Xiuping Lu et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 1, 2022

2020004561 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 1, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/998,041 03/11/2011 Xiuping Lu PU080163 2381 14868 7590 03/01/2022 Patent Docketing 200 Bellevue Parkway Suite 300 Wilmington, DE 19809 EXAMINER ITSKOVICH, MIKHAIL ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2483 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/01/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing@interdigital.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte, XIUPING LU, SHEMIMON MANALIKUDY ANTHRU, and DAVID ANTHONY CAMPANA ____________ Appeal 2020-004561 Application 12/998,041 Technology Center 2400 ____________ Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, JAMES B. ARPIN, and CARL L. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL1 Appellant2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1-4, 6-14, 16-20, 31, 32, 34, and 35, which constitute all pending claims. Claims 5, 15, 21-30, 33, and 36 are canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the (1) Final Office Action dated April 12, 2019 (“Final Act.”); (2) Appeal Brief dated January 1, 2020 (“Appeal Br.”); and (3) Examiner’s Answer dated January 22, 2020 (“Ans.”). No Reply Brief was filed. 2 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies INTERDIGITAL CE PATENT HOLDINGS as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2020-004561 Application 12/998,041 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The invention relates to data communication systems, and particularly to the delivery of video data. Spec., Abstr., ¶¶ 2-6, Figs. 2, 5, 6. Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative3 : 1. A method of reproducing an encoded digital video signal transmitted in first and second layers in a video reproduction apparatus, wherein the second layer comprises information for enhancing at least one of resolution, frame rate and quality of the first layer, the method comprising: receiving at a user terminal data units including digital samples of the second layer formatted in a media container file and downloaded before showtime, during off-peak times, the media container file comprising an edit-list including a media time and duration and a time-to sample table including timing and structural data for the media; storing the received data units of the second layer in an enhancement layer media container file at the user terminal, wherein the enhancement layer media container file preserves decoding timing information of each video frame in a time-to-sample table; receiving at the user terminal data units including digital samples of the first layer corresponding to the data units of the second layer; determining if the video reproduction apparatus is enabled to read the stored data units of the second layer; if the video reproduction unit is enabled to read the stored data units of the second layer, combining at the user terminal the data units of the first layer with corresponding data units of the second layer while receiving further data units of the first layer, 3 Based on Appellant’s arguments and our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal of obviousness and eligibility rejection of claims 1-4, 6-14, 16-20, 31, 34, and 35 on the basis of representative claim 1. Appeal Br. 2-17. Appeal 2020-004561 Application 12/998,041 3 wherein the data units of the second layer are received and stored before any corresponding data units of the first layer are received, the data units of the first and second layers comprising digital samples and the combining step including: identifying digital samples in the first layer and digital samples in the second layer having matching synchronization information, the identifying including: determining a temporal displacement of an access point of the first layer from the start of a stream of first layer data units using a timestamp of the access point; and identifying the data unit of the second layer whose temporal displacement from the start of a track timeline matches the temporal displacement of the access point of the first layer from the start of the stream of first layer data units, including determining the temporal displacement of the data unit of the second layer from the start of the track timeline by accessing the time-to-sample table of the enhancement layer media container file, the time-to-sample table comprising samples of the second layer and a corresponding duration for each of the samples; and wherein a decoding time of the each of the samples is determined by adding all of the corresponding durations of all preceding samples in the time-to-sample table; and generating output video frames by decoding the combined data units at the user terminal, wherein the first layer includes at least one of a scalable video base layer and a scalable video enhancement layer and the second layer including a scalable video enhancement layer higher than the first layer. Appeal. Br. 18-19 (Claims App.) (emphases added). REFERENCES AND REJECTION The Examiner relies on the following references: Appeal 2020-004561 Application 12/998,041 4 Name Reference Date Takeuchi US 2002/0051581 A1 May 2, 2002 Forecast US 7,096,481 B1 Aug. 22, 2006 Gupte US 2006/0282864 A1 Dec. 14, 2006 Claims 1-4, 6-14, 16-20, 31, 32, 34, and 35 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to patent-ineligible subject matter without significantly more. Final Act. 4-10. Claims 1-4, 6-14, 16-20, 31, 32, 34, and 35 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combined teachings of Takeuchi, Gupte, and Forecast. Id. at 12-22. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s contentions in the Appeal Brief that the Examiner has erred, as well as the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief. Arguments not made are forfeited. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We provide the following for highlighting and emphasis. The § 103 Rejection In the Final Office Action, the Examiner finds Takeuchi, Gupte, and Forecast teach the limitations of representative claim 1 and provides reasons why one of ordinary skill in the art would combine the teachings. Final Act. 12- 18 (citing Takeuchi, Figs. 1-3, ¶¶ 6, 14, 19, 20, 21, 23, 44, 48, 51, 58-60, 67; Gupte ¶¶ 74, 77, Fig. 4; Forecast, 26:58-17:11, 2:27-30). In the Appeal Brief, Appellant presents arguments why the cited references do not teach the limitations of claim 1, and argues the Examiner Appeal 2020-004561 Application 12/998,041 5 presents insufficient evidence to support the combination of the teachings of the cited references, Appeal Br. 12-16. In the Answer, the Examiner notes that the present case is closely related to a Decision, issued on September 27, 2017, also referred by the Examiner as “PTAB 2017.” This is Appeal 2017-002983, Application 12/998,041, dated September 27, 2017. Ans. 3-17. The Examiner asserts that the PTAB 2017 Decision affirms the § 103 rejections to similar claims over the identical references. Id. The Examiner also addresses Appellant’s arguments in the present appeal and points out specifically that the Examiner’s findings in the present appeal are supported by PTAB 2017. Id. Appellant does not submit a Reply Brief in the present appeal. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments and agree with and adopt the findings of the Examiner.4 Additionally, we note that Appellant did not identify PTAB 2017 as a “Related Appeals and Interferences.” See Appeal. Br. 4. PTAB 2017 was issued September 27, 2017; Appellant’s Appeal Brief was filed November 12, 2019 (noticed as a Defective Appeal Brief) and refiled January 1, 2020. 4 See ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc., 849 F.3d 1034, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“As an initial matter, the PTAB was authorized to incorporate the Examiner’s findings.”); see also In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1564 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (upholding the PTAB’s findings, although it “did not expressly make any independent factual determinations or legal conclusions,” because it had expressly adopted the examiner’s findings). Appeal 2020-004561 Application 12/998,041 6 Neither of these Appeal Briefs identify the PTAB 2017. As discussed, supra, PTAB 2017 is closely related. See 37 CFR 41.37(c)(1)(i). In view of the above, we sustain the § 103 rejection of representative claim 1, and claims 2-4, 6-14, 16-20, 31, 32, 34, and 35. The § 101 Rejection PRINCIPLES OF LAW Patent-eligible subject matter is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101 of the Patent Act, which recites: Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. There are, however, three judicially-created exceptions to the broad categories of patent-eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101: “‘[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.’” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (brackets in original). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the U.S. Supreme Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75-77). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Appeal 2020-004561 Application 12/998,041 7 Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219-20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594-95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second part of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of Appeal 2020-004561 Application 12/998,041 8 the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) published guidance on the application of § 101. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (“October 2019 Update”) at 1. Under this guidance, we first determine whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)-(c), (e)-(h) (9th Ed., Rev. 10.2019 (June 2020)). Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or Appeal 2020-004561 Application 12/998,041 9 (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52-56. A claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application applies, relies on, or uses the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. When the judicial exception is so integrated, then the claim is not directed to a judicial exception and is patent eligible under § 101. Id. The § 101 Rejection of Claims 1-4, 6-14, 16-20, 31, 32, 34, and 35 In the Final Office Action, the Examiner rejected the claims as patent ineligible as directed to an abstract idea, such as subject matter similar to Electric Power Group, LLC v. ALSTOM SA, 830 F. 3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Selecting information for collection by content or source, analyzing it, and displaying results of collection and analysis are not eligible either separately or in combination.), without significantly more Final Act. 5-6. Additionally, the Examiner determines the claims are ineligible subject matter under § 101 under the “Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance” issued on January 7, 2019 (Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 4, 50). Id. at 6-10. The Examiner determines the claims are directed to an abstract idea, namely, mental processes, as the claims appear to recite a judicial exception, an abstract idea, directed to mental processes (observation, evaluation, judgment)] of receiving, storing, determining and identifying contents of received video data, generating and decoding data at a high degree of algorithmic generality. The claims read data, rearrange Appeal 2020-004561 Application 12/998,041 10 data, and then output data in a general application to a computing environment. Id. at 7-8. The Examiner determines the claims do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. Id. at 8-9. The Examiner determines the claims do not present an inventive concept significantly more than the ineligible subject matter. Id. at 9-10. In the Appeal Brief, Appellant argues the Examiner’s determinations do not sufficiently show the claims fall into abstract idea analysis as set forth in the Guidelines. Appeal Br. 9-12. According to Appellant, the claimed invention does not fall into any of the “abstract ideas” grouping exceptions which would require further analysis, since the claims do not recite any of mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity, and mental processes; as well as laws of nature and natural phenomena. Id. Appellant argues, even if the claims are directed to abstract ideas (a judicial exception), the claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application and is patent eligible under the Guidelines. Id. at 11. Appellant argues the claims are directed to a delivery method using Scalable Video Coding (SVC) that shifts the delivery of peak-time bandwidth-intensive video to off-peak time windows in which previously under-utilized off-peak bandwidth is used advantageously, and to improve overall delivery efficiency with little or no network upgrade cost. Id. at 9-10. According to Appellant, the present claimed invention is nevertheless patent eligible since the claims as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application for the exception under the revised Guidance. The revised Guidance sets forth a new procedure to determine whether a claim is “directed to” a judicial exception under USPTO Step 2A. “Under the procedure, if a claim recites a judicial exception (a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea as grouped in Section I, above), it must then be Appeal 2020-004561 Application 12/998,041 11 analyzed to determine whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application for the exception. A claim is not ‘directed to’ a judicial exception, and thus is patent eligible, if the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application for the exception. A claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application will apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Id. at 11. In the Answer, the Examiner determines the claims are not limited to linear digital television or any other particular application of the ineligible subject matter embodied in combining data. Ans. 18. The Examiner finds: Here, the concept of combining contents of two digital signals (even if they are related to video content) is not limited to digital linear television or set top boxes. The claims apply equally to general purpose computing (viewing media files, streaming over a network, performing data analysis or search of the media, . . .), to audio data, and to non-television media or data. The claims are not limited to a particular practical application of combining data. Ans. 18-19. We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner has erred under the Guidelines. First, on the record before us, we are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner does not sufficiently support a determination that the claims are directed to the abstract idea of mental processes. Abstract ideas may include, but are not limited to, fundamental economic practices, methods of organizing human activities, and mathematical formulas or relationships. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-21. Under this guidance, we must, therefore, ensure at step one that we articulate what Appeal 2020-004561 Application 12/998,041 12 the claims are directed to with enough specificity to ensure the step one inquiry is meaningful. Id. at 217 (“[W]e tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law.”). If a method can be performed by human thought alone, or by a human using pen and paper, it is merely directed to an abstract idea and is not patent eligible under § 101. See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.” CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375. See also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1146-47 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Moreover, “[u]sing a computer to accelerate an ineligible mental process does not make that process patent- eligible.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[R]elying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.”). Examples of claims that do not recite mental processes because they cannot be practically performed in the human mind include: (a) a claim to a method for calculating an absolute position of a global positioning system (GPS) receiver and an absolute time of reception of satellite signals, where the claimed GPS receiver calculated pseudoranges that estimated the distance from the GPS receiver to a plurality of satellites, SiRF Technology, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, 601 F.3d 1319, 1331-33 (Fed. Cir. 2010); (b) a claim to detecting suspicious activity by using network monitors and analyzing network packets, SRI International, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Appeal 2020-004561 Application 12/998,041 13 Inc., 930 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2019); (c) a claim to a specific data encryption method for computer communication involving a several-step manipulation of data, Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (distinguishing TQP Devel., LLC v. Intuit Inc., Appeal No. 2:12-cv-180-WCB, 2014 WL 651935, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2014)) (the specific data encryption method “could not conceivably be performed in the human mind or with pencil and paper”). Whereas a claimed method that “can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper” qualifies as a mental process, a claimed process that “could not, as a practical matter, be performed entirely in a human’s mind” (even if aided with pen and paper) would not qualify as a mental process.5 Here, the claims are directed to more than reading, rearranging, and then outputting data in a general application to a computing environment, as suggested by the Examiner. Final Act. 7. As set forth below, the claim recites numerous limitations that cannot be performed in the human mind (emphasis added): 1. A method of reproducing an encoded digital video signal transmitted in first and second layers in a video reproduction apparatus, wherein the second layer comprises information for enhancing at least one of resolution, frame rate and quality of the first layer, the method comprising: receiving at a user terminal data units including digital samples of the second layer formatted in a media container file and downloaded before showtime, during off-peak times, the media container file comprising an edit-list including a media 5 CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372, 1375- 76 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (distinguishing Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010), and SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). Appeal 2020-004561 Application 12/998,041 14 time and duration and a time-to sample table including timing and structural data for the media; storing the received data units of the second layer in an enhancement layer media container file at the user terminal, wherein the enhancement layer media container file preserves decoding timing information of each video frame in a time-to- sample table; receiving at the user terminal data units including digital samples of the first layer corresponding to the data units of the second layer; determining if the video reproduction apparatus is enabled to read the stored data units of the second layer; if the video reproduction unit is enabled to read the stored data units of the second layer, combining at the user terminal the data units of the first layer with corresponding data units of the second layer while receiving further data units of the first layer, wherein the data units of the second layer are received and stored before any corresponding data units of the first layer are received, the data units of the first and second layers comprising digital samples and the combining step including: identifying digital samples in the first layer and digital samples in the second layer having matching synchronization information, the identifying including: determining a temporal displacement of an access point of the first layer from the start of a stream of first layer data units using a timestamp of the access point; and identifying the data unit of the second layer whose temporal displacement from the start of a track timeline matches the temporal displacement of the access point of the first layer from the start of the stream of first layer data units, including determining the temporal displacement of the data unit of the second layer from the start of the track timeline by accessing the time-to-sample table of the enhancement layer media container file, the time-to-sample table comprising samples of the Appeal 2020-004561 Application 12/998,041 15 second layer and a corresponding duration for each of the samples; and wherein a decoding time of the each of the samples is determined by adding all of the corresponding durations of all preceding samples in the time-to-sample table; and generating output video frames by decoding the combined data units at the user terminal, wherein the first layer includes at least one of a scalable video base layer and a scalable video enhancement layer and the second layer including a scalable video enhancement layer higher than the first layer. Second, we are persuaded by Appellant arguments that, even if the claims recite an abstract idea, the claims recite the integration of that abstract idea into a practical application under the Guidelines. As the October 2019 Update to the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance explains, in determining whether claims integrate an alleged abstract idea into a practical application, the ‘improvements’ analysis in Step 2A determines whether the claim pertains to an improvement to the functioning of a computer or to another technology without reference to what is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. That is, the claimed invention may integrate the judicial exception into a practical application by demonstrating that it improves the relevant technology although it may not be an improvement over well-understood, routine, conventional activity. October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, 12-13. To determine whether the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, we identify whether there are “any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s)” and evaluate those elements to determine whether they integrate the judicial exception into a recognized practical application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54-55 (emphasis added); see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)-(c), (e)-(h). Appeal 2020-004561 Application 12/998,041 16 Based on the record before us, the Examiner presents insufficient evidence that the additional limitations do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Here, the pending claims lead to a system with improved overall delivery efficiency by utilizing previously under-utilized peak bandwidth. More particularly, the Examiner presents insufficient evidence that the claim does not recite: (i) an improvement to the functionality of a computer or other technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)); (ii) use a “particular machine” to apply or use the judicial exception (see MPEP § 2106.05(b)); (iii) a particular transformation of an article to a different thing or state (see MPEP § 2106.05(c)); or (iv) any other meaningful limitation (see MPEP § 2106.05(e)). See also 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Accordingly, the Examiner does not provide support for the rejection. “[T]he examiner bears the initial burden, on review of the prior art or on any other ground, of presenting a prima facie case of unpatentability.” In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In view of the above, on the record before us, we do not sustain the § 101 rejection of representative claim 1, and of claims 2-4, 6-14, 16-20, 31, 32, 34, and 35. CONCLUSION We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-4, 6-14, 16-20, 31, 32, 34, and 35 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-4, 6-14, 16- 20, 31, 32, 34, and 35 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Appeal 2020-004561 Application 12/998,041 17 DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1-4, 6-14, 16-20, 31, 32, 34, 35 103(a) Takeuchi, Gupte, Forecast 1-4, 6-14, 16-20, 31, 32, 34, 35 1-4, 6-14, 16-20, 31, 32, 34, 35 101 Eligibility 1-4, 6-14, 16-20, 31, 32, 34, 35 Overall Outcome 1-4, 6-14, 16-20, 31, 32, 34, 35 FINALITY AND RESPONSE Because we sustain at least one ground of rejection with respect to each claim on appeal, we affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting all claims on appeal. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1). No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED