Yu Kun et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 2, 2021

2020000603 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 2, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/094,823 03/30/2005 Yu Kun 47315-US-PAT 9572
100809 7590 08/02/2021
Conversant Wireless Licensing Ltd.
5830 Granite Parkway #100-247
Suite 247
Plano, TX 75024
EXAMINER
ONYEKABA, AMY
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2628
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/02/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipadmin-core@conversant-wireless.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte YU KUN, WANG KONGQIAO, and JAR A. KANGAS
Appeal 2020-000603
Application 11/094,823
Technology Center 2600
Before JAMES R. HUGHES, JOHN A. EVANS, and LARRY J. HUME,
Administrative Patent Judges.
HUME, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 38–52, which are all claims pending in
the application. Appellant has canceled claims 1–37. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Conversant Wireless
Licensing S.a.r.l. Appeal Br. 1.
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Application 11/094,823

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
The claimed subject matter is directed to an improved mobile
communication terminal and method. See Spec. (Title). In particular,
Appellant’s disclosed embodiments and claimed invention “relate[] to a
method and apparatus as well as a computer program for controlling a
mobile communication terminal that is capable of handwriting recognition.
Spec. 1:3–6.
Exemplary Claim
Claim 38, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
Appeal (emphasis added to contested prior-art limitations):
38. A method of entering text into a mobile device,
comprising:
displaying a first arrangement of a plurality of symbol
sub-areas at a touch-sensitive portion of a display of the device,
each of the plurality of symbol sub-areas in the first
arrangement representing a text symbol;
displaying at least one function sub-area at the touch-
sensitive portion;
receiving an input corresponding to a touch action at a
position of the touch-sensitive portion within the displayed first
arrangement of the plurality of symbol sub-areas;
responsive to the input corresponding to a trace
comprised of a sequence of detected positions of the touch-
sensitive portion, recognizing a text input from the sequence by

2 Our decision relies upon Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed
July 5, 2019); Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Sept. 3, 2019); Final
Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed Nov. 5, 2018); and the original
Specification (“Spec.,” filed Mar. 30, 2005). Appellant did not file a Reply
Brief in response to the factual findings and legal conclusions in the
Examiner’s Answer.
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analyzing the sequence in a hand writing recognition
procedure;
responsive to the input corresponding to a tapping action
at one of the plurality of symbol sub-areas, recognizing a text
input as the text symbol corresponding to that symbol sub-area;
and
responsive to the input corresponding to a tapping action
at a function sub-area, displaying a second arrangement of a
plurality of symbol sub-areas at the touch-sensitive portion,
wherein each of at least a subset of the plurality of symbol sub-
areas in the second arrangement represents a different text
symbol from the text symbols represented in the first
arrangement.
REFERENCES
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence:
Name Reference Date
Skinner US 6,661,920 B1 Dec. 9, 2003
Graham US 2004/0070573 A1 Apr. 14, 2004
Kushler et al. (“Kushler”) US 7,098,896 B2 Aug. 29, 2006
REJECTION
Claims 38–52 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combination of Skinner, Kushler, and Graham. Final
Act. 13.
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CLAIM GROUPING
Based on Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 4–13) and our discretion
under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal of the obviousness
rejection of claims 38–52 on the basis of representative claim 38.3
ISSUES
Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 4–11) the Examiner’s rejection of claim
38 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of
Skinner, Kushler, and Graham is in error. These contentions present us with
the following issues:
Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art combination teaches
or suggests “[a] method of entering text into a mobile device” that includes,
inter alia, “recognizing a text input from the sequence by analyzing the
sequence in a hand writing recognition procedure”, as recited in claim 38?
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
“[O]ne cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references
individually where . . . the rejections are based on combinations of
references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). “The test for
obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be
bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference . . . . Rather,

