (1) an “Optimal Cybersecurity Approach for PSAPs”; (2) an “NG 9-1-1 Readiness Scorecard”; and (3) a “Funding Sustainment Model.”

Communications Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) VI and Small Carrier NG911 Considerations. In 2017, the Commission directed CSRIC VI to recommend measures to improve both legacy 911 and NG911 systems, including recommending ways in which the Commission can further the NG911 transition, enhance the reliability and effectiveness of NG911, and assist small originating service providers as they transition to providing NG911 service. The CSRIC VI Working Group 1 considered four types of small originating service providers: wireless carriers, LECs, television cable operators, and internet/Data Service Providers. The CSRIC NG911 Transition Report describes the issues these carriers face as they update their networks to support NG911, and it advises the FCC on small carrier concerns related to NG911 implementation. The Transition Report is organized into three major sections, dealing with the scope and nature of the report; analysis, findings and recommendations; and a small carrier readiness checklist structured around service provider support for migration to NG911. The report's recommendations relating to small carriers address: (1) transition timelines; (2) the regulatory environment; (3) NG911 funding; (4) interconnection options; and (5) delivering caller location to the NG911 ESInet. The report includes advice on how small carriers should prepare to deliver their 911 traffic in an NG911 compatible manner; what economic challenges small carriers may face; and what barriers to implementation, if any, the FCC should address.

One of CSRIC's chief recommendations was for the Commission to “explore opportunities to resolve [the] cost recover[y] debate,” referring to disputes between carriers and 911 Authorities over how to fairly allocate the costs of NG911 networks. CSRIC suggested that the Commission update its King County decision in order to resolve ongoing uncertainty about cost responsibilities in the NG911 environment. CSRIC also suggested a three-stage structure for the transition to NG911, ranging from current legacy 911 systems; through a “transitionary phase” in which carriers may not yet originate 911 traffic in IP but are able to interconnect with a 911 Authority's ESInet and deliver IP-based traffic via IP translation; and an “End State . . . where the small carrier has deployed an IP-based network.” In CSRIC's transitionary phase, the originating service provider would deliver 911 calls in IP via one of two options—either (1) by providing an LNG itself and converting its TDM signaling to SIP before interconnecting with the ESInet using native SIP and converting the legacy data access protocols ( e.g. E2) to those used by the ESInet, or (2) by using legacy signaling ( e.g., TDM) and data access protocols ( e.g., E2) to interconnect with the ESInet at an LNG provided by the ESInet vendor. CSRIC also suggested that smaller carriers with fewer resources may need a longer timeline to transition to NG911, and it stressed the importance of coordination between carriers and 911 Authorities. Overall, the CSRIC NG911 Transition Report called on the FCC to provide structure and certainty to the NG911 transition via rulemaking while maintaining some flexibility and accounting for smaller carriers' more-limited resources.

C. Recent Regulatory Changes

NASNA Petition. In October 2021, NASNA filed a petition asking the Commission to initiate a rulemaking or notice of inquiry to facilitate the transition to NG911 (NASNA Petition). Specifically, NASNA asked the Commission to assert authority over the delivery of 911 communications by OSPs to ESInets and to amend the Commission's rules as needed to advance the transition to NG911. As part of its petition, NASNA urged the Commission to set a default cost demarcation point in the NG911 environment analogous to its King County ruling in the E911 environment. NASNA also asked the Commission to set deadlines for OSPs to begin delivering 911 traffic in NG911 format when the relevant state or local 911 Authority achieves NG911 readiness, and to establish a registry through which 911 authorities would notify OSPs of their NG911 readiness status. The Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB or Bureau) placed the Petition on public notice in December 2021, and received twenty-two comments, eight replies, and seven ex partes.

Wireless Location-Based Routing. In December 2022, the Commission issued the Location-Based Routing Notice proposing to require CMRS and covered text providers to implement location-based routing for 911 calls and texts nationwide. As part of that proceeding, the Commission sought comment on aspects of the NG911 transition raised by the NASNA Petition as they applied to CMRS and covered text providers. Specifically, the Commission proposed to require CMRS and covered text providers to deliver 911 calls, texts, and associated routing information in IP format upon request of 911 Authorities that have established the capability to accept NG911-compatible IP-based 911 communications. In addition, the Commission proposed to establish time frames for CMRS and covered text providers to deliver IP-based 911 traffic. Further, the Commission sought comment on whether to make available a registry or database that would allow state and local 911 authorities to notify CMRS and covered text providers of the 911 authorities' readiness to accept IP-based communications. The Commission noted that these proposals, if adopted, would effectively implement a key element of NASNA's petition with respect to transition to NG911 for wireless 911 calls and texts, which represent an estimated 80 percent of 911 traffic in many areas.

NG911 Notice Proposed Framework. In June 2023, the Commission issued the NG911 Notice seeking to establish a framework that would expedite the nation's transition to NG911 by proposing comprehensive requirements that would apply to wireline, CMRS, interconnected VoIP, and internet-based TRS providers. First, the Commission proposed to require wireline, interconnected VoIP, and internet-based TRS providers to complete all translation and routing to deliver 911 calls, including associated location information, in the requested IP-based format to an ESInet or other designated point(s) that allow emergency calls to be answered upon request of 911 authorities who have certified the capability to accept IP-based 911 communications. Second, as state and local 911 authorities transition to IP-based networks, the Commission proposed to require wireline, interconnected VoIP, CMRS, and internet-based TRS providers to transmit all 911 calls to destination point(s) designated by a 911 Authority. Third, the Commission proposed that in the absence of agreements by states or localities on alternative cost recovery mechanisms, wireline, interconnected VoIP, CMRS, and internet-based TRS providers must cover the costs of transmitting 911 calls to the point(s) designated by a 911 Authority, including any costs associated with completing the translation and routing necessary to deliver such calls and associated location information to the designated destination point(s) in the requested IP-based format.

In the NG911 Notice, the Commission explained that it sought to create a consistent framework for ensuring that all originating service providers take the necessary steps to implement the transition to NG911 in coordination with 911 Authorities. In addition, the Commission sought to align the NG911 transition rules for wireline, interconnected VoIP, and internet-based TRS providers with similar requirements that the Commission had proposed for CMRS and covered text providers in the LBR Notice, thereby promoting consistency across service platforms. The Commission also explained that the demarcation point and cost allocation proposals sought to address what NASNA described in its Petition as “the critical component, and biggest regulatory roadblock, to transitioning to NG911 services.” PSHSB announced the comment and reply comment filing deadlines for the NG911 Notice on July 10, 2023, and the Commission received 47 comments, 28 replies, and a number of ex partes.

LBR Order. In 2024, we issued the LBR Order requiring all CMRS providers to implement location-based routing nationwide for wireless calls and real-time text (RTT) communications to 911 call centers. Under those rules, most 911 voice calls and RTT texts will be routed based on the location of the caller as opposed to the location of the cell tower that handles that call. However, we deferred to this docket consideration of NG911-related proposals and issues raised in the LBR Notice concerning IP-formatted delivery of wireless 911 voice calls, texts, and associated routing information. Accordingly, we incorporate comments received on these issues and proposals in response to the LBR Notice into this proceeding, and we address the NG911 requirements applicable to all originating service providers in this document and the Order.

III. Discussion

In this document and the Order, we require OSPs to support the NG911 transition. In the sections below and in the Order, we explain the basis for adopting NG911 transition rules, including the significant and potentially life-saving benefits that NG911 affords, and we set forth the scope and extent of our NG911 requirements. We also find that the deadlines adopted are achievable and technically feasible for OSPs.

A. The Need for Rules To Facilitate the NG911 Transition

In the NG911 Notice and LBR Notice, the Commission proposed to expedite the nationwide transition to NG911 by adopting certain requirements that would apply to wireline, CMRS, covered text, interconnected VoIP, covered text providers, and internet-based TRS providers. Together, our proposals were intended not only to expedite this vital transition, but also to help ensure that the nation's 911 system functions effectively and utilizes advanced capabilities. In addition, the proposed rules in the NG911 Notice responded to the petition from NASNA, the organization that represents state 911 administrators, urging the Commission to adopt rules to facilitate the transition to NG911.

As the Commission noted in the NG911 Notice, to achieve the transition to NG911, state and local 911 authorities must implement IP-based technologies and applications that will provide all of the functions of the legacy E911 system as well as new capabilities. NG911 relies on IP-based architecture to provide an expanded array of emergency communications services that encompasses both the core functionalities of legacy E911 and additional functionalities that take advantage of the enhanced capabilities of IP-based devices and networks. The transition to NG911 involves fundamental changes in the technology that 911 Authorities use to receive and process 911 traffic, and it requires equally fundamental changes in the way OSPs deliver 911 traffic to PSAPs. The benefits that result from the transition to NG911 include improvements to 911 network reliability and resilience, improvements to interoperability between PSAPs, and location information that is available to PSAPs more quickly. As the Commission observed in the NG911 Notice, in its end state, NG911 will also support the transmission of text, photos, video, and data.

Most states have already made significant commitments to implementing NG911. Thirty-seven states and jurisdictions reported to the FCC in 2023 that they had ESInets operating in 2022. Despite investments in these new capabilities, however, some states report experiencing delays in OSPs connecting to their ESInets. Disputes with OSPs include issues of both cost allocation and the points to which the OSPs will deliver 911 traffic. In addition, some commenters contend that some OSPs have financial incentives to delay transitioning from legacy 911 to NG911, resulting in protracted disputes and mounting costs for 911 Authorities, and further contributing to delays. As a result of these delays, 911 Authorities incur prolonged and compounded costs because they must maintain both legacy and IP networks during the transition. Managing 911 traffic on both legacy and IP networks may also result in increased vulnerability and risk of 911 outages.

Adopting rules in this proceeding is necessary to advance the critical transition to NG911, with its vital public safety benefits for the entire American public. Currently, as 911 Authorities deploy NG911 infrastructure, there are no rules at the federal level describing what OSPs must do to support the transition. The lack of rules creates uncertainty for 911 stakeholders and increases delays in the transition. In addition, the increased costs incurred to support both 911 and NG911 systems concurrently while the transition to NG911 is delayed reduce the limited amount of funding actually available to implement NG911 itself, further stalling the eventual transition to lifesaving NG911 technology across the country. The magnitude of delays and costs in the national transition to NG911 to date demonstrates the necessity and importance of the Commission taking action to establish a regulatory framework for the orderly and efficient implementation of NG911. In addition, we believe that promulgating a consistent regulatory approach to 911 for all OSPs reflects the reality that distinctions between OSP types are becoming less relevant as technologies converge and advance. This “all platforms” approach promotes accountability, transparency, and certainty.

Numerous commenters on the NG911 Notice have voiced support for the Commission's goals in this rulemaking and have acknowledged the need for rules to facilitate the transition to NG911, although some have advocated for changes to the proposed rules. For example, NASNA says it is “grateful” to the Commission for its “forward-thinking action in facilitating NG911,” says “[t]his rulemaking will be instrumental” in moving NG911 forward, and “urges timely implementation of effective rules to make NG911 a reality nationwide.” The Maine PUC “applauds the FCC for undertaking this rulemaking to expedite the much-needed transition to NG911.” The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency notes that Pennsylvania's ability to successfully and completely implement NG911 service and retire legacy E911 technologies is hampered by the current lack of rules clarifying roles and responsibilities among stakeholders, and that a regulatory framework is needed. Similarly, Communications Equality Advocates (CEA) “[a]pplauds” the Commission's efforts to pave the way for full migration to NG911. NENA supports the Commission's NG911 rulemaking proceeding and “commends” the Commission for initiating a proceeding “to build a framework to make NG9-1-1 in our nation a reality.” APCO indicates support of the Commission adopting NG911 rules, noting the Commission's proposals “have the potential to accelerate the transition” to NG911. Commenter iCERT notes its “strong support for accelerating the implementation of NG911 across the country,” urges the FCC “to establish a clear regulatory framework,” and urges the FCC “to act promptly in this proceeding” due to the “urgent need to implement NG911 throughout the nation.” Comtech expresses support for the Commission's proposed NG911 rules and notes “the urgent need for swift adoption of these rules to help mitigate NG911 deployment delays.” Other commenters note the benefits of transitioning to NG911 and support Commission action to facilitate that transition. Only one commenter appears to be opposed to the Commission adopting rules in some form to facilitate the transition to NG911.

Therefore, based on the foregoing and the record as a whole, we conclude that there is a need for the Commission to establish rules to facilitate the NG911 transition. We believe the rules provide a regulatory framework that will assist in expediting the critical transition to NG911 nationwide, which will serve to greatly promote public safety in the years to come.

B. Definitions of Key Terms

In this section, we discuss and adopt definitions for certain key terms, such as “Next Generation 911 (NG911),” “commonly accepted standards,” “Emergency Services internet Protocol Network (ESInet),” and other terms. The definitions we adopt for additional key terms, such as “911 Traffic,” “NG911 Delivery Point,” “Session Initiation Protocol (SIP),” “Functional Element,” “Location Validation Function (LVF),” and “Location Information Server (LIS)” are discussed in subsequent sections of this document and the Order.

Next Generation 911 (NG911). In the NG911 Notice, the Commission sought comment on defining the term “Next Generation 911.” As reflected in relevant proposed legislation and the comments of parties in the NG911 and LBR proceedings, stakeholders have varying views on how, or even whether, to define Next Generation 911 in the Commission's rules. In the NG911 Notice, the Commission noted that there are multiple definitions of “NG911” in proposed federal legislation and a definition of “Next Generation 9-1-1 services” in federal law. The Spectrum Auction Reauthorization Act of 2023 (H.R. 3565), a bill introduced in May 2023, proposed the following definition of “Next Generation 9-1-1”:

[A]n internet Protocol-based system that—(A) ensures interoperability; (B) is secure; (C) employs commonly accepted standards; (D) enables emergency communications centers to receive, process, and analyze all types of 9-1-1 requests for emergency assistance; (E) acquires and integrates additional information useful to handling 9-1-1 requests for emergency assistance; and (F) supports sharing information related to 9-1-1 requests for emergency assistance among emergency communications centers and emergency response providers.

Several other pieces of recent proposed federal legislation have used the same or a very similar definition of NG911.

Some commenters on the LBR Notice argued that the Commission should adopt a definition of NG911. For example, APCO urged the Commission to adopt the definition of NG911 “as defined by the public safety community with support from a variety of stakeholders” that appeared in legislation passed by the House of Representatives in 2022 but that was not enacted into law. By contrast, NENA urged the Commission to “be cautious in adopting formal definitions [of terms such as NG911] . . . without full industry-wide support and without considering all potential consequences of such definitions.” NENA also asked the Commission to consider using the term “i3 compatible” or some other mutually agreed upon terminology rather than “IP-enabled” to describe standards-based NG911.

In the NG911 Notice, the Commission sought comment on whether it should adopt one of these definitions or incorporate elements of these or other definitions of NG911 into our rules. The Commission asked whether a definition of NG911 is necessary for compliance with its proposed NG911 rules and, if so, sought input on crafting a definition that would be technologically neutral. The Commission noted that recent proposed legislative definitions include qualitative descriptors of NG911 systems, such as security, interoperability, and use of commonly accepted standards, as well as specific technical capabilities. The Commission asked if it should include any or all of these elements in a definition of NG911 adopted by the Commission, and whether the definitions discussed encompass current NG911 networks and technologies as well as possible future NG911 technologies.

In comments on the NG911 Notice, APCO contends that a definition of NG911 is necessary. APCO again urges the Commission to adopt the same definition of NG911 proposed in the Spectrum Auction Reauthorization Act of 2023 (H.R. 3565), calling this a “comprehensive definition . . . crafted by the public safety community,” and stating that adopting this definition is important for aligning the rules with public safety's needs and the Commission's objectives. Similarly, NASNA indicates a definition of NG911 is needed and advocates adopting the NG911 definition used in H.R. 3565. Mission Critical Partners also believes that a definition of NG911 is needed, stating that, to speed up the process of migrating to NG911, “it would be best to have the Commission define, for purposes of the rulemaking, what NG911 means.” However, Mission Critical Partners states that “NG911 has been defined differently by many groups,” and advocates for a different and more detailed definition of NG911 than that recommended by APCO and NASNA. NENA notes that a definition of NG911 and other terms “can provide stakeholders with clarity” as the transition to NG911 progresses, and recommends that an NG911 definition be standards based. Nevertheless, NENA again cautions the Commission only to adopt formal definitions for terms with public and private 911 industry-wide support.

Commenters also express differing views on whether a codified definition of NG911 should reference the NENA i3 standard or any specific technical standard. To ensure compatibility and interoperability of NG911 systems, NENA argues that any definition of NG911 should reference “an i3-centric architecture.” Colorado PUC agrees that the Commission should consider including language regarding “i3 standard compatibility” in the NG911 definition, stating that “[t]he vast majority, if not all” implementations of NG911 technology across the country have the goal of deploying i3-based NG911 systems. In contrast, APCO opposes incorporating i3 or any other specific NG911 standard into the Commission's rules, noting that there are alternative potential standards, that the telecommunications ecosystem and technology continue to evolve, and that Emergency Communications Centers (ECCs) should have flexibility to pursue their preferred approaches with a “technology-neutral approach” that ensures “ECCs can continually benefit from ongoing innovation.” APCO urges that the Commission must avoid rules or assumptions that might “lock ECCs into a particular approach to implementing NG9-1-1” and should not adopt rules “that bake in specific architectures for NG9-1-1.” APCO states that this is why the public safety community's “comprehensive definition of NG9-1-1 [ i.e., the definition in H.R. 3565, H.R. 1784, and H.R. 7624] references the use of `commonly accepted standards' rather than identify[ing] a particular standard for NG9-1-1.” Mission Critical Partners also advocates for a “technology-neutral definition” of NG911 “to reduce any ambiguity by providers or 911 authorities regarding compliance with the proposed NG911 rulemaking.”

We find that adopting a definition of NG911 will facilitate compliance with the NG911 rules, as it will help promote clarity and certainty about the Commission's NG911 requirements. Accordingly, we adopt the definition of NG911 used in the Spectrum Auction Reauthorization Act of 2023 (H.R. 3565), a definition that is supported by multiple stakeholders in the public safety community and that has been used in several recent pieces of proposed Federal legislation. Although not all commenters to this proceeding support this specific definition, we believe that it comes closest to reflecting a broad consensus as to the essential elements that should be included in a definition of NG911. In particular, the definition will advance our goal of a technology-neutral approach to implementation of NG911, and it contains the important requirements that an NG911 system ensure interoperability, be secure, and employ commonly accepted standards.

We decline to reference any specific standard or set of standards as part of the codified definition of NG911. Although NENA and Colorado PUC advocate for including a reference to the i3 standard in the rules, we conclude that the better approach is to adopt a technology-neutral definition that avoids referencing any specific standard. As discussed below, we believe commenters' concerns that NG911 development be standards-based are fully addressed by including “commonly accepted standards” as an element of our NG911 definition.

We have also considered, but decline to adopt, the more detailed NG911 definition suggested by Mission Critical Partners. Mission Critical Partners' proposed NG911 definition identifies many specific operational and technical functions, such as the ability to “bridge additional users into calls in progress;” “provide cybersecurity functions at the edges of all interconnected networks and throughout the inner workings of each NGCS,” “transfer calls and sessions between ECCs/PSAPs on the network and to other NG911 systems without the loss of location data,” and “log, and report on, call data and associated network, service, and system activity.” While we anticipate that many NG911 networks will support these capabilities, incorporating this level of detail into the codified definition of NG911 appears unnecessary and could cause confusion to the extent that it goes beyond the level of detail in the draft legislative definition supported by most commenters.

The definition of NG911 addresses other concerns raised by commenters on the NG911 Notice. In the NG911 Notice, the Commission sought comment on how to ensure that its proposed rules would support interoperability in the NG911 environment. Commenters confirm the importance of interoperability in NG911 to enable the efficient transfer of emergency calls, texts, and data between ESInets, PSAPs, and first responders. In addition, commenters note that the uniform use of commonly accepted standards by OSPs and NG911 vendors is a necessary prerequisite to interoperability, although it is not enough by itself to achieve interoperability. Consistent with commenters' views, the definition of NG911 in this document and the Order therefore specifies that NG911 systems shall “ensure interoperability.”

Google and EPIC urge the importance of security, with Google stating that “security has to be built into NG911 and should be part of the Commission's definition of NG911.” The definition of NG911 adopted here specifically includes that the system “is secure.” CEA urges the Commission to adopt an NG911 definition “that includes accessibility as an essential characteristic,” and notes favorably that the NG911 definition in the Spectrum Auction Reauthorization Act of 2023 (H.R. 3565) requires that NG911 “be capable of processing `all types' of requests.” CEA states that “[w]e read this requirement as mandating that NG911 standards support accessible technologies.” We agree with CEA's reading and find that adopting the same language used in H.R. 3565 is sufficient to incorporate the accessibility component into the NG911 definition.

Commonly Accepted Standards. The NG911 definition specifies that NG911 systems and technology must be based on “commonly accepted standards.” In the NG911 Notice, we discussed the concept of commonly accepted standards but did not propose a specific definition of that term.

Commenters generally support including a definition of “commonly accepted standards” in the rules. The proposed legislation in H.R. 3565 provides a definition of “commonly accepted standards.” NENA offers a similar definition that “very closely aligns with the definitions as promulgated in multiple NG9-1-1 funding bills as introduced in Congress.” We find that requiring that the commonly accepted standards be developed and approved by an accredited standards development organization will help ensure that there is a minimum threshold for ensuring the integrity and validity of such standards, as technology continues to evolve over time. Accordingly, we adopt the following definition of “commonly accepted standards”:

The technical standards followed by the communications industry for network, device, and internet Protocol connectivity that—(1) enable interoperability; and (2) are—(i) developed and approved by a standards development organization that is accredited by a United States standards body (such as the American National Standards Institute) or an equivalent international standards body in a process that—(A) is open to the public, including open for participation by any person; and (B) provides for a conflict resolution process; (ii) subject to an open comment and input process before being finalized by the standards development organization; (iii) consensus-based; and (iv) made publicly available once approved.

This definition tracks the definition of “commonly accepted standards” set forth in H.R. 3565, with minor non-substantive revisions.

As noted above, this definition of “commonly accepted standards” does not specify a particular standard or set of standards to which 911 Authorities or networks must adhere. This approach gives parties flexibility to implement changes or improvements as more advanced technologies become available and allows industry standards to evolve without the need for rule changes. Equally important, our approach discourages the use of “proprietary . . . standards,” which do not meet the definition of “commonly accepted standards” as they (1) would not enable interoperability; and (2) would not be developed and approved by a standards development organization accredited by a United States standards body or equivalent international standards body, subject to an open, consensus-based comment and input process prior to finalization, or made publicly available once approved.

We also emphasize that the NENA i3 standard qualifies as a “commonly accepted standard” under the definition in this document and the Order. As numerous commenters indicate, the i3 standard is the prevailing standard adopted by all NG911 systems currently being deployed in the U.S. (and in Canada and Europe) is the NENA i3 standard. The i3 standard has been approved by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), following an open comment and input process, and was made publicly available once approved. In addition, work is ongoing to improve and augment the i3 standard as the NG911 transition proceeds. While we do not specifically reference the i3 standard in our rules, as some commenters advocate, we regard the widespread adoption of i3 as a positive trend that will help ensure that the development of NG911 is in accordance with “commonly accepted standards” as defined in our rules. At the same time, our rules provide flexibility that will “help promote a technology-neutral approach that ensures that ECCs can continually benefit from ongoing innovation.”

911 Authority. In the NG911 Notice, the Commission proposed to define “911 Authority” as “[t]he state, territorial, regional, Tribal, or local agency or entity with the authority and responsibility under applicable law to designate the point(s) to receive emergency calls.” The Commission asked if this definition encompassed the diverse set of authorities in the United States that have authority and responsibility to designate the point(s) to receive emergency calls.

The South Carolina Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Office (South Carolina RFA) agrees that the NG911 Notice 's proposed definition “sufficiently encompasses the roles and responsibilities of the 911 Authority for the State.” Other commenters, however, propose to modify the definition. NASNA states that the definition should reference 911 Authorities' broader responsibilities for coordinating the deployment of the ESInet and its data inputs and proposes to define “911 authority” as “[t]he state, territorial, regional, Tribal, or local agency or entity with the authority and responsibility under applicable law to procure and administer an ESInet and NG911 core services on behalf of one or more PSAPs and to designate the point(s) to receive emergency calls.” Commenter Brian Rosen similarly states that the Commission should define “911 Authority” as “the entity contracting for the ESInet and the NGCS service.” Colorado PUC notes that there may be 911 Authorities with concurrent jurisdiction over the same geographic area but “having different roles and responsibilities” over the 911 system and suggests including language indicating this possibility. We agree with these commenters and include a reference in our definition of “911 Authority” to the operation or administration of “a communications network for the receipt of 911 traffic at NG911 Delivery Points and for the transmission of such traffic from that point to PSAPs.” This definition better captures the range of responsibilities that 911 Authorities have and is broad enough to accommodate the possibility of overlapping authorities—for example, a state's public safety agencies and its public utility commission—over various aspects of the state's 911 network(s).

We find that this modified definition of “911 Authority” will provide greater clarity and assist parties in complying with our rules. Accordingly, we adopt the following definition of “911 Authority”:

“ 911 Authority”: A state, territorial, regional, Tribal, or local governmental entity that operates or has administrative authority over all or any aspect of a communications network for the receipt of 911 traffic at NG911 Delivery Points and for the transmission of such traffic from that point to PSAPs.

Emergency Services internet Protocol Network (ESInet). In the NG911 Notice, the Commission proposed to adopt a definition of “Emergency Services internet Protocol Network (ESInet)” that would define the term “in reference to the protocol used on the network, the entities that manage the network, and the use of the network for purposes of emergency services communications.” The Commission's proposed definition was “[a]n internet Protocol (IP)-based network managed by public safety authorities and used for emergency services communications, including Next Generation 911.”

Mission Critical Partners generally supports this definition of ESInet but notes that the ESInet is “simply a transport mechanism.” NASNA proposes to define ESInet as: “[t]he internet Protocol (IP)-based network tier of a Next Generation 911 system that exists between the points designated by the 911 authority and a PSAP, which is used for emergency services communications, including Next Generation 911.” NENA states that “[w]ithin the confines of this proceeding,” it concurs with NASNA's proposed definition for ESInet. Alaska Telecom notes that the Commission seeks comment on the definitions of both “NG911” and “ESInet,” and says that any definitions adopted should reference “statewide, or at least regional, ESInet development,” as doing so will ensure that deployment of NG911 networks “is coordinated with a statewide (or at a minimum, partially statewide) rollout,” not conducted solely on a PSAP-by-PSAP, provider-by-provider basis.

We adopt a definition of “ESInet” similar to that proposed in the NG911 Notice, with slight revisions to add greater clarity and certainty to what constitutes an ESInet for purposes of these NG911 rules. The modifications in this final definition are consistent with the criteria set forth by the Commission in the NG911 Notice, and also reflect wording that NASNA and NENA support and recommend in their proposed “ESInet” definition. The definition is as follows:

Emergency Services internet Protocol Network (ESInet). An internet Protocol (IP)- based network that is managed or operated by a 911 Authority or its agents or vendors and that is used for emergency services communications, including Next Generation 911.

The adopted definition of “ESInet” reflects the three criteria that we proposed in the NG911 Notice for the definition of “ESInet”—the protocol used on the network, the entities that manage the network, and the use of the network for purposes of emergency services communications. In addition, while our proposed definition provided that the network must be managed by “public safety authorities,” the final definition adopted provides greater clarity by specifying that the network must be managed or operated by a “911 Authority or its agents or vendors,” with “911 Authority” being a term specifically defined elsewhere in the rules.

NASNA and NENA propose stating in the definition that the ESInet is the “internet Protocol (IP)-based tier of a Next Generation 911 system that exists between the points designated by the 911 authority and a PSAP.” While ESInets typically operate in the manner described by NASNA and NENA, we believe that ESInets should be defined functionally without reference to any particular “tier” or network configuration. Alaska Telecom recommends that the “ESInet” definition reference “statewide, or at least regional, ESInet development” to ensure that NG911 networks are not deployed on a PSAP-by-PSAP, provider-by-provider basis. We find that it is not necessary to include specific wording on this issue. The “ESInet” definition is intended to be flexible and leaves the scale of ESInet deployment ( e.g., local, state, or regional) to the discretion of stakeholders.

Originating Service Providers. The NG911 Notice discussed wireline providers, rural wireline providers, and non-rural telecommunications wireline providers, but it did not propose specific definitions for “Wireline Provider” or “Non-Rural Wireline Provider.” Similarly, the NG911 Notice did not specifically propose to define the terms “Nationwide CMRS Provider,” “Non-Nationwide CMRS Provider,” and “Rural Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier (RLEC).” In addition, the Commission noted that it had previously defined the term “Covered Text Provider” at 47 CFR 9.10(q)(1), but did not specifically propose to adopt a definition of that term in this proceeding. However, in the NG911 Notice the Commission sought comment on whether there are “any other terms that we should define for purposes of the cost allocation and IP-delivery rules.” The terms “Wireline Provider,” “Non-Rural Wireline Provider,” “Covered Text Provider,” “Nationwide CMRS Provider,” “Non-Nationwide CMRS Provider,” and “Rural Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier (RLEC)” are used in certain NG911 rules. We find that specifically defining these terms will ensure greater clarity and certainty, and will help parties to comply with our regulations. Accordingly, we incorporate and adopt the definitions for these terms that have previously been set forth in other existing statutes and regulations.

The NG911 Notice and the LBR Notice did not specifically propose a defined term that would encompass all providers that would be specifically subject to NG911 rules. We define the term “Originating Service Providers” for purposes of this rulemaking and the new NG911 rules as follows:

Originating Service Providers. Providers that originate 911 traffic, specifically wireline providers; commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) providers, excluding mobile satellite service (MSS) operators to the same extent as set forth in § 9.10(a); covered text providers, as defined in § 9.10(q)(1); interconnected Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) providers, including all entities subject to subpart D of this part; and internet-based Telecommunications Relay Service (TRS) providers that are directly involved with routing 911 traffic, pursuant to subpart E of this part.

Other Definitions. Some commenters suggest that the Commission codify definitions of additional terms, such as “Associated Location Information,” “IP-based format,” and “Phases of Readiness.” We conclude that adopting formal definitions of these terms is unnecessary, but we note that some of the suggested additional terms are discussed and explained in other sections of this document and the Order. We believe that the formal definitions we adopt in this proceeding provide sufficient certainty, clarity, and guidance for stakeholders at this time.

C. Service Providers' Obligation To Deliver 911 Traffic in IP Format Upon Request

1. Two-Phased Implementation of IP-Based Transmission Formats

a. Overview

For the transition to NG911, we adopt rules that require OSPs to take steps in two phases to complete all translation and routing to deliver 911 traffic, including associated routing and location information, in the requested IP-based format. These requirements are intended to correspond to and complement the readiness phases for 911 Authorities, such that once a 911 Authority is ready to receive NG911 traffic in a specific IP format, the OSP will be required to deliver it in that format.

In the LBR Notice, the Commission proposed to require CMRS and covered text providers to deliver 911 calls, texts, and associated location information in IP-based format to NG911-capable PSAPs that request it. The Commission reasoned that such a requirement would advance the transition to NG911 by helping address operational and routing issues for jurisdictions that have implemented NG911. The Commission also noted that the 2016 TFOPA Report concluded that a significant impediment to NG911 service was that originating service providers were not prepared to deliver 911 calls via IP technology with location information to NG911 service providers. The Commission reasoned that requiring OSPs to deliver IP-formatted calls and routing information to NG911-capable PSAPs would alleviate the burden on state and local 911 Authorities of maintaining transitional gateways and other networks to process and convert legacy calls and would help jurisdictions realize additional public safety benefits available on NG911 networks.

In the NG911 Notice, the Commission proposed to require wireline, interconnected VoIP, and internet-based TRS providers to complete all translation necessary to deliver 911 calls, including associated location information, in the requested IP-based format to an ESInet or other designated point(s) that allow emergency calls to be answered upon request of 911 Authorities who have established the capability to accept NG911-compatible, IP-based 911 communications. The Commission reasoned that its proposal would help jurisdictions that are seeking to implement NG911 by alleviating the burden on 911 Authorities to maintain transitional gateways and other network elements to process and convert legacy calls and would complement its IP-delivery proposal in the LBR Notice. In the NG911 Notice, the Commission sought comment on achieving regulatory parity in its requirements for delivery of IP-based 911 calls by CMRS, wireline, interconnected VoIP, and internet-based TRS providers, and asked whether there were reasons to apply different requirements to 911 calls from different platforms. In addition, the Commission sought specific comment on how its proposal should extend to 911 calls that originate on non-IP wireline networks and how to extend its proposed requirement to internet-based TRS.

In both the LBR Notice and NG911 Notice, the Commission proposed to require OSPs to complete all NG911 transition steps in a single phase. In the NG911 Notice, the Commission also sought comment on whether to consider different or additional phases, including NASNA's proposal for three phases based on TFOPA's “NG911 Readiness Scorecard.” In addition, the Commission asked related questions regarding the costs and benefits associated with NASNA's suggestion.

In response to the NG911 Notice, several commenters, including NASNA, USTelecom, Intrado, MSCI, iCERT, and the Colorado PUC, advocate for regulations that account for multiple phases in the transition to NG911. Several of these commenters indicate that a phased approach would better reflect the realities of the ongoing, typically phased, implementation of NG911 thus far. NASNA states that the implementation of NG911 is “typically a multi-phase transition process” and that “there is not just one phase of readiness.” Intrado states that “a phased-in approach . . . account[s] for, on the one hand, the significant difference between delivering IP-formatted traffic to the NG911 POI and delivering i3-formatted traffic and, on the other hand, differences in OSP type.” iCERT states that “FCC rules should recognize and accommodate various stages of NG911 implementation.” MSCI argues that requiring immediate implementation of full NG911 capabilities in a single phase would “complicate, if not frustrate, the Commission's goal to more quickly transition TDM-based communications to IP-based communications.” However, some commenters support implementation of the transition in a single phase, urge the Commission to seek further comment on phased approaches, or urge the Commission to create an industry task force to further study NG911.

We require OSPs to complete in two phases all translation and routing to deliver 911 traffic, including associated location information, in the requested IP-based format. In Phase 1, OSPs will be required to deliver 911 traffic in a basic SIP format, thereby implementing the fundamental IP translation or transport that is a prerequisite for the delivery of 911 traffic in SIP format that complies with commonly accepted standards. In Phase 2, OSPs will be required to deliver 911 traffic in SIP format that complies with NG911 commonly accepted standards. This approach represents a division of the one phase approach proposed in the LBR Notice and NG911 Notice.

We adopt two phases for all OSPs— i.e., wireline providers, CMRS providers, covered text providers, interconnected VoIP providers, and internet-based TRS providers—to facilitate an ordered and synchronized transition to NG911, to better reflect the transition to NG911 as it currently is progressing, and to achieve regulatory parity in the requirements for the delivery of IP-based 911 calls across different platforms. We agree with Colorado PUC that “every implementation of NG911 is being accomplished on a phased basis, so allowing for multiple iterations of requirements to be established is necessary.” This approach recognizes that OSPs will need additional time to achieve delivery of 911 traffic using NG911 commonly accepted standards in Phase 2.

The phased approach we adopt is consistent with phased approaches recommended by Intrado and MSCI, with minor adjustments to accommodate our regulatory goal of encompassing current and future NG911 commonly accepted standards. Intrado states that “NG911 delivery is divisible into two distinct stages—(1) IP transit ( i.e., SIP delivery to the POI) and (2) NG911-formatted call information under the i3 standard, with the former being a prerequisite for the latter.” MSCI suggests that the Commission consider “a two-step approach to NG911 deployment. The first step would involve a requirement that an OSP deliver 911 calls in IP format [upon request of a 911 Authority] . . . . The second step would involve a requirement that an OSP deliver 911 calls consistent with NENA i3 standard . . . .” The rules are very similar to Intrado's and MSCI's recommendations.

NASNA proposed a three-phase approach in which the initial phase would be triggered when the 911 Authority has an ESInet that is ready to receive 911 calls from the OSPs via an LNG. Colorado PUC similarly contemplates a phase in which 911 Authorities would maintain an LNG. We conclude that incorporating this initial phase into our rules is unnecessary and potentially counterproductive, as it merely describes the earliest transitional stage in which 911 Authorities continue to maintain LNGs to accommodate OSPs that have not transitioned to IP. We agree with MSCI that including this “legacy phase” could “prolong the migration.” Instead, Phase 1 and Phase 2 in our rules correspond to the second and third phases proposed by NASNA, which call for OSPs to first support basic SIP and then support SIP that complies with NG911 commonly accepted standards.

We prefer the two-phase approach to the single-phase approach proposed in the LBR Notice and NG911 Notice because a single-phase approach is less capable of encompassing the sequencing of steps that both 911 Authorities and OSPs must take during the NG911 transition. As discussed by several commenters, a phased regulatory approach aligns with the typical multi-phased implementation of NG911. In addition, we find it unnecessary to seek further comment on whether to adopt a phased approach, given that the Commission sought comment on NASNA's phased recommendation in the NG911 Notice and has gathered an adequate record for decision. We additionally conclude that, in light of the extensive record in this proceeding, an industry task force is not needed to further study these NG911 rules. We also find that a two-phased approach will not needlessly slow the transition to NG911, as argued by APCO, as the phased approach we adopt will ensure that OSPs and 911 Authorities take the necessary steps at each phase of the transition to NG911.

We affirm the Commission's reasoning in the LBR Notice and NG911 Notice that IP delivery requirements will advance the transition to NG911 by alleviating the burden on 911 Authorities to maintain transitional gateways and helping 911 Authorities realize the public safety benefits of NG911 networks. We agree with iCERT's assertion that the need to accommodate TDM-based 911 calls creates added costs for state and local 911 authorities, and that the adoption of IP delivery requirements will reduce the cost burdens of maintaining and operating legacy 911 infrastructure. We also agree with Intrado's assertion that establishing direct OSP connectivity via SIP to ESInets “will materially reduce the number of 911 outages through improved network reliability and availability.” We agree with Comtech that maintaining both legacy and IP-based systems for the delivery of 911 traffic involves significant costs and creates increased vulnerability and risk of 911 outages. NENA also states that it is prohibitively expensive to maintain TDM and IP networks for 911 simultaneously.

In addition, we affirm the principle of parity in NG911 requirements for OSPs at Phases 1 and 2, though as discussed in this document and section III.C.3 of the Order, differences among types of OSPs regarding their current NG911 transition progress and capabilities merit adjustment of compliance timelines for some classes of OSPs. NENA, iCERT, NASNA, Maine PUC, Colorado PUC, Mission Critical Partners, and the Ad Hoc NG911 Service Providers Coalition support parity among different types of OSPs. Several commenters indicate that the Commission should decline to extend IP delivery requirements to wireline and VoIP providers as these services deliver location information to 911 Authorities differently than CMRS providers. We note that interconnected VoIP providers already use a LIS functional element to transmit location information to 911 Authorities, subject to the NENA i2 standard, and we therefore find arguments that interconnected VoIP providers cannot provide location information to NG911 networks via a LIS to be unsupported. The record also confirms that it is technically feasible for wireline providers to use a LIS to transmit location information to 911 Authorities, even when they do not originate calls in IP. We also note that nothing under these rules changes the existing obligations that all OSPs have to determine the location of the 911 caller under the OSP-specific rules in part 9.

b. Phase 1

(i) Requirement

Upon receipt of a valid Phase 1 request from a 911 Authority, OSPs must (i) deliver all 911 traffic bound for the relevant PSAPs in the IP-based SIP format requested by the 911 Authority, (ii) obtain and deliver 911 traffic to enable the ESInet and other NG911 network facilities to transmit all 911 traffic to the destination PSAP, (iii) deliver all such 911 traffic to one or more in-state NG911 Delivery Points designated by the 911 Authority, and (iv) complete connectivity testing to confirm that the 911 Authority receives 911 traffic in the IP-based SIP format requested by the 911 Authority. OSPs are not required to originate 911 traffic in an IP format, and therefore may use a legacy TDM-to-IP gateway (LNG) to achieve compliance with these Phase 1 requirements.

The diagram below demonstrates the main high-level functions covered at Phase 1. This diagram is not meant to represent required network architectures in an “as built” configuration and is not prescriptive in nature. The call flow is illustrated by blue lines representing SIP 911 traffic and red lines indicating legacy 911 traffic. In the diagram below, 911 traffic originates on the left side of the diagram and flows from left to right.

The above diagram uses the following acronyms:

• ANI = Automatic Number Identification
• ALI = Automatic Location Information
• BCF = Border Control Function
• ESInet = Emergency Services IP Network
• IMS = IP Multimedia Subsystem
• LIS = Location Information Server
• LNG = Legacy Network Gateway
• LPG = Legacy PSAP Gateway
• LSRG = Legacy Selective Router Gateway
• MSAG = Master Street Address Guide
• NG PSAP = Next Generation 911 PSAP
• NGCS = NG911 Core Services
• TDM = Time Division Multiplex

Implementing Phase 1 will help reduce costs and improve 911 reliability by moving 911 traffic from legacy to IP transmission facilities, and will establish the foundation necessary for subsequent implementation of Phase 2. MSCI and iCERT argue, and we agree, that delivery in IP is a critical first step before compliance with NG911 commonly accepted standards. Intrado asserts that IP delivery will “materially reduce the number of 911 outages through improved network reliability.” Mission Critical Partners, iCERT, Comtech, and the State of Minnesota Department of Public Safety-Emergency Communication Networks (Minnesota DPS-ECN) indicate that relieving 911 Authorities of the burden of supporting TDM traffic from OSPs will materially reduce costs to those 911 Authorities.

To the extent that OSPs originate 911 traffic in TDM, we find that they should be responsible in Phase 1 for translating such traffic to SIP when delivering it to the designated NG911 Delivery Point. We disagree with Verizon's argument that requiring each individual TDM-based OSP to provide an LNG “imposes unnecessary costs on OSPs” and that “LNG capabilities should thus presumptively remain the PSAP/NG911 provider's responsibility.” As most OSPs already transmit traffic via SIP, it is unreasonable to require 911 Authorities to maintain LNGs for the small number of OSPs that continue to originate and transmit their traffic in TDM. In addition, we find that it is not unreasonably costly for OSPs that originate and transmit traffic in TDM to maintain an LNG or contract with a third party to translate 911 traffic. We find that it should be the responsibility of the OSP to translate 911 traffic from legacy formats and deliver 911 traffic in the SIP format requested by the 911 Authority. However, nothing in our rules prevents a 911 Authority from continuing to host an LNG for OSPs to use, either through an alternative agreement with an OSP or by choosing not to use the valid request mechanism in our rules. This possibility was noted by CSRIC, which observed that a 911 Authority's ESInet provider “can provide the LNG as a service and accommodate small carriers coming on board with minimal expense to the smaller carrier.”

Connectivity Testing. As part of Phase 1, we require OSPs to conduct connectivity testing to confirm that the 911 Authority receives 911 traffic in the IP-based SIP format requested by the 911 Authority. Such testing will help to ensure that the connection from the OSP to the 911 Authority is implemented correctly and meets the requirements of the 911 Authority. The Commission sought comment on testing related to NG911 delivery in the LBR Notice and NG911 Notice. Several commenters emphasize the importance of connectivity testing as part of the process of initiating delivery of 911 traffic to ESInets. Commenters also note that connectivity testing will require cooperation, coordination, and collaboration among multiple parties, including OSPs, NG911 vendors, and 911 Authorities. Because the ability of OSPs to complete testing within the required time period depends on such cooperation, we condition the testing requirement on 911 Authorities securing commitments from their NG911 vendors to ensure that such vendors are available to complete connectivity testing by the compliance deadline applicable to the OSP.

(ii) Definitions

To facilitate compliance with our rules for Phase 1 delivery, we adopt definitions for “911 traffic,” “NG911 Delivery Point,” and “Session Initiation Protocol (SIP).” Adopting functional definitions of these terms will provide guidance to OSPs in complying with our cost allocation and IP-delivery rules and will assist both OSPs and 911 Authorities by providing baseline definitions of important technical terms relevant to their needs. We define the term “911 traffic” as a convenient descriptor of the transmissions regulated under these rules. We similarly define the term “NG911 Delivery Point” as a convenient descriptor of the point to which an OSP's 911 traffic is delivered. While several commenters called for definitions of the terms “IP-capable,” “IP-based,” and “NG911-capable,” the term “SIP” is a standard technical term used in NG911 reference materials. “SIP” was also used by several other commenters in the record. We believe that referencing “SIP” to describe IP delivery and 911 Authority readiness at Phases 1 and 2 and defining that term will provide clarity regarding the Commission's NG911 rules, as it is a technically more precise term than “IP-based format” and similar terms.

We find that defining these terms will help to clarify our NG911 requirements and assist parties with compliance. Accordingly, we adopt the following definitions:

911 traffic. Transmissions consisting of all 911 calls (as defined in §§ 9.3, 9.11(b)(2)(ii)(A), 9.14(d)(2)(iii)(A), and 9.14 (e)(2)(ii)(A)) and/or 911 text messages (as defined in § 9.10(q)(9)), as well information about calling parties' locations and originating telephone numbers and routing information transmitted with the calls and/or text messages.

NG911 Delivery Point. A geographic location, facility, or demarcation point designated by a 911 Authority where an originating service provider shall transmit and deliver 911 traffic in an IP format to ESInets or other NG911 network facilities.

Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). A signaling protocol used for initiating, maintaining, modifying, and terminating communications sessions between internet Protocol (IP) devices. SIP enables voice, messaging, video, and other communications services between two or more endpoints on IP networks.

c. Phase 2

(i) Requirement

Upon receipt of a 911 Authority's valid Phase 2 request, OSPs must deliver all 911 traffic bound for the relevant PSAPs to NG911 Delivery Points designated by the 911 Authority in an IP-based SIP format that complies with NG911 commonly accepted standards identified by the 911 Authority, including having location information embedded in the call signaling using Presence Information Data Format—Location Object (PIDF-LO) or its functional equivalent. OSPs must also either (1) install and put into operation all equipment, software applications, and other infrastructure necessary to use a LIS or its functional equivalent for the verification of their customer location information and records, or (2) acquire services that can be used for the same purpose. In addition, OSPs must complete connectivity testing to confirm that the 911 Authority receives 911 traffic in the IP-based SIP format that complies with the identified NG911 commonly accepted standards. Because Phase 2 builds upon Phase 1, and completion of Phase 1 is a prerequisite for Phase 2, the OSP must also continue to comply with Phase 1 requirements during Phase 2, including the requirement to deliver all such 911 traffic to NG911 Delivery Points designated by the 911 Authority. Phase 2 will facilitate the full use of the functional elements of NGCS, including LVF, which can deliver more dynamic and actionable information to PSAPs than legacy ALI databases, and policy routing functions that can dynamically reroute 911 calls and texts in response to real-time events. This will eliminate the need for 911 Authorities to maintain legacy ANI and ALI components and will provide PSAPs with greater flexibility to avoid network disruptions and reduce the impact of outages on 911 continuity.

We provide the below illustrative diagram to demonstrate the main high-level functions covered at Phase 2. This diagram is not meant to represent required network architectures in an “as built” configuration and is not prescriptive in nature. The call flow is illustrated by blue lines representing SIP 911 traffic and red lines indicating legacy 911 traffic. In the below diagram, 911 traffic originates on the left side of the diagram and flows from left to right.

The above diagram uses the following acronyms:

• ANI = Automatic Number Identification
• ALI = Automatic Location Information
• BCF = Border Control Function
• ECRF = Emergency Call Routing Function
• ESInet = Emergency Services IP Network
• ESRP = Emergency Services Routing Proxy
• GIS = Geographic Information System
• IMS = IP Multimedia Subsystem
• LIS = Location Information Server
• LNG = Legacy Network Gateway
• LPG = Legacy PSAP Gateway
• LVF = Location Validation Function
• MSAG = Master Street Address Guide
• NG PSAP = Next Generation 911 PSAP
• NGCS = NG911 Core Services
• PRF = Policy Routing Function

OSPs may comply with Phase 2 either by originating 911 traffic in IP format or by maintaining or accessing an LNG to convert the traffic in order to deliver 911 traffic in SIP format that complies with the NG911 commonly accepted standards identified by the requesting 911 Authority. This addresses a concern raised by several commenters that requiring IP origination, as opposed to delivery, could be burdensome for some wireline providers. Although some commenters support an origination requirement, AT&T notes that this could require certain OSPs to make “inefficient alterations to network components that are nearing end-of-life.” USTelecom states that in some instances OSPs would have to “overbuild their existing networks with fiber on an abbreviated timeline, a proposition that is not only unnecessary but would be extremely costly.” USTelecom also notes that some wireline providers have carrier of last resort (COLR) obligations “prohibiting them from retiring legacy networks and technology.” We agree that in light of these considerations, IP origination should be encouraged but not required, so long as OSPs ensure that 911 calls originated in TDM are translated and delivered in SIP format. Therefore, in both Phase 1 and Phase 2, we permit OSPs to choose between upgrading networks to enable IP origination or converting their TDM traffic to IP before delivery to the NG911 network.

The Competitive Carriers Association (CCA) questions whether the Commission provided sufficient notice of a proposed requirement for wireless carriers to translate 911 traffic to IP. We find that both the NG911 Notice and LBR Notice clearly proposed requirements for TDM-based wireless carriers to translate 911 traffic to IP. The proposed rules in the LBR Notice specified that CMRS providers would be required to deliver calls in the requested IP-based format. In the NG911 Notice, the Commission proposed that valid requests by 911 Authorities for IP-based service would trigger obligations for all OSPs, including CMRS providers. Therefore, there has been sufficient notice, and the Commission finds CCA's concern unwarranted.

Some wireline commenters argue that it is not technically feasible for wireline carriers to translate 911 calls from TDM to IP with the inclusion of location data that is required for Phase 2. We disagree. There are several commercially available solutions that offer LIS services to wireline providers, as well as gateway products for translating calls from TDM to IP with the inclusion of location data. We therefore find that it is technically feasible for wireline providers to provide location information to 911 Authorities in a format that complies with NG911 commonly accepted standards. Further, we agree with NCTA that “any provider that continues to originate traffic in TDM format should bear responsibility for adding appropriate location information and converting such calls to IP format before delivering them to the demarcation point.”

APCO urges the Commission to explore options for ensuring that PSAPs receive actionable location information in the form of dispatchable location. We clarify that nothing in our rules is intended to change existing location accuracy requirements for OSPs, including rules that require provision of dispatchable location when feasible.

We decline to adopt the Texas 9-1-1 Entities' alternative proposal to establish different requirements for OSPs that already are capable of originating 911 calls in IP format versus OSPs that continue to rely on legacy TDM switching facilities for voice traffic within their networks. Under the Texas 9-1-1 Entities proposal, IP-capable OSPs would be required to fully support delivery of 911 calls in Phase 2 NG911 format, but non-IP capable OSPs would deliver calls to LNGs designated by 911 Authorities or their NG911 service providers. The 911 Authorities or their service providers would be responsible for operating the LNGs, which would translate the 911 calls into IP format. We decline to adopt this proposal because it would require 911 Authorities to continue to operate and maintain LNGs to support a small number of TDM-based OSPs, thereby incentivizing OSPs to continue to maintain legacy infrastructure, increase costs, and lengthen the time to transition to NG911. Instead, our rules appropriately shift the burden of maintaining translation gateways to those OSPs that continue to originate legacy 911 calls that require translation.

Connectivity testing. In Phase 2, we require OSPs to complete connectivity testing to confirm that the 911 Authority receives 911 traffic in the IP-based SIP format that complies with the NG911 commonly accepted standards identified by the requesting 911 Authority. Such testing is important to ensure that the connection from the OSP to the 911 Authority is implemented correctly and meets the requirements of the 911 Authority. Several commenters raise the importance of testing as part of the process of initiating delivery of 911 traffic to ESInets in a way that complies with NG911 commonly accepted standards. As with Phase 1 valid requests, we also adopt a condition prerequisite that 911 Authorities secure commitments from their NG911 vendors at Phase 2 in order to ensure that such vendors are available to complete connectivity testing by the compliance deadline applicable to the OSP.

(ii) Definitions

To facilitate Phase 2 implementation, there are definitions of “Functional Element,” “Location Information Server (LIS),” and “Location Validation Function (LVF)” in the NG911 regulations in this document and the Order. In the LBR Notice and NG911 Notice, the Commission proposed to require OSPs to complete all translation necessary to deliver 911 calls, including associated location information, in the requested IP-based format to an ESInet or other designated point(s) that allow emergency calls to be answered upon request of 911 authorities who have established the capability to accept NG911-compatible, IP-based 911 communications. We are establishing functional requirements to facilitate the provision of location information with 911 traffic for Phase 2. Under our Phase 2 default rules, LIS based location validation uses LVF, and this interaction is analogous to the interaction between the ANI/ALI database and MSAG in the E911 context. However, in the NG911 environment, LVF replaces the functionality of the MSAG. Given the extent to which our rules use these terms, we find that defining them will provide greater certainty and clarity regarding our NG911 requirements and will assist parties in complying with our rules. To codify our approach, we adopt a definition of “functional elements” that will be part of our definitions for LIS and LVF. Accordingly, we adopt the following definitions for these terms:

• Functional Element. A set of software features that may be combined with hardware interfaces and operations on those interfaces to accomplish a defined task.
• Location Information Server (LIS). A Functional Element that provides locations of endpoints. A LIS can provide Location-by-Reference or Location-by-Value, and, if the latter, in geodetic or civic forms. A LIS can be queried by an endpoint for its own location, or by another entity for the location of an endpoint.
• Location Validation Function (LVF). A Functional Element in an NG911 Core Services (NGCS) consisting of a server where civic location information is validated against the authoritative Geographic Information System (GIS) database information. A civic address is considered valid if it can be located within the database uniquely, is suitable to provide an accurate route for an emergency call, and is adequate and specific enough to direct responders to the right location.

d. Modification of Phase Requirements by Mutual Agreement

We encourage OSPs and 911 Authorities to collaborate throughout the transition to NG911. To facilitate such collaboration, and consistent with our proposals in the NG911 Notice and LBR Notice, we permit 911 Authorities and OSPs to enter into mutual agreements specifying requirements, timetables, and other terms that are different from the Phase 1 and Phase 2 rules in this document and the Order. Commenters confirm that such flexibility is important to address unique or unforeseen challenges that OSPs may face in transitioning from legacy 911 to NG911. The alternative agreement rule provides additional flexibility beyond what was proposed in the NG911 Notice and LBR Notice, which focused on alternative agreements establishing different compliance timeframes for OSPs, as well as different cost recovery mechanisms for certain providers. The rules allow 911 Authorities and OSPs to mutually address specific concerns beyond timeframes for compliance, including designation of NG911 delivery points or cost allocation for OSPs. We find that this additional flexibility should be beneficial to both 911 Authorities and OSPs.

When OSPs and 911 Authorities enter into an alternative agreement, we require OSPs to notify the Commission of the agreement and its pertinent terms, as was proposed in the NG911 Notice and LBR Notice, within 30 days of the date of execution of the agreement. We also require that the notice specifically identify each provision of the agreement that differs from the rules. Mission Critical Partners recommends that for certain deployment agreements, “an explanation and detailed plan with a timeline should be included and provided to the Commission and the 911 authority requesting the service.” We permit but do not require that the actual plans and timeline documents themselves be provided to the Commission. We delegate authority to PSHSB to issue instructions for OSPs to provide notification to the Commission of the modification of the agreement and its pertinent terms.

e. Internet-Based TRS Providers

The Phase 1 and Phase 2 requirements apply to internet-based TRS providers. However, ClearCaptions and Hamilton Relay point out that whereas most internet-based TRS providers directly support 911 calling, internet Protocol Captioned Telephone Service providers generally rely on underlying providers for routing emergency calls. We therefore clarify that Phase 1 and Phase 2 requirements only apply to internet-based TRS providers that are directly involved with routing 911 traffic, pursuant to part 9, subpart E of the Commission's rules.

Brian Rosen suggests that the Commission take additional steps to impose additional requirements on IP CTS, IP Relay, and videoconferencing services. We did not make such proposals in the NG911 Notice and therefore decline to take such steps at this time as they are outside the scope of this proceeding.

2. Valid Requests for Delivery of 911 Traffic in IP-Based Transmission Formats

We adopt rules defining the prerequisites that 911 Authorities must meet in order to make a valid request to OSPs for compliance with the requirements of Phase 1 and Phase 2. In the LBR Notice and NG911 Notice, the Commission proposed that for a 911 Authority request to be deemed valid, the 911 Authority would certify that it (1) is technically ready to receive 911 calls and texts in the IP-based format requested, (2) is specifically authorized to accept calls and/or texts in the IP-based format requested, and (3) has provided notification to the OSPs receiving the request that it meets these requirements. The Commission also sought comment on whether other prerequisites were needed to determine a 911 Authority's readiness.

For both Phases 1 and 2, we adopt the three general prerequisites for a valid request proposed in the LBR Notice and NG911 Notice: technical readiness, authorization, and notification. We adopt a valid request definition at each phase that specifies the functional requirements that NG911 networks must achieve prior to OSP compliance. In order to facilitate communication between 911 Authorities and OSPs, valid requests must indicate the location of NG911 Delivery Point(s) designated by the 911 Authority. Finally, we implement a process by which OSPs may file a petition contesting whether the 911 Authority has met the prerequisites for a Phase 1 or Phase 2 valid request, but we decline to automatically toll OSP compliance deadlines based on submission of such a petition.

a. Phase 1 Valid Requests

In order for a Phase 1 request to be valid for purposes of our rules, the requesting 911 Authority must certify that it has all of the necessary infrastructure installed and operational to receive 911 traffic in a basic SIP format and transmit such traffic to the PSAP(s) connected to it. We believe that this certification is sufficient to establish that the 911 Authority is technically ready for Phase 1. We agree with Intrado that “there is normally party consensus regarding a 911 Authority's technical capability to receive 911 traffic in IP-format ( i.e., SIP),” and we therefore do not believe that establishing additional specific technical requirements to meet the elements of a Phase 1 valid request is necessary.

We believe that Phase 1 is a reasonable interim step in 911 Authority readiness to establish the ingress of IP traffic to an ESInet. While Verizon argues that establishing IP connectivity at the ESInet is “not always necessary for the PSAP and its NG911 vendor to migrate to NG911” and that “full NG911 implementation is a viable and potentially better alternative to the two-stage approach,” the record indicates that most 911 Authorities have implemented or plan to implement IP connectivity as a transitional step in their implementation of NG911. For OSPs that wish to deliver Phase 2 without implementing Phase 1 first, we note that OSPs and 911 Authorities may mutually agree on such an approach. As our goal is a prompt transition to NG911, to the extent that 911 Authorities and OSPs are ready to proceed directly to Phase 2, we encourage them to take that step using the mutual agreement process.

b. Phase 2 Valid Requests

For a Phase 2 request to be deemed valid, the requesting 911 Authority must certify that it has all of the necessary infrastructure installed and operational to receive 911 traffic in SIP format that complies with NG911 commonly accepted standards and to transmit such traffic to the PSAP(s) connected to it. The 911 Authority also must certify that its ESInet is connected to a fully functioning NGCS network that can provide access to a LVF and interface with a LIS or its functional equivalent provided by the OSP. We believe that these elements functionally describe the prerequisites for an NG911 network to accept traffic in SIP format that complies with NG911 commonly accepted standards.

The readiness prerequisites that we adopt for a valid Phase 2 request are generally supported by commenters. For example, T-Mobile provides a checklist of elements that it uses when considering “i3 NG911 Readiness.” T-Mobile's checklist asks questions regarding whether the PSAP's NGCS supports standards-based NG911 connectivity to T-Mobile's LIS. This element is similar to the Phase 2 prerequisite that the 911 Authority be able to interface with the LIS or functionally equivalent capability provided by the OSP. Our readiness prerequisites additionally stipulate that the ESInet is connected to a fully functioning NGCS network, which is similar to T-Mobile's checklist questions regarding the extent of NGCS deployment. While the Phase 2 readiness elements we in this document and the Order are less granular and do not specify every element in T-Mobile's checklist, the two are substantially consistent.

Several wireless industry commenters support the completion of an HTTP-Enabled Location Delivery (HELD) certification as a prerequisite of 911 Authority readiness. While 911 Authorities need not certify to the Commission that they or their NGCS providers have a HELD certification, we recognize that use of the HELD protocol may enable providers to access location information from a LIS, depending on technical requirements. We decline to include this certification as a required element because it is not clear that a HELD certification is necessary in every situation for a 911 Authority to access a LIS. ATIS indicates that it is working to develop technical documentation to include “readiness checklists and guidelines for PSAPs/911 Authorities to request NG911 connectivity,” and we encourage such work to the extent that it serves to provide technical guidance to 911 Authorities in achieving readiness to initiate a Phase 1 or 2 request. We also encourage OSPs, 911 service providers, and 911 Authorities to collaborate to develop methods, processes, and best practices to facilitate responses to 911 Authorities' valid requests, as suggested by APCO.

c. Other Readiness Considerations

Designation of NG911 Delivery Points. As part of a Phase 1 or 2 valid request, the requesting 911 Authority includes the designated location of NG911 Delivery Point(s) relevant to Phase 1 or 2. We agree with Verizon that the establishment of NG911 Delivery Points is a threshold capability for technical readiness; however, as discussed in this document and section III.D.1 of the Order, we disagree that such a designation should be the result of a “mutual agreement regarding the location and terms and conditions governing” the NG911 Delivery Points. The inclusion of the location of NG911 Delivery Point(s) as part of a Phase 1 and 2 valid request will facilitate OSPs' compliance with Phase 1 and 2 by the relevant deadline.

Readiness established at time of request. A Phase 1 or 2 valid request indicates that the 911 Authority is ready at the time the request is made to receive 911 traffic from an OSP in Phase 1 or 2 format. Several commenters support this approach. We agree with T-Mobile that a valid request also includes the readiness of any vendors used by the 911 Authority to implement NG911 services. We require readiness at the time of the valid request in order to address concerns that a valid request indicating future readiness could slow the NG911 transition. We agree with Verizon that readiness at the time of a valid request is an “appropriate departure from the trigger for six-month deployment of wireless E911 Phase 1 and 2, which allowed a PSAP to certify that it would be capable within that period.” For the foregoing reasons, we decline to implement Comtech's suggestion that a valid request “is one in which the applicable 911 Authority certifies that it will be technically ready to receive 911 calls in the requested IP-based format.”

Individual PSAP readiness not a required part of a valid request. Neither phase would require individual PSAPs connected to the ESInet to be NG911-ready. The 911 Authority is responsible for ensuring that all connected PSAPs can receive 911 communications via the ESInet, either by implementing NG911 upgrades or by translating/converting the communications after they have transited the ESInet via a Legacy PSAP Gateway. BRETSA, NASNA, and Mission Critical Partners agree with this approach. As such, we decline to specifically require that 911 Authorities implement NG911 call handling equipment at the PSAP prior to the initiation of a valid request for either Phase 1 or 2, as suggested by some commenters. This will provide flexibility to 911 Authorities in upgrading PSAPs while enabling the NG911 network to capture the benefits of receiving 911 traffic in either a basic SIP format at Phase 1 or SIP format that complies with NG911 commonly accepted standards at Phase 2. iCERT states that criteria for readiness should include “details about any arrangements that have been entered into with NG911 service providers to secure equipment, interconnection agreements, and other service arrangements that will ensure PSAPs are ready to accept IP-based 911 calls.” We disagree that 911 Authorities must provide such details to OSPs as a component of a valid request, as the 911 Authority remains responsible for the delivery of 911 calls and texts to PSAPs connected to the ESInet.

Connectivity testing not required prior to a valid request. As noted above, for both Phase 1 and 2 valid requests, we require the 911 Authority to certify that it has obtained commitments from an ESInet vendor, NGCS vendor, and/or call handling equipment vendor needed to facilitate and complete connectivity testing within the compliance timeframe applicable to the originating service provider. However, we decline to require testing as a prerequisite to a 911 Authority's valid request, as suggested by some commenters. In order to meet the readiness element to receive 911 traffic at Phase 1 or 2, we believe that it is highly likely that 911 Authorities would need to have completed at least some internal testing of their network elements to ensure that they are operational and functioning effectively. The nature and extent of this testing is likely to vary based on the specific NG911 vendors the 911 Authority has selected. We believe that our approach to require 911 Authorities to demonstrate readiness for connectivity testing with OSPs accomplishes our goal of facilitating timely OSP compliance with NG911 rules.

We permit flexible compliance timelines, subject to mutual agreement of OSPs and 911 Authorities, to accommodate variability in the length of testing, as suggested by some commenters. We emphasize that our rules function as a default. In situations in which connectivity testing takes longer than the time allotted under our default NG911 rules, OSPs and 911 Authorities may wish to consider establishing by mutual agreement extended deployment timelines.

d. Authorized Requesting Entities

For purposes of the rules in this document and the Order, only “911 Authorities” as defined in our rules may make a valid request to OSPs for compliance with the requirements of Phase 1 or 2. The Commission stated in the NG911 Notice that the appropriate authority to request IP-based service from OSPs would be “the local or state entity with the authority and responsibility to designate the point(s) that allow emergency calls to be answered.” The Commission also proposed that a valid request would be made by a local or state entity that certifies that it is “specifically authorized to accept calls in the IP-based format requested.” We adopt these proposals with minor modifications to the structure of the rule for clarity.

We limit valid requests to 911 Authorities, as defined in the Commission's NG911 rules. We recognize that the entity with sufficient jurisdiction and authority to request the delivery of NG911 service from OSPs depends on the governance structure that applies to that 911 jurisdiction. We decline to assume that a request should come from a state-level entity, as suggested by Maine PUC and Colorado PUC. We also decline to limit authorized requests to statewide authorities or ESInets, as suggested by Bandwidth. In declining to limit or prioritize requests from statewide authorities, we acknowledge that some NG911 networks are local or regional, rather than state-wide. In some instances, the appropriate jurisdictional authority may be a state 911 administrator, and in other instances, the local or regional 911 office may be the appropriate requesting entity. Texas 9-1-1 Entities states, and we agree, that “there are various potential governance and ESInet/NGCS deployment scenarios nationwide.” We also agree with NENA that the “entity having sufficient jurisdiction to make the request to deliver NG9-1-1 calls depends entirely on how the local 9-1-1 service is governed, designed, and configured.” We decline to require, as argued by Verizon, that “to the extent a valid request is dependent on a vendor's actions” certifications submitted by 911 Authorities should include an affidavit signed by the director or officer of the vendor “subject to the same affidavit standards” as an OSP's petition challenging the validity of a request.” We emphasize that 911 Authorities are responsible for ensuring the readiness of their vendors prior to making a Phase 1 or Phase 2 request. We believe that the petition process for OSPs challenging the validity of a request is sufficient to guard against premature requests.

We decline to allow parties other than a 911 Authority to submit Phase 1 and 2 requests. BRETSA argues that 911 Authorities “should have the discretion to appoint” other parties, such as the NGCS provider, “to negotiate, implement, and test the delivery of 9-1-1 calls in the requested format.” Several other commenters argue that NGCS providers should play a role in determining readiness to receive NG911 traffic. We agree with Verizon that our rules do not prohibit a 911 Authority and its vendor from entering into a letter of authorization or similar arrangement to facilitate “technical and operational business-to-business discussions.” We recognize that NGCS providers have an important role and encourage 911 Authorities to work closely with their NGCS providers in establishing readiness. However, consistent with prior 911 technology transitions and to minimize confusion, we identify a governmental entity as the appropriate entity to initiate a valid request.

e. Notification Mechanism for Valid Requests

As part of a valid Phase 1 or Phase 2 request to an OSP, the requesting 911 Authority must provide notification to each OSP provider that includes the certifications and information required by our rules. In the LBR Notice and the NG911 Notice, the Commission proposed that 911 Authorities could provide this notification either by submission to a Commission-provided registry or by written notification to individual OSPs. As discussed below, we adopt this proposal and allow 911 Authorities to use either notification method.

Several commenters support the proposal to establish a voluntary centralized registry for submission of valid requests from 911 Authorities. A centralized registry will reduce the administrative burden on 911 Authorities to make individual requests to OSPs for Phase 1 and 2. It will also reduce the administrative burden on OSPs to track valid requests; we disagree with RWA and CTIA that monitoring a centralized registry is a burdensome requirement for small, rural OSPs. RWA's members, as covered text providers, already monitor a similar registry on the Commission's website in the text-to-911 context, and checking the NG911 registry requires only incremental additional resources. We agree with Maine PUC that the registry will provide “clarity and predictability, as well as a similar expectation for all providers.” We also agree with Mission Critical Partners that a voluntary registry may help resolve challenges 911 Authorities face in identifying all OSPs in their coverage area. Therefore, we provide the option of the voluntary registry as an efficient mechanism to submit requests to all OSPs within a 911 Authority's jurisdiction. We also decline to require 911 Authorities to use a direct notification mechanism to inform OSPs of their valid requests, as requested by CCA, as 911 Authorities may not be aware of all of the OSPs within their jurisdiction and requiring them to identify and separately notify each OSP is unduly burdensome and inefficient. We direct PSHSB to develop, implement, and maintain a centralized electronic registry for submission of Phase 1 and Phase 2 requests by 911 Authorities. We leave to the Bureau's discretion whether to consolidate the registry with existing Bureau registries for PSAPs and text-to-911 notifications, if the Bureau determines such a step to be necessary or beneficial. We further direct PSHSB to open a new docket and issue guidance regarding filing of NG911 valid requests, and to work with OSPs, 911 Authorities, and industry organizations such as CTIA to ensure that all OSPs receive timely notice of valid requests.

We do not require 911 Authorities to use the registry to notify OSPs of Phase 1 and Phase 2 requests. As an alternative to providing notice in the registry, 911 Authorities may notify OSPs of Phase 1 and Phase 2 requests by direct written notification. Direct notification is permitted at any time after the rules take effect, regardless of when the registry is made available.

CTIA and ATIS argue that notification in the registry should not be the trigger for OSP compliance deadlines. CTIA argues that any deadlines imposed should be “triggered only when OSPs and PSAPs have agreed that a PSAP is capable of receiving NG911-compatible traffic.” Similarly, ATIS argues that 911 Authorities should “engage directly” with OSPs to “become technically ready and capable to receive IP format calls in the first instance.” We find that notification of a valid request is sufficient to trigger OSP compliance deadlines. However, we encourage 911 Authorities and OSPs to communicate directly with one another both before and after valid Phase 1 and Phase 2 requests.

We decline to adopt several notification alternatives proposed by commenters. NENA suggests that the national “Forest Guide,” a component of NG911 architecture specified in the i3 standard, could serve as a centralized database for NG911 transition notifications. However, it is unclear whether a national Forest Guide is operational or could be used for the purpose suggested. We also decline to implement a “push notification feature,” as suggested by Intrado. We have not previously determined that such a feature is necessary and the Commission does not maintain the information required in order to implement such a feature. We therefore instead require OSPs to monitor the central registry, as is the case for the existing Text-to-911 Registry.

f. OSP Petitions Challenging Validity of 911 Authority Requests

Some commenters convey concerns regarding attestations they have received from 911 Authorities as part of the ongoing NG911 transition; namely, that attestations of readiness do not translate to actual readiness. To address circumstances in which an OSP believes that a 911 Authority has submitted an invalid Phase 1 or 2 request, an OSP may submit a petition challenging the 911 Authority's request. The petition must be submitted within 60 days of receipt of the request and must document the basis for the OSP's assertion that the request does not satisfy a requirement or requirements of a Phase 1 or 2 valid request. This petition process is subject to procedural requirements set forth in 47 CFR 1.41, 1.45, and 1.47. The petition must be in the form of an affidavit and include specific information relating to the progress of NG911 implementation. In particular, the affidavit must be signed by a director or officer of the OSP and include the basis for the OSP's assertion that the 911 Authority's request does not satisfy one or more of the conditions for a Phase 1 or Phase 2 valid request; each of the specific steps that the OSP has taken to implement Phase 1 or Phase 2 requirements; the basis for the OSP's assertion that it cannot make further implementation efforts until the 911 Authority satisfies the conditions for a Phase 1 or Phase 2 valid request; and the specific steps that must be completed by the OSP and, to the extent known, the 911 Authority or other parties before the OSP can implement the Phase 1 or Phase 2 requirements. All affidavits must be correct, and the director or officer who signs the affidavit has the duty to personally determine that the affidavit is correct. An OSP that challenges a 911 Authority's valid request must describe the steps it has taken toward implementing Phase 1 or Phase 2 requirements that are not dependent on the readiness of the 911 Authority. We anticipate that this requirement will deter OSPs from using the request challenge process as a pretext to delay implementation, while ensuring that OSPs are able to successfully use the challenge process when it is necessary. We do not adopt the suggestion by some commenters that a petition should automatically toll the compliance deadline triggered by the request. We delegate authority to PSHSB to review and decide petitions, including whether to pause implementation deadlines for the OSP that has submitted the petition, affirm the request of the 911 Authority as valid, or take other action as necessary. If the Bureau upholds the 911 Authority request as valid, the OSP may be subject to enforcement of the original Phase 1 or Phase 2 compliance date. We direct PSHSB to open a new docket and issue guidance regarding OSP petitions challenging the validity of 911 Authority requests.

We anticipate that the availability of the petition process will deter 911 Authorities from making premature Phase 1 and Phase 2 requests and will provide reasonable recourse for OSPs that believe that they have received an invalid request. A 911 Authority may file an opposition to the OSP's petition and the OSP may file a reply to that opposition in accordance with 47 CFR 1.45. A copy of the document (petition, opposition, or reply) must be served on the other party (911 Authority or OSP) at the time of filing in accordance with 47 CFR 1.47. We decline, as suggested by Comtech, to adopt “attestation requirements” in which a 911 Authority would certify specific elements in response to an OSP dispute of a request. 911 Authorities already are required to certify their readiness when submitting a Phase 1 or 2 request, and a requirement to submit further attestations would do little to resolve the dispute while entrenching parties in their positions. We believe that the OSP petition regarding requests, an option for the 911 Authority to respond, and a chance for the Bureau to consider such requests provide both OSPs and 911 Authorities with a clear pathway to resolve disputes.

3. OSP Implementation Timeframes

a. Default Timeframes

At Phase 1, we require non-rural wireline providers, nationwide CMRS providers, covered text providers, and interconnected VoIP providers to comply with NG911 requirements within six months after receiving a Phase 1 valid request. We provide additional time to RLECs, non-nationwide CMRS providers, and internet-based TRS providers, which must comply with our NG911 requirements within 12 months after receiving a Phase 1 valid request.

At Phase 2, we require non-rural wireline providers, nationwide CMRS providers, covered text providers, and interconnected VoIP providers to comply with our N911 requirements within six months after the latest of: (1) the 911 Authority's Phase 2 valid request; or (2) the date when the OSP is required to comply with Phase 1 requirements, or when it does comply with those requirements (whichever is earlier). Similarly, RLECs, non-nationwide CMRS providers, and internet-based TRS providers must comply with our NG911 requirements within 12 months after the latest of: (1) the 911 Authority's Phase 2 valid request; or (2) the date when the OSP is required to comply with Phase 1 requirements, or when it does comply with those requirements (whichever is earlier).

Our rules also allow 911 Authorities and OSPs to negotiate alternative agreements regarding the timelines for compliance with NG911 requirements at either Phase 1 or 2. This approach will help expedite the transition to NG911 while providing 911 Authorities and OSPs flexibility to manage the transition at the state and local level.

Wireline and Interconnected VoIP Providers. In the NG911 Notice, the Commission proposed that all wireline and interconnected VoIP providers be required to deliver 911 calls in IP format within six months after a valid request or six months from the effective date of such requirement. Public safety commenters and NG911 vendors express general support for this timeline, and there is specific support for the proposed timeframes for interconnected VoIP providers. However, some commenters recommend longer compliance timeframes. For example, South Carolina recommends that local exchange carriers be given between six and twelve months to convert their technology to IP-based transmission. NCTA similarly states that “[a] twelve-month transition period should be sufficient for most providers once they receive notice that the 911 Authority has implemented NG911.” Some wireline commenters recommend longer timeframes of between two and three years for RLECs, ILECs, or smaller providers. Several commenters indicate that the time required will be variable based on several factors, including the responsiveness of third-party transport providers, whether the NG911 implementation is standards-based, the availability of suppliers and installation personnel, resource constraint, and supply chain issues.

We determine that six months per phase provides adequate time for non-RLEC wireline providers and interconnected VoIP providers to transition first to basic SIP at Phase 1, and second to SIP format that complies with NG911 commonly accepted standards at Phase 2. By splitting the transition into two six-month phases, we provide a longer total transition timeframe for wireline and interconnected VoIP providers than was originally proposed. We find that this approach balances the concerns raised by commenters that sought a longer total timeframe than six months with the need to ensure an expeditious transition, which could be complete under these rules within a year of the 911 Authority's Phase 1 request. The time period we implement for non-RLEC wireline providers and interconnected VoIP providers takes into account the various factors raised by commenters.

We adopt an extended timeframe of 12 months per phase for RLECs to complete Phase 1 and Phase 2. As RLEC commenters note, RLECs operate in rural and sometimes remote areas and can face resource limitations and other challenges when transitioning to NG911, e.g., finding vendors that can perform the required work, negotiating and executing contracts, and upgrading networks ( e.g., installation of new switches). Compliance with NG911 requirements at each phase may take longer for RLECs to complete given these factors.

CMRS Providers. In the LBR Notice, the Commission proposed that nationwide CMRS providers would have six months and non-nationwide CMRS providers would have 12 months to deliver IP-formatted calls, texts, and location information following the effective date of the rule or a valid request, whichever is later. Some commenters support the timelines as proposed in the LBR Notice, while other commenters support longer timeframes. Verizon indicates that a six-month timeline is feasible only if “the PSAP has fully implemented i3 in its network through a NG911 provider that has deployed its service in coordination with Verizon.” Non-nationwide CMRS providers requested longer timeframes to comply with NG911 delivery requirements. T-Mobile opposes the implementation of Commission deadlines for the transition to NG911 altogether.

We determine that six months per phase provides adequate time for nationwide CMRS providers to transition to basic SIP in Phase 1 and to SIP format that complies with NG911 commonly accepted standards in Phase 2. By adopting a phased approach, we address concerns raised by commenters while balancing the needs of 911 Authorities to complete the NG911 transition in a timely manner. We also determine that 12 months per phase (for twenty-four months total) provides adequate time for non-nationwide CMRS providers to transition to Phase 1 and 2. This longer timeframe accounts for the unique challenges raised by non-nationwide CMRS providers in their comments, while ensuring that the NG911 transition proceeds in a timely manner in order to provide crucial benefits to public safety. Longer timelines for non-nationwide CMRS providers, such as the 18 months per phase favored by RWA and CCA, would result in significant and unwarranted additional delay for users of these non-nationwide CMRS providers' services and for 911 Authorities. We disagree with T-Mobile's opposition to implementation deadlines; the record indicates that timelines are needed to provide certainty for both OSPs and 911 Authorities and to expedite the transition to NG911.

Internet-based TRS providers. The Commission proposed in the NG911 Notice that internet-based TRS providers would be required to deliver 911 calls in IP format within 12 months after a valid request or 12 months from the effective date of such requirement, consistent with previous Commission action regarding these services. We determine that 12 months per phase provides adequate time for internet-based TRS providers to comply with NG911 requirements at Phase 1 and 2. Internet-based TRS providers are primarily small entities and have operational differences that distinguish them from other types of providers, ²⁸³ warranting a longer timeframe for compliance.

Covered Text Providers. The Commission proposed in the LBR Notice that covered text providers would have six months to deliver IP-formatted texts and location information following the effective date of the rule or a valid request, whichever is later. No commenter to either the LBR Notice or NG911 Notice addressed compliance timelines for covered text providers to deliver 911 texts to 911 Authorities that have implemented NG911. We therefore adopt the six-month transition timeline at each phase for covered text providers. We believe this timeframe to be reasonable in light of prior Commission transition periods for covered text providers to implement technology changes.

Sequencing of Phase 1 and Phase 2. Under the rules for all OSPs, compliance with Phase 1 requirements is a prerequisite for Phase 2, meaning that an OSP's transition to Phase 1 must be completed before the implementation period can start for Phase 2 for a particular requesting 911 Authority. We recognize that the NG911 transition is ongoing and that many OSPs have already achieved Phase 1 connectivity with NG911 networks. In such scenarios, 911 Authorities may initiate a Phase 2 request without having to first issue a Phase 1 request. We decline to adopt NASNA's recommended 18-month waiting period between valid requests at each phase, which we believe could unnecessarily slow the transition to NG911.

In other instances, a 911 Authority may have met the conditions for providing a valid request for Phase 2 as well as Phase 1, but an OSP may not yet have implemented either phase of the transition. In such a case, the 911 Authority may send the OSP valid requests for both Phase 1 and Phase 2 simultaneously, or it may send the OSP a Phase 2 valid request after it has issued the Phase 1 request but before the OSP's deadline for complying with it. In such scenarios, the six- or twelve-month period of time for the OSP to come into compliance with the Phase 2 request would begin on the date of its Phase 1 compliance deadline or when it complies with the Phase 1 requirements, whichever is earlier, rather than on the earlier date when the Phase 2 request was issued. For example, if the 911 Authority issues both Phase 1 and Phase 2 requests to a nationwide CMRS provider on January 2, 2026, then the provider's deadline for implementing the Phase 1 request would be six months later (on July 2, 2026), and its deadline for implementing Phase 2 would be six months after that (on January 2, 2027). However, if the nationwide CMRS provider complied with its Phase 1 requirements on June 2, 2026, then its deadline for implementing Phase 2 would be six months after that (on December 2, 2026). This provision should benefit both OSPs and 911 Authorities and could accelerate the implementation of Phase 2 NG911 in some circumstances. It accounts for the practical hurdles facing some OSPs that have not yet implemented the Phase 1 requirements and accommodates their need to do so before they start implementing Phase 2. It also relieves 911 Authorities of a potentially burdensome procedural hurdle by making it unnecessary to issue separate, sequential Phase 1 and Phase 2 requests to OSPs that have not yet implemented Phase 1. A 911 Authority would not need to wait until an OSP finishes implementing the Phase 1 requirements to issue a Phase 2 request to that OSP. Instead, the 911 Authority could issue both valid requests to the OSP simultaneously and establish firm milestone dates for the OSP to comply with both phases in sequence. As discussed in this document and section III.C.3.b of the Order, 911 Authorities and OSPs may also reach alternative agreements regarding timelines.

CTIA and CCA suggest that there are instances in which an originating service provider may provide more than one type of service across the same network, which could potentially subject that originating service provider to inconsistent compliance deadlines. We clarify that when an originating service provider is subject to both six- and twelve- month timelines for different services on the same network as the result of a 911 Authority's valid request, the originating service provider may comply with its obligations under the later of the two deadlines. This approach ensures the full benefit of extended NG911 transition deadlines for specific types of OSPs where an OSP uses a combination of network elements in a local area.

As an alternative to setting timelines for OSPs to complete the transition to NG911, AT&T and ATIS propose that we focus our rules on setting timelines for OSPs to take specific affirmative steps toward transitioning to IP delivery, such as placing circuit orders. We recognize that setting deadlines for individual implementation steps could provide additional certainty, but focusing on individual steps without requiring completion of all necessary steps is unlikely to achieve our objectives. In addition, the concerns raised by AT&T and ATIS are addressed by other modifications that we have made to our proposals from the NG911 Notice, including adopting a two-phase approach and lengthening the amount of time for OSPs to comply with NG911 obligations, ensuring 911 Authority readiness at the time of valid request, and providing flexibility to agree to alternative timelines for compliance with 911 Authorities.

Brian Rosen, RWA, and Verizon suggest that OSPs may need a longer timeline to make the required transition the first time that an OSP connects to an ESInet or NG911 vendor. These commenters recommend increasing the time frame for OSPs to connect to the first ESInet and then retaining a six-month timeline for subsequent connections. RWA argues that the Commission should extend the timeline for the first connection to an ESInet but revert to a shorter timeline for subsequent valid requests. Verizon similarly indicates that the onboarding process for the first time it connects to an NG911 vendor can take several months to a year, but that lead time is not needed for the vendor's subsequent 911 Authority customers. We decline to establish different timelines for “first-time” transition by OSPs. Although such transitions may take longer as OSPs connect with ESInets and NG911 service providers for the first time, our rules provide ample flexibility for OSPs and 911 Authorities to address these issues. We encourage 911 Authorities to collaborate with OSPs that are connecting to ESInets and NG911 vendors in the first instance. In addition, the Commission's waiver process is available to providers facing extraordinary circumstances.

Rally Networks proposes that instead of a six-month compliance period, the Commission should require 911 authorities to pre-notify any OSPs that will need technology upgrades in order to comply with the NG911 rules, or that we should allow RLECs to propose and negotiate compliance timelines with 911 Authorities after a 911 Authority request. With regards to the first proposal, nothing in our rules prevents 911 Authorities from pre-notifying OSPs, including RLECs, as they take steps to prepare for the transition to NG911. In addition, the steps that 911 Authorities take to prepare for NG911, including selecting contractors for their NG911 network, are typically public and accessible on 911 Authorities' websites. We find that these resources are sufficient to provide OSPs with notice of the transition and make it unnecessary to require pre-notification by 911 Authorities before transmittal of a Phase 1 or Phase 2 request. With regards to the second proposal, under the rules, OSPs and 911 Authorities may agree to alternative timelines for compliance with NG911 requirements. Nothing in our rules would prevent an RLEC, for example, from proposing and negotiating compliance timelines with a 911 Authority following the 911 Authority's valid request.

Due to unique challenges in Alaska, Alaska Telecom Association (Alaska Telecom. Assoc.) requests “an implementation extension or exemption for non-IP networks, or portions of networks” and “longer implementation timelines as well as an opportunity for waivers of timing requirements.” Alaska Telecom. Assoc. also requests that “any NG911 rules should provide carriers in Alaska with a presumptive waiver of mandated IP-delivery deadlines, provided such a carrier can demonstrate that it is working in good faith with the PSAP to complete the request.” We observe that NG911 implementation timelines are tied to the readiness of the 911 Authority, and Alaska Telecom. Assoc. notes that “PSAPs in Alaska have not yet launched NG911 service.” We decline to provide additional time specifically for Alaska telecommunications providers as part of these rules, but reiterate that OSPs may negotiate with 911 Authorities for separate compliance timelines under our rules. We also decline to provide a presumptive waiver of compliance deadlines for Alaska OSPs. Providers facing extraordinary circumstances may request relief under the Commission's existing waiver process.

b. Modification of Deadlines by Agreement

We allow 911 Authorities and OSPs to mutually agree on implementation deadlines that are different from the default compliance deadlines in this document and the Order. This approach addresses commenter requests that we allow flexibility in our compliance timelines, and it is supported by AT&T, Colorado PUC, CTIA, Mission Critical Partners, NENA, and RWA. This approach is also consistent with the proposals in the NG911 Notice and LBR Notice to permit the modification of deadlines by agreement. We encourage OSPs to communicate with 911 Authorities if they experience situations that may warrant alternative agreements. We also encourage 911 Authorities and OSPs to reach an alternative agreement in instances in which challenges are encountered by 911 Authorities and their vendors. If an alternative agreement is reached, the OSP must notify the Commission of the key terms of the agreement and the alternative deadline within 30 days of the execution of the agreement so that the Commission is aware of any changes to the default obligations of OSPs. We direct PSHSB to open a new docket and issue guidance to OSPs about notifying the Commission regarding alternative agreements.

Mission Critical Partners suggests that there be a mechanism “whereby these agreements could be canceled and a return to the mandated timeline executed if needed.” Although the rules do not provide for cancellation or termination of alternative agreements, there is nothing in the rules prohibiting such an outcome, and parties are free to include a cancellation or termination provision in their agreements as they see fit. We also clarify that, upon cancellation or termination of an alternative agreement, the NG911 rules and deadlines will apply when a valid request is in effect, in the absence of any alternative provision.

D. NG911 Delivery Points and Cost Responsibilities

We adopt default rules requiring that, starting at Phase 1, OSPs must transmit and deliver 911 traffic to NG911 Delivery Points designated by 911 Authorities and must bear the financial responsibility for such transmission, including costs associated with completing any needed TDM-to-IP translation and the costs of delivering associated routing and location information in the requested IP-based format. Beyond these NG911 Delivery Points, 911 Authorities will be responsible for processing and transmitting such traffic to PSAPs. We emphasize that these are default rules that do not preclude alternative arrangements between 911 Authorities and OSPs at the state or local level. Moreover, our rules presumptively do not alter or invalidate existing agreements between state or local 911 Authorities and OSPs, but will apply in the absence of such agreements.

The NG911 traffic delivery and cost responsibility requirements in this document and the Order are essentially the same as those proposed in the NG911 Notice, subject to a few modifications in response to the record. Specifically, as discussed below, OSPs will be obligated to deliver 911 traffic only to NG911 Delivery Points located in the 911 Authority's state or territory; in providing for such delivery, OSPs retain the right to decide which transmission routes to use and which transport, aggregation, and other services to obtain from third parties, if any. Finally, we clarify that OSPs who use the services of third parties will continue to remain ultimately responsible for any acts of their agents that violate the Commission's 911 rules.

We adopt these requirements in light of clear record evidence that the transition to NG911 nationwide is being delayed by uncertainty and disagreements between OSPs and 911 Authorities over the basic terms on which NG911 service is to be provided. Many of these disagreements concern the location of delivery points for 911 traffic and the allocation of cost responsibilities in the NG911 environment. We find that the default rules in this document and the Order will help resolve these disputes by eliminating key points of disagreement and facilitating discussions between OSPs and 911 Authorities concerning the issues that they need to coordinate. As a result, we expect these rules to accelerate the rollout of IP-based NG911 service to 911 callers nationwide.

1. Originating Service Providers' Default Responsibility for Transmitting and Delivering 911 Traffic to NG911 Delivery Points Designated by 911 Authorities

Consistent with the proposal in the NG911 Notice, our default rule establishes that 911 Authorities may designate the locations of the NG911 Delivery Points where OSPs will be required to transmit and hand off NG911 traffic starting at Phase 1. Many commenting parties, including OSP representatives as well as members of the public safety community, support the default delivery rule proposed in the NG911 Notice. However, a number of parties, including a coalition of RLECs and organizations representing RLECs led by NTCA (collectively, RLEC Coalition), suggest modifications to the proposed rule or argue for alternative approaches. Based on the record, we adopt several of the requested modifications to the proposed default rule and decline to adopt others, as discussed below.

Home State NG911 Delivery Points. First, we modify the proposed default rule to require OSPs to transmit and deliver 911 traffic to NG911 Delivery Points designated by a 911 Authority only if those points are located within the same state or territory as the PSAPs connected to the 911 Authority's ESInet. This addresses the concern expressed by some RLECs that they could incur unreasonably high transport costs if 911 Authorities had unlimited discretion to require OSPs to deliver traffic to NG911 Delivery Points located anywhere in the country. We believe that any such costs would likely be far less substantial than these parties fear, both because the costs of transmitting calls in IP format are not primarily based on the distance the calls must travel and because OSPs could mitigate the distance-related costs to transmit calls in TDM format by converting calls into IP format prior to sending them over any long-distance transmission paths. OSPs could also mitigate their costs by originating calls in IP format before transmitting them anywhere, entering into cost-sharing arrangements, or using other means. Nonetheless, requiring OSPs to deliver 911 traffic only to designated NG911 Delivery Points within 911 Authorities' home states or territories will provide OSPs, particularly RLECs, with greater certainty regarding potential costs. This requirement is unlikely to increase costs for 911 Authorities given that the cost of transmitting IP traffic to a potentially distant point in a different state or territory is not appreciably greater than the cost of transmitting such traffic over a shorter distance to locations within the same state or territory.

This home-state NG911 Delivery Point qualification also addresses concerns that RLECs could face increased risk of liability if they were required to transport 911 calls to locations in out-of-state jurisdictions. As discussed in more detail below, we believe that the obligation to transmit and deliver 911 calls to NG911 Delivery Points will have little, if any, impact on RLECs' exposure to liability under state tort law. Nonetheless, the home-state qualification may make it easier for RLECs to anticipate and manage those risks without having to evaluate differing tort law standards in multiple states. The home-state qualification also should address RLECs' concerns that an obligation to deliver calls out-of-state would compel them to retain third-party long distance transmission vendors and render them potentially liable for 911 rule violations committed by these vendors. The home-state qualification will reduce the need for RLECs to retain third-party vendors and make it easier for them to monitor the performance of any third-party vendors they do retain.

Finally, we believe it is reasonable to expect 911 Authorities to locate NG911 Delivery Points within the states or territories where they are responsible for the provision of 911 services. By definition, 911 Authorities are state, local, regional, territorial, or Tribal government entities that typically are responsible for implementing NG911 systems that serve PSAPs within an individual state, a local jurisdiction within a state, or a territory. Moreover, the end users who initiate 911 communications and the PSAPs that those users are seeking to reach typically are located in the same state or territory. Therefore, from a network design and cost perspective, it would appear logical for a 911 Authority to provide an in-state point where OSPs are required to deliver NG911 traffic, particularly for small OSPs that operate only within that state or territory. However, our rules do not preclude 911 Authorities and OSPs from mutually agreeing on out-of-state delivery points. For example, if a 911 Authority retains the same ESInet provider that neighboring authorities have retained, that 911 Authority may agree with an OSP in its state that the OSP's existing connections to the ESInet provider's network in the neighboring states are sufficient NG911 Delivery Points.

OSPs' Use of Aggregation Services and Other Cost-Saving Measures. Our default NG911 delivery rule does not prohibit OSPs from using aggregation services, and it allows OSPs to choose the methods of transport they will use to deliver 911 traffic to ESInets. Some RLEC commenters report that ESInet providers have tried to restrict their choices of network arrangements, such as by opposing their shared use of aggregation services. Such services enable multiple small carriers to bundle their data streams and share the cost of transporting the pooled data stream to a common destination, resulting in lower overall costs than if each OSP paid for separate transport. We agree that OSPs should be allowed to implement such reasonable cost-saving measures, and we find that this approach could help avoid disputes between OSPs and 911 Authorities.

We encourage OSPs, NGCS providers, ESInet providers, and 911 Authorities to work together to enable OSPs to comply with Phase 1 and 2 delivery obligations. We also expect OSPs to select transport options that are reliable, secure, and comply with industry standards for reliability and security. NTCA, WTA, and Home Telephone argue that the Commission should establish rules requiring the transport of 911 traffic over dedicated SIP lines, and highlight that there are several options available to OSPs to comply with IP delivery rules with varying reliability, including third-party IP transport, dedicated SIP, and public internet. We decline to establish the requested rules at this time. We also decline to condition OSP obligations on an ESInet operator permitting VPN/internet connections, as suggested by Brian Rosen. At this time, we provide flexibility to 911 Authorities, in concert with their NG911 vendors, to determine the IP-based SIP format to request from OSPs.

Other Restrictions on Designation of NG911 Delivery Point Locations. We decline to impose any restrictions on 911 Authorities' selection of NG911 Delivery Point locations other than the home-state qualification discussed above. For example, we disagree with proposals to relieve a LEC of its NG911 traffic delivery obligations unless the 911 Authority establishes at least one NG911 Delivery Point within the LEC's local service area, or within a specified distance of such service area's boundary. Such a restriction, in effect, would require 911 Authorities in states with many small RLECs to establish individual NG911 Delivery Points for each of those RLECs, which could be inefficient and unreasonably costly to implement. We decline to adopt a restriction that, in effect, would compel 911 Authorities to structure their networks in a potentially inefficient manner to accommodate the RLECs' historic service area boundaries, rather than in a more efficient and cost-effective manner to ensure the reliable delivery of public safety emergency services.

For similar reasons, we reject proposals to restrict the number of NG911 Delivery Points a 911 Authority may designate. While some commenters advocate limiting delivery points to two per OSP, a limited number per state, or two per Local Access and Transport Area (LATA), we see no reason to limit the flexibility of 911 Authorities to determine the number of delivery points available to OSPs. Increasing the number of delivery points can contribute to the resiliency of NG911 networks by providing more options for routing calls to ESInets, while limits on the number of delivery points may create network vulnerabilities or needlessly drive up costs. Moreover, some states have chosen to implement multiple regional ESInets, and it would be reasonable for them to designate a greater number of NG911 Delivery Points than states that have implemented a single statewide ESInet.

We also reject proposals to require 911 Authorities to designate NG911 Delivery Points that are “reasonable” or not “excessive” or to require 911 Authorities to negotiate with OSPs “in good faith” over the locations of interconnection points. While we expect 911 Authorities to act reasonably, codifying such conditions in the rules is unnecessary and likely to lead to protracted negotiations that enable OSPs to delay the NG911 transition by refusing to deliver 911 traffic to states' and localities' NG911 networks in a manner that facilitates efficient network design and deployment. The rule will reduce uncertainty, assist with resolving deadlocks in negotiations, and expedite the nationwide transition to NG911.

Finally, we do not adopt a modification requested by one commenter that 911 Authorities be required to provide certain equipment at the NG911 Delivery Point or to comply with the hardware specifications of OSPs or their transport vendors. The record lacks evidence that disagreements over connection hardware have interfered with NG911 adoption, and we expect that OSPs and 911 Authorities will continue to be able to coordinate such logistical details on their own without regulatory intervention. We also are concerned that any default rule concerning hardware might interfere with 911 Authorities' network architecture plans or impose unwarranted burdens on 911 Authorities if we allowed OSPs to dictate these decisions in all circumstances. While we do not impose any specific hardware requirements, we note that our default rules assign 911 Authorities the responsibility to furnish all NG911 Delivery Point facilities, which includes the connection hardware necessary to receive 911 traffic from the OSP.

2. Default Cost Responsibilities

We adopt the default requirement proposed in the NG911 Notice and confirm that OSPs will be responsible for the cost of transmitting 911 traffic from their end users to the points of interconnection designated by 911 Authorities ( i.e., NG911 Delivery Points). Conversely, our default rule provides that OSPs are not responsible for the cost of transmitting calls from NG911 Delivery Points to PSAPs or for any reformatting or call translation within the NG911 network beyond the point where the OSP has handed off the call. To maintain this allocation, OSPs may not charge 911 Authorities or their vendors for providing the NG911 services that our rules require OSPs to provide, and once OSPs hand off 911 traffic to the 911 Authorities, the 911 Authorities and their vendors are responsible for delivering 911 traffic to PSAPs. OSPs must also bear the cost of compatibility testing for connecting to and using facilities at the NG911 Delivery Points to ensure compliance with NG911 commonly accepted standards specified by 911 Authorities. This clear allocation of financial responsibilities should resolve delays in the transition to NG911 caused by OSP uncertainty or unwillingness to take responsibility for the cost of transmitting 911 traffic originated by their own users. Most public safety agencies, NG911 service providers, and OSP industry representatives support this default cost responsibility rule as fair, rational, consistent with longstanding regulatory requirements and industry practice, and conducive to expediting the NG911 transition.

The NG911 cost responsibility default rule is analogous to the cost requirement the Commission adopted over two decades ago during the implementation of wireless E911. In its 2002 King County Order on Reconsideration, the Commission established a default requirement that CMRS providers bear the costs associated with transmitting 911 calls from their end users to the points where they hand off such calls to the selective routers used to transmit those calls to the appropriate PSAPs. Like those E911 requirements, the NG911 default rule reasonably holds OSPs responsible for the costs of complying with their own 911 service obligations. By continuing to adhere to our historical approach to E911 cost responsibility, we ensure that the NG911 transition will proceed on the same core principles that have defined prior iterations of 911 service. We provide continuity to the entities whose customers originate more than 80% of 911 calls—the CMRS providers that have been operating under the comparable E911 cost allocation rule for more than 20 years.

Adopting a single default cost standard also promotes our goal to facilitate a technology-neutral implementation of NG911. In NG911 networks, the distinctions between originating service provider types—CMRS, covered text providers, wireline, interconnected VoIP, and internet-based TRS—disappear, as all providers will terminate 911 traffic in an IP-based SIP format that complies with NG911 commonly recognized standards. This uniformity in service will reduce emergency response times; increase reliability and interoperability; and facilitate the integration of life-saving NGCS into emergency response systems. Adopting an “all-platforms” regulatory approach in our NG911 rulemaking is not only possible, but necessary, and we therefore adopt the default cost rule proposed in the NG911 Notice to ensure regulatory parity across service platforms.

By contrast, we decline to adopt the proposal advanced by the RLEC Coalition, which argues that cost allocation for wireline carriers, and particularly for RLECs, should operate under different rules from those applicable to wireless providers and all other OSPs. The RLEC Coalition proposes that for 911 calls originated by RLEC end users, the 911 Authorities, rather than the RLECs themselves, should be financially responsible for the cost of delivering their end user's 911 traffic from the RLEC local network to the designated NG911 Delivery Point. The RLECs justify this proposed approach by suggesting that 911 Authorities (or their ESInet vendors) are the RLECs' “customers” and therefore should pay for the services that the RLECs provide. This mischaracterizes the nature of the relationship between these entities. In the 911 context, the RLECs' customers are the end users who purchase their communications services and use them to initiate 911 calls, not the PSAPs that receive 911 calls or the ESInet operators that receive and transmit those calls on the PSAPs' behalf. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) has previously affirmed the Commission's E911 requirements that result in CMRS providers bearing financial responsibility for E911 implementation, noting that the Commission has “imposed upon wireless carriers an obligation to implement a service in the public interest,” and “[w]hether it does this directly or with the cooperation of other governmental safety organizations [ e.g., PSAPs], it has no obligation to compensate carriers for their costs.” Just as “PSAPs are not the cost causers for wireless E911 implementation,” PSAPs (and ESInet vendors that act on their behalf) are not the cost causers for wireline carriers' NG911 implementation. Indeed, rather than adopting the RLECs' suggestion that OSPs be treated as providing a service to the ESInet vendors, we could reasonably treat the OSPs as receiving a service from the ESInet vendors, since it is the ESInet vendors that enable the OSPs to satisfy their own obligation to deliver 911 traffic to PSAPs.

We also reject RLECs' argument that it would be unreasonable to require RLECs to bear the cost of transporting 911 traffic to NG911 Delivery Points because some ESInet operators may be entitled to payment for the same transport services under their contracts with 911 Authorities. This claim is speculative and premature for several reasons. First, the record does not reflect the terms of the many contractual arrangements that have been negotiated between 911 Authorities and their ESInet vendors to date. Even if that information were available, the Commission still would be required to speculate as to whether those agreements will remain in place in future years when the RLECs become responsible for providing NG911 service, which will not occur until after the NG911 rules become effective; 911 Authorities issue valid requests, and the RLECs' one-year period for compliance has passed. By that that time, ESInet operators' current contracts may have lapsed, been renegotiated, or been amended pursuant to change-in-law or change-in regulation provisions, among other possibilities. The RLECs' concern over possible unwarranted payments to ESInet providers for transport services also may become moot depending on where 911 Authorities choose to locate their NG911 Delivery Points; whether 911 Authorities agree to depart from the default NG911 rules as permitted by section 9.34; and whether state laws and regulations prohibit such payments under contracts with state agencies. We decline to adopt any rule to address this hypothetical future issue given the numerous unknown variables and because we will not intrude on states' 911 implementation regimes; the rules are limited to the 911-related services and obligations of OSPs. Moreover, the possibility that some ESInet providers may potentially benefit from our NG911 rules is irrelevant to the Commission's well-established authority to enact public safety rules as well as the RLECs' legal obligation to comply with them.

We encourage 911 Authorities and their ESInet service providers not to impose unreasonable fees on OSPs for connecting to or using facilities at NG911 Delivery Points. This is consistent with historic practice and the King County Order on Reconsideration, in which the Commission held that wireless OSPs satisfy their obligation to deliver E911 calls by delivering them to ILEC selective routers and that PSAPs are responsible for all subsequent costs, including the costs to maintain and upgrade the facility itself and all of its components and functionalities. However, we decline to adopt a rule prohibiting such fees, because doing so would impose on the inherent regulatory and oversight powers that 911 Authorities, including PUCs, have over the operations of intrastate emergency communications networks.

The default cost responsibilities of OSPs and 911 Authorities will mirror their respective service obligations at Phase 1 and Phase 2. At Phase 1, our rules require OSPs to deliver 911 traffic in the IP-based SIP format requested by the 911 Authority, using either IP origination or IP translation through an LNG or other solution; obtain and deliver 911 traffic to enable the ESInet and other NG911 network facilities to transmit all 911 traffic to the destination PSAP; and to transmit the 911 traffic to NG911 Delivery Points designated by the 911 Authority, which we anticipate will be located at an ESInet as a general matter. We expect that, at Phase 1, OSPs that rely on TDM architecture will continue to obtain location and routing information from ALI/ANI databases connected to selective routers; and accordingly, OSPs will be responsible for the costs of hardware and software components associated with delivering location and routing information, as well as the costs of transmitting 911 traffic to NG911 Delivery Points. At Phase 1, 911 Authorities are responsible for furnishing the necessary infrastructure at the NG911 Delivery Points and for transporting NG911 traffic from the NG911 Delivery Points to the appropriate PSAPs. Given these service responsibilities, OSPs will not be responsible for the costs associated with deploying, maintaining, or upgrading the NG911 Delivery Point facilities, transport of 911 traffic to the appropriate PSAPs, PSAP customer premises equipment, or any other components or functionalities at or beyond the NG911 Delivery Points.

However, if an OSP relies on IP translation functionalities that a 911 Authority (or its vendor) provides using LNGs or other facilities to comply with its SIP delivery obligation at Phase 1, then the OSP may be required to pay for its use of such facilities. These provisions ensure that OSPs bear the cost of delivering traffic in the required IP-based SIP format. They also give OSPs appropriate incentives to comply with their IP delivery obligation by originating traffic in IP format, since translating TDM calls to IP using LNGs usually will be a more expensive option.

At Phase 2, OSPs will be required to deliver all 911 traffic to NG911 Delivery Points in the IP-based SIP format that complies with commonly accepted NG911 standards identified by the 911 Authority, as well complying with the Phase 1 requirements. In addition, OSPs will be required to put into operation a LIS or functional equivalent or to acquire equivalent services. Accordingly, OSPs will be presumptively responsible for the costs associated with these functions at Phase 2 (as well as the costs associated with their obligations continuing from Phase 1, including IP origination or translation and transport to the input to the NG911 Delivery Point). OSPs, however, will not be responsible for the costs of the functions that 911 Authorities will carry out at Phase 2, such as deploying NGCS. Moreover, as at Phase 1, OSPs will not be responsible for the costs of functions such as furnishing the necessary infrastructure at the NG911 Delivery Points and transmitting 911 traffic beyond the NG911 Delivery Points, which 911 Authorities will continue to carry out at Phase 2. As discussed above, OSPs and 911 Authorities may negotiate and agree to alternative financial arrangements that differ from these default responsibilities. We will monitor developments in the NG911 marketplace to ensure that additional NG911 costs are not unreasonably shifted under this framework to either OSPs or 911 Authorities.

E. Legal Authority

1. The Commission's Authority To Promulgate NG911 Rules

The rules in this document and the Order are grounded in the Commission's broad authority to “promot[e] safety of life and property through the use of wire and radio communications,” including through use of the nation's 911 system. Congress has enacted numerous provisions in the Act and other 911-related statutes “that, taken together, establish an overarching federal interest in ensuring the effectiveness of the 911 system.” One of the main purposes of the Act is “promoting safety of life and property through the use of wire and radio communications,” and public safety is one of the Commission's most important responsibilities. This statutory objective informs the Commission's exercise of its other statutory authority pursuant to Congress's other directives. Beyond this general mandate, section 251(e)(3) confirms the Commission's authority and responsibility for designating 911 as the universal emergency telephone number for both wireline and wireless telephone service, demonstrating Congress's intent to grant the Commission broad authority for “ensuring that 911 service is available throughout the country.” In a subsequent statute, Congress found that “for the sake of our Nation's homeland security and public safety, a universal emergency telephone number (911) that is enhanced with the most modern and state-of-the-art telecommunications capabilities possible should be available to all citizens in all regions of the Nation.” The D.C. Circuit has consistently affirmed the Commission's duty to consider public safety under the Act and to impose obligations to protect public safety in the public interest.

In addition to these authorities, the CVAA directly authorizes the Commission to promulgate the NG911 rules and reflects statutory criteria that circumscribe that authority. Congress enacted the CVAA to ensure that people with disabilities have “equal access to emergency services . . . as a part of the migration to a national [IP]-enabled emergency network[.]” To further that goal, Congress required the FCC to establish an Emergency Access Advisory Committee (EAAC) to survey people with disabilities and make recommendations to the Commission regarding “the most effective and efficient technologies and methods” by which to achieve the CVAA's purpose. Importantly, however, Congress also provided the Commission “the authority to promulgate regulations to implement the recommendations proposed by the [EAAC],” as well as the authority to promulgate “any other regulations, technical standards, protocols, and procedures as are necessary to achieve reliable, interoperable communication that ensures access by individuals with disabilities to an [IP]-enabled emergency network, where achievable and technically feasible.”

The rules we adopt comport with the CVAA's mandate because they advance the nationwide transition to NG911—the IP-enabled emergency network addressed in the CVAA—and promote equal and universal access to that network. Expediting the implementation of NG911 will significantly promote IP-based 911 access for people with disabilities, including through the use of internet-based TRS, which is used primarily by persons who are deaf, hard of hearing, deafblind, or have a speech disorder, as well as through the use of wireline, CMRS, covered text, and interconnected VoIP services with multimedia capabilities that cannot be supported on legacy TDM-based networks. Indeed, one of EAAC's recommendations to the Commission was to ensure an “[a]ccessible NG9-1-1 Network” that could “support features, functions and capabilities . . . to enable individuals with disabilities to make multimedia NG9-1-1 emergency calls.” Communications Equality Advocates supports the Commission's proposed regulations, noting the importance of NG911 implementation for enabling people with disabilities to access 911, and agreeing that “ubiquitous deployment of NG911 will yield many benefits, including . . . support for transmission of texts, photos, videos, and data, all of which are essential for CEA's constituents.”

As the Commission previously observed when it used its authority under the CVAA shortly after its enactment to require CMRS and interconnected text messaging services to implement text-to-911, the Commission's regulatory authority under the CVAA is not limited to services that are used exclusively by people with disabilities. Nor does the CVAA “requir[e] the FCC to ensure that any rules we adopt confer zero benefits on consumers outside the disability community[.]” Rather, the rules adhere to and advance the CVAA's mandate precisely because they promote access to NG911 equally between people with and without disabilities on a platform-neutral basis. Moreover, in an emergency situation, many people with disabilities will use the same wireline, CMRS, covered text, and interconnected VoIP services as those without disabilities, or they may rely on a caretaker or other person using such services. The Commission's NG911 access rules therefore must broadly cover different types of service providers in order to ensure that persons with disabilities will have full and equal access to emergency services when they are needed.

Other 911-related statutes confirm the Commission's authority and responsibility to establish and maintain a comprehensive and effective 911 system. For example, the NET 911 Act articulated the congressional goal “[t]o promote and enhance public safety by facilitating the rapid deployment of IP-enabled 911 and E-911 services, encourage the Nation's transition to a national IP-enabled emergency network, and improve 911 and E-911 access to those with disabilities.” The NET 911 Act also acknowledged that the Commission may modify its 911 regulations from time to time, including to address changes in the market or technology. Similarly, RAY BAUM'S Act further acknowledged the Commission's authority to adopt rules to ensure that dispatchable location information is conveyed with 911 calls “regardless of the technological platform used.”

Together, the foregoing statutes give the Commission broad authority to ensure that the 911 system is available and accessible and functions effectively to process and deliver 911 calls and texts from all people in need of aid using any type of service, authorize the Commission to adopt the rules herein and in the Order, and represent the repeated endorsement by Congress of the Commission's ability to act in this context. The Commission has previously concluded that “[i]n light of these express statutory responsibilities, regulation of additional capabilities related to reliable 911 service, both today and in an NG911 environment, would be well within Commission's . . . statutory authority.” The Commission also has stated that “[t]he Commission already has sufficient authority to regulate the 911 and NG911 activity of, inter alia, wireline and wireless carriers, interconnected VoIP providers, and other IP-based service providers” and that its jurisdiction to regulate 911 extends to the regulation of NG911 across different technologies.

The Commission sought comment on this legal framework in the NG911 Notice, and few commenters disagreed with its analysis or its findings that “Congress has given the Commission broad authority to ensure that the 911 system, including 911, E911, and NG911 calls and texts from all providers, is available and functions effectively,” and that “its jurisdiction to regulate 911 extends to the regulation of NG911 across different technologies.” The NG911 rules are well within the scope of this authority, and we reject arguments to the contrary raised by commenters that advocate for a different conclusion. In addition, our action here to adopt NG911 rules is consistent with Congress's public safety and 911 policy objectives.

2. Our Rules Are Not Contrary to Sections 251 and 252

We reject the contention of some RLEC commenters that sections 251 and 252 of the Act govern OSPs' transmission of 911 traffic to ESInets or that sections 251 and 252 preclude our adoption of these NG911 rules. In particular, we reject the arguments that those statutory provisions foreclose our default requirement that RLECs must transmit traffic to 911 Authorities' designated NG911 Delivery Points regardless of whether such delivery points are located outside of the RLECs' traditional local service boundaries.

These commenters misunderstand the statutory foundation for our actions here, and its relationship to sections 251 and 252 of the Act. In sections 251(a) through (d) and 252 of the Act, Congress adopted a range of obligations for telecommunications carriers focused on the objective of opening the marketplace for telecommunications services to increased competition. But we are not implementing those provisions of sections 251 and 252 in this document and the Order. Rather, as discussed above, we are exercising the Commission's distinct, broad authority over the nation's 911 system. Thus, sections 251(a) through (d) and 252 do not govern our actions as a legal matter. Further, we are not exercising our statutory authority in the advancement of local competition, but to preserve and enhance a vital part of our nation's emergency response and disaster preparedness system, consistent with our statutory 911 authorities, and also our more general duties under the Act. As important as local competition is, “whenever public safety is involved, lives are at stake.” Thus, we also are not persuaded that judgments Congress made when calibrating regulatory requirements designed to promote marketplace competition should limit the tools we employ under other statutory provisions that we find necessary to the public safety objectives of 911.

We also reject the RLECs' argument that the Commission may not require them to transport 911 traffic to interconnection points outside their state-certificated service areas or that their “network edges” should coincide with the boundaries of those service areas. The definitions of RLECs' state-certificated service area boundaries are entirely irrelevant to the Commission's authority, under the Federal statutory provisions discussed above, to adopt rules concerning the implementation of NG911, including the locations where OSPs must deliver 911 traffic in an IP-based format. Indeed, RLECs have long been responsible for ensuring that their subscribers' 911 calls reach their intended destinations whether or not those destinations lie within the RLECs' own service area boundaries. Moreover, the RLECs mischaracterize the term “network edge.” In the Commission's intercarrier compensation precedent, “network edges” need not (and often do not) coincide with service area boundaries. In any event, the default cost rule does not require RLECs to extend their physical networks; it only defines their financial responsibilities for the delivery of 911 traffic in the context of NG911 systems. As we make clear above, our NG911 rules do not require RLECs to extend their network facilities; all OSPs are free to satisfy their responsibility for the transmission of 911 calls to the NG911 Delivery Points specified by the 911 Authorities either using the OSPs' own facilities or using transmission services purchased from others.

3. Preservation of State Authority

The Commission historically has shared authority over the 911 system with state and local government. State and local governance of 911 is exercised by various types of agencies, including public safety agencies and, in some instances, state public utility commissions (PUCs). The rules are consistent with our statutory charge to support 911 Authorities' efforts to ensure that their public safety infrastructures are connected to reliable networks that enable callers to reach public safety agencies by dialing 911. We find that these NG911 rules “str[ike] [an] appropriate balance between federal guidance and state and local autonomy.” As discussed above, we rely on state and local 911 Authorities to determine the locations where OSPs must deliver 911 calls, to select the NG911 technical standards that OSPs must implement in Phase 2, and to decide when and how they wish to transition to NG911. These rules thus ensure that 911 Authorities, including PUCs, will retain broad decision-making authority regarding the configuration, timing, and cost responsibility for NG911 implementation within their jurisdictions.

Nor do the rules intrude upon state PUCs' authority over the “charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection with intrastate communication service.” The rules do not affect state PUCs' authority to “address the terms and conditions and potential additional cost recovery mechanisms that may be necessary for 911-related end-to-end intrastate calls.” The 911 calls subject to these rules are “intrastate,” in that the OSP customers who initiate the 911 calls will be located in the same state as the NG911 Delivery Points where OSPs deliver the calls and the PSAPs to which 911 traffic is routed. As a result, the rules governing Federal/state cost allocation, jurisdictional separations, and other matters involving rate-of-return regulation will treat the costs of transmitting these calls as jurisdictionally intrastate, and hence, subject to state PUCs' authority. Like all of the Commission's 911-related rules, our NG911 rules govern the manner in which OSPs provide 911 services and their responsibilities for transmitting their subscribers' 911 calls. But nothing in the pre-existing 911 rules or in the NG911 rules restricts state PUCs' authority to determine whether and how regulated carriers may recover the costs of compliance. The Act and our regulations require all local carriers that qualify for high-cost universal service support ( i.e., Eligible Telecommunications Carriers (ETCs)) to provide their subscribers with access to 911 as part of their basic local telecommunications service offerings, but these requirements do not interfere with state PUCs' authority over the rates for these local services.

We also reject the argument that the Commission's rules improperly intrude upon state authority by regulating “the network arrangements associated with . . . purely intrastate 911 calls carried over dedicated 911 trunking.” This argument is unfounded because our rules do not constrain OSPs' ability to configure their own 911 network arrangements, including dedicated trunking. To the contrary, our rules specifically preserve OSPs' right to make their own decisions about the routing and network facilities they use to deliver 911 traffic to NG911 Delivery Points. Thus, an OSP could comply with any existing or new state requirements that govern the configuration or deployment of its network facilities without violating any Commission rule. There can be no preemption where there is no conflict or inconsistency between Federal and state requirements.

Finally, some RLECs challenge the proposed NG911 rules on the grounds that the rules will impose substantial costs that effectively would compel RLECs or their regulators to raise subscribers' rates for intrastate services. There is no basis for this contention. As an initial matter, the RLECs ignore (or decline to dispute) the fact that they have full recourse to address such concerns at the state level, because state PUCs retain full authority to increase, decrease, or allow changes to regulated carriers' rates. More importantly, the RLECs have failed to establish that they will incur higher costs due to these rule changes or that such costs would lead to higher rates. The record in this proceeding gives us no basis for predicting with any confidence whether, and to what extent, NG911 implementation would “affect monthly or annual charges to subscribers” and whether “there [is] a range or specific dollar amount that would be newly reflected on customers' monthly bills” across the board. This is due in part to the very different ways RLECs are regulated (or deregulated) in various jurisdictions across the country: different state PUCs apply different statutes, regulations, and procedures that affect rate levels, and even in any individual state, various categories of carriers may be subject to different pricing requirements or policies. Moreover, our NG911 rules will affect different carriers' rates differently depending on the factual circumstances. For some carriers, any increased costs to implement one aspect of the NG911 rules may be offset by cost savings due to some other impact of these rules. Other carriers' costs may not change at all, or change only minimally, because they have already implemented the network upgrades or other changes needed to comply with 911 Authorities' valid requests and are already transporting 911 traffic to locations outside their service areas. Finally, we believe it is unlikely that any entity's rates would increase substantially as a result of the rules because, as discussed in the cost/benefit analysis below, we expect that any cost increase is likely to be minimal.

In any event, the Commission is under no obligation to protect carriers from each and every policy change that might have a collateral impact on subscribers' rates. As discussed below, any adverse cost impacts of our rules are likely to be far outweighed by their substantial benefits to the public. Depending on the circumstances, the same conclusion that we reach for the country as a whole may also apply to specific geographic areas served by any given RLEC. Telecommunications consumers in rural areas ought to receive the same benefits of a modernized 911 system as consumers in other parts of the country.

4. Other Challenges to the Commission's Authority Are Unsound

Sections 201 and 202. We reject the argument that our NG911 rules would burden RLECs with unjust and unreasonable transport costs in violation of sections 201(b) and 202(a) of the Act. The provisions in those sections regarding unjust and unreasonable rates and terms pertain only to common carriers' interstate services, not intrastate 911 transmission services that OSPs will provide to their subscribers under these rules. There is thus no need for us to conduct a supplemental “Section 201-202 analysis” before enacting the rules.

Cost responsibility. We disagree with the argument made by the RLEC Coalition and the Pennsylvania Telephone Association that we have no authority to cause RLECs to bear costs associated with providing NG911 service. These commenters overlook the CVAA's authorization for us to enact “any . . . regulations” needed to “achieve reliable, interoperable communication that ensures access by individuals with disabilities to an internet protocol-enabled emergency network, where achievable and technically feasible.” The regulations to advance the nationwide transition to NG911 will significantly enable vital 911 access for people with disabilities, including through internet-based TRS and other service types. Thus, the Commission has clear statutory authority to adopt these NG911 regulations. Moreover, rural wireless carriers presented essentially the same arguments to challenge the Commission's E911 rules, and those arguments were squarely rejected. The D.C. Circuit held that the Commission was not required to ensure that states maintained a funding mechanism to support rural wireless carriers' provision of E911 and observed that it was “ludicrous to suggest that government cannot pass these costs along to regulated entities.”

Takings. We disagree with the assertion of some commenters that the NG911 rules constitute a taking of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. First, our rules do not represent a physical or per se taking because they do not appropriate property owned by OSPs or deny them all economically beneficial use of their property. They also do not represent a regulatory taking. The principal factors that courts review in determining whether a governmental regulation effects a taking are: (1) the character of the governmental action; (2) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; and (3) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations. Regarding the first factor, as noted above, the rules adopted in the Order do not appropriate any property for government use, but instead promote a significant common good by promoting life and safety and enhancing the capabilities and reliability of the nation's 911 system. With respect to the second factor, a “mere diminution in the value of property, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking.” Nor will our rules interfere with reasonable investment-backed expectations under the third factor. OSPs' networks have long been subject to Commission 911-related regulations, including analogous requirements to transmit 911 calls in specified formats to locations designated by 911 Authorities. The Supreme Court has recognized that, for property that has “long been subject to federal regulation,” there is no “reasonable basis to expect” that the regulatory regime will not change, and the D.C. Circuit has held that the Commission may properly require OSPs to incur the costs of providing 911 service without ensuring them compensation. Particularly in light of “the heavy burden placed upon one alleging a regulatory taking,” we find no basis to find a regulatory taking on the record here.

Liability. We disagree with some commenters' claims that the NG911 rules will unreasonably expose RLECs to significantly greater liability risks, and hence unjustified costs. RLEC commenters express concern that they will face increased liability costs for 911 call failures occurring within the networks of the third-party transport services they will retain to deliver 911 calls beyond their service areas, “particularly to distant, out-of-state interconnection points.” As discussed above, the home-state qualification addresses the concern that RLECs could face liability under out-of-state tort law. More fundamentally, RLECs have failed to provide any record support for their purported tort liability concerns. State statutes generally grant liability protections to parties involved in transmitting and responding to 911 calls, including not only OSPs but also their third-party vendors, and Federal law guarantees parity in liability protection within the state for all OSPs. To illustrate, the South Carolina RLECs characterize their state's statute as providing “broad immunity from liability,” and indicate the statute's protections extend to the “officers, employees, assigns, [and] agents” of an OSP. Against this backdrop, no commenter has identified any instance of a state court judgment in which an OSP has been held liable under tort law for failing to deliver 911 calls.

Even assuming there is some increased risk of liability, RLECs may mitigate that risk by more closely monitoring their vendors' network performance or by increasing their insurance coverage, as one commenter suggests. Commenters do not provide estimates of the costs of these mitigation measures, however, much less demonstrate that these costs would be significant. And as discussed above, if an RLEC faces increased exposure to liability for dropped 911 calls, it may seek authorization from its state PUC to recover these costs in the same manner as other incremental cost increases resulting from its implementation of NG911.

Most importantly, the implementation of NG911 is far more likely to reduce the risk of dropped 911 calls than to increase it. OSPs that make the necessary changes to fully implement NG911 will be able to leverage improvements to 911 security and reliability, including the ability to reroute 911 calls in response to network congestion or outages. Indeed, OSPs may face greater exposure to liability due to the risk of dropped 911 calls if they fail to implement NG911 in a timely and prudent manner as the NG911 rules require. Finally, certain commenters suggest that we should apply 911 network reliability and PSAP outage notification requirements to additional categories of service providers in an NG911 environment. We defer consideration of such issues to a future proceeding.

F. Other Proposals

Several commenters raised additional issues or proposals in response to the NG911 Notice. We discuss each of these issues or proposals in turn below.

Interoperability. Some commenters suggest that we take additional action in this proceeding with respect to NG911 interoperability. APCO proposes that in addition to focusing on the delivery of 911 traffic by OSPs, the Commission should take the “next step toward achieving public safety's vision for NG9-1-1” by initiating a further notice of proposed rulemaking to address “interoperability requirements for 9-1-1 service providers and other elements of the emergency communications chain.” Texas 9-1-1 Entities propose that “separate from this NPRM, the Commission should consider a notice of inquiry regarding interoperability between NG911 service providers, with emphasis on 911 call transfers between ESInets and within ESInets.” Google and NENA urge us to consider the implementation of new interoperable messaging protocols. Because these proposals are beyond the scope of this proceeding, we decline to address them here. However, we agree with these commenters that facilitating interoperability between 911 service providers and in all portions of the NG911 emergency communications chain are important goals that warrant further scrutiny. We therefore encourage 911 Authorities, NG911 service providers, and OSPs to support conformance and compliance testing, functional testing of network connections between NG911 systems, appropriate business and policy implementation, and continued standards development.

Cybersecurity and Privacy. In its comments to the NG911 Notice, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) suggests that the Commission adopt additional cybersecurity and privacy measures in this proceeding. We believe it is premature to consider additional measures at this time, but we will continue to monitor the implementation of cybersecurity measures in NG911 networks. We also note that the Commission has previously adopted privacy protections for personal information used to support 911, and that these protections will continue to protect the privacy of such information in the NG911 environment. We encourage 911 Authorities, NG911 service providers, and OSPs to take steps that support the security, and specifically the cybersecurity, of these systems during the transition to NG911. In particular, we encourage OSPs and 911 Authorities to implement the cybersecurity recommendations and best practices put forward by TFOPA and CSRIC VII. Both TFOPA and CSRIC VII recommended adherence to the recognized and widely adopted approach to cyber defense detailed in the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (NCF). CSRIC VII also recommended that 911 Authorities implement specific cybersecurity mitigation techniques, including: continuous cyber monitoring, regular vulnerability assessments, minimum backups, a written cyber response plan, cyber-hygiene training, and other techniques. Finally, we encourage 911 Authorities, NG911 service providers, and OSPs to leverage resources made available by other Federal agencies, most notably CISA, to foster and enhance public safety cybersecurity.

Over-the-Top Services. NENA asks the Commission to consider extending some requirements for NG911 to over-the-top messaging services, which “provide robust multimedia capabilities and would enhance NG9-1-1 availability to individuals regardless of their underlying telecommunications/internet provider.” Because the Commission only considered requirements for OSPs in the NG911 Notice, the role of providers of over-the-top services is outside the scope of this proceeding, as NENA acknowledges, and we therefore decline to consider this request at this time.

Additional Accessibility Proposals. Several parties urge the Commission to expand this proceeding to consider NG911 accessibility issues beyond the scope of the proposals in the NG911 Notice. CEA encourages the Commission to seek further comment on requiring that “NG911 systems be capable of handling text, data, and video communications that are accessible to members of the Deaf, Deaf Disabled, DeafBlind, Hard of Hearing, and Late-Deafened communities.” Hamilton Relay requests that the Commission adopt a 2019 proposal that would require IP CTS providers transmitting 911 calls to provide a call-back telephone number while also ensuring that the user receives captions on the callback. Richard Ray requests that the FCC collaborate with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Department of Transportation's National 911 Program, and the U.S. Department of Justice to implement Next Generation 911 features that will “ensure effective communication with individuals with disabilities in NG9-1-1 environments.” Because these proposals are beyond the scope of this proceeding, we decline to address them here. However, consistent with our authority under the CVAA, we will continue to monitor the development of NG911 systems and technologies and are prepared to take steps as necessary to ensure that NG911 is fully accessible to all.

G. Benefits and Costs

We find that the benefits of the rules will overwhelmingly exceed the costs. As discussed below, we have extensive evidence that supports this conclusion, and we reject parties' unsupported arguments to the contrary. We estimate that the rules will generate substantial improvements in the efficiency and reliability of the 911 public safety response system that will likely result in a reduction of mortality risk equivalent to saving over 16,800 lives per year after the end of the fifth year following the effective date of the Order. As a result, we estimate that the rules will save more than 84,000 lives within a ten-year period after the effective date of the rules, conservatively estimating that most benefits will begin to accrue at the end of the fifth year. In addition, these improvements will likely reduce nonfatal injuries and property damage by even larger amounts that we have not attempted to quantify.

By contrast, applying conservative assumptions, we estimate that OSPs will incur total costs of no more than $321 million over the same ten-year period to implement the rules. These expenditures would be fully justified even if they resulted in reducing mortality risks equivalent to preventing the loss of only 26 lives. This cost estimate at the nationwide aggregate level is based on an assessment that the cost to OSPs of implementing Phase 1 will be approximately $4.4 million in total one-time non-recurring costs and no more than $5.5 million in annual recurring costs, and that OSPs will incur non-recurring one-time costs of approximately $24 million and approximately $50 million per year to implement Phase 2 requirements, for a total net present value of $321 million over a ten-year period to implement the rules required for both phases. Taking into account these estimated benefits and costs, it is evident that the benefits far exceed the costs. We discuss each of these findings below.

1. Benefits

Evidence in the record strongly supports our tentative conclusion in the NG911 Notice that the benefits of accelerating the overall NG911 transition will include real-time call routing flexibility, faster call delivery, and improved service reliability. For example, data from Indiana confirm that 911 calls have been delivered substantially more quickly following Indiana's initial deployment of NG911. Further, we find APCO's observation that NG911 implementation will greatly improve neighboring PSAPs' ability to transfer calls to one another and improve interoperability to be highly credible. Likewise, NENA, APCO, and Peninsula Fiber Network demonstrate that legacy PSAP call transfers are slow and cumbersome and that the improvements to this process resulting from NG911 will be significant. The use of NG911 features to transfer and share incident information seamlessly and in real time will not only reduce response times, but it also will improve the quality of response by ensuring that the right assets are dispatched as quickly as possible once the need for them is identified. Currently, emergency responses are typically “upgraded” ( i.e., public safety resources are added or the level of priority is increased) only after the first unit arrives on the scene. If an incident requires action by multiple PSAPs and/or emergency response agencies, then all the information (including caller and incident specifics) must be coordinated among these PSAPs and emergency responders by telephone, radio, and/or mobile data terminals. The ability to use NG911 features to share that information more quickly and accurately through immediate transfers, rather than through a chain of intermediate communications methods, will substantially improve response quality and outcomes. No commenter argues that the NG911 transition will not result in substantial overall benefits.

These benefits are confirmed by numerous commenting parties. For example, Rally Networks states that “[r]ural communities will receive significant benefits from the transition” because, “[i]n a rural community, it takes longer for emergency responders to arrive on scene and evaluate and request the additional emergency response resources that may be required,” and “NG911 provides an opportunity for resources to be more appropriately dispatched before first responders arrive on scene and evaluate the need.” Comtech agrees that the enormous technology benefits of NG911 will “dramatically improve emergency response.” Brian Rosen states that interconnected ESInets enable call transfers beyond local areas, and allow the transfer of “much richer data” than in a legacy environment.

We estimate the public safety benefits based on three types of impacts of the accelerated NG911 implementation that likely will result from the rules: (1) increased network reliability and resiliency, which will reduce the number of dropped 911 calls; (2) more efficient routing and delivery of 911 calls as a result of introducing new policy routing capabilities; and (3) improvements in the delivery of location information with 911 calls. We also note that additional benefits (or avoided costs) will be realized by 911 Authorities, PSAPs, and some OSPs due to retiring legacy 911 network facilities that are costly to operate.

Network Reliability and Resiliency. The record confirms our tentative conclusion in the NG911 Notice that the NG911 transition will improve the reliability of the 911 system, and thus improve public safety. Accelerating the implementation of NG911 will reduce the likelihood of 911 service outages because it will facilitate deployment of new facilities to replace the aging and failure-prone infrastructure used to operate the legacy 911 system. NASNA reports that a recent study of California 911 calls showed that “[i]n 2017[,] the average number of minutes of outage was 17,000 minutes per month, but in 2022 the average increased to over 59,000 outage minutes per month.” NASNA states that legacy 911 call routing and network infrastructure “is beyond end-of-life and has an increasing failure rate.” Intrado confirms that establishing direct OSP connectivity via SIP to ESInets “will materially reduce the number of 911 outages through improved network reliability and availability.” Comtech agrees that full implementation of NG911 will eliminate the need for maintaining both legacy and IP-based systems for the delivery of 911 traffic, which involves significant costs and creates “increased vulnerability and risk of 911 outages.”

The Commission has previously observed that an aging legacy 911 system is prone to increasing failures. The rules will accelerate the full retirement of the legacy TDM-based 911 system and facilitate use of an NG911 architecture that uses newer and less failure-prone facilities. Selective routers will be replaced with NGCS IP routing at the ESInet, ALI/ANI databases will be replaced with IP-based systems with more precise location information, TDM trunks will be replaced with IP transmission to provide faster connections, and traffic will be routed to more reliable and efficient IP-based NG911 Delivery Points. Migrating 911 call traffic from aging legacy infrastructure to newer IP infrastructure creates a reliability benefit of traffic delivery by newer and more recently built facilities. Furthermore, the more extensive use of IP routing in the Phase 2 architecture is inherently more reliable than legacy TDM selective routing because of the greater capability of IP traffic to be dynamically rerouted among various available paths.

NG911 IP Policy Routing Capabilities. The implementation of NG911 will facilitate greater use of policy routing— i.e., systems that enable calls to be diverted automatically from their default routing paths to alternative paths for dynamic reasons, such as congestion or call volume surges. In the 911 context, policy routing can also be used to implement failover plans so that calls can be directed to alternative PSAPs in instances when temporary surges in call volumes exceed the capability of 911 telecommunicators at the default PSAPs. Policy routing thus can be used to enable the best situated PSAPs to receive calls and direct emergency responses.

We find that the improved policy routing that NG911 makes possible will result in substantial improvements over legacy TDM selective routers, which will reduce 911 call failures and save lives. NG911 architecture provides far more routing options than legacy TDM because IP traffic is not constrained by the location of the caller or the PSAP that serves the caller. In legacy 911 networks, selective routers must be relatively close to the PSAPs they serve, whereas in NG911, traffic can be easily rerouted to servers and locations outside the affected area, providing more resiliency and redundancy in disaster situations. APCO has observed that IP-based NG911 systems' policy routing functions will significantly improve local authorities' emergency response capabilities. Mission Critical Partners states that Phase 2 NG911 will improve the reliability of 911 call routing, further facilitating interoperability between ESInets and allowing for the retirement of legacy network elements. First, NG911 facilitates more precise routing than legacy selective routers using ALI/ANI location information because NG911 systems can implement “geospatial routing” and update GIS data more frequently than legacy location databases.

Furthermore, as NENA explains, NG911 policy routing rules facilitate automated “mutual aid agreements” between PSAPs that allow intelligent call diversion processes for 911 calls to be re-directed or redistributed among PSAPs based on outages, maintenance, or other emergencies. NG911 policy routing also “provides more options to a PSAP to institute consideration of multiple conditions ( e.g., policies), with greater flexibility, and to adjust the call diversion policies on a near real-time basis . . . to address a wide range of operational situations to ensure 9-1-1 calls are delivered to a PSAP that can provide assistance consistent with established mutual aid agreements.” NG911 thus will “help jurisdictions realize . . . enhanced policy routing functions,” which “flexibly route[] calls to PSAPs based on variables such as call volume, available telecommunicator resources, or the need for specialized response to particular emergencies.” Those “specialized responses” could include advanced automatic policy routing directives to send certain 911 calls straight to call handlers with American Sign Language expertise, foreign language skills, or real-time text capabilities, which would dramatically reduce the response times to many 911 calls.

Improved Delivery of Caller Location Information. In NG911 systems, the legacy ALI/ANI caller location technology will be replaced with IP-based LVF and LIS for the verification of customer records and delivery of caller location information to PSAPs. This will facilitate full use of the functional elements of NG911, which can deliver higher-quality actionable information to PSAPs than legacy ALI/ANI databases, even after CMRS providers finish implementing location-based routing under existing rules. Mission Critical Partners states that full NG911 will reduce location delivery failures because it is more reliable than the current legacy system dependent on ALI data. MSCI argues that the NG911 IP caller location delivery systems will standardize location information delivery, improving PSAP use of caller location data over the legacy ALI/ANI system.

Additionally, the location data transmitted via IP features such as LIS databases will enable PSAPs and other public safety agencies to utilize GIS technology more extensively to give emergency responders the capacity to visually map caller locations for more precise and accurate emergency responses. Upgrading 911 location technology from ALI/ANI servers to LIS or comparable IP databases will also enable the implementation of PIDF-LO technology. PIDF-LO embeds location information into IP-based NG911 calls, allowing “instant, accurate location provisioning as a caller moves around a campus or high-rise environment” for hyper-targeted emergency response from public safety agencies.

Calculation of Public Safety Benefits. We conclude, based on the available evidence, that the expeditious implementation of NG911 will yield enormous public safety benefits. We estimate these benefits by assessing the likely number of lives saved in 911 emergency responses due to the more efficient and reliable delivery of actionable information with 911 calls due to the factors described above— i.e., the greater reliability and resilience of 911 facilities, the increased use of policy routing, and possibly the delivery of higher-quality location information. As noted above, a study in Indiana showed that “[t]he year before Indiana began the transition to NG911, a citizen dialing 911 waited 23 to 27 seconds for the call to be routed to a 911 operator. With NG911, that's now less than three seconds.” These improvements to the 911 systems will reduce the 911 routing time by an appreciable amount and thus will enable 911 call responders to dispatch ambulances more rapidly in response to 911 callers' requests for emergency medical assistance.

The Commission has previously relied on a study examining 73,706 emergency incidents in the Salt Lake City area that found that, on average, a one-minute decrease in ambulance response times would reduce the total number of post-incident deaths from 4,386 deaths to 3,640 deaths within 90 days after the incident (746 lives saved), representing a 17% reduction in mortality. If reducing the response time by one minute results in reducing mortality rates by 17%, then we can estimate that reducing the response time by one-third of a minute (20 seconds) could lead to a reduction in mortality by one-third of 17%— i.e., 5.67% per year—because the regression in the Salt Lake City Study is linear.

According to the National Association of State Emergency Medical Services Officials (NASEMSO), local Emergency Medical Services (EMS) agencies respond to nearly 28.5 million 911 dispatches each year. In the LBR Order, we relied on calculations set forth in the LBR Notice that assumed 80% or more of the total calls to 911 annually are from wireless devices. Since the LBR Order already accounts for some benefits accrued from faster emergency medical service responses to wireless 911 calls with improved location information, we conservatively consider the impact to wireline and VoIP calls only to estimate the benefits of improved 911 responses due to the NG911 rules. According to calculations based on the data in the Fifteenth Annual 911 Fee Report, approximately 17.5% (or 5 million) of all EMS dispatches are associated with wireline and VoIP 911 calls. While we do not know when the transition to NG911 will be completed, we estimate that, if approximately 6% of emergency medical dispatches would have resulted in a death, a 5.67% reduction in mortality is equivalent to saving at least 16,868 lives per year as a result of the NG911 rules. This implies a total of 84,340 lives saved over the entire ten-year period following the effective date of the rules.

The improvements to the 911 system associated with implementation of NG911 also will reduce 911 call failures and outages. We estimate that, from 2019 through 2023, an average of 4.1 billion user-hours of telecommunication voice service outages per year were reported to the Commission. If these 4.1 billion user-hours of outages were distributed evenly across the total U.S. population (approximately 335 million people), this is equivalent to each person in the country experiencing an average of 12 hours of voice telecommunications service outages per year. Hence, we estimate that on average, consumers experience telecommunications outages 0.14% of the time per year. As noted above, available evidence shows that 911 calls resulted in 28.5 million EMS dispatches per year during the most recent year when data was available. If service outages prevent 0.14% of these 911 calls from going through, that means 39,900 potentially life-saving emergency 911 calls would be dropped per year as a result of legacy 911 system failures. If we conservatively estimate that our rules speeding the NG911 transition result in improved 911 emergency system reliability and thus reduce the number of 911 outages and call failures by just 1%, this would translate to an additional reduction in mortality risks associated with emergency medical situations for which ambulances were dispatched in response to 911 calls roughly equivalent to 23 lives saved per year ( i.e., up to 115 lives saved over a five-year period). Moreover, these benefits will continue to accrue beyond the completion of the transition of both phases.

We believe that our calculations above are likely a significant underestimate of the benefit of the rules and that the actual life-saving rate from improved emergency responses will likely be higher than that used in our calculations. Whereas our analysis is based on saved lives in the context of emergency medical response, it does not account for lives saved due to more expeditious dispatch of police, firefighters, and other first responders in response to 911 emergency calls. Also, our estimate of the life-saving benefits of more expeditious and accurate completion of 911 calls (discussed above) excludes benefits from improvements to wireless 911 calls. The improved NG911 systems also are likely to yield benefits that go beyond the lives saved due to improved emergency medical responses (the primary basis for the benefit estimates discussed above); the analysis does not account for injuries prevented, other improved public health outcomes, and averted property damage due to quicker response to 911 calls associated with non-life-threatening events. Finally, our estimate includes 911 voice calls only and does not include text-to-911.

911 Authorities' Cost Savings from Retiring Legacy 911 Network Components. Several commenting parties submit information indicating that our rules will enable 911 Authorities to realize cost savings by more rapidly decommissioning expensive legacy 911 network elements and replacing them with more cost-efficient IP networks. For instance, South Carolina RFA estimates that, when the NG911 transition is complete, enabling it to transmit all 911 traffic over its ESInet, it will no longer need to pay for the legacy selective routers, circuits, and trunks to provide TDM connectivity, which currently costs the state approximately $1.4 million per year. Minnesota DPS-ECN estimates the proposed rules will save the state over $1.1 million per year by avoiding paying for legacy 911 facilities that will become unnecessary when the NG911 transition is complete. The Ad Hoc NG911 Service Providers Coalition estimates that Florida will be able to avoid paying $1.6 million annually for selective routers and ANI/ALI databases supplied by the state's largest carrier once the NG911 transition is complete. Extrapolating these figures from commenters, we estimate the total cost saving nationwide would be between $24 million to $87 million per year. Assuming these cost savings will not materialize until end of the fifth year following the effective date of the rules, we estimate that the present value of this cost-saving benefit over 10 years, using a 7% discount rate, is approximately $69 million to $255 million.

2. Costs

We sought comment on the costs that the 2,327 OSPs in the country would incur to comply with our proposed rules, and multiple parties submitted information in response. Based on information in the record and from other public sources, as well as data in service providers' most recent Form 477 filings, we conservatively estimate that, at the nationwide level, affected OSPs will likely incur approximately $4.4 million in one-time costs and $5.5 million in annual recurring costs to implement Phase 1, and $24 million in one-time costs and $50 million in annual recurring costs to implement Phase 2 following adoption of our rules. Using a 7% discount rate, we estimate the present value of the total cumulative costs over the next 10 years to be approximately $321 million. These expenditures would be fully justified even if they resulted in reducing mortality risks equivalent to preventing the loss of only 26 lives. Considering the substantial benefits to the improvement in public safety attributable to the rules, we conclude that the total benefits significantly outweigh the total costs.

Significantly, we believe that all of the quantitative cost estimates below are likely to be overstated, for several reasons. First, they do not take into account the fact that 911 calls make up only a very small portion of the overall number of voice calls that these OSPs will transmit using some of the same infrastructure. Second, they are based on estimated expenditures that cannot reasonably be attributed entirely to our NG911 rules because most OSPs are already on the path of transitioning to full modern IP networks for other reasons. Third, the assumed incremental expenditures for IP conversion may not materialize because many of the OSPs that have not yet completed IP network upgrades are likely to complete them before the deadlines for complying with any 911 Authorities' valid requests.

Phase 1 Recurring Costs: Transport for IP Delivery Costs. OSPs will be required to transmit 911 calls to designated NG911 Delivery Points in IP format over SIP trunks within a specified period of time after 911 Authorities issue valid Phase 1 requests. Because CMRS providers, interconnected VoIP providers, internet-based TRS providers, and non-RLEC wireline providers are already delivering most calls in IP format, typically transported through SIP trunks, we believe that the Phase 1 IP transport requirement would not impose material incremental costs on these OSPs.

Nonetheless, we recognize that some OSPs—primarily RLECs—will incur some incremental recurring cost of IP transport via SIP trunks, even if those RLECs already have IP switches, can convert TDM to IP on their own networks, and can provide broadband service using their own IP switching facilities. As some parties point out, these RLECs might incur some SIP call transport costs if they do not have settlement-free peering agreements and cannot hand off IP voice traffic to existing interconnection partners. We estimate that the total of these costs will be below $5.5 million per year. This estimate is based on assumptions that the transport cost would be $2,000 per month for the 16 OSPs that currently only offer TDM-based voice services ( i.e., they do not offer broadband or VoIP services) and serve fewer than 10,000 subscribers, and 50% more ( i.e., $3,000 per month) for the two OSPs that provide no broadband or VoIP but serve more than 10,000 subscribers. We further assume that the 414 OSPs that offer both voice and broadband services—including the 394 that serve fewer than 10,000 subscribers and the 20 that serve 10,000 or more subscribers—would incur 50% of the transport cost because they are already delivering a portion of their regular calls in IP format via SIP trunks.

We conclude that most of the RLECs' and other commenting parties' estimates of the recurring costs of IP transport to NG911 Delivery Points are unduly high. Almost all of these cost estimates for 911 IP transport are premised on assumptions that OSPs will be required to transmit 911 calls over long distances across multiple states to faraway NG911 Delivery Points. These assumptions are unfounded in light of the rules, which require OSPs to transport 911 calls only to in-state NG911 Delivery Points designated by 911 Authorities. Moreover, most of these cost estimates assume that the cost of IP transport is distance-sensitive. This assumption is clearly incorrect. Indeed, given the ample evidence showing that IP transport costs are significantly lower than TDM transport costs, we believe that the rules might actually reduce the overall transport costs for OSPs. For example, South Carolina RFA submits data indicating that IP transport of 911 traffic is generally 27% cheaper than TDM call delivery, regardless of where the calls are delivered. iCERT points out that, to avoid the higher cost of transporting TDM calls, RLECs could convert their traffic from TDM to IP format prior to transporting them. Five Area Telephone also points out that OSPs could significantly lower the overall costs of transmitting 911 calls to ESInets by taking advantage of third-party aggregators' services.

Phase 1 Non-Recurring Costs: Reconfiguring Network Facilities for IP Delivery. We estimate Phase 1 non-recurring costs based on an assumption that some OSPs will incur some material and labor costs prior to initiating IP transport. We estimate a total of $4.4 million in one-time material and labor costs, including approximately $4 million to convert TDM calls to IP format and $343,000 to configure the delivery to new NG911 Delivery Points. Because the majority of OSPs are capable of transmitting calls in IP format, we estimate that only a subset of OSPs that do not offer full IP-related services would need to incur the cost of facilities needed to convert TDM calls to IP format; other OSPs that already originate traffic in IP format would incur no up-front IP conversion costs. We conservatively estimate an upper bound of the IP conversion cost to be no more than $17,600 for voice-only OSPs with no more than 10,000 subscribers; a 50% higher unit cost for voice-only OSPs with more than 10,000 subscribers; and half of these amounts for OSPs that offer broadband as well as voice services and likely have some capability to convert TDM calls to IP format but might need to acquire more. We estimate that the total one-time cost that all OSPs would incur to obtain the facilities needed to convert TDM calls to IP format would be approximately $4 million, including $334,400 for the 18 OSPs that do not offer any IP services and $3.7 million for the 414 OSPs that offer broadband as well as voice services. We believe that our estimate is conservative because it does not take into account the many non-911 calls that these OSPs would transmit using the same equipment.

We use Five Area Telephone's estimate of $17,600 as the upper bound for the up-front equipment costs for small OSPs to connect to ESInets—an estimate that, according to Five Area Telephone, includes the costs of “establishing network connectivity, procurement of private line circuits, configuration assistance, switching equipment configuration, testing, cutover, and final testing,” equaling over $40 million if applied to all 2,327 carriers. We believe that this estimate substantially overstates the cost of the network equipment required to convert TDM calls to IP format, because it assumes a major system upgrade would be required, and we reject Five Area Telephone's assertion that the total cost would exceed $40 million because that erroneously assumes that all 2,327 OSPs would incur the same amount. Nonetheless, we apply Five Area Telephone's $17,600 one-time cost estimate as the basis to calculate the upper bound of our IP conversion cost estimate, because other commenters' estimates are even less credible. Most of them include the non-recurring cost of system upgrades that are not required by the rules; many of them rely on unsupported cost figures for specific OSPs without providing any basis for us to examine whether these costs are typical; and some include no cost figures at all.

We estimate that the one-time costs of reconfiguring and changing 911 traffic delivery points would require all affected OSPs to incur labor costs totaling $343,000. This is based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics' estimate that the average wage for telecommunications equipment installers and repairers is $32.26 per hour, as well as an estimate, based on evidence in the record, that OSPs serving fewer than 10,000 subscribers would need to pay for up to three hours of labor and OSPs serving more than 10,000 subscribers would need to pay 50% more in labor costs due to the potentially more complex tasks these entities might need to undertake to reconfigure, and change the delivery points for their 911 traffic. We rely on the assertion of RWA that “the number of person-hours required will typically be closer to two or three,” rather than the one hour estimated in the NG911 Notice, and we adjust this amount upward by 50% more for OSPs serving more than 10,000 subscribers to account for the greater complexity of the task. Based on these assumptions, we arrive at the total one-time labor cost of $343,000 for all the OSPs to change the delivery points.

Phase 2 Costs. We estimate that wireline carriers, interconnected VoIP providers, and other OSPs that are not CMRS providers (and thus not subject to the LBR Order) will incur approximately $24 million in one-time costs and $50 million in annual recurring costs to comply with 911 Authorities' Phase 2 requests to transmit and maintain accurate location information with 911 calls in IP format using LIS databases. The rules allow OSPs to use “LIS as a service” from a third-party vendor as an option instead of creating their own LIS or equivalent databases. This LIS service may either involve native IP LIS or LIS equivalent database population, or a database conversion of OSPs' existing ALI/ANI/MSAG data to LIS formats. CSRIC explains that LIS as a service is contemplated as an NG911 solution at “minimal expense” to small OSPs, as it relieves OSPs of most costs beyond monthly services, and an LNG and can be provided either by a commercial vendor or the 911 authority. This is a substantial cost-savings measure, especially for smaller OSPs with TDM networks, who may not be ready to decommission older legacy equipment and modernize their networks for IP/VoIP.

We conservatively base these figures on Five Area Telephone's estimates that, to comply with location-based routing-type requirements to insert location information into call paths, wireline and VoIP providers would need to incur non-recurring costs of approximately $10,000 and monthly recurring costs of $1,750. Extrapolating these statistics and increasing the costs by 50% for larger OSPs serving more than 10,000 subscribers, we estimate that compliance with the Phase 2 rules would require non-CMRS OSPs to incur a total of $24 million in one-time costs and $50 million in annual recurring costs. We conclude that the location information requirement does not result in any additional costs for CMRS providers because they will have already implemented such upgrades.

We reject AT&T's cost estimate submitted in the record. AT&T alleges that “requiring the introduction of a Location Information Server (`LIS') would be extremely expensive and inefficient” for carriers with legacy TDM switching facilities and “could cost several billion dollars on an industry-wide basis.” AT&T, in its role as the lead NGCS and ESInet contractor in Virginia, has already provided a solution that allows legacy OSP wireline ALI and MSAG location data to be used for NG911-compliant LIS as a service, which eliminates TDM OSPs' needs to upgrade their networks to IP. We therefore find AT&T's record assertion was based on an assumption of an IP origination requirement, which we decline to impose.

Our Phase 2 cost estimate does not include the costs of originating traffic in IP format. WTA claims that “obtaining the full benefits of NG911 service will not be possible unless 911 calls originate in IP format,” and that converting networks from TDM to IP carries “not only significant network and customer equipment changes and reconfigurations, but also substantial customer service and education costs.” Although we agree that converting TDM networks to IP networks can be costly, we reject the contention that such system upgrade costs should be attributed to the requirements in these rules. The transition from TDM to IP technology has been ongoing for over a decade as the subscriptions to voice-only local exchange telephone service (switched access lines) has fallen from nearly 141 million lines in December 2008 to 27 million in June 2022. A linear model predicts that switched access lines will be fully phased out in the near future. Therefore, since we can reasonably expect that these system upgrades will occur organically as part of the natural technological evolution, regardless of whether OSPs are required to comply with Phase 2 requests, the cost of the upgrades cannot be attributed to these requirements. Instead, they should be considered baseline costs of operating telecommunications business. Furthermore, even if a handful of RLECs delayed their system upgrades for idiosyncratic reasons, the 6- to 12-month timeline to comply with the requirements for each of the two phases would be sufficient for RLECs to move away from the legacy systems that are beyond end of their life.

We emphasize that the rules do not require OSPs to originate 911 calls in IP format, and hence OSPs can choose other alternative solutions to send 911 calls in the format that can be interoperable with the industry standards in Phase 2. Moreover, our rules do not preclude OSPs from negotiating with 911 Authorities for alternative arrangements. If the costs of upgrading network systems are as high as some OSPs claim, those entities could offer 911 Authorities alternative, less costly arrangements, such as offering to pay the 911 Authorities to maintain the costly legacy conversion components for these OSPs to use in order to fulfill the requirements. Nonetheless, in light of the ample record evidence that most 911 Authorities are eager to decommission these legacy facilities due to the high cost of maintaining them (as well as the limitations on these facilities' functionality), we believe it is highly unlikely that any OSP would find such an arrangement to be cost-effective, especially when compared with the cost of upgrading their own networks—upgrades that they almost certainly will need to implement within the applicable time frame for reasons that have nothing to do with these NG911 rules.

H. Implementation, Monitoring, and Compliance

In the NG911 Notice, the Commission sought comment on whether the Commission should implement any new data collections to assist in monitoring compliance with our proposed rules for NG911. The Commission tentatively concluded that public safety entities and members of the public seeking to report non-compliance with the proposed rules would be able to file complaints via the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau's Public Safety Support Center or through the Commission's Consumer Complaint Center. The Commission did not propose any rule for monitoring the transition to NG911 or addressing compliance with the new requirements.

We believe the existing complaint mechanisms should be sufficient and that the Commission would be able to address complaints in a timely manner. A handful of commenters state that existing mechanisms of oversight should be sufficient. AT&T and Hamilton Relay agree that the Commission should decline to adopt any new data collections. Colorado PUC states that the Commission “should be prepared to engage with complaints in a timely manner.” WTA, on the other hand, requests that the Commission “establish one or more mechanisms that will encourage and enable the negotiation of and dispute resolution for more efficient and equitable ESInet location arrangements and/or more equitable distribution of or compensation for the additional costs of the ultimate NG911 configuration.” As we discuss above, we establish a procedure in which an OSP, within 60 days of the receipt of a Phase 1 or Phase 2 valid request, may submit a petition to PSHSB asserting that the 911 Authority has failed to meet the requirements of a Phase 1 or 2 valid request. In cases where OSPs and 911 Authorities negotiate alternative arrangements, we require that OSPs notify the Commission of any alternative agreement and the pertinent terms of that agreement. This requirement ensures the Commission maintains proper oversight of the nationwide NG911 transition and awareness of any technical implementation issues that may arise. Furthermore, in addition to the OSP petition procedure we adopt, we believe that the existing avenues within the Commission, as well as the rules, are sufficient for monitoring the transition and compliance, and for addressing disputes.

Finally, Comtech “urges the Commission to place formal complaints regarding OSP noncompliance on the Commission's Accelerated Docket,” which is a complaint mechanism that is available for selected formal complaints. Proceedings on the Accelerated Docket must be concluded within 60 days, and are therefore subject to shorter pleading deadlines and other modifications to the procedural rules that govern formal complaint proceedings. Given that our rules afford Commission staff the discretion to decide whether a complaint, or portion of a complaint, is suitable for inclusion on the Accelerated Docket, we decline Comtech's suggestion to default to the Accelerated Docket for complaints regarding OSP noncompliance.

I. Promoting Digital Equity and Inclusion

As noted in the NG911 Notice, the Commission is engaged in a continuing effort to advance digital equity for all, including people of color, persons with disabilities, persons who live in rural or Tribal areas, and others who are or have been historically underserved, marginalized, or adversely affected by persistent poverty or inequality. The NG911 Notice invited comment on equity-related considerations and benefits, if any, that may be associated with the proposals and issues under consideration. Specifically, the Commission sought comment on how its proposals may promote or inhibit advances in diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility.

Several parties submitted comments indicating that the transition to NG911 would promote digital equity and inclusion. Richard Ray “support[s] the implementation and deployment of NG9-1-1 to provide direct, equal, and meaningful access to emergency services for everyone, including individuals with disabilities, using all four elements: voice, video, text, and data.” CEA concurs with a previous Commission statement that adding video, text, and image capabilities to the 911 system will “make the system more accessible to the public,” including “for people with disabilities.” NENA states that NG911 introduces a variety of capabilities to support persons with disabilities and marginalized groups. NASNA states that it “believes in providing equal access to 911 services to all citizens through local NG911 systems.” These regulations to advance the nationwide transition to NG911 will significantly promote and enable vital 911 access for individuals with disabilities, including through internet-based TRS and video/data capabilities.

Certain RLEC commenters contend that the NG911 rules will have adverse effects on one particular group included in the Commission's initiative to promote digital equity and inclusion: persons who live in rural areas. South Carolina Telephone Coalition argues that imposing additional costs on RLECs without simultaneously changing high-cost universal service support would result in “a system that disproportionately benefits wireless callers through enhanced texting and video capabilities makes no sense and will ultimately hurt rural Americans.” South Dakota Telecommunications Association states that requiring “transport to out-of-state points of interconnection (POIs) will add cost, which will need to be recovered from either the Universal Service Fund (USF) or the end-user's customers.” As we discuss above, we are tempering costs to RLECs and other OSPs by requiring 911 Authorities to designate NG911 Delivery Points within their own states. Moreover, the rules we adopt do not require RLECs and other OSPs to extend their physical networks, and RLECs and other OSPs may retain other entities to transmit 911 traffic to the NG911 Delivery Points specified by the 911 Authorities. Accordingly, we expect that RLECs' increased NG911-related costs are likely to be relatively modest, thus limiting the cost increases to be passed on to rural subscribers.

On the other hand, Rally Networks argues that, especially in rural communities, “NG911 provides an opportunity for resources to be more appropriately dispatched before first responders arrive on scene and evaluate the need.” We agree. As we discuss above, NG911 implementation will yield substantial benefits to consumers, including rural subscribers, due to the improved functionalities it supports, its capacity to deliver a greater range of information from 911 callers to PSAPs and first responders, the increased security, reliability, and interoperability of NG911 networks, and the likelihood that 911 calls will be delivered to first responders more rapidly and accurately, thus saving lives. We conclude that our NG911 rules would advance digital equity for all, including for persons who live in rural areas.

In sum, we acknowledge the importance of the continuing effort to advance digital equity for all. We believe that the rules, requiring OSPs to take actions to start the transition to NG911 in coordination with 911 Authorities, will help to advance those goals.

IV. Procedural Matters

Regulatory Flexibility Act. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA), requires that an agency prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis for notice and comment rulemakings, unless the agency certifies that “the rule will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.” Accordingly, we have prepared a Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) concerning the possible impact of the rule changes contained in this document and the Order on small entities. The FRFA is set forth in Appendix B of the Order.

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Analysis. This document and the Order contain new information collection requirements in § 9.31(a), (b), and (c), and § 9.34(a) and (b), that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law 104-13. These rules will be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review under section 3507(d) of the PRA. OMB, the general public, and other Federal agencies will be invited to comment on the new information collection requirements contained in this proceeding. In addition, we note that, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, we previously sought specific comment on how the Commission might further reduce the information collection burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees. We received a few such comments. South Carolina states that “a simple certification by providers that they are in compliance with requirements for delivery of calls in IP format to the designated demarcation points is sufficient rather than creating additional burdens on the providers for reporting requirements.” As we indicate above, we are not imposing requirements to report compliance with the rules. We received a comment relevant to our new information collection requirement for OSPs and 911 Authorities that enter into agreements, which requires the OSP to notify the Commission. Alaska Telecom Assoc. “agrees” that providing OSPs and 911 Authorities “the flexibility to negotiate an alternative time frame” is “a significant step to minimize the economic impact for small entities.” The Commission does not believe that the new information collection requirements in § 9.31(a), (b), and (c), and § 9.34(a) and (b), will be unduly burdensome on small businesses. We describe impacts that might affect small businesses, which includes most businesses with fewer than 25 employees, in the FRFA in Appendix B of the Order.

V. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA), an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was incorporated in NG911 Notice adopted in June 2023. The Commission sought written public comment on the proposals in the NG911 Notice, including comments on the IRFA. One comment was filed addressing the IRFA. This Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) conforms to the RFA.

A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Final Rules

In the NG911 Notice, the Commission proposed a framework to advance the nationwide transition to NG911. Like communications networks generally, dedicated 911 networks are evolving from TDM-based architectures to IP-based architectures. With the transition to NG911, 911 Authorities ( i.e., a State, territorial, regional, Tribal, or local governmental entity that operates or has administrative authority over all or any aspect of a communications network for the receipt of 911 traffic at NG911 Delivery Points and for the transmission of such traffic from that point to the PSAPs) will replace the circuit-switched architecture of legacy 911 networks with IP-based technologies and applications, which provide new capabilities and improved interoperability and system resilience. Most States have invested significantly in NG911, but some report that they are experiencing delays in providers connecting to these IP-based networks. As a result of these delays, the transition to NG911 is being delayed, and State and local 911 authorities incur prolonged costs because of the need to maintain both legacy and IP networks during the transition. Managing 911 traffic on both legacy and IP networks also results in increased vulnerability and risk of 911 outages.

In the Order, the Commission adopted rules and procedures to expedite the NG911 transition that will apply to all wireline, Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS), covered text, interconnected Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), and internet-based Telecommunications Relay Service (TRS) providers (collectively, Originating Service Providers or OSPs for purposes of this proceeding) as 911 Authorities transition to IP-based networks and develop the capability to support NG911 elements and functions. Specifically, we require OSPs to complete necessary network upgrades to complete the transition to NG911 in two phases, triggered at each phase by separate valid requests of 911 Authorities who have completed their required NG911 technology upgrade readiness for that phase. At Phase 1, OSPs must deliver 911 traffic in IP format to NG911 Delivery Points designated by 911 Authorities, such as an Emergency Services IP network (ESInet) or similar designated point. All Phase 1 requirements must be completed in order to progress to Phase 2. At Phase 2, OSPs must deliver traffic in fully compliant NG911 format to include information that enables routing to the correct Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP), as well as caller location information, in the IP Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) header of the IP-delivered 911 call.

Smaller wireline providers (such as Rural Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (RLECs)), non-nationwide CMRS providers, and internet-based TRS providers will have one year following a 911 Authority request to comply with each phase of the transition. Larger wireline providers, nationwide CMRS providers, covered text providers, and interconnected-VoIP providers will have six months to comply with a valid request with each phase of the transition. For all OSPs, the initial compliance date will be extended based on the effective date of the rules— i.e. no OSP must comply with a 911 Authority Phase 1 request sooner than one year after the effective date of these rules, regardless of the timing of the 911 Authority's request. This timing rule is similar to the requirements adopted for CMRS and covered text providers in our recent proceeding on wireless location-based routing.

The Commission's two-phased approach allows OSPs and states or localities to negotiate alternate agreements on cost recovery terms. However, in the absence of alternate agreements by states or localities, OSPs must cover the costs of transmitting 911 calls to the NG911 Delivery Points designated by a 911 Authority starting in Phase 1. OSPs bear responsibility for any costs associated with completing the TDM-to-IP translation necessary to deliver such calls and associated routing and location information in the requested IP-based format. Thus, the NG911 Delivery Point becomes the network demarcation point for allocating all 911 network costs between the OSP portions of the network and the state and local government portions of the network. States and localities can establish alternative cost allocation arrangements with OSPs. However, OSPs are presumptively responsible for all the costs associated with delivering traffic to the NG911 Delivery Point identified by the appropriate 911 Authority in the absence of any such alternative arrangements.

Expediting the NG911 transition will help ensure that the nation's 911 system functions effectively and reliably, and with the most advanced capabilities available. In the Order, the Commission's actions also respond to the petition filed in 2021 by the National Association of State 911 Administrators (NASNA), urging the Commission to resolve uncertainty and disputes between OSPs and state 911 Authorities regarding the NG911 transition. With the rules we adopt, the Commission creates a consistent framework for ensuring that OSPs take the necessary steps to implement the transition to NG911 capability in coordination with state and local 911 Authorities. The rules also align the NG911 transition requirements for all OSPs with similar Commission requirements adopted for CMRS in the LBR Order, thereby promoting consistency across service platforms. Finally, the demarcation point and cost allocation rules the Commission adopted in the Order address “the critical component, and biggest regulatory roadblock, to transitioning to NG911 services.”

B. Summary of Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments in Response to the IRFA

One commenter, RTCC, raises significant issues in response to the IRFA. RTCC states that the Commission's initial estimate in the NG911 Notice that only 8.5% of RLECs would incur 911 IP call transport costs “lack[s] a factual foundation” and therefore “call[s] into question the reliability and sustainab[ility]” of the IRFA. We disagree. Further, while not raised in response to the IRFA, comments filed by RLECs also raise cost-related concerns associated with the IP transport rule proposed in the NG911 Notice. Following the Commission's review of comments from multiple parties associated with our cost estimates in the NG911 Notice, including comments submitted in the record by RLECs, the Order adjusted the cost estimates to implement the requirements to advance the nationwide transition to Next Generation 911. In response to comments, the Order also modified the proposed rules to substantially minimize any significant cost impacts on small businesses. We discuss RTCC and RLECs concerns in Section E of the FRFA, as well as modifications adopted in the Order in Section F of the FRFA. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the IRFA included in the NG911 Notice was sound and has fulfilled its purposes in satisfaction of the requirements of the RFA.

C. Response to Comments by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration

Pursuant to the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which amended the RFA, the Commission is required to respond to any comments filed by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration (SBA), and to provide a detailed statement of any change made to the proposed rules as a result of those comments. The Chief Counsel did not file any comments in response to the proposed rules in this proceeding.

D. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which the Rules Will Apply

The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of and, where feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities that may be affected by the rules adopted in the Order. The RFA generally defines the term “small entity” as having the same meaning as the terms “small business,” “small organization,” and “small governmental jurisdiction.” In addition, the term “small business” has the same meaning as the term “small business concern” under the Small Business Act.” A “small business concern” is one which: (1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the SBA.

Small Businesses, Small Organizations, Small Governmental Jurisdictions. Our actions, over time, may affect small entities that are not easily categorized at present. We therefore describe, at the outset, three broad groups of small entities that could be directly affected herein. First, while there are industry specific size standards for small businesses that are used in the regulatory flexibility analysis, according to data from the Small Business Administration's (SBA) Office of Advocacy, in general a small business is an independent business having fewer than 500 employees. These types of small businesses represent 99.9% of all businesses in the United States, which translates to 33.2 million businesses.

Next, the type of small entity described as a “small organization” is generally “any not-for-profit enterprise which is independently owned and operated and is not dominant in its field.” The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uses a revenue benchmark of $50,000 or less to delineate its annual electronic filing requirements for small exempt organizations. Nationwide, for tax year 2022, there were approximately 530,109 small exempt organizations in the U.S. reporting revenues of $50,000 or less according to the registration and tax data for exempt organizations available from the IRS.

Finally, the small entity described as a “small governmental jurisdiction” is defined generally as “governments of cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or special districts, with a population of less than fifty thousand.” U.S. Census Bureau data from the 2022 Census of Governments indicate there were 90,837 local governmental jurisdictions consisting of general purpose governments and special purpose governments in the United States. Of this number, there were 36,845 general purpose governments (county, municipal, and town or township) with populations of less than 50,000 and 11,879 special purpose governments (independent school districts) with enrollment populations of less than 50,000. Accordingly, based on the 2022 U.S. Census of Governments data, we estimate that at least 48,724 entities fall into the category of “small governmental jurisdictions.”

All Other Telecommunications. This industry is comprised of establishments primarily engaged in providing specialized telecommunications services, such as satellite tracking, communications telemetry, and radar station operation. This industry also includes establishments primarily engaged in providing satellite terminal stations and associated facilities connected with one or more terrestrial systems and capable of transmitting telecommunications to, and receiving telecommunications from, satellite systems. Providers of internet services ( e.g. dial-up ISPs) or Voice over internet Protocol (VoIP) services, via client-supplied telecommunications connections are also included in this industry. The SBA small business size standard for this industry classifies firms with annual receipts of $40 million or less as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 1,079 firms in this industry that operated for the entire year. Of those firms, 1,039 had revenue of less than $25 million. Based on this data, the Commission estimates that the majority of “All Other Telecommunications” firms can be considered small.

Advanced Wireless Services (AWS) —(1710-1755 MHz and 2110-2155 MHz bands (AWS-1); 1915-1920 MHz, 1995-2000 MHz, 2020-2025 MHz and 2175-2180 MHz bands (AWS-2); 2155-2175 MHz band (AWS-3); 2000-2020 MHz and 2180-2200 MHz (AWS-4)). Spectrum is made available and licensed in these bands for the provision of various wireless communications services. Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite) is the closest industry with an SBA small business size standard applicable to these services. The SBA small business size standard for this industry classifies a business as small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 2,893 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of this number, 2,837 firms employed fewer than 250 employees. Thus, under the SBA size standard, the Commission estimates that a majority of licensees in this industry can be considered small.

According to Commission data as of December 2021, there were approximately 4,472 active AWS licenses. The Commission's small business size standards with respect to AWS involve eligibility for bidding credits and installment payments in the auction of licenses for these services. For the auction of AWS licenses, the Commission defined a “small business” as an entity with average annual gross revenues for the preceding three years not exceeding $40 million, and a “very small business” as an entity with average annual gross revenues for the preceding three years not exceeding $15 million. Pursuant to these definitions, 57 winning bidders claiming status as small or very small businesses won 215 of 1,087 licenses. In the most recent auction of AWS licenses 15 of 37 bidders qualifying for status as small or very small businesses won licenses.

In frequency bands where licenses were subject to auction, the Commission notes that as a general matter, the number of winning bidders that qualify as small businesses at the close of an auction does not necessarily represent the number of small businesses currently in service. Further, the Commission does not generally track subsequent business size unless, in the context of assignments or transfers, unjust enrichment issues are implicated. Additionally, since the Commission does not collect data on the number of employees for licensees providing these services, at this time we are not able to estimate the number of licensees with active licenses that would qualify as small under the SBA's small business size standard.

Wired Telecommunications Carriers. The U.S. Census Bureau defines this industry as establishments primarily engaged in operating and/or providing access to transmission facilities and infrastructure that they own and/or lease for the transmission of voice, data, text, sound, and video using wired communications networks. Transmission facilities may be based on a single technology or a combination of technologies. Establishments in this industry use the wired telecommunications network facilities that they operate to provide a variety of services, such as wired telephony services, including VoIP services, wired (cable) audio and video programming distribution, and wired broadband internet services. By exception, establishments providing satellite television distribution services using facilities and infrastructure that they operate are included in this industry. Wired Telecommunications Carriers are also referred to as wireline carriers or fixed local service providers.

The SBA small business size standard for Wired Telecommunications Carriers classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 3,054 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2022 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021, there were 4,590 providers that reported they were engaged in the provision of fixed local services. Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 4,146 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, most of these providers can be considered small entities.

Local Exchange Carriers (LECs). Neither the Commission nor the SBA has developed a size standard for small businesses specifically applicable to local exchange services. Providers of these services include both incumbent and competitive local exchange service providers. Wired Telecommunications Carriers is the closest industry with an SBA small business size standard. Wired Telecommunications Carriers are also referred to as wireline carriers or fixed local service providers. The SBA small business size standard for Wired Telecommunications Carriers classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 3,054 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2022 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021, there were 4,590 providers that reported they were fixed local exchange service providers. Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 4,146 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, most of these providers can be considered small entities.

Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (LECs). Neither the Commission nor the SBA has developed a size standard for small businesses specifically applicable to local exchange services. Providers of these services include several types of competitive local exchange service providers. Wired Telecommunications Carriers is the closest industry with an SBA small business size standard. The SBA small business size standard for Wired Telecommunications Carriers classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 3,054 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2022 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021, there were 3,378 providers that reported they were competitive local service providers. Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 3,230 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, most of these providers can be considered small entities.

Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (Incumbent LECs). Neither the Commission nor the SBA have developed a small business size standard specifically for incumbent local exchange carriers. Wired Telecommunications Carriers is the closest industry with an SBA small business size standard. The SBA small business size standard for Wired Telecommunications Carriers classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 3,054 firms in this industry that operated for the entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2022 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021, there were 1,212 providers that reported they were incumbent local exchange service providers. Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 916 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, the Commission estimates that the majority of incumbent local exchange carriers can be considered small entities.

Interexchange Carriers (IXCs). Neither the Commission nor the SBA have developed a small business size standard specifically for Interexchange Carriers. Wired Telecommunications Carriers is the closest industry with an SBA small business size standard. The SBA small business size standard for Wired Telecommunications Carriers classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 3,054 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2022 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021, there were 127 providers that reported they were engaged in the provision of interexchange services. Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 109 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, the Commission estimates that the majority of providers in this industry can be considered small entities.

Local Resellers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA have developed a small business size standard specifically for Local Resellers. Telecommunications Resellers is the closest industry with an SBA small business size standard. The Telecommunications Resellers industry comprises establishments engaged in purchasing access and network capacity from owners and operators of telecommunications networks and reselling wired and wireless telecommunications services (except satellite) to businesses and households. Establishments in this industry resell telecommunications; they do not operate transmission facilities and infrastructure. Mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) are included in this industry. The SBA small business size standard for Telecommunications Resellers classifies a business as small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that 1,386 firms in this industry provided resale services for the entire year. Of that number, 1,375 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2022 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021, there were 207 providers that reported they were engaged in the provision of local resale services. Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 202 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, most of these providers can be considered small entities.

Broadband Personal Communications Service. The broadband personal communications services (PCS) spectrum encompasses services in the 1850-1910 and 1930-1990 MHz bands. The closest industry with an SBA small business size standard applicable to these services is Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite). The SBA small business size standard for this industry classifies a business as small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 2,893 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of this number, 2,837 firms employed fewer than 250 employees. Thus under the SBA size standard, the Commission estimates that a majority of licensees in this industry can be considered small.

Based on Commission data as of November 2021, there were approximately 5,060 active licenses in the Broadband PCS service. The Commission's small business size standards with respect to Broadband PCS involve eligibility for bidding credits and installment payments in the auction of licenses for these services. In auctions for these licenses, the Commission defined “small business” as an entity that, together with its affiliates and controlling interests, has average gross revenues not exceeding $40 million for the preceding three years, and a “very small business” as an entity that, together with its affiliates and controlling interests, has had average annual gross revenues not exceeding $15 million for the preceding three years. Winning bidders claiming small business credits won Broadband PCS licenses in C, D, E, and F Blocks.

In frequency bands where licenses were subject to auction, the Commission notes that as a general matter, the number of winning bidders that qualify as small businesses at the close of an auction does not necessarily represent the number of small businesses currently in service. Further, the Commission does not generally track subsequent business size unless, in the context of assignments or transfers, unjust enrichment issues are implicated. Additionally, since the Commission does not collect data on the number of employees for licensees providing these, at this time we are not able to estimate the number of licensees with active licenses that would qualify as small under the SBA's small business size standard.

Narrowband Personal Communications Services. Narrowband Personal Communications Services (Narrowband PCS) are PCS services operating in the 901-902 MHz, 930-931 MHz, and 940-941 MHz bands. PCS services are radio communications that encompass mobile and ancillary fixed communication that provide services to individuals and businesses and can be integrated with a variety of competing networks. Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite) is the closest industry with an SBA small business size standard applicable to these services. The SBA small business size standard for this industry classifies a business as small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 2,893 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of this number, 2,837 firms employed fewer than 250 employees. Thus under the SBA size standard, the Commission estimates that a majority of licensees in this industry can be considered small.

According to Commission data as of December 2021, there were approximately 4,211 active Narrowband PCS licenses. The Commission's small business size standards with respect to Narrowband PCS involve eligibility for bidding credits and installment payments in the auction of licenses for these services. For the auction of these licenses, the Commission defined a “small business” as an entity that, together with affiliates and controlling interests, has average gross revenues for the three preceding years of not more than $40 million. A “very small business” is defined as an entity that, together with affiliates and controlling interests, has average gross revenues for the three preceding years of not more than $15 million. Pursuant to these definitions, 7 winning bidders claiming small and very small bidding credits won approximately 359 licenses. One of the winning bidders claiming a small business status classification in these Narrowband PCS license auctions had an active license as of December 2021.

In frequency bands where licenses were subject to auction, the Commission notes that as a general matter, the number of winning bidders that qualify as small businesses at the close of an auction does not necessarily represent the number of small businesses currently in service. Further, the Commission does not generally track subsequent business size unless, in the context of assignments or transfers, unjust enrichment issues are implicated. Additionally, since the Commission does not collect data on the number of employees for licensees providing these services, at this time we are not able to estimate the number of licensees with active licenses that would qualify as small under the SBA's small business size standard.

Offshore Radiotelephone Service. This service operates on several UHF television broadcast channels that are not used for television broadcasting in the coastal areas of states bordering the Gulf of Mexico. Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite) is the closest industry with an SBA small business size standard applicable to this service. The SBA small business size standard for this industry classifies a business as small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 2,893 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of this number, 2,837 firms employed fewer than 250 employees. Thus under the SBA size standard, the Commission estimates that a majority of licensees in this industry can be considered small. Additionally, based on Commission data, as of December 2021, there was one licensee with an active license in this service. However, since the Commission does not collect data on the number of employees for this service, at this time we are not able to estimate the number of licensees that would qualify as small under the SBA's small business size standard.

Radio and Television Broadcasting and Wireless Communications Equipment Manufacturing. This industry comprises establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing radio and television broadcast and wireless communications equipment. Examples of products made by these establishments are: transmitting and receiving antennas, cable television equipment, GPS equipment, pagers, cellular phones, mobile communications equipment, and radio and television studio and broadcasting equipment. The SBA small business size standard for this industry classifies businesses having 1,250 employees or less as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 656 firms in this industry that operated for the entire year. Of this number, 624 firms had fewer than 250 employees. Thus, under the SBA size standard, the majority of firms in this industry can be considered small.

Rural Radiotelephone Service. Neither the Commission nor the SBA have developed a small business size standard specifically for small businesses providing Rural Radiotelephone Service. Rural Radiotelephone Service is radio service in which licensees are authorized to offer and provide radio telecommunication services for hire to subscribers in areas where it is not feasible to provide communication services by wire or other means. A significant subset of the Rural Radiotelephone Service is the Basic Exchange Telephone Radio System (BETRS). Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite), is the closest applicable industry with an SBA small business size standard. The SBA small business size standard for Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite) classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer employees as small. For this industry, U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 2,893 firms that operated for the entire year. Of this total, 2,837 firms employed fewer than 250 employees. Thus under the SBA size standard, the Commission estimates that the majority of Rural Radiotelephone Services firm are small entities. Based on Commission data as of December 27, 2021, there were approximately 119 active licenses in the Rural Radiotelephone Service. The Commission does not collect employment data from these entities holding these licenses and therefore we cannot estimate how many of these entities meet the SBA small business size standard.

Wireless Communications Services. Wireless Communications Services (WCS) can be used for a variety of fixed, mobile, radiolocation, and digital audio broadcasting satellite services. Wireless spectrum is made available and licensed for the provision of wireless communications services in several frequency bands subject to Part 27 of the Commission's rules. Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite) is the closest industry with an SBA small business size standard applicable to these services. The SBA small business size standard for this industry classifies a business as small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 2,893 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of this number, 2,837 firms employed fewer than 250 employees. Thus under the SBA size standard, the Commission estimates that a majority of licensees in this industry can be considered small.

The Commission's small business size standards with respect to WCS involve eligibility for bidding credits and installment payments in the auction of licenses for the various frequency bands included in WCS. When bidding credits are adopted for the auction of licenses in WCS frequency bands, such credits may be available to several types of small businesses based average gross revenues (small, very small and entrepreneur) pursuant to the competitive bidding rules adopted in conjunction with the requirements for the auction and/or as identified in the designated entities section in part 27 of the Commission's rules for the specific WCS frequency bands.

In frequency bands where licenses were subject to auction, the Commission notes that as a general matter, the number of winning bidders that qualify as small businesses at the close of an auction does not necessarily represent the number of small businesses currently in service. Further, the Commission does not generally track subsequent business size unless, in the context of assignments or transfers, unjust enrichment issues are implicated. Additionally, since the Commission does not collect data on the number of employees for licensees providing these services, at this time we are not able to estimate the number of licensees with active licenses that would qualify as small under the SBA's small business size standard.

Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite). This industry comprises establishments engaged in operating and maintaining switching and transmission facilities to provide communications via the airwaves. Establishments in this industry have spectrum licenses and provide services using that spectrum, such as cellular services, paging services, wireless internet access, and wireless video services. The SBA size standard for this industry classifies a business as small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 2,893 firms in this industry that operated for the entire year. Of that number, 2,837 firms employed fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2022 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021, there were 594 providers that reported they were engaged in the provision of wireless services. Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 511 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, most of these providers can be considered small entities.

Wireless Telephony. Wireless telephony includes cellular, personal communications services, and specialized mobile radio telephony carriers. The closest applicable industry with an SBA small business size standard is Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite). The size standard for this industry under SBA rules is that a business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. For this industry, U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 2,893 firms that operated for the entire year. Of this number, 2,837 firms employed fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2022 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021, there were 331 providers that reported they were engaged in the provision of cellular, personal communications services, and specialized mobile radio services. Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 255 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, most of these providers can be considered small entities.

700 MHz Guard Band Licensees. The 700 MHz Guard Band encompasses spectrum in 746-747/776-777 MHz and 762-764/792-794 MHz frequency bands. Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite) is the closest industry with an SBA small business size standard applicable to licenses providing services in these bands. The SBA small business size standard for this industry classifies a business as small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 2,893 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of this number, 2,837 firms employed fewer than 250 employees. Thus under the SBA size standard, the Commission estimates that a majority of licensees in this industry can be considered small.

According to Commission data as of December 2021, there were approximately 224 active 700 MHz Guard Band licenses. The Commission's small business size standards with respect to 700 MHz Guard Band licensees involve eligibility for bidding credits and installment payments in the auction of licenses. For the auction of these licenses, the Commission defined a “small business” as an entity that, together with its affiliates and controlling principals, has average gross revenues not exceeding $40 million for the preceding three years, and a “very small business” an entity that, together with its affiliates and controlling principals, has average gross revenues that are not more than $15 million for the preceding three years. Pursuant to these definitions, five winning bidders claiming one of the small business status classifications won 26 licenses, and one winning bidder claiming small business won two licenses. None of the winning bidders claiming a small business status classification in these 700 MHz Guard Band license auctions had an active license as of December 2021.

In frequency bands where licenses were subject to auction, the Commission notes that as a general matter, the number of winning bidders that qualify as small businesses at the close of an auction does not necessarily represent the number of small businesses currently in service. Further, the Commission does not generally track subsequent business size unless, in the context of assignments or transfers, unjust enrichment issues are implicated. Additionally, since the Commission does not collect data on the number of employees for licensees providing these services, at this time we are not able to estimate the number of licensees with active licenses that would qualify as small under the SBA's small business size standard.

Lower 700 MHz Band Licenses. The lower 700 MHz band encompasses spectrum in the 698-746 MHz frequency bands. Permissible operations in these bands include flexible fixed, mobile, and broadcast uses, including mobile and other digital new broadcast operation; fixed and mobile wireless commercial services (including FDD- and TDD-based services); as well as fixed and mobile wireless uses for private, internal radio needs, two-way interactive, cellular, and mobile television broadcasting services. Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite) is the closest industry with an SBA small business size standard applicable to licenses providing services in these bands. The SBA small business size standard for this industry classifies a business as small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 2,893 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of this number, 2,837 firms employed fewer than 250 employees. Thus under the SBA size standard, the Commission estimates that a majority of licensees in this industry can be considered small.

According to Commission data as of December 2021, there were approximately 2,824 active Lower 700 MHz Band licenses. The Commission's small business size standards with respect to Lower 700 MHz Band licensees involve eligibility for bidding credits and installment payments in the auction of licenses. For auctions of Lower 700 MHz Band licenses the Commission adopted criteria for three groups of small businesses. A very small business was defined as an entity that, together with its affiliates and controlling interests, has average annual gross revenues not exceeding $15 million for the preceding three years, a small business was defined as an entity that, together with its affiliates and controlling interests, has average gross revenues not exceeding $40 million for the preceding three years, and an entrepreneur was defined as an entity that, together with its affiliates and controlling interests, has average gross revenues not exceeding $3 million for the preceding three years. In auctions for Lower 700 MHz Band licenses seventy-two winning bidders claiming a small business classification won 329 licenses, twenty-six winning bidders claiming a small business classification won 214 licenses, and three winning bidders claiming a small business classification won all five auctioned licenses.

In frequency bands where licenses were subject to auction, the Commission notes that as a general matter, the number of winning bidders that qualify as small businesses at the close of an auction does not necessarily represent the number of small businesses currently in service. Further, the Commission does not generally track subsequent business size unless, in the context of assignments or transfers, unjust enrichment issues are implicated. Additionally, since the Commission does not collect data on the number of employees for licensees providing these services, at this time we are not able to estimate the number of licensees with active licenses that would qualify as small under the SBA's small business size standard.

Upper 700 MHz Band Licenses. The upper 700 MHz band encompasses spectrum in the 746-806 MHz bands. Upper 700 MHz D Block licenses are nationwide licenses associated with the 758-763 MHz and 788-793 MHz bands. Permissible operations in these bands include flexible fixed, mobile, and broadcast uses, including mobile and other digital new broadcast operation; fixed and mobile wireless commercial services (including FDD- and TDD-based services); as well as fixed and mobile wireless uses for private, internal radio needs, two-way interactive, cellular, and mobile television broadcasting services. Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite) is the closest industry with an SBA small business size standard applicable to licenses providing services in these bands. The SBA small business size standard for this industry classifies a business as small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 2,893 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of that number, 2,837 firms employed fewer than 250 employees. Thus, under the SBA size standard, the Commission estimates that a majority of licensees in this industry can be considered small.

According to Commission data as of December 2021, there were approximately 152 active Upper 700 MHz Band licenses. The Commission's small business size standards with respect to Upper 700 MHz Band licensees involve eligibility for bidding credits and installment payments in the auction of licenses. For the auction of these licenses, the Commission defined a “small business” as an entity that, together with its affiliates and controlling principals, has average gross revenues not exceeding $40 million for the preceding three years, and a “very small business” an entity that, together with its affiliates and controlling principals, has average gross revenues that are not more than $15 million for the preceding three years. Pursuant to these definitions, three winning bidders claiming very small business status won five of the twelve available licenses.

In frequency bands where licenses were subject to auction, the Commission notes that as a general matter, the number of winning bidders that qualify as small businesses at the close of an auction does not necessarily represent the number of small businesses currently in service. Further, the Commission does not generally track subsequent business size unless, in the context of assignments or transfers, unjust enrichment issues are implicated. Additionally, since the Commission does not collect data on the number of employees for licensees providing these services, at this time we are not able to estimate the number of licensees with active licenses that would qualify as small under the SBA's small business size standard.

Wireless Resellers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA have developed a small business size standard specifically for Wireless Resellers. The closest industry with an SBA small business size standard is Telecommunications Resellers. The Telecommunications Resellers industry comprises establishments engaged in purchasing access and network capacity from owners and operators of telecommunications networks and reselling wired and wireless telecommunications services (except satellite) to businesses and households. Establishments in this industry resell telecommunications and they do not operate transmission facilities and infrastructure. Mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) are included in this industry. Under the SBA size standard for this industry, a business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that 1,386 firms in this industry provided resale services during that year. Of that number, 1,375 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees. Thus, for this industry under the SBA small business size standard, the majority of providers can be considered small entities.

Semiconductor and Related Device Manufacturing. Semiconductor and Related Device Manufacturing. This industry comprises establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing semiconductors and related solid state devices. Examples of products made by these establishments are integrated circuits, memory chips, microprocessors, diodes, transistors, solar cells and other optoelectronic devices. The SBA small business size standard for this industry classifies entities having 1,250 or fewer employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 729 firms in this industry that operated for the entire year. Of this total, 673 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees. Thus under the SBA size standard, the majority of firms in this industry can be considered small.

Telecommunications Relay Service (TRS) Providers. Telecommunications relay services enable individuals who are deaf, hard of hearing, deaf-blind, or who have a speech disability to communicate by telephone in a manner that is functionally equivalent to using voice communication services. Internet-based TRS (iTRS) connects an individual with a hearing or a speech disability to a TRS communications assistant using an Internet Protocol-enabled device via the internet, rather than the public switched telephone network. Video Relay Service (VRS) one form of iTRS, enables people with hearing or speech disabilities who use sign language to communicate with voice telephone users over a broadband connection using a video communication device. Internet Protocol Captioned Telephone Service (IP CTS) another form of iTRS, permits a person with hearing loss to have a telephone conversation while reading captions of what the other party is saying on an internet-connected device. Providers must be certified by the Commission to provide VRS and IP CTS and to receive compensation from the TRS Fund for TRS provided in accordance with applicable rules.

Neither the Commission nor the SBA have developed a small business size standard specifically for TRS Providers. All Other Telecommunications is the closest industry with an SBA small business size standard. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Voice over internet Protocol (VoIP) services, via client-supplied telecommunications connections are included in this industry. The SBA small business size standard for this industry classifies firms with annual receipts of $40 million or less as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 1,079 firms in this industry that operated for the entire year. Of those firms, 1,039 had revenue of less than $25 million. Based on Commission data there are ten certified iTRS providers. The Commission however does not compile financial information for these providers. Nevertheless, based on available information, the Commission estimates that most providers in this industry are small entities.

E. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements for Small Entities

The rules adopted in the Order will impose new or additional reporting, recordkeeping, and/or other compliance obligations on small entities. Some of our requirements contain written notification and certification requirements that will be applicable to small entities, and other requirements impose compliance obligations on small entities that may require small entities to hire professionals to implement and comply.

Reporting and Recordkeeping. The Commission adopted the reporting and recordkeeping requirements proposed in the NG911 Notice, with minor adjustments. First, in each phase of the NG911 transition, the Commission allows OSPs and 911 Authorities the flexibility to agree to alternate time frames or cost allocation arrangements, but the OSPs must notify the Commission of the alternate arrangements, including the pertinent terms of that agreement, within 30 days of the agreement. We note that the notice of the alternative agreement must specifically identify which requirements from the rules are impacted, and what are the mutually agreed upon new requirements ( e.g., compliance time frames, dates). In contrast, the rules proposed in the NG911 Notice limited OSPs and 911 Authorities to entering into mutual agreements to establish alternative time frames for meeting the requirements to deliver 911 calls and texts in the requested IP-based format. Second, to ensure OSPs receive valid requests from a technologically-ready 911 Authority to initiate each phase, we require the requesting local or state entity to certify its technology readiness suitable to the appropriate phase with a formal notice that must be transmitted in writing to the OSPs or made available to them via a Commission public registry.

Other Compliance Requirements. Several comments filed in response to the NG911 Notice discussed various categories of potential expenses to comply with NG911 transition requirements, with many asserting that there would be a greater burden on smaller RLECs. Our initial estimate of the upper bound of these costs for all 2,327 OSPs industry-wide in the NG911 Notice was approximately $103,000 in one-time costs and $11.6 million in recurring annual costs for new annual IP 911 call delivery transport charges for the 81 of those OSPs that currently provide only TDM telephony. As discussed below, in this document and the Order the Commission adjusted our cost estimates to account for industry-submitted data and further Commission analysis.

Assessment of Costs of Compliance Requirements. We update our cost calculation for a total of 2,287 OSPs based on newer Form 477 data, and we estimate that OSPs will incur approximately $4.4 million in total one-time non-recurring costs and no more than $5.5 million in annual recurring costs to implement Phase 1 requirements, and additionally approximately $24 million in non-recurring costs and approximately $50 million per year to implement Phase 2 requirements.

Phase 1 Compliance Costs. The new IP transport costs due to the rules are non-negligible. We respond to RTCC's comment that our initial estimate of IP transport costs for only 8.5% of RLECs was in error by reassessing that wireline OSPs may incur some transport costs regardless of whether they already have IP switches and can convert TDM to IP on their own networks or not, particularly assuming SIP trunking is used. We recognize that some smaller OSPs—primarily RLECs—will incur incremental recurring cost of IP transport via SIP trunks, even if those RLECs already have IP switches, can convert TDM to IP on their own networks, and can provide broadband service using their own IP switching facilities. As some parties point out, these RLECs might incur some SIP call transport costs if they do not have settlement-free peering agreements and cannot hand off IP voice traffic to existing interconnection partners. We estimate that the total of these costs will be below $5.5 million per year. This estimate is based on assumptions that the transport cost would be $2,000 per month for the 16 OSPs that currently only offer TDM-based voice services ( i.e., they do not offer broadband or VoIP services) and serve fewer than 10,000 subscribers, and 50% more ( i.e., $3,000 per month) for the two OSPs that provide no broadband or VoIP but serve more than 10,000 subscribers.

The Commission concludes that most of the RLECs' and other commenting parties' estimates of the recurring costs of IP transport to NG911 Delivery Points are unduly high. Almost all of these cost estimates for 911 IP transport are premised on assumptions that OSPs will be required to transmit 911 calls over long distances across multiple states to faraway NG911 Delivery Points. These assumptions are unfounded in light of the rules, which require OSPs to transport 911 calls only to in-state NG911 Delivery Points designated by 911 Authorities. Given the ample evidence showing that IP transport costs are significantly lower than TDM transport costs, we believe that the rules might actually reduce the overall transport costs for OSPs. For example, South Carolina RFA submits data indicating that IP transport of 911 traffic is generally 27% cheaper than TDM call delivery, regardless of where the calls are delivered. iCERT points out that, to avoid the higher cost of transporting TDM calls, RLECs could convert their traffic from TDM to IP format prior to transporting them. Five Area Telephone also points out that OSPs could significantly lower the overall costs of transmitting 911 calls to ESInets by taking advantage of third-party aggregators' services.

We further assess small and other OSPs will incur additional non-recurring Phase 1 material and labor costs in order to comply with the IP transport requirement. The Commission estimates a total of $4.4 million in one-time material and labor costs, including approximately $4 million to convert TDM calls to IP format and $343,000 to configure the delivery to new NG911 Delivery Points. Because the majority of OSPs are capable of transmitting calls in IP format, we estimate that only a subset of OSPs that do not offer full IP-related services would need to incur the cost of facilities needed to convert TDM calls to IP format; other OSPs that already originate traffic in IP format would incur no up-front IP conversion costs. For the smallest entities, we conservatively estimate an upper bound of the one-time IP conversion cost to be no more than $17,600 for the voice-only OSPs with no more than 10,000 subscribers.

We use Five Area Telephone's estimate of $17,600 as the upper bound for the up-front equipment costs for small OSPs to connect to ESInets—an estimate that, according to Five Area Telephone, includes the costs of “establishing network connectivity, procurement of private line circuits, configuration assistance, switching equipment configuration, testing, cutover, and final testing,” equaling over $40 million if applied to all 2,327 carriers. The Commission believes this estimate substantially overstates the cost of the network equipment required to convert TDM calls to IP format, because it assumes a major system upgrade would be required, and we reject Five Area Telephone's assertion that the total cost would exceed $40 million because that erroneously assumes that all 2,327 OSPs would incur the same amount. Nonetheless, we apply Five Area Telephone's $17,600 one-time cost estimate as the basis to calculate the upper bound of our IP conversion cost estimate, because other commenters' estimates are even less credible. Most of them include the non-recurring cost of system upgrades that are not required by the rules; many of them rely on unsupported cost figures for specific OSPs without providing any basis for us to examine whether these costs are typical; and some include no cost figures at all.

Including larger entities, we estimate that the total one-time cost that OSPs would incur to obtain the facilities needed to convert TDM calls to IP format would be approximately $4 million, including $334,400 for the 18 that do not offer any IP services and $3.7 million for the 414 that offer broadband as well as voice services. We believe our estimate is conservative because it does not take into account the many non-911 calls that these OSPs would transmit using the same equipment.

The Commission also estimates that the one-time costs of reconfiguring and changing 911 traffic delivery points would require all affected OSPs to incur labor costs totaling $343,000. This is based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics' estimate that the average wage for telecommunications equipment installers and repairers is $32.26 per hour, as well as an estimate, based on evidence in the record, that OSPs serving fewer than 10,000 subscribers would need to pay for up to three hours of labor and OSPs serving more than 10,000 subscribers would need to pay 50% more in labor costs due to the potentially more complex tasks these entities might need to undertake to reconfigure and change the delivery points for their 911 traffic. We rely on RWA's assertion that “the number of person-hours required will typically be closer to two or three,” rather than the one hour estimated in the NG911 Notice, and adjust this amount upward by 50% more for OSPs serving more than 10,000 subscribers to account for the greater complexity of the task. Based on these assumptions, we arrive at the total one-time labor cost of $343,000 for all the OSPs to change the delivery points.

Phase 2 Compliance Costs. We estimate that wireline carriers, interconnected VoIP providers, and other OSPs that are not CMRS providers (and thus not subject to the LBR Order) will incur approximately $24 million in one-time costs and $50 million in annual recurring costs to comply with 911 Authorities' Phase 2 requests to transmit and maintain accurate location information with 911 calls in IP format using LIS databases and the LVF function (or their equivalent). The rules allow OSPs to use “LIS as a service” from a third-party vendor as an option instead of creating their own LIS or equivalent databases. This LIS service may either involve native IP LIS or LIS equivalent database population, or a database conversion of OSPs' existing ALI/ANI/MSAG data to LIS formats. CSRIC explains that LIS as a service is contemplated as an NG911 solution at “minimal expense” to small OSPs, as it relieves OSPs of most costs beyond monthly services, and an LNG and can be provided either by a commercial vendor or the 911 authority. This is a substantial cost-savings measure especially for smaller OSPs with TDM networks, who may not be ready to decommission older legacy equipment and modernize their networks for IP/VoIP.

We conservatively base these figures on Five Area Telephone's estimates that, to comply with location-based routing-type requirements to insert location information into call paths, wireline and VoIP providers would need to incur non-recurring costs of approximately $10,000 and monthly recurring costs of $1,750. Extrapolating these statistics and increasing the costs by 50% for larger OSPs serving more than 10,000 subscribers, we estimate that compliance with the Phase 2 rules would require non-CMRS OSPs to incur a total of $24 million in one-time costs and $50 million in annual recurring costs. The Commission concludes that the location information requirement does not result in any additional costs for CMRS providers because they will have already implemented such upgrades.

We reject AT&T's cost estimate submitted in the record. AT&T alleges that “requiring the introduction of a Location Information Server (`LIS') would be extremely expensive and inefficient” for carriers with legacy TDM switching facilities and “could cost several billion dollars on an industry-wide basis.” AT&T, in its role as the lead NGCS and ESInet contractor in Virginia, has already provided a solution that allows legacy OSP wireline ALI and MSAG location data to be used for NG911-compliant LIS as a service, which eliminates TDM OSPs' needs to upgrade their networks to IP. The Commission therefore finds AT&T's record assertion, which could have been relevant to small carriers with legacy TDM switching facilities, was based on an assumption of an IP origination requirement, which we do not impose.

The Commission emphasizes that these Phase 2 rules do not require OSPs to originate 911 calls in IP format. Our Phase 2 cost estimate does not include the costs of originating traffic in IP format. However, we nevertheless consider WTA's claims that “obtaining the full benefits of NG911 service will not be possible unless 911 calls originate in IP format,” and that converting networks from TDM to IP carries “not only significant network and customer equipment changes and reconfigurations, but also substantial customer service and education costs.” Although we agree that converting TDM networks to IP networks can be costly, we reject the contention that such system upgrade costs should be attributed to the requirements in these rules. The transition from TDM to IP technology has been ongoing for over a decade as the subscriptions to voice-only local exchange telephone service (switched access lines) has fallen from nearly 141 million lines in December 2008 to 27 million in June 2022. A linear model predicts that switched access lines will be fully phased out in the near future. Therefore, since we can reasonably expect that these system upgrades will occur organically as part of the natural technological evolution, regardless of whether OSPs are required to comply with Phase 2 requests, the upgrades cannot be attributed to these requirements. Instead, they should be considered baseline costs of operating telecommunications business. Furthermore, even if a handful of RLECs delayed their system upgrades for idiosyncratic reasons, the 6- to 12-month timeline to comply with the requirements for each of the two phases would be sufficient for RLECs to move away from the legacy systems that are beyond end of their life.

Finally, our Phase 2 rules do not preclude small and other OSPs from negotiating with 911 authorities for alternative arrangements. If the costs of upgrading network systems are as high as some OSPs claim, those entities could offer 911 Authorities alternative, less costly arrangements, such as offering to pay the 911 Authorities to maintain the costly legacy conversion components for these OSPs to use in order to fulfill the requirements. Nonetheless, in light of the ample record evidence that most 911 Authorities are eager to decommission these legacy facilities due to the high cost of maintaining them (as well as the limitations on these facilities' functionality), we believe it is highly unlikely that any OSP would find such an arrangement to be cost-effective, especially when compared with the cost of upgrading their own networks—upgrades that they almost certainly will need to implement within the applicable time frame for reasons that have nothing to do with these NG911 rules.

OSP Implementation Timeframes. In the Order the Commission also adjusted the compliance timeframes for small and rural OSPs. RLECs, non-nationwide CMRS providers, and internet-based TRS providers are required to comply with a 911 Authority's valid request at each phase of the NG911 transition within 12 months after receiving a valid request or within 12 months after the effective date of the rules adopted in the Order, whichever is later. The Commission granted these OSPs a longer time to comply than nationwide CMRS providers, interconnected VoIP providers, and non-RLEC wireline providers who are required to comply within six months after receiving a valid request at each phase of the NG911 transition or within six months after the effective date of the rules adopted in the Order.

The important life-saving public safety benefits that will result from the rules the Commission adopted in the Order are conservatively estimated at over one trillion dollars annually. The rule changes to implement NG911 will save lives by improving the reliability of the 911 network and decrease outages and call failures, improving routing to PSAPs to ensure each 911 call goes to the most appropriate PSAP that can most quickly answer and respond with the most suitable emergency assistance, and improving the standardized format and reliability of caller location data delivered to PSAPs to ensure faster public safety response times. Accordingly, these rule changes serve the public interest.

F. Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered

The RFA requires an agency to provide “a description of the steps the agency has taken to minimize the significant economic impact on small entities . . . including a statement of the factual, policy, and legal reasons for selecting the alternative adopted in the final rule and why each one of the other significant alternatives to the rule considered by the agency which affect the impact on small entities was rejected.”

In this document and the Order the Commission describes the significant public safety benefits to be achieved from requiring all OSPs to acquire and implement NG911 technology. We also discuss that based on the record in this proceeding, the Commission finds it is technologically feasible for all OSPs to do so. While all OSPs are capable of complying with the NG911 transition requirements, the rules the Commission adopted in the Order are intended to be cost effective and minimally burdensome for small and other entities impacted by the rules. For example, the Commission did not propose, and declined to adopt any rules for monitoring the transition to NG911 or addressing compliance with the new requirements as supported by a small iTRS provider Hamilton Relay. Additionally, the adopted rules pertaining to Phase 2 SIP location and LIS costs only require OSPs to use “LIS as a service” from a third-party vendor instead of creating their own LIS databases. Using LIS as a service often involves simple database conversion of OSPs' existing ALI/ANI/MSAG data to LIS formats. As discussed by CSRIC, LIS as a service is envisioned as an NG911 solution at “minimal expense” to small OSPs, which absolves OSPs of most costs beyond monthly services and a Legacy Network Gateway (LNG), and the service can be provided either by a commercial vendor, or the 911 Authority. LIS as a service is a substantial cost-savings measure especially for smaller OSPs, who may not be ready to decommission older legacy equipment and modernize their networks for NG911 end-state architecture. Below we discuss other steps the Commission has taken to minimize costs and reduce the economic impact for small entities, as well as some alternatives considered.

In-State NG911 Delivery Points. In response to RLEC comments and concerns that they might be required to incur unreasonably high transport costs if 911 Authorities had unlimited discretion to designate interconnection points anywhere in the country, and about the high costs they might incur where 911 Authorities “have delegated the operation of an ESInet to a third-party provider [that designates a] connection point far outside of state boundaries,” the Commission modified the proposed default rule to require OSPs to deliver NG911 traffic to NG911 Delivery Points designated by a 911 Authority only if those points are located within the 911 Authority's home state. Moreover, although the Commission believes the obligation to transmit 911 calls to NG911 Delivery Points will have little, if any impact on RLECs' exposure to liability under state tort law, the home-state qualification may make it easier for RLECs to anticipate and manage those de minimis risks by avoiding exposing them to multiple states' differing tort law standards. In addition, RLECs' concerns that an obligation to deliver calls to faraway states would compel them to retain third-party long distance transmission vendors, and they could be held liable for violations of the Commission's 911 reliability rules committed by these vendors, should be addressed by the home-state qualification requirement. The home-state qualification should also reduce the need for RLECs to retain third-party vendors, and make it easier for them to monitor the performance of both their own networks and those of the third-party vendors.

No IP 911 Call Origination Requirement/LNG Gateway Solution. The rules decline to require IP origination of 911 calls for OSPs at Phase 2, marking a substantial cost saving flexibility for small and other OSPs that still originate calls in TDM. In the Notice, the Commission sought comment about such a requirement, but we decline to impose it. Permitting these OSPs to maintain their legacy TDM facilities instead of moving to VoIP for NG911 Phase 2 will reduce the burdens on smaller entities. Specifically, our rules do not prevent OSPs from meeting the Phase 2 requirements by using a LIS gateway solution, which converts OSPs' existing legacy ALI/ANI location data into IP format for delivery in the SIP header code to ESInets and PSAPs. This allows the smallest OSPs to continue to operate legacy TDM networks and their ALI/ANI facilities without having to immediately convert their networks to VoIP.

Time to Comply for Smaller Entities. The additional six months for small and rural OSPs to comply with each Phase of the NG911 transition is also a significant step to reduce burdens by the Commission in the Order. In the previous section we discuss the implementation timeframes for small and rural OSPs—RLECs, non-nationwide CMRS providers, and internet-based TRS providers—which require these providers to comply with a 911 Authority's valid request at each phase of the NG911 transition within 12 months after receiving a valid request or within 12 months after the effective date of the rules in this document and the Order, instead of the six month compliance timeframe for OSPs that do not fall into any of these classifications. The extended timeframe recognizes the concerns of RLEC commenters' about the challenges that they may face when transitioning to NG911. The Commission considered but declined RWA's request that non-nationwide providers have 30 months from a valid PSAP request to implement NG911. We also considered but declined to adopt an alternative sought by the Alaska Telecom Assoc. for, (1) “an implementation extension or exemption for non-IP networks, or portions of networks” and “longer implementation timelines as well as an opportunity for waivers of timing requirements;” and (2) NG911 rules that provide carriers in Alaska with a presumptive waiver of mandated IP-delivery deadlines, provided such a carrier can demonstrate that it is working in good faith with the PSAP to complete the request a carrier can demonstrate that it is working in good faith with the PSAP to complete their request, recommending that OSPs and 911 Authorities negotiate alternative agreement timelines where reasonable.

Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements. The Order minimizes the burden of reporting requirements on businesses and governmental jurisdictions identified as small by the SBA. First, in response to comments, we adopt use of a Commission-owned registry for valid 911 authority readiness requests as the most efficient and least burdensome method of communication between 911 authorities and OSPs. Furthermore, we considered but declined to implement any additional and new data collections for monitoring performance and compliance with the NG911 rules the Commission adopts. Thus, the Commission does not impose any added costs in addition to those discussed in the NG911 Notice. As discussed in this document and in section E of the Order the rules adopted in the Order gives small and other OSPs more flexibility than proposed in the NG911 Notice by the allowing OSPs and 911 Authorities to agree to alternate timeframes or cost allocation arrangements instead of those the Commission adopts but imposes notification requirements OSPs must make to the Commission regarding any alternate arrangements.

Impact on Universal Service. Small entities could potentially incur an economic impact if requiring the NG911 technology transitions adversely affects universal service in a way that deprives smaller entities of cost recovery mechanisms. However, given that under the adopted rules states remain free to implement cost recovery mechanisms as they deem necessary, the Commission concludes that the rules we adopt will not adversely impact universal service. Moreover, some parties argue the rules in the NG911 Notice are contrary to universal service principles because RLECs will bear disproportionate costs of the NG911 transition. This is incorrect. To the extent RLECs' higher-cost service areas require them to spend more than urban and suburban OSPs for NG911 transition costs, those costs can be recovered from intra-state universal service funds. South Carolina RFA notes that its intra-state Universal Service Fund already provides generous subsidies to high-cost RLECs. Further, the Kansas RLECs indicate that the Kansas Universal Service Fund disbursements can be increased by the Kansas Corporation Commission (KCC) upon petition, which the KCC takes approximately 8 months to address. State regulatory agencies are better positioned than the Commission to assess the needs of their rural businesses and establish appropriate universal service policies for intra-state call traffic (such as 911) which best serve the interests of their state and local populations, both now and during the NG911 transition.

G. Report to Congress

The Commission will send a copy of the Order, including the FRFA, in a report to Congress pursuant to the Congressional Review Act. In addition, the Commission will send a copy of the Order, including the FRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA.

VI. Ordering Clauses

Accordingly, it is ordered, pursuant to sections 1, 2, 4(i), 201, 214, 222, 225, 251(e), 301, 303, 316, and 332 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 152, 154(i), 201, 214, 222, 225, 251(e), 301, 303, 316, 332; the Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, Public Law 106-81, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 615 note, 615, 615a, 615a-1, 615b; and section 106 of the Twenty-First Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act of 2010, Public Law 111-260, 47 U.S.C. 615c, that the Report and Order is adopted.

It is further ordered that the amendments to part 9 of the Commission's rules, as set forth in Appendix A of the Report and Order, are adopted, effective sixty (60) days after publication in the Federal Register . Compliance will not be required for paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of § 9.31 and paragraphs (a) and (b) of § 9.34 until after any review by the Office of Management and Budget that the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau deems necessary. The Commission delegates authority to the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau to publish a document in the Federal Register announcing that compliance date and revising paragraph (d) of § 9.31 and paragraph (c) of § 9.34.

It is further ordered that the Commission's Office of the Secretary, Reference Information Center, shall send a copy of the Report and Order, including the Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.

It is further ordered that the Office of the Managing Director, Performance Program Management, shall send a copy of the Report and Order in a report to be sent to Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).

For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal Communications Commission amends 47 CFR part 9 as follows:

1. The authority citation for part 9 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 47 U.S.C. 151-154, 152(a), 155(c), 157, 160, 201, 202, 208, 210, 214, 218, 219, 222, 225, 251(e), 255, 301, 302, 303, 307, 308, 309, 310, 316, 319, 332, 403, 405, 605, 610, 615, 615 note, 615a, 615b, 615c, 615a-1, 616, 620, 621, 623, 623 note, 721, and 1471, and Section 902 of Title IX, Division FF, Pub. L. 116-260, 134 Stat. 1182, unless otherwise noted.

2. Revise § 9.1 to read as follows:

3. Add subpart J, consisting of §§ 9.27 through 9.34, to read as follows:

[FR Doc. 2024-18603 Filed 9-23-24; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6712-01-P

Table Summarizing NG911 Compliance Timeframes for OSPs