Winnie Tak Yu. Wan

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 30, 2019

14506931 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 30, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/506,931 10/06/2014 Winnie Tak Yu Wan 088325-0919396
(003811US)
2120
51206 7590 09/30/2019
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP/Oracle
Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22
1100 Peachtree Street
Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309
EXAMINER
HOFFLER, RAHEEM
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2156
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/30/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
KTSDocketing2@kilpatrick.foundationip.com
ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com
oraclepatentmail@kilpatricktownsend.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte WINNIE TAK YU WAN
____________________

Appeal 2018-009184
Application 14/506,931
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, MICHAEL R. ZECHER, and
MICHAEL T. CYGAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

CYGAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1–5, 7–15, 17–18, and 20–23, which
are all of the claims pending. App. Br. 5. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Oracle
International Corporation. App. Br. 3.
Appeal 2018-009184
Application 14/506,931

2
BACKGROUND
The disclosure relates to performing metadata reconciliation to update
the metadata of objects in a data warehouse. Abs. According to the
Specification, a data warehouse is a centralized collection of data. Spec. ¶ 5.
When changes to the warehouse are introduced, such as a new column in a
source table, the data warehouse design becomes out of sync and requires
fixes. Id. ¶ 7. The process of fixing a data warehouse design so that it
becomes in sync with the new changes is called reconciliation and focuses
on reconciling “metadata,” which, according to the Specification, is data that
defines other data. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. For example, metadata may include the
database schema used in a source database or in a data warehouse. Id.
Independent claim 1, reproduced below, exemplifies the claimed
invention:
1. A method comprising:
receiving, at one or more computer systems, a change to
metadata of a first object stored in a data warehouse;
performing, with one or more processors associated with
the one or more computer systems, an impact analysis for the
first object to identify a first set of objects that depend from the
first object and that are impacted by the change to the metadata
of the first object, wherein each of the first set of objects is stored
in the data warehouse in locations different from a location of the
first object; and
generating, with the one or more processors associated
with the one or more computer systems, at least one first task to
propagate an impact of the change to the metadata of the first
object to the first set of objects that are impacted by the change
to the metadata of the first object.

App. Br. 16 (Claims App.).

Appeal 2018-009184
Application 14/506,931

3
Dependent claims 2–5, 7–10, and 21 incorporate these limitations
through their dependency on claim 1. Independent claim 11, and its
dependent claims 12–15, 17–18, and 22, recite a computer-readable medium
having limitations commensurate with those of claim 1. Independent claim
20, and its dependent claim 23, recite a system having limitations
commensurate with those of claim 1.
The Examiner has set forth the following rejections:
(1) claims 1–5, 7–9, 11–15, 17–18, and 20–23 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious over pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)2 over Chu et
al., US 6,493,720 B1, issued December 10, 2002 (hereinafter
“Chu”) in view of Alumbaugh et al., US 2003/0172368 A1,
published September 11, 2003 (hereinafter “Alumbaugh”).
Final Act. 3–10.3
(2) claim 10 as obvious over pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Chu
in view of Alumbaugh, further in view of Shah et al.,
US 2005/0044108 A1, published February 24, 2005 (hereinafter
“Shah”). Final Act. 10–11.
(3) claims 1–5, 7–15, 17–18, and 20–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
failing to claim eligible subject matter. This rejection was
added as a new ground of rejection in the Answer. Ans. 4.

2 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29,
125 Stat. 284, 287–88 (2011), revised 35 U.S.C. § 103, effective March 16,
2013. Because the ‘931 application claims the benefit of a parent
application that was filed before this date, and Appellant has not asserted
that the application ever contained a claim to a claimed invention that has an
effective filing date after that date, the pre-AIA version of § 103 applies.
3 All references to the Final Action refer to the Final Action mailed on
October 6, 2017.
Appeal 2018-009184
Application 14/506,931

4
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections (Final Act. 2–16) in light
of Appellant’s contentions that the Examiner has erred (App. Br. 10–14).
Further, we have reviewed the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s
contentions (Ans. 4–16), and Appellant’s Reply Brief (Reply Br. 2–7).
I.
The Examiner rejects claims 1–5, 7–9, 11–15, 17–18, and 20–23 as
obvious over pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Chu in view of Alumbaugh.
With respect to claim 1, the Examiner finds Chu to teach or suggest
receiving a change to metadata of a first object, citing Chu’s monitoring
objects and synchronizing metadata for those objects if there is a
manipulation occurring. Final Act. 3. The Examiner relies upon
Alumbaugh to teach or suggest performing an impact analysis, citing
Alumbaugh’s change monitoring capability that produces a “change
specification” and “Impact Analysis Reports” to assess the impact of change
across an application and the organization. Id. at 4–5 (citing inter alia
Alumbaugh ¶¶ 324–331). The Examiner further finds Chu to teach or
suggest generating at least one task to propagate an impact of the change to a
set of objects impacted by the change, citing Chu’s maintenance of
timestamps for comparison of, and to determine the source of, the most
current metadata, and updating the objects in an information catalog. Id. at
3.
Appellant first contends that Alumbaugh does not perform an impact
analysis as set forth in the second phrase of claim 1, which recites
“performing an impact analysis for the first object to identify a first set of
objects that depend from the first object and that are impacted by the
Appeal 2018-009184
Application 14/506,931

5
change to the metadata of the first object.” App. Br. 12–13. Appellant
characterizes Alumbaugh as determining how a change to a code in one
application (object) affects other applications (objects). Id. at 13. Appellant
argues that Alumbaugh does not determine how a change to metadata
impacts other objects. Id. at 12–13.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. The Examiner relies
upon Alumbaugh’s “change specification,” which identifies a change in
schema elements from a data source (Alumbaugh ¶ 330), wherein the
schema elements may be extracted metadata elements (Alumbaugh ¶ 327).
The change specification reports show “how specific changes to monitored
data sources will impact existing management reports[ and] ad hoc reports.”
Alumbaugh ¶ 331. Appellant has characterized these reports as objects.
App. Br. 13 (stating that “[b]oth the reports and the monitored data sources
would be considered ‘objects’”). Accordingly, the Examiner’s finding that
Alumbaugh teaches or suggests identifying a first set of objects (reports) that
depend from a first object and are impacted by a change to the metadata of
the first object is supported by the record.
Furthermore, Appellant has argued solely against the teachings of
Alumbaugh, rather than against the combined teachings of Alumbaugh and
Chu. One cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually
where the rejection is based on a combination of references. In re Keller,
642 F.2d 413 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091 (Fed. Cir.
1986). Here, although Appellant argues that Alumbaugh does not teach
determining how a change to metadata affects other objects, Appellant
admits that Chu teaches or suggests receiving a change to metadata of a first
object and that Alumbaugh teaches determining how a change to an object
Appeal 2018-009184
Application 14/506,931

6
affects other objects. App. Br. 11–13. The Examiner has stated that
Alumbaugh’s change determination accounts for metadata, which is
supported by the record. Ans. 14 (citing Alumbaugh ¶¶ 234, 324–331).
Accordingly, Appellant has not persuasively explained why the Examiner’s
combination of Alumbaugh and Chu would not teach or suggest identifying
a first set of objects that depend from a first object and are impacted by a
change to the metadata of the first object.
Appellant further contends that Chu does not propagate changes in
metadata as claimed. App. Br. 11. Appellant argues that Chu synchronizes
changes to different versions of the metadata of a single object rather than
propagating an impact of the change to a set of entirely different objects. Id.
at 12. Further, Appellant argues that Chu merely alters metadata, but does
not make changes to a first set of objects associated with the metadata. Id.
However, Appellant provides an example that instead supports an
interpretation of Chu as modifying a set of objects associated with metadata.
Appellant provides the example of a media file (object) having metadata,
such as song titles. App. Br. 11. Appellant characterizes Chu as addressing
the situation in which the media file (object) is distributed to different
devices, wherein a change is made to the metadata for one media file on one
device. Id. Appellant characterizes the metadata synchronizer of Chu as
determining which metadata should be synchronized with other versions. Id.
However, because the media file is distributed to different devices,
Appellant’s characterization of Chu involves a set of objects associated with
the metadata, even though the content of each of the separate objects may be
the same. Under Appellant’s characterization of Chu, when one object
undergoes a change to the metadata, the metadata synchronizer determines if
Appeal 2018-009184
Application 14/506,931

7
that change should be synchronized, i.e., propagated to the metadata of other
object files having the same content. Accordingly, the Examiner’s finding
that Chu teaches or suggests generating a task to propagate an impact of a
change to metadata of a first object to a first set of objects that are impacted
by the change to the metadata of the first object is consistent with
Appellant’s characterization of Chu.
Furthermore, Appellant has argued solely against the teachings of
Chu, rather than against the combined teachings of Chu and Alumbaugh.
The step of propagating an impact of the change to metadata is dependent on
the prior step of identifying a set of objects that depend from the first object
and are impacted by the change to metadata, which the Examiner finds to be
taught or suggested by Alumbaugh. Final Act. 4–5. To the extent that
Appellant argues that Chu teaches making changes to a single object rather
than an identified set of objects (Reply Br. 4), Appellant has not
persuasively argued how the combined teachings or suggestions of Chu and
Alumbaugh do not account for that claim limitation.
For the above-discussed reasons, we affirm the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection of claim 1. Because Appellant has provided no
additional argument for claims 2–5, 7–9, 11–15, 17–18, and 20, and because
those claims are rejected on the same grounds of rejection, we determine that
those claims stand or fall together. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 2–5,
7–9, 11–15, 17–18, and 20.
With respect to claim 10, Appellant has provided no additional
arguments other than those provided for claim 1. Accordingly, we affirm
Appeal 2018-009184
Application 14/506,931

8
the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 10 for the same reason as for
claim 1. See App. Br. 11–13.
With respect to claims 21–23, Appellant argues that Chu does not
perform a lineage analysis as claimed. App. Br. 13–14; Reply Br. 6.
Appellant does not contest the Examiner’s finding that Chu “can be used to
create, maintain and display metadata properties and lineage for objects.”
Reply Br. 6 (citing Ans. 16). Appellant admits that Chu “allows a user to
view a hierarchy of objects.” App. Br. 14. Appellant instead argues that this
finding does not show that Chu identifies objects on which a first object
depends and determines whether they are impacted by a change to the
metadata of the first object. Id., Reply Br. 6.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. Appellant argues that
Chu does not perform an identification of objects from which a first object
depends and are impacted by a change to the metadata of the first object. Id.
As noted, supra at 6, Appellant has not persuasively explained why the
Examiner’s combination of Alumbaugh and Chu would not teach or suggest
identifying a first set of objects that depend from a first object and are
impacted by a change to the metadata of the first object. The Examiner finds
Alumbaugh to provide “a change monitoring capability that monitors
changes to objects such as product versions in order to know exactly what is
different.” Final Act. 4 (citing Alumbaugh ¶¶ 234, 324-331). The Examiner
further references Alumbaugh’s change specification as utilizing an impact
analysis feature to assess the impact of change. Id. Further, Appellant
admits that Chu “allows for the monitoring and display of an object in a
hierarchy such that a lineage could be visible to a user.” Reply Br. 6.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s determination
Appeal 2018-009184
Application 14/506,931

9
that the combined teachings and suggestions of Alumbaugh and Chu render
obvious claim 21. Since claims 22 and 23 are not argued separately from
claim 21, and are rejected upon the same grounds as claim 21, they stand or
fall with claim 21. We, therefore, affirm the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of claims 21–23.
II.
We have reviewed the Examiner’s subject matter eligibility rejection
(Ans. 4–11) in light of Appellant’s contentions that the Examiner has erred
(Reply Br. 2–4). We are not persuaded by Appellant that the Examiner erred
in rejecting the pending claims 1–5, 7–9, 10–15, 17–18, and 20–23 under 35
U.S.C. § 101.4
Patent-eligible subject matter is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101 of the
Patent Act, which recites:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject
to the conditions and requirements of this title.
There is, however, an implicit, longstanding exception to patent-
eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (citation omitted). This exception precludes

4 We note Appellant’s concerns about the timing of the 35 U.S.C. § 101
rejection and the inability to submit additional evidence in a reply brief.
Reply Br. 2. However, Appellant was afforded an opportunity to reopen
prosecution to submit additional evidence or, alternatively, maintain the
appeal by filing a reply brief. Ans. 16–17. Appellant choose the latter.
Further, concerns relating to actions taken during examination are
addressable through timely petition under 37 C.F.R. § 1.181, rather than
through appeal.
Appeal 2018-009184
Application 14/506,931

10
patenting of “the basic tools of scientific and technological work” from
which all inventions spring. Id. at 216–17 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Invention or discovery under § 101 is distinguished as being the
application of such tools to an end otherwise satisfying the requirements of
the patent statutes. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
The Supreme Court has established a framework for this eligibility
determination. Where a claim is directed towards a law of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract idea, the elements of the claim, as a whole, must
ensure that the claim, in practice, amounts to significantly more than a patent
on the law of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea itself. Alice, 573
U.S. at 217–18. In applying this eligibility analysis, our reviewing court has
stated, “the decisional mechanism courts now apply is to examine earlier
cases in which a similar or parallel descriptive nature can be seen[,] . . . the
classic common law methodology for creating law when a single governing
definitional context is not available.” Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom,
Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
To address the growing body of precedent, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (“USPTO”) recently published revised examination
guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (hereinafter “2019
Guidance”). The 2019 Guidance seeks to improve the clarity of the subject
matter eligibility analysis and improve consistency of this analysis across the
USPTO. Id.
Under the 2019 Guidance, we first look to whether the claim is
directed to a judicial exception because:
Appeal 2018-009184
Application 14/506,931

11
(1) the claim recites a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract
idea, the last of which includes certain groupings, identified as
mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity
and mental processes; and
(2) the claim as a whole fails to recite additional elements that integrate
the judicial exception into a practical application (see MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINATION PROCEDURE (hereinafter “MPEP”)
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that are not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or instead,
simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality,
to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Guidance, passim.

“Recites an Abstract Idea”
The Examiner states (Ans. 4) that claim 1 recites the steps of:
receiving . . . a change to metadata of a first object stored
in a data warehouse, performing . . . an impact analysis for the
first object to identify a first set of objects that depend from the
first object and that are impacted by the change to the metadata
of the first object and generating . . . at least one first task to
propagate an impact of the change to the metadata of the first
Appeal 2018-009184
Application 14/506,931

12
object to the first set of objects that are impacted by the change
to the metadata of the first object.
The Examiner characterizes these limitations as generation of rule-
based tasks based on an analysis, which is a type of practice that humans
have long performed, and as such, is an abstract idea. Ans. 4–5.
Appellant disagrees with the Examiner’s determination, arguing that
no human action is involved; instead, the computerized database
management system performs the claimed tasks of performing the impact
analysis and generating tasks. Reply Br. 2.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. The involvement
of the computing device in performing these steps does not preclude a
finding that the steps recite an abstract idea. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 52 n.14 (citing Versata Dev. Grp. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2015)) for the proposition that “[c]ourts have examined claims
that required the use of a computer and still found that the underlying,
patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper or in a
person’s mind.”).
Here, the Examiner has identified steps in claim 1 as setting forth a
process for performing rule-based tasks based upon analysis, which involve
acts of observation, opinion, and judgment that have been characterized as
mental processes. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Such characterization
is consistent with the Appellant’s explanation that the problem being solved
is the amount of resources involved in the conventional maintenance of data
warehouses by warehouse designers, i.e., persons. Reply Br. 3; Spec. ¶ 12.
The record before us, therefore, indicates that the claimed processes are of
the type that can be practically performed in the human mind; i.e., of the
Appeal 2018-009184
Application 14/506,931

13
warehouse designer. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s
arguments that the Examiner has not shown sufficient reasoning to support a
finding that claim 1 recites a mental process that qualifies as an abstract idea
under the 2019 Guidance.
“Directed to an Abstract Idea”
Having determined that the claims recite an abstract idea, we next
determine, under Step 2A, Prong 2 of the 2019 Guidance, whether the claims
are directed to that abstract idea, or whether the claims integrate the abstract
idea into a practical application of that abstract idea. 2019 Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 54.
The Examiner finds claim 1 to have elements additional to those
limitations reciting an abstract idea; namely, storage of data and processors
for executing the limitations identified as corresponding to the abstract idea.
Ans. 5–6. The Examiner determines these limitations do not improve the
computer itself or improve any other technology. Id.
Appellant contends that claim 1 improves the technology of data
warehousing and the technical process of data migration and data updates
through performance of the impact analysis. Reply Br. 3. Appellant
contends that the decision of McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America
Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (2016) illustrates that a claim that enables the
automation of tasks that previously could not be automated provides a
technological improvement over the prior art. Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that claim 1 improves
any particular technology. Although Appellant contends improvement to the
technical process of data migration and data updates, Appellant has not
explained if these improvements result from improvements to technology or
Appeal 2018-009184
Application 14/506,931

14
from improvements to the abstract idea. The Specification attributes these
improvements to the impact analysis; however, the impact analysis relies
upon determining the dependencies among objects, which “may vary from
context to context.” Spec. ¶ 41. Appellant’s invention is “not limited to a
particular type of dependency rules,” but instead the “dependency rules may
be determined based upon a set of heuristics specified for a particular
context.” Id. ¶ 42.
As best understood, the claimed processor, database, and data storage
function as computational tools to carry out the claimed impact analysis
based upon determination of dependencies among objects via an unclaimed
approach for determining these dependencies. Appellant has not explained
how the alleged improvement necessarily results from the involvement of
the claimed technological components, and is not solely from either the
manner by which dependency rules have been determined, or the tasks
themselves that the Examiner has