Zhang, Wenli

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 28, 2021

2019005374 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 28, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/457,419 08/12/2014 Wenli Zhang 131505US01 4362
52025 7590 01/28/2021
SAP SE c/o BUCKLEY, MASCHOFF & TALWALKAR LLC
50 LOCUST AVENUE
NEW CANAAN, CT 06840
EXAMINER
NGUYEN, LOAN T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2158
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/28/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
colabella@bmtpatent.com
martin@BMTPATENT.COM
szpara@bmtpatent.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte WENLI ZHANG
Appeal 2019-005374
Application 14/457,419
Technology Center 2100
Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, JAMES B. ARPIN, and
IRVIN E. BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judges.
STRAUSS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–19, all of the pending claims. See
Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm in part.

1 We refer to the Specification, filed August 12, 2014 (“Spec.”); Final Office
Action, mailed February 28, 2018 (“Final Act.”); Appeal Brief, filed August
7, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); Examiner’s Answer, mailed June 17, 2019 (“Ans.”);
and Reply Brief, filed July 5, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).
2 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant
identifies the real party in interest as SAP SE. Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2019-005374
Application 14/457,419
2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to dynamic linked multi-layered business
object configurations. Spec., Title. Claim 1, reproduced below with labels
added, is illustrative:
1. A system comprising:
[(a)] a memory storing processor-executable process steps; and
[(b)] a processor to execute the processor-executable process
steps to cause the system to:
[(b.1)] receive an instruction to determine configuration
properties of an instance of a first business object, wherein the
configuration properties of the instance of the first business
object are determined from a configuration properties object
associated with the instance of the first business object;
[(b.2)] select a first type of the instance of the first business
object;
[(b.3)] determine, based on metadata defining each business
object configuration, whether or not the first type of the instance
of the first business object is extendable by determining whether
or not the first type of the instance of the first business object
shares one or more configuration properties with a business
object instance of a reference object type; and
[(b.4)] in a case where it is determined that the first type is
extendable,
[(b.4.A)] obtain a first reference object type conforming to
the first type of the instance of the first business object,
[(b.4.B)] obtain an instance of the first reference object
associated with the instance of the first business object,
[(b.4.C)] obtain specified configuration properties of the
instance of the first reference object, and
[(b.4.D)(i)] reuse the specified configuration properties of
the instance of the first reference object obtained in the
obtaining step [(ii)] by returning, in response to the
instruction, at least the specified configuration properties of
the instance of the first reference object as the configuration
properties of the instance of the first business object.
Appeal 2019-005374
Application 14/457,419
3
REFERENCES
The Examiner relies on the following references:
Name Reference Date
Massmann US 2008/0163253 A1 July 3, 2008
Brunswig US 2014/0157154 A1 June 5, 2014
REJECTION3
Claims 1–19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
the combined teachings of Brunswig and Massmann. Final Act. 8–17.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
OPINION
The Examiner finds Brunswig’s management of business objects
teaches or suggests the limitations of claim 1 except for “returning step”
b.4.D.i of reuse limitation b.4.D, i.e., “returning, in response to the
instruction, at least the specified configuration properties of the instance of
the first reference object as the configuration properties of the first instance
of the first business object.” Final Act. 8–10. The Examiner finds
Massmann’s management of business objects in memory teaches returning
the specified configuration properties as recited by returning step b.4.D.i.
Id. at 10. According to the Examiner, “it would have been obvious . . . to
have modified the system of Brunswig to include the system as disclosed by

3 A rejection of claims 1–19 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial
exception without significantly more (Final Act. 7–8) is withdrawn. Ans. 3.
Appeal 2019-005374
Application 14/457,419
4
Massmann in order to allow declarative based constraints to be determined
so that properties can be determined dynamically based on business object
status, user and actions with reduced costs.” Id. at 10–11.
Determining Limitation b.3
Appellant contends:
Although Brunswig may discuss redefining/reusing business
object properties in general, Appellant submits that the rejection
fails to identify where in the above-listed paragraphs of
Brunswig or elsewhere in Brunswig that the Examiner believes
there is a teaching of “determin[ing], based on metadata defining
each business object configuration, whether or not the first type
of the instance of the first business object is extendable by
determining whether or not the first type of the instance of the
first business object shares one or more configuration properties
with a business object instance of a reference object type,” as
recited in Claim 1 (emphasis added).
Appeal Br. 17.
The Examiner responds, summarizing Brunswig as describing:
[M]anaging business objects by determining properties of each
business object, displaying each business object in a
configuration table of a user interface, mapping user interface
fields in reference to defining the properties of each business
object, defining a context of input parameters of data used to
determine the properties of each business object, defining rules
associated with the properties of each business object, defining
types of input parameters include global/static such as business
configuration. The business properties can be reused by
redefining properties for each business object, wherein a
standard extension mechanism to allow property redefinition by
higher layers, wherein each of the different layers are configured
to extend or redefine one or more properties of each business
objects.
Appeal 2019-005374
Application 14/457,419
5
Ans. 4–5 (citing Brunswig, Figs. 5, 8, ¶¶ 4–5, 28, 34–35). According to the
Examiner, determining limitation b.3 is taught or suggested by the cited
portions of Brunswig as summarized by the Examiner. Id.
Appellant replies, arguing the Examiner’s Answer still “fails to
identify where in the additionally cited portions of Brunswig or elsewhere in
Brunswig that the Examiner believes there is a teaching of [determining
limitation b.3].” Reply Br. 3.
Appellant’s contention is unpersuasive of reversible Examiner error.
As an initial matter, as recognized by Appellant (id. at 2), the Examiner’s
Answer cites Figures 5 and 8 and paragraphs 4–5, 24, and 34–35 of
Brunswig in addition to originally cited paragraphs 31, 33, and 48 for
teaching determining limitation b.3. Ans. 4. Thus, contrary to Appellant’s
contention, the Examiner has identified specific portions of the reference
asserted to teach or suggest the disputed determining limitation b.3.
However, Appellant fails to address these additional citations and explain
why the Examiner’s findings are erroneous. A general denial that fails to
address the Examiner’s findings is insufficient. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“A statement [that] merely points out what a claim recites
will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of the
claim.”); In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold that
the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive
arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and
a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the
prior art.”).
Furthermore, Appellant fails to explain why Brunswig’s description of
generating and using a metadata model for each business object (Brunswig
Appeal 2019-005374
Application 14/457,419
6
Fig. 3, steps 306–310; ¶¶ 4, 23, 30, 31, 34) together with Brunswig’s
description of reusing business object properties (Brunswig ¶ 30) does not
reasonably teach or suggest using business object metadata to determine
whether there are business properties that may be shared and, therefore,
reused, i.e., identifying whether an object is an extendable business object as
recited by claim 1. We note that, in the absence of explicit disclosure, it is
proper for this Board to rely on common sense in finding a claim limitation
to be obvious when accompanied by reasoned analysis and evidentiary
support. B/E Aerospace, Inc. v. C&D Zodiac, Inc., 962 F.3d 1373, 1379–80
(Fed. Cir. 2020), cert. denied sub nom. B/E Aerospace, Inc. v. C&D Zodiac,
Inc. No. 20-737, 2021 WL 78497 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2021). Here, one ordinarily
skilled in the art would have recognized that, to reuse configuration
properties, there must be some shared properties to reuse, otherwise there is
nothing to reuse.
For the reasons discussed above, Appellant’s argument in connection
with determining limitation b.3 is unpersuasive of reversible Examiner error.
Reuse Limitation b.4.D
Appellant argues the specifics of reuse limitation b.4.D are not taught
by Massmann. Appeal Br. 17. Appellant argues, “it is unclear how
‘returning a list of fields and properties with violations to evaluated field
properties’ [as disclosed in paragraphs 262 and 263 of Massmann] teaches or
reasonably suggests [reusing limitation b.4.D].” Id.
The Examiner responds, explaining it is the combination of
Brunswig’s and Massmann’s teachings, not Massmann’s teachings alone,
that teaches or suggests reuse limitation b.4.D. Ans. 5. The Examiner
further finds Brunswig’s description of (i) a need to improve the
Appeal 2019-005374
Application 14/457,419
7
management of business objects, (ii) reuse of business properties, and
(iii) property redefinition by higher layers teach the reuse of configuration
properties of an instance of the first reference object obtained in the
obtaining step b.4.A. Id. (citing Brunswig ¶¶ 3, 30–31). The Examiner
finds the requirement to return specified configuration properties of an
instance of the reference object as the configuration of the instance of the
first business object is taught by Massmann’s _Get_Data and Persistency
classes and Massmann’s description that
each field of a business object in a given layer is presented in a
row of a table and a set of value in the business object and node,
wherein a set of functions for managing data flow for modify and
retrieving (returning) data, wherein the check_field_properties
method return a list of fields and properties with violations to
evaluated field properties and decide how to react such as allow
more restrictive redefinitions field properties of business object
based on the rules.
Id. at 6 (citing Massmann ¶¶ 257, 260, 262, 263, 273).
Appellant replies, contending the Examiner “still does not adequately
specify where the Examiner believes that Brunswig in view of Massmann
discloses [returning step b.4.D.i of reuse limitation b.4.D].” Reply Br. 3.
Appellant argues:
[The] Examiner’s Answer cites generally to paras. [0053]
and [0056] of Massmann, which merely describe a method
“Get_Data” which “[c]an return a reference to the current data”
and a persistency object that stores references to instantiated,
created, changed and deleted entries. Examiner’s Answer, page
6, lines 4-11.
The Examiner’s Answer further cites generally to paras.
[0260], [0262], [0263], [0273], and [0257] of Massmann and
attempts to clarify the rejection by stating: “wherein each field of
a business object in a given layer is presented in a row of a table
Appeal 2019-005374
Application 14/457,419
8
and a set of value in the business object and node, wherein a set
of functions for managing data flow for modify and retrieving
(returning) data, wherein the check_field_properties method
return a list of field and properties with violations to evaluated
field properties and decide how to react such as allow more
restrictive redefinitions field properties of business object based
on the rules.” Examiner’s Answer, page 6, lines 11-16.
Id. Appellant concludes, “it remains unclear how the above teaches or
suggests the above-noted elements of Claim 1, e.g., how ‘returning a list of
fields and properties with violations to evaluated field properties’ teaches or
reasonably suggests ‘reuse’ [limitation b.4.D] step of Claim 1.” Id. at 4.
Appellant’s contention is persuasive of reversible Examiner error.
“When a reference is complex or shows or describes inventions other than
that claimed by the applicant, the particular part relied on must be designated
as nearly as practicable. The pertinence of each reference, if not apparent,
must be clearly explained and each rejected claim specified.” 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.104(c)(2). Here, although Massmann discloses returning field
properties, it is unclear from the Examiner’s rejection that these properties
are of the instance of the first reference object and are used as the
configuration properties of the instance of the first business object as recited
by returning step b.4.D.ii of reuse limitation b.4.D. Thus, we agree with
Appellant.
For the reasons discussed supra, and constrained by the record before
us, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent apparatus
claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. For similar reasons, we do not sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of independent Beauregard-style medium claim 11,
which recites commensurate limitations. In addition, we do not sustain the
Appeal 2019-005374
Application 14/457,419
9
Examiner’s rejections of claims 2–5 and 12–19, which depend directly or
indirectly from independent claims 1 and 11.
Claim 6 recites a method including a step of determining “whether or
not the first type of the instance of the first business object is extendable by
determining whether or not the first type of the instance of the first business
object shares one or more configuration properties with a business object
instance of a reference object type.” That is, only upon satisfaction of a
condition (i.e., that the first type of the instance of the first business object
shares one or more configuration properties with a business object instance
of a reference object type) is the first type of the instance of the first business
object found to be extendable. It is only upon satisfaction of this latter
extendable condition that limitations b.4.A though b.4.D, including argued
limitation b.4.D.ii, are required to be executed, i.e., performed “in a case
where it is determined that the first type is extendable” per limitation b.4.
That is, in those cases where it is not determined that the first type is
extendable, limitations b.4.A through b.4.D, including limitation b.4.D.ii,
need not be performed. Thus, unlike apparatus claim 1 and Beauregard-style
medium claim 11,4 the rejection of which we do not sustain on the basis of
limitation b.4.D, step b.4.D is a conditional limitation that is not limiting in
method claim 6. See Ex parte Schulhauser, No. 2013-007847, 2016 WL
6277792, at *4–5 (PTAB Apr. 28, 2016) (precedential) (holding conditional
limitations in a method claim not limiting under a broadest reasonable

4 The broadest reasonable interpretation of an apparatus claim with structure
that performs a function, which only needs to occur if a condition precedent
is met, still requires the capability of performing the function should the
condition occur. Schulhauser at 14–15. We see no reason to treat
Beauregard-style medium claim 11 differently.
Appeal 2019-005374
Application 14/457,419
10
interpretation, and thus the Examiner need not apply prior art for the non-
limiting elements); see also MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (MPEP) § 2111.04(II) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)
(citing Schulhauser). Accordingly, Appellant’s argument with regard to
method claim 6 is unpersuasive as it is not commensurate in scope with the
claim. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 6 together with the
rejection of dependent claims 7–10 that are not argued separately with
particularity.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–5 and 11–19
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combined teachings of Brunswig and
Massmann.
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 6–10 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combined teachings of Brunswig and Massmann.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference Affirmed Reversed
1–19 103(a) Brunswig,
Massmann
6–10 1–5, 11–19
RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED IN PART