3 “Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the failure of
appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together
shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the
patentability of any grouped claim separately.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
In addition, when Appellant does not separately argue the patentability of
dependent claims, the claims stand or fall with the claims from which they
depend. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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the test is what the combined teachings of those references would have
suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. at 425.
In KSR, the Court stated “[t]he combination of familiar elements
according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more
than yield predictable results.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
416 (2007).
When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design
incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it,
either in the same field or a different one. If a person of
ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103
likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique
has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary
skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar
devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless
its actual application is beyond his or her skill . . . . [A] court
must ask whether the improvement is more than the predictable
use of prior art elements according to their established
functions.
Id. at 417.
Further, the relevant inquiry is whether the Examiner has set forth
“some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the
legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (cited with approval in KSR, 550 U.S. at 418).
During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation when reading claim language in light of the specification as it
would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of
Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under this standard,
we interpret claim terms using “the broadest reasonable meaning of the
words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of
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ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way
of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description
contained in the applicant’s specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048,
1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
ANALYSIS
In reaching this decision, we consider all evidence presented and all
arguments actually made by Appellant. To the extent Appellant has not
advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other
issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2019).
We disagree with Appellant’s arguments with respect to claims 38–52
and, unless otherwise noted, we incorporate by reference herein and adopt as
our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action
from which this appeal is taken, and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth in
the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s arguments. We highlight
and address specific findings and arguments regarding claim 38 for
emphasis as follows.
The Examiner finds,
Graham teaches a method of combining data entry of
handwritten symbols with displayed character data wherein the
data being entered is analyzed in a handwriting recognition
procedure (See Fig’s. 1, 2, 3 and Para. [0029]–[0036]; After a
handwritten character is entered 18, handwriting recognition
software processes the input data, recognizes the handwritten
input, and displays the resulting character in the display field 13
at the location of the edit cursor 19). Also Applicant prior art
disclosure see Page 2, lines 9-14 it states ‘The movement of the
stylus along a trace over the touch sensitive pad or display
generates a trace signal that is digitized and analyzed by
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handwriting recognition procedures that typically are
implemented by means of software instructions[.]’
Final Act. 16.
Appellant contends, “there is no teaching or suggestion in the Graham
reference of the use of handwriting recognition to recognize a text input
from strokes made over a virtual keyboard (i.e., an arrangement of a
plurality of symbol sub-areas, each representing a text symbol, as claimed).”
Appeal Br. 9.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments and agree with the
Examiner’s finding that Graham teaches “recognizing a text input from the
sequence by analyzing the sequence in a hand writing recognition
procedure” as recited in claim 38. Final Act. 16. We agree with the
Examiner because Graham in Figure 2 shows recognizing text input from a
sequence of inputs using hand writing recognition procedures. Figure 2 of
Graham is replicated below:

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“FIG. 2 is a sample handwriting recognition graphical user interface
for a portable digital assistant device, in accordance with the present
invention.” Graham ¶ 24.
The Examiner finds that it would have been obvious to combine
Graham with Kushler and Skinner, “in order to enhance the system
providing user’s [sic] with a user friendly and intuitive interface.” Final
Act. 16.
Appellant argues the “Graham reference specifically contrasts its
operation with that of a prior device corresponding substantially to that
disclosed in the Skinner reference.” Appeal Br. 9 (citing Graham ¶ 33). The
Federal Circuit held “[a] known or obvious composition does not become
patentable simply because it has been described as somewhat inferior to
some other product for the same use.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 554 (Fed.
Cir. 1994).
Graham teaches, “[t]he interface according to the present invention
appears much simpler than the previous example, as it requires no separate
areas for text recognition, no menu buttons, and no graphical keyboards for
its operation.” Graham ¶ 33. Graham, however, also shows several menu
buttons, i.e., on the top of Figure 2 as the days of the week; and on the
bottom of Figure 4, e.g., “Sel”.
Graham Figure 9 illustrates a shortened keyboard 103 with selectable
letters that present options for interpretation of user hand writing in cases of
ambiguity. Graham’s statement that an input without a separate area for text
recognition or menu buttons is “much simpler” (see Graham ¶ 33), appears
to be contradicted by Graham’s own disclosure, e.g., Figures 2, 4, and 9.
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Furthermore, we find that Graham’s teaching in paragraph 33 is
analogous to the holding in Gurley that a virtual keyboard and separate areas
for menu buttons is “somewhat inferior to some other product for the same
use.” Gurley, 27 F.3d at 553. Therefore, we are not persuaded by Graham’s
disclosure in paragraph 33 that the Examiner’s obviousness rejection is in
error.
Based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not persuaded
of error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art combination to teach
or suggest the disputed limitation of claim 38, nor do we find error in the
Examiner’s resulting legal conclusion of obviousness. Therefore, we sustain
the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 38, and grouped
claims 39–52 which fall therewith. See Claim Grouping, supra.
CONCLUSIONS
We AFFIRM the Examiner’s rejection.
More specifically, Appellant has not persuasively argued that the
Examiner erred with respect to the obviousness rejection of claims 38–52
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the cited prior art combination of record, and
we sustain the rejection.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/
Basis Affirmed Reversed
38–52 103(a)
Skinner,
Kushler,
Graham
38–52
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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED