WWOR-TV

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 17, 2000

330 N.L.R.B. 1265 (N.L.R.B. 2000)

WWOR-TV 1265
WWOR-TV, Inc. and National Association of Broad-
cast Employees and Technicians-CWA, AFL–
CIO. Case 22–CA–21674
April 17, 2000
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS LIEBMAN, HURTGEN, AND BRAME
On July 16, 1998, Administrative Law Judge Steven
Davis issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and brief1 and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order.
We agree with the judge that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to bargain
with the Union and by unilaterally changing employee
terms and conditions of employment. The facts, which
are fully set forth in the judge’s decision, can be summa-
rized as follows.
The Respondent and the Union have been parties to
several collective-bargaining agreements, the most recent
of which ran from 1993 to October 31, 1996.3 In Sep-
tember through October 17, the Union took the position
that the Respondent had failed properly to terminate the
1993–1996 contract, that, therefore, the contract had
automatically renewed for a year pursuant to its terms,
and that the Union had no obligation to bargain with the
Respondent for a new contract.4
On October 3, the Respondent announced that it in-
tended to implement new terms and conditions of em-
ployment effective November 1. On October 17, the
Union replied that, without prejudice to its position that
the Respondent had failed to terminate the current con-
tract, the Union was prepared to bargain “unequivo-
cal[ly] and unconditional[ly]” for a new contract. On
October 31, the Union filed a grievance claiming that the
Respondent had not properly terminated the current con-
tract.
At a meeting on November 6, the Union advised the
Respondent that although the Union was not abandoning
its position regarding the termination of the contract, it
was “ready, willing, and able” to bargain “uncondition-
ally” for a new contract. The Union repeated during the
meeting that it was present to bargain unconditionally.5
Nevertheless, the Respondent ended the meeting without
having engaged in any bargaining with the Union. On
November 7, the Respondent cancelled the meeting that
had been scheduled for that date.

1 The Respondent has requested oral argument. The request is de-
nied as the record, exceptions, and brief adequately present the issues
and the positions of the parties.
2 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
3 All dates hereafter refer to 1996, unless otherwise noted.
4 It is now undisputed that the Union’s position was legally incor-
rect.
On December 18, the Respondent implemented the
new terms and conditions of employment it had an-
nounced earlier. The Respondent did not bargain with
the Union regarding a new contract between October 17
and December 18, and the Respondent did not bargain
with the Union before making the December 18 changes.
The judge found, and we agree, that although the Un-
ion initially refused to bargain with the Respondent, on
and after October 17 the Union offered to bargain uncon-
ditionally. Accordingly, the judge concluded, and again
we agree, that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act by refusing to bargain with the Union since Oc-
tober 17 and by unilaterally changing employees’ terms
and conditions of employment in the absence of a bar-
gaining impasse.
Our dissenting colleague accepts the judge’s finding
that the parties were not at impasse when the Respondent
implemented changes in employees’ terms and condi-
tions of employment. He, nonetheless, would find no
violation on the ground that the Union’s continued pur-
suit of its grievance entitled the Respondent to refuse to
bargain and make unilateral changes. We disagree.
The logical conclusion to draw from our dissenting
colleague’s position is that the Respondent may lawfully
refuse to bargain until the Union withdraws the griev-
ance. This, however, is contrary to Board precedent.
The Board has repeatedly held that an employer may not
condition bargaining on the withdrawal of unfair labor
practice charges or other litigation. See, e. g., Caribe
Staple Co., 313 NLRB 877, 890 (1994), and Interna-
tional Metal Specialties, 312 NLRB 1164 (1993).
Our dissenting colleague argues that the Union’s res-
ervation of its right to pursue its grievance “conditioned
its willingness to bargain” and constituted a “refus[al] to
bargain, albeit with privilege.” Again, we disagree.
Under its collective-bargaining agreement, the Union
had a right to file a grievance and obtain a ruling from an
arbitrator on the question of whether the Respondent had
effectively terminated the 1993–1996 contract. Under
5 We find no merit to the Respondent’s contention that the judge’s
decision is defective because he failed to resolve a credibility conflict—
whether the Union’s attorney on November 6 responded “no” when the
Respondent’s attorney asked if the Union recognized a duty to bargain.
It is clear that such a statement, if made, was an expression of the Un-
ion’s position on the merits of its underlying grievance. As the judge
found, continuing to pursue the grievance was not an unlawful refusal
to bargain. Thus, the statement by the Union’s attorney, if made, is not
in conflict with the judge’s finding that the Union repeatedly and
clearly announced that it would unconditionally bargain for a successor
bargaining agreement.
330 NLRB No. 180
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1266
the National Labor Relations Act, the Union had a right
to bargain with the Respondent over its proposed
changes in employee terms and conditions of employ-
ment. Contrary to our dissenting colleague’s position,
the Union was not required to waive its statutory right in
order to vindicate its contract right.
Under analogous circumstances, the Board has held
that a union can bargain in good faith with an employer
while taking the legal position in other litigation that it
was under no such bargaining obligation. See Interna-
tional Paper Co., 319 NLRB 1253, 1264–1265, 1276 fn.
50 (1995), enf. denied on other grounds 115 F.3d 1045
(D.C. Cir. 1997). In that case, the union filed an unfair
labor practice charge alleging that the employer’s perma-
nent subcontracting proposal was unlawful. The union’s
charge ultimately was dismissed. While the charge was
pending, the union regularly attended negotiations, ex-
plained its adamant opposition to the permanent subcon-
tracting proposal, and listened to the employer’s position
on the proposal. When the General Counsel alleged that
the employer had violated Section 8(a)(5) by unilaterally
implementing the permanent subcontracting proposal in
the absence of a genuine impasse, the employer defended
on the ground that the union had refused to bargain over
the proposal, citing the position the union advanced in its
nonmeritorious unfair labor practice charge. The Board
rejected the employer’s defense, concluding that while
the pendency of the unfair labor practice charge did not
suspend the union’s obligation to bargain with respect to
the proposal, the union’s conduct at the negotiation ses-
sions satisfied the requirements of the Act. Thus, the
Board held that a union can bargain in good faith within
the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act even
while maintaining other litigation which, if successful,
would result in a determination that the union was under
no duty to bargain.
Similarly, in the instant case, the Union’s pursuit of its
claim that the 1993–1996 contract had automatically
renewed did not disable it from negotiating with the Re-
spondent for a successor agreement. Under the Act, the
Union’s obligation was to bargain in good faith with the
Respondent. The judge found that, on October 17 and
thereafter, the Union sought to comply with this obliga-
tion. Rather than test the Union’s good faith, the Re-
spondent rebuffed the Union’s offer to bargain and broke
off negotiations.6 The judge correctly concluded that the

6 Member Liebman finds it unnecessary to rely on the judge’s anal-
ogy of the Union’s pursuit of its grievance to the situation in which an
employer is refusing to bargain with a union in order to obtain court
review of the validity of the union’s certification. The rule that an
employer cannot bargain in good faith at the same time that it is chal-
lenging a union’s certification is a necessary result of the statutory
scheme, under which Board action in representation cases is not subject
to direct judicial review, but can only be reviewed if the employer
refuses to bargain. See Terrace Gardens Plaza v. NLRB, 91 F.3d 222,
225–226 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The instant case is not a test-of-certification
and any order the Board issues in this case is subject to judicial review.
Respondent’s refusal to bargain and subsequent unilat-
eral changes in employees’ terms and conditions of em-
ployment violated Section 8(a)(5).7
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, WWOR-TV, Inc., Secaucus,
New Jersey, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Order.

MEMBER HURTGEN, dissenting.
I do not agree that the Respondent acted unlawfully
when it refused to negotiate on November 6, 1996, and
unilaterally implemented certain changes in unit employ-
ees’ terms and conditions of employment on December
18, 1996.
From September 5 until October 17, the Union had
unlawfully refused to bargain with the Respondent. Dur-
ing this period, the Union had intransigently insisted that
the Respondent failed timely to terminate the parties’
prior collective-bargaining agreement and was therefore
still bound by that contract’s terms. Even assuming that
the Union corrected its conduct on and after October 17,
when it relented from an absolute refusal to meet with
the Respondent to negotiate a successor agreement, the
Union conditioned all bargaining on its pursuit of efforts
to hold the Respondent to the prior contract. Under these
circumstances, the Respondent was legally entitled to

Thus, in Member Liebman’s view, the unique aspect of the statutory
scheme that compels the above-mentioned rule is not involved in this
case. Accordingly, because only one Board Member in the majority
(Member Brame) relies on the judge’s analogy, it is not part of the
majority’s rationale.
Member Brame finds that the judge’s analogy to the situation in
which the Board requires an employer to bargain while testing a un-
ion’s election certification in court is quite apropos here where the
Union was willing to bargain in case it lost its grievance claim that the
collective-bargaining agreement had automatically renewed for another
year. In both instances, lawful bargaining, if required, would occur at
the time that the obligation arose and would be most meaningful. This
is entirely constent with Show Industries, 326 NLRB 910 (1998), in
which Member Hurtgen and Member Brame formed the plurality find-
ing that the employer did not violate the Act when it was willing to
bargain about the effects of closing its business while continuing to
challenge the validity of the union’s election certification. Member
Hurtgen’s view in this case that the Respondent could lawfully avoid
bargaining over a successor agreement unless the Union withdrew its
grievance asserting automatic contract renewal is contrary to his posi-
tion in Show Industries, which encourages the pursuit of contempora-
neous bargaining.
7 In the final paragraph of his dissent, our colleague states that he
would not require the Respondent “to withhold action for [a] prolonged
period” on its proposed changes. Nor would he “hold the Respondent
prisoner” to the Union’s contract claim. In response, we would note
that our position cannot be legitimately criticized on either ground. As
the judge recognized, the Respondent would have been justified in
unilaterally implementing its proposed changes had it first bargained
with the Union to a bona-fide impasse. See, e.g., Taft Broadcasting
Co., 163 NLRB 475, 478 (1967), petition for review denied sub nom.
Television Artists AFTRA v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
WWOR-TV 1267
refuse to negotiate and to make the unilateral changes at
issue.
The parties’ last collective-bargaining agreement ran
from November 1, 1993, to October 31, 1996. It con-
tained an automatic renewal clause. That is, in the event
that neither party gave timely notice of intent to modify
or terminate within 60 days of the expiration date, the
contract would roll over for another year. On July 11,
1996, the Respondent sent notice of a desire to terminate
the contract. From September 5 through October 17,
however, the Union refused to meet with the Respondent
to negotiate a successor agreement. The Union con-
tended that it had no obligation to negotiate because the
Respondent allegedly had served its termination notice
on the wrong union party.1
On October 3, the Respondent sent the Union a letter
detailing new terms and conditions of employment that it
intended to implement on November 1 in light of the
Union’s refusal to bargain. On October 17, the Union
sent a reply letter reiterating its position that the Respon-
dent had not effectively terminated the current contract
and that the Union would pursue “all avenues of redress,
including arbitration.” The letter continued by stating:

We are, however, and without prejudice to our legal
position, prepared to review the document submitted by
you to [the Union] and, when our analysis is complete,
we will negotiate the terms and conditions of a succes-
sor collective bargaining agreement. This offer to ne-
gotiate is unequivocal and unconditional.

The Union’s letter triggered an exchange of letters in which
the Respondent contended that the Union’s preservation of
its challenge to the effectiveness of the Respondent’s con-
tract termination was a disabling condition to the Union’s
proclaimed “unconditional” willingness to negotiate the
terms of a successor agreement. The Respondent sought
unequivocal assurances that the Union had abandoned its
prior position. It received none.
In fact, on October 31, the last date of the contract’s
term, the Union filed a grievance claiming that the Re-
spondent had not effectively terminated the contract.
When the parties met on November 6 to discuss the
prospects for bargaining, the Union’s officials made clear
their intent to pursue the grievance. The Respondent
asked the Union’s attorney if the Union recognized a
duty to bargain. The attorney replied, “no.”2 In light of
the Union’s position, the Respondent’s representatives
declined to negotiate for a successor agreement. By let-

1 The Respondent had sent its termination notice to the president of
NABET Local 209, rather than to NABET, the parent union of Local
209 and actual signatory to the collective-bargaining agreement with
the Respondent.
2 There is a credibility conflict on this point. My colleagues assume
arguendo that the Union’s attorney made that response. In the instant
dissenting response to the majority, I shall make the same assumption.
However, it is not critical to my dissent.
ter dated November 7, the Union declared that it wished
to “bargain a new labor agreement in good faith and
without any conditions,” but it did not repudiate its
grievance. On November 15, the Union notified the Re-
spondent that it would submit the grievance directly to
arbitration.
On December 18, the Respondent unilaterally imple-
mented the changes encompassed in its October 3 letter
to the Union. The Respondent also filed unfair labor
practice charges. Those charges resulted in a complaint
that the Union unlawfully refused to bargain with the
Respondent from September 5 to October 17. Over the
Respondent’s objection, the General Counsel executed a
settlement agreement with the Union on June 13, 1997,
disposing of the charges against it.3
The Union also filed unfair labor practice charges, and
these resulted in a hearing before the judge on the instant
complaint alleging that the Respondent had unlawfully
refused to bargain and had unlawfully implemented the
December 18 changes. The judge found that the Re-
spondent was obligated to negotiate with the Union after
October 17, that the Respondent had failed to do so, and
that it unilaterally implemented changes in unit employ-
ees’ terms and conditions of employment prior to any
impasse in good faith negotiations between the parties.
He therefore concluded that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. My colleagues agree with the
judge. I disagree.
There are two key points to the judge’s analysis, and
he is mistaken on both of them. First, the judge found
that on and after October 17, 1996, the Union offered to
bargain unconditionally. I disagree. It is obvious that at
all relevant times the Union conditioned its willingness
to bargain for a successor agreement on preservation of
its right to pursue the claim that there was no obligation
to bargain at all because the parties still had a contract.
In particular, the Union’s October 17 letter specifically
stated that it would pursue “all avenues of redress, in-
cluding arbitration” and that its offer to bargain was
made “without prejudice to our legal position.” In my
view, proclamations of an “unconditional” willingness to
negotiate a new contract were meaningless in light of the
Union’s clear intent to pursue its grievance and, if it won,
to nullify any agreement reached and to insist on the Re-
spondent’s adherence to the terms of the prior contract.
Second, the judge concluded that the Respondent had a
legal obligation to bargain with the Union while it pur-
sued its grievance. Again, I disagree. The judge rea-
soned that the Respondent’s bargaining obligation here is
analogous to that of an employer required to bargain with
the union even while the employer contests a Board or-
der to bargain in a court of appeals. Benchmark Indus-
3 There are no exceptions to the judge’s observation that “a finding
may be made that the Union refused to bargain with Respondent from
September 5 to October 17, 1996.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1268
tries, 269 NLRB 1096, 1098 (1984); Montgomery Ward
& Co., 228 NLRB 1330, 1331 (1977).4 The analogy
does not support the General Counsel-Union position in
this case. Where an employer refuses to bargain in order
to test a certification, it acts at its peril. Thus, for exam-
ple, any unilateral changes that it makes during the pe-
riod of the refusal will be unlawful if the employer ulti-
mately loses its “test of certification” case. However, let
us assume that the employer offers to bargain, reserving
however its challenge to the certification. And, let us
assume further that the union refuses to bargain under
this condition. Even if the employer’s offer is lawful, I
think it clear, and I assume that my colleagues would
agree, that the union would not violate Section 8(b)(3) by
refusing to bargain under this condition.5
The situation here is the same, except that the Em-
ployer is in the Union’s position, and vice-versa. That is,
the Union was taking the legal position that it did not
have to bargain (because it claimed that the contract
rolled over). And, the Union said that it was willing to
bargain, while maintaining its legal position that it was
not required to do so. The Employer refused to bargain
under these conditions. Just as the Union would not
commit a Section 8(b)(3) violation in the “test of certifi-
cation” situation, so the Employer here (Respondent) did
not commit an 8(a)(5) violation in the instant situation.
Similarly, my colleagues also argue that a union does
not commit an 8(b)(3) violation by pursuing a charge
while negotiating. In support of this, they cite Interna-
tional Paper, 319 NLRB 1253. I do not disagree. I am
not contending that the Union here violated Section
8(b)(3). I am simply saying that the Union’s conduct
privileged the Respondent’s responsive conduct.6
My colleagues contend that an employer cannot condi-
tion bargaining on the withdrawal of litigation. How-
ever, in the instant case, the “other litigation” (i.e., the
grievance) went directly to the core issue of whether
there was a bargaining obligation. The Union’s position
in this regard was that there was no such obligation, and
the Union was wrong.
With respect to the unilateral change allegation, I rec-
ognize that there was no impasse, the event that is the
usual defense to an allegation of unlawful unilateral
change. However, there was no impasse because both

4 My colleagues are split on this point. Member Liebman finds it
unnecessary to rely on the judge’s analogy, while Member Brame
would do so. There is therefore no majority to adopt this portion of the
judge’s rationale.
5 See Show Industries, supra.
Member Brame asserts that I am inconsistent in this regard. The as-
sertion is not correct. In Show Industries, I concluded (as part of a
majority) that an employer did not violate Sec. 8(a)(5) by testing a
certification while bargaining. Similarly, the Union here does not
violate Sec. 8(b)(3) by pressing its grievance while offering to bargain.
However, the issue here is whether the Respondent’s responsive con-
duct is unlawful.
6 In other respects, International Paper is distinguishable. In that
case, the employer’s proposal was itself unlawful.
sides were refusing to bargain, albeit with privilege. In
these circumstances, where there is no bargaining (be-
cause of mutual privileges), I would not require the em-
ployer to withhold action for the prolonged period during
which the legal issues are being litigated and adjudicated.
Where, as here, the changes are otherwise legitimate, i.e.,
not for the purpose of undermining the Union, I would
not condemn those changes. To do so would require
Respondent to withhold otherwise lawful changes until
the Union’s contractual claim is resolved. I would not
hold the Respondent prisoner to that claim.7

Bert Dice-Goldberg, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Don Carmody, Esq., of Kerhonkson, New York, for the Re-
spondent.
Stephen Sturm, Esq. (Sturm and Perl, Esqs.), of New York,
New York, for the Union.

DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STEVEN DAVIS, Administrative Law Judge. Based upon a
charge filed on November 7, 1996, by National Association of
Broadcast Employees and Technicians-CWA (Local 209), a
complaint was issued against WWOR-TV, Inc. (Respondent)
on March 18, 1997.1
The complaint alleges essentially that Respondent (a) on Oc-
tober 3, 1996 notified the National Association of Broadcast
Employees and Technicians-CWA (NABET) of its intent to
implement numerous changes to the terms and conditions of its
employees without affording NABET an opportunity to bargain
with it; (b) on October 17 failed and refused to bargain with
NABET upon NABET’s offer to bargain with the Respondent
concerning the terms of a successor collective-bargaining
agreement; and (c) implemented the changes to its employees’
terms and conditions of employment on December 18 without
affording NABET an opportunity to bargain with it.
Respondent’s answer denied the material allegations of the
complaint, and on June 17 and 18, 1997, a hearing was held
before me in Newark, New Jersey.
Upon the evidence presented in this proceeding, and my ob-
servation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after considera-
tion of the briefs filed by General Counsel and Respondent, I
make the following2
7 My colleagues say that the Respondent could have made the
change after bargaining to impasse. However, that would have required
the Respondent to bargain with a Union that was claiming that there
was no duty to bargain.
1 An order consolidating this case with Cases 22–CB–8401(1) and
22–CB–8401(2) was issued on March 21, 1997. Thereafter, following
the approval of informal settlement agreements in those CB cases, on
June 13, 1997, the Regional Director issued an order severing the CB
cases from this case.
2 Following the close of the hearing, General Counsel, joined by the
Union, moved to strike portions of Respondent’s brief on the ground
that it made reference to certain alleged facts which were not part of the
record. Respondent filed an opposition, and moved to reopen the record
in order to respond to certain arguments made in General Counsel’s
brief, and to supplement the record with additional evidence in support
of its affirmative defenses. I have considered the foregoing motions,
and they are denied.
WWOR-TV 1269
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a corporation, having its office and place of
business in Secaucus, New Jersey, has been engaged in the
operation of a broadcast television station which advertises
goods sold nationally, and subscribes to national wire services.
During the 12-month period ending November 30, 1996, Re-
spondent derived gross revenues in excess of $100,000 from its
business operations, and during the same period, purchased
products, goods and materials valued in excess of $5000 di-
rectly from points outside New Jersey.
Respondent admits and I find that it is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
The Unions
Before 1994, NABET was an independent union, but an af-
filiate of the AFL–CIO. In January 1994, NABET merged with
the Communications Workers of America (CWA). NABET
now functions as a semi-autonomous sector of the CWA.
NABET has its own officers and bylaws, and conducts its own
affairs under the CWA umbrella.
Local 209, NABET-CWA, AFL–CIO (Local 209) is a local
union affiliated with NABET. It is a CWA local, and also a
NABET local. Local 209 has officers and a president, Brian
Wood. “Union” will refer to NABET and Local 209 collec-
tively where appropriate.
Respondent admits the complaint allegation that NABET is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Facts
The Contract and the Bargaining Unit
The Respondent and NABET have been parties to collective-
bargaining agreements, the most recent of which ran from No-
vember 1, 1993, to October 31, 1996.3 The collective-
bargaining unit set forth in that contract includes “all employ-
ees employed by the Employer in the broadcasting of the Em-
ployer in the Metropolitan Area of New York City, New York
to perform the work as specified in Article II of this Agree-
ment.”
The Notification of Termination of the Agreement
and Bargaining Dates
The contract which was due to expire on October 31, pro-
vides that if either party desires to modify or terminate the
agreement, the party must notify the other “party” at least 60
days prior to October 31. If no such notification is sent, the
contract is automatically renewed for 1 year.
Pursuant to that provision, on July 11, Douglas Land, vice
president and general counsel of Respondent, wrote to Brian
Wood, president of Local 209 at its Secaucus address, advising
of Respondent’s desire to terminate the 1993–1996 contract.
The letter enclosed a copy of a Federal Mediation and Concilia-
tion Service notice which notified that agency that “written
notice of proposed termination or modification of the existing
collective-bargaining contract was served upon the other party.
. . .”

3 All dates hereafter are in 1996 unless otherwise stated.
Land’s letter advised that Respondent sought to bargain with
the Union over the terms of a successor agreement, and wished
to conclude such negotiations prior to October 31, the expira-
tion of the current contract. He set forth 26 dates, from August
22 to October 31, during which Respondent’s representatives
were available for bargaining, and urged Local 209 to contact
him as soon as possible concerning their availability on those
dates or other dates.
Local 209 president Wood stated that at the time he received
the July 11 letter, the local had not yet appointed a bargaining
committee, and it was thus not possible to agree to any of the
proposed dates. It was also deemed necessary to have the par-
ticipation of John Clark, the president of NABET at the nego-
tiations, and his availability had not yet been determined.
On August 22, Richard Miner, Respondent’s executive direc-
tor of production and engineering and executive producer of
sports, wrote to Wood, complaining that he had not committed
to any of the suggested dates, and offered additional dates to
meet.
In late August, a union meeting was held in order to discuss
dates for bargaining. Present were Clark, Wood, Vince Vero,
the vice president of Local 209, Carl Gabrili, a member of the
bargaining committee, and Stephen Sturm, counsel to the Un-
ion. Prior to that meeting, proposals were formulated for pres-
entation to Respondent in the upcoming negotiations.
At the meeting, Clark remarked that the 2 letters sent by Re-
spondent were sent only to Local 209, and not to NABET, the
signatory to the agreement. Those present concluded that Re-
spondent’s July 11 notification of termination was ineffective
since the proper party, NABET, was not notified that Respon-
dent sought to terminate the contract. They agreed not to send a
notice of modification or termination of the contract (which
would have been timely had they sent it prior to August 31).
They instead decided to take the position that inasmuch as no
proper notification of termination had been received by
NABET, the current contract automatically renewed for one
year.
The September 5 Meeting
On September 5, the parties met. Those present for the Un-
ion were the same as at the late August union meeting. Respon-
dent’s representatives included Miner, Kenneth McGowan, its
chief engineer, and counsel Don Carmody. The Respondent
was prepared to bargain.
The Union presented a letter dated September 5 to Respon-
dent. It stated as follows:

The parties to this agreement are NABET-CWA and
WWOR-TV, Inc. Since neither NABET-CWA or WWOR-
TV, Inc. notified the other in writing more than 60 days prior
to the termination, of their desire to modify or terminate, the
current labor agreement “continue[s] in effect from year to
year thereafter. . . .”
Pursuant thereto, NABET-CWA is under no obligation
to negotiate at this time. However, we are available to
meet, discuss and evaluate any suggested changes desired
by WWOR-TV, Inc. If the NABET-CWA Committee rec-
ommends modification of the agreement, it must be sub-
mitted for ratification by the membership.

Respondent’s attorney, Carmody, asked whether the Union
had anything to add to the letter, and was told that it spoke for
itself. Carmody replied that Respondent did not agree with the
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1270
Union’s position regarding the contract automatically renewing,
and insisted that Respondent provided the proper notice of ter-
mination. Carmody said that he assumed that the Union had no
contract proposals to present, and Clark said that it did not.
Sturm added that they would listen to Respondent’s proposal.
The meeting then concluded.
On September 23, the Union again told Respondent that it
would not negotiate a successor agreement, and had no obliga-
tion to do so.
On October 3, Miner sent a letter to Wood, advising that in
light of the Union’s refusal to bargain toward a successor
agreement, Respondent “intends to undertake the employment
of the employees . . . upon new terms and conditions of em-
ployment, effective November 1, 1996,” and “has defined the
terms and conditions of employment to prevail from November
1, 1996 to October 31, 1999. . . .” Miner sent a collective-
bargaining agreement “memorializing these terms and condi-
tions of employment” for execution, and stated that if it was not
executed by November 1, Respondent would implement those
terms on that date.
It is the Respondent’s position that, as of October 3, it was
not obligated to bargain about the terms and conditions of em-
ployment of its employees.
On October 17, Clark, the president of NABET, wrote to
Miner advising that he continued to disagree that Respondent
had effectively terminated the contract by its letter of July 11,
and would pursue “all avenues of redress, including arbitra-
tion.” Clark also advised Miner that:

[w]e are, however, and without prejudice to our legal position,
prepared to review the document submitted by you to Brian
Wood and, when our analysis is complete, we will negotiate
the terms and conditions of a successor collective bargaining
agreement. This offer to negotiate is unequivocal and uncon-
ditional. Since you cancelled all meeting dates between us, I
will ask Brian to contact you when the negotiating committee
has completed its review to arrange mutually satisfactory
meeting dates.

On October 22, Miner replied, asserting that the Union’s Oc-
tober 17 letter was not a valid offer to negotiate uncondition-
ally, since the Union unlawfully conditioned bargaining by
concurrently pursuing efforts to hold Respondent’s termination
of the contract ineffective.
Nevertheless, Miner stated that he would treat the Union’s
letter as a “complete abandonment of your earlier position that
you are under no obligation to negotiate a successor collective-
bargaining agreement” based upon its position that Respondent
had not properly terminated the current agreement. Miner asked
for confirmation of his understanding of the Union’s position.
Miner also noted that the Union’s actions forced it to reveal
the wage increases it would have been willing to give in ex-
change for the modifications to the agreement which were in-
cluded therein. Miner concluded that Respondent would meet
with the Union upon its confirmation that it was “indeed ready
to negotiate unconditionally.”
On October 29, Clark replied to Miner, stating that “we iter-
ate our conditional and unambiguous desire to meet and bar-
gain in good faith with WWOR-TV for a successor agreement.
The disagreement the Company has with our position regarding
Section 1.03 [termination of the contract] in no way conditions
our desire, as set forth above.” (Emphasis added.) Clark agreed
to meet on November 5, 6, and 7.
On October 31, Miner replied, apparently referring to the
Union’s statement in its October 29 letter that it had a “condi-
tional” desire to bargain, stating that Respondent has carefully
noted each word of the Union’s letter, and expressly relied
upon them, unless advised to the contrary by November 1.
Miner also noted that the Union did not confirm that it com-
pletely abandoned its position that Respondent’s termination of
the contract was ineffective.
On October 31, the Union filed a grievance which stated
that Respondent violated the contract “when it insisted on bar-
gaining for a successor labor agreement without properly ter-
minating the current labor agreement.”
The November 6 Meeting
At the opening of the meeting, Carmody asked about the Un-
ion’s “conditional” bargaining set forth in the Union’s October
29 letter. Clark advised Carmody that the word should have
been “unconditional” and was a typographical error. Sturm then
told Carmody that the Union was “ready, willing and able” to
bargain for a new contract.
Carmody asked whether the Union was abandoning its posi-
tion regarding the termination of the contract, and Sturm re-
plied that it was not abandoning that position, since it filed a
grievance concerning it, and would abide by the arbitrator’s
decision, but nevertheless, they were present to bargain for a
new agreement. Carmody asked whether he recognized an obli-
gation to bargain. According to Clark, Sturm answered that the
Union recognized that an arbitrator might disagree with the
Union’s position, but that if the arbitrator agreed, it might make
their bargaining moot, adding that the grievance did not make
the meeting or its bargaining conditional. Clark added that sev-
eral times during the meeting, Sturm stated that the Union was
present to bargain unconditionally.
Wood testified that Carmody asked for an “unambiguous
declaration that you are here ready to bargain unconditionally.”
The Union replied that it was, and repeated later that it was
ready to bargain unconditionally, and that it had a duty to bar-
gain.
Clark stated that Sturm wanted to ask questions concerning
Respondent’s proposal, but that Respondent did not want to
discuss its proposal, and did not discuss it at all. There was a
brief discussion about the current, 1993–1996 agreement,
which was never executed. Clark produced a copy and signed
it, and gave it to Respondent.
Respondent caucused, and returned with Carmody saying
that Respondent had received information at the meeting that it
did not have before, and suggested a break until the following
morning, at which time Respondent’s position would be pre-
sented. Miner testified that Carmody said that “we now have
the answer to the question we had been seeking since Septem-
ber 5.” Miner also conceded that Respondent ended the meeting
at that time, saying that they could meet again the following
day.
Miner stated that at the meeting, Sturm asked Respondent to
go over, explain and help the Union understand the new collec-
tive-bargaining agreement distributed on October 3. Respon-
dent’s representatives replied by asking the Union to clarify its
position on their willingness to bargain. Respondent’s represen-
tatives did not explain the new contract to the Union at any
time.
Miner testified that the purpose of the meeting was Respon-
dent’s attempt to obtain an unambiguous answer as to the Un-
WWOR-TV 1271
ion’s willingness to bargain for a new contract inasmuch as
Respondent was confused regarding its position based upon the
filing of the grievance. Miner and McGowan conceded, how-
ever, that the Union orally corrected its typographical error, and
stated that it was ready, willing and able to negotiate.
McGowan added that he believed that Sturm said that the Un-
ion would bargain “unconditionally.”
Miner, and McGowan stated that when asked whether he
agreed that the Union had an obligation to negotiate a new con-
tract, Sturm said, “[N]o,” but added that since a grievance was
outstanding, an arbitrator’s finding may make their delibera-
tions moot. Carmody asked the Union if it had abandoned its
grievance, and was told that it had not.
Clark denied that Sturm said that the Union had no bargain-
ing obligation.
The Events of November 7
As the Union representatives prepared to attend the meeting
on November 7, they received a call from Respondent, stating
that it was canceling the meeting, and they should await a letter.
A letter was delivered which advised, that in view of the Un-
ion’s continuing refusal to recognize its duty to bargain a suc-
cessor collective-bargaining agreement, Respondent intended to
implement the new terms and conditions of employment set
forth in its October 3 transmittal. The letter conceded that at the
November 6 meeting, the Union “professed an unconditional
desire to bargain,” but alleged that it stated that it did not rec-
ognize a duty to bargain a new contract because an arbitrator
might agree with its position concerning the termination of the
1993–1996 agreement.
The letter further noted that based on the Union’s course of
conduct, it believed that the Union’s “professed desire to nego-
tiate a new contract is totally insincere” and solely an attempt to
delay the implementation of the new terms and conditions of
employment.
The letter concluded that it would implement the new terms
and conditions of employment effective December 9.
By letter dated November 7, Wood replied that at the meet-
ing the Union said that it was present to “bargain a new labor
agreement in good faith and without any conditions,” and noted
that it had corrected the typographical error in the October 29
letter. The instant charge was filed that day.
The same day, Respondent notified its employees that at the
November 6 meeting, it was told that the Union did not recog-
nize that it had a duty to bargain a new contract, and it was
therefore implementing the new terms and conditions of em-
ployment effective December 9.
Later Events
Thereafter, on November 15, the Union notified Respondent
that it would submit its grievance directly to arbitration. On
November 18, Respondent advised the Union that it would
submit the Union’s grievance to arbitration, and ask as a rem-
edy that the grievance be dismissed. On March 7, 1997, the
Union advised the American Arbitration Association (AAA)
that it was withdrawing its grievance. On March 11, the AAA
advised that in view of the withdrawal, it was canceling the
hearing scheduled for August 8, 1997.4

4 Another letter sent by the AAA on March 11 advised that a hearing
would take place on June 19. That letter referenced a different case
number than the other letter. It was not made clear whether the June 19
hearing related to the Respondent’s pursuit of the grievance.
Apparently the Board’s Regional Office asked Respondent to
defer implementation of the terms of the new contract until
December 17 in order to permit the office to complete its inves-
tigation of the instant charge.
On December 17, Respondent filed charges in Cases 22–
CB–8401(1) and 22–CB–8401(2) against the Union alleging
that it had failed to bargain with Respondent for a successor
collective-bargaining agreement. On March 17, 1997, a com-
plaint was issued against NABET, alleging that from Septem-
ber 5 to October 17, it refused to bargain with the Employer in
violation of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. On March 18, 1997, the
instant complaint against Respondent was issued.
As set forth above, NABET entered into a settlement agree-
ment of the complaint, which was approved by the Regional
Director on June 13, 1997. The Employer refused to join in the
settlement agreement.
The Arguments of the Parties
The General Counsel argues that Respondent’s conduct on
October 3, in notifying the Union of its intent to implement
changes in the terms and conditions of employment of its em-
ployees, was improper because it did not give the Union an
opportunity to bargain with respect to such changes. However,
the General Counsel concedes that the Union’s refusal to bar-
gain during that period of time, from September 5 to October
17, was improper.
Nevertheless, the General Counsel argues and the complaint
alleges, that upon the Union’s decision to bargain with Respon-
dent on October 17, Respondent’s refusal to bargain about the
October 3 announced changes, was unlawful.
The General Counsel further argues that by unilaterally im-
plementing the changes on December 18, Respondent commit-
ted further violations of its bargaining obligation.
Respondent first argues that the Union never unconditionally
offered to bargain with it since it sought to grieve the issue of
the termination of the contract. However, even assuming that it
did, Respondent further argues that, because of the Union’s
refusal to bargain with it from September 5, Respondent was
not obligated to bargain about the terms and conditions of em-
ployment with the Union thereafter. Respondent also argues
that it was justified in notifying the Union on October 3 of its
intent to make changes in its employees’ terms and conditions
of employment, and later implementing those changes.
Analysis and Discussion
The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742–
743 (1962), has stated that the duty to bargain collectively as
set forth in Section 8(a)(5) of the Act is defined by Section 8(d)
as the duty to “meet . . . and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.”
The Court held that “an employer’s unilateral change in condi-
tions of employment under negotiation is . . . a violation of
Section 8(a)(5)” of the Act. Accordingly, an employer may not
change matters related to wages, hours, or terms and conditions
of employment without first affording the employees’ bargain-
ing representative a reasonable and meaningful opportunity to
discuss the proposed changes.
The Board has held that when parties are engaged in negotia-
tions for a collective-bargaining agreement, an employer’s
obligation to refrain from unilateral changes extends beyond
the mere duty to provide notice and an opportunity to bargain;
it encompasses a duty to refrain from implementation at all,
unless and until an overall impasse has been reached on bar-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1272
gaining for the agreement as a whole. L & L Wine & Liquor
Corp., 323 NLRB 848, 851 (1997); Bottom Line Enterprises,
302 NLRB 373, 374 (1995).
Respondent first argues that the Union’s refusal to bargain
with it from September 5 until October 17 excused it from its
obligation to bargain with the Union. First, there is no question
that the Union refused to bargain with Respondent during that
period of time. The Union clearly refused to bargain based
upon its letters of September 5 and 23.
In certain circumstances, a union’s refusal to bargain with an
employer excuses an employer from bargaining with the union.
Double S Mining, 309 NLRB 1058 (1992), and permits an em-
ployer to institute unilateral changes as “it was the union’s own
acts which foreclosed effective negotiations.” Louisiana Dock
Co., 293 NLRB 233, 235 (1989).
A complaint was issued based on the Union’s refusal to bar-
gain with the Respondent from September 5 to October 17.
Based upon the facts concerning the Union’s actions during that
period of time, a finding may be made that the Union refused to
bargain with Respondent from September 5 to October 17.
Under those circumstances, I cannot find, as alleged in para-
graphs 10 through 12 of the complaint, that Respondent unlaw-
fully notified the Union of its intent to implement changes to
the terms and conditions of its employees on October 3 without
affording the Union an opportunity to bargain with it. At the
time of the notification, October 3, the Union was refusing to
bargain with the Respondent. Accordingly, Respondent did not
violate the Act by announcing its intention to implement the
changes. I will accordingly recommend that paragraphs 10
through 12 of the complaint be dismissed.5
However, although an 8(b)(3) complaint was issued alleging
the Union’s refusal to bargain with respect to its conduct from
September 5 though October 17, that fact is not relevant to
Respondent’s obligation to bargain thereafter. That case was
settled, and a commitment was given by the Union that it would
not refuse to bargain with Respondent, and would upon request,
bargain with it. There is no evidence that the Union has vio-
lated the terms of that agreement. Cascade Corp., 192 NLRB
533 fn. 2 (1971). I accordingly reject Respondent’s affirmative
defenses that the Regional Director lacked statutory authority to
issue the instant complaint because of the complaint and set-
tlement agreement in Cases 22–CB–8401(1) and 22–CB–
8401(2).6
On October 17, 2 weeks following Respondent’s notification
that it intended to implement its proposal, the Union changed
its mind, and decided to bargain with Respondent. The Union’s
letter of October 17 offered to negotiate unconditionally, and at
the November 6 meeting, the Union corrected the erroneous
wording in its October 29 letter, and again stated its willingness

5 In view of this finding, I need not reach Respondent’s argument
that the charge did not allege that Respondent’s October 3 conduct was
unlawful.
6 I reject Respondent’s further affirmative defense that the issuance
of the complaint was an abuse of the Regional Director’s prosecutorial
discretion because of alleged contrary determinations made by the
Regional Director for Region 1 in Case 1–CB–8666(1–3). That com-
plaint, which involved different parties, alleged that the union refused
to bargain with an employer by, inter alia, submitting a request for
arbitration in which it sought a finding that the collective-bargaining
agreement had not been effectively terminated. In the absence of a
Board finding on this issue, I am not bound by a Regional Director’s
issuance of a complaint concerning that matter.
to unconditionally bargain for a successor agreement. Further,
Respondent’s November 7 letter confirmed that the Union of-
fered to bargain unconditionally.
Accordingly, it is clear that on October 17 and thereafter the
Union agreed to unconditionally bargain with Respondent.
Respondent unlawfully refused to bargain with the Union since
October 17. Respondent argues that the Union’s continued
insistence on pursuing its claim that the contract automatically
renewed constitutes conditional bargaining. I do not agree. In
Lou’s Produce, 308 NLRB 1194, 1195 (1992), the Board held
that a union had not engaged in bad-faith bargaining by stating
that the parties’ contract had automatically renewed, and its
statement did not privilege the employer’s unilateral implemen-
tation of a health insurance plan.
The Union’s pursuit of its grievance may be analogized to
the situation in which an employer is required to bargain with a
union while it litigates in the court of appeals the Board’s order
that it bargain with the union. Benchmark Industries, 269
NLRB 1096, 1098 (1984); Montgomery Ward & Co., 228
NLRB 1330, 1331 (1977). An employer is thus entitled to seek
review of the Board’s order, but is at the same time required to
bargain with the union. Similarly, here the Union is justified in
seeking a determination of the issue concerning the automatic
renewal of the contract, but is also required to bargain with
Respondent.
Respondent argues that the Union exhibited bad faith in stat-
ing that an arbitrator’s finding that the contract had automati-
cally terminated would make their bargaining moot. However,
where court review of the Board’s bargaining order is sought,
the court’s reversal of the Board’s order may likewise result in
the parties’ bargaining being moot. Nevertheless, a party may
seek court review, and at the same time is required to bargain.
The Union’s belief that the parties’ contract had automati-
cally renewed, and its filing of a grievance in order to obtain a
determination of that issue is “not inherently inconsistent with a
continued willingness to negotiate, and as long as there is such
willingness and no impasse has developed, the employer’s ob-
ligation continues.” NLRB v. Katz, supra, 369 U.S. at 741 fn. 7.
I accordingly find that the Union’s insistence upon grieving
the issue of the alleged automatic renewal of its contract did not
constitute an unlawful refusal to bargain, particularly in light of
its contemporaneous and clear announcement that it would
unconditionally bargain for a successor collective-bargaining
agreement. I therefore find that Respondent was not justified in
implementing the changes based upon the Union’s pursuit of its
grievance.
As set forth above, an employer is justified in making unilat-
eral changes to its employees’ working conditions only follow-
ing impasse in negotiations with the union representing such
employees.

A genuine impasse in negotiations is synonymous with dead-
lock. Where there is a genuine impasse the parties have dis-
cussed a subject or subjects in good faith, and despite their
best efforts to achieve agreement with respect to such, neither
party is willing to move form its respective position. The
Board does not lightly find an impasse. . . . An impasse is
reached after “good-faith negotiations have exhausted the
prospects of concluding an agreement” and there is no realis-
tic possibility that continuation of discussion[s] at that time
would be fruitful. [CJC Holdings, 320 NLRB 1041, 1044
(1996).]

WWOR-TV 1273
Applying the above standard, it is immediately clear that no
impasse occurred in these negotiations. In fact, it is obvious
that no negotiations occurred at all. Indeed, it is Respondent’s
position that, as of October 3, it was not obligated to bargain
about the terms and conditions of employment of its employ-
ees. Accordingly, following the Union’s announcement on
October 17 that it would unconditionally bargain for a new
contract, the Respondent did not engage in bargaining. At the
November 6 meeting, the Union’s attempt to have Respondent
discuss the collective-bargaining agreement it sought to imple-
ment was refused. Respondent’s admitted purpose in meeting
on November 6 was to obtain an answer as to whether the Un-
ion sought to bargain unconditionally, and not to bargain with
the Union. When the Union announced that it was pursuing the
grievance, Respondent cut off discussions, left the meeting, and
cancelled the following day’s meeting.
It thus cannot be said that impasse has occurred, or even that
negotiations took place. I accordingly find that on December
18, when Respondent implemented the changes in its employ-
ees’ terms and conditions of employment, an impasse did not
exist between Respondent and the Union. As of that time, the
Union was willing to bargain unconditionally. Having found
that the parties were not at impasse in their negotiations, Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by unilaterally im-
plementing its contract proposals on December 18, 1996. Bot-
tom Line Enterprises, supra at 375 (1991); Quik Park Garage
Corp., 315 NLRB 111, 112 (1994).7
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The appropriate collective-bargaining unit includes all
employees employed by the Employer in the broadcasting of
WWOR-TV, Inc. in the Metropolitan Area of New York City,
New York, to perform the work as specified in article II of the
1993–1996 collective-bargaining agreement.
4. By refusing to bargain with the Union, and by unilaterally
changing and implementing changes to terms and conditions of
employment of its unit employees without affording the Union
an opportunity to bargain with Respondent with respect to such
changes, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
5. The above unfair labor practices constitute unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, I find it necessary to order Respondent to cease
and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action nec-
essary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent violated the Act by unilater-
ally changing and implementing changes to terms and condi-
tions of employment of its unit employees without affording the
Union an opportunity to bargain with the Respondent with re-
spect to such changes, I shall order Respondent to restore the
status quo by rescinding, on request from the Union, those uni-
lateral changes and make all affected unit employees whole for

7 In view of my findings herein, Respondent’s Motion for Summary
Judgment made at the hearing is denied.
losses they incurred by virtue of its unilateral changes, in ac-
cordance with Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970),
with interest as prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded,
283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended8
ORDER
The Respondent, WWOR-TV, Inc., Secaucus, New Jersey,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Unilaterally changing and implementing changes to the
terms and conditions of employment of its unit employees,
without affording the Union an opportunity to bargain with
Respondent with respect to such changes.
(b) Refusing to bargain with National Association of Broad-
cast Employees and Technicians-CWA, AFL–CIO in the fol-
lowing appropriate unit which includes all employees employed
by the Employer in the broadcasting of WWOR-TV, Inc. in the
Metropolitan Area of New York City, New York, to perform
the work as specified in article II of the 1993–1996 collective-
bargaining agreement.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive rep-
resentative of the employees in the following appropriate unit
concerning terms and conditions of employment and, if an un-
derstanding is reached, embody the understanding in a signed
agreement: all employees employed by the Employer in the
broadcasting of WWOR-TV, Inc. in the Metropolitan Area of
New York City, New York, to perform the work as specified in
article II of the 1993–1996 collective-bargaining agreement.
(b) On request of the Union, rescind the unilateral changes
made on about December 18, 1996, and make whole the af-
fected employees for losses incurred by virtue of the implemen-
tation of the unilateral changes, with interest, as prescribed in
the remedy section of the decision.
(c) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make available
to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards, per-
sonnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Or-
der.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Secaucus, New Jersey, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”9 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 22, after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for
8 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
9 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1274
60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In
the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since October 17, 1996.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed inso-
far as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide
by this notice.

WE WILL NOT unilaterally change and implement changes to
the terms and conditions of employment of our unit employees,
without affording the National Association of Broadcast Em-
ployees and Technicians-CWA, AFL–CIO, an opportunity to
bargain with us with respect to such changes.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with National Association of
Broadcast Employees and Technicians-CWA, AFL–CIO in the
appropriate collective-bargaining unit which includes all em-
ployees employed by us in the broadcasting of WWOR-TV,
Inc., in the Metropolitan Area of New York City, New York, to
perform the work as specified in article II of the 1993–1996
collective-bargaining agreement.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL on request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive
representative of the employees in the following appropriate
collective-bargaining unit concerning terms and conditions of
employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody the
understanding in a signed agreement: all employees employed
by us in the broadcasting of WWOR-TV, Inc., in the Metropoli-
tan Area of New York City, New York, to perform the work as
specified in article II of the 1993–1996 collective-bargaining
agreement.
WE WILL on request of the Union, rescind the unilateral
changes made by us on about December 18, 1996, and make
whole the affected employees for losses incurred by virtue of
the implementation of the unilateral changes, with interest.

WWOR-TV, INC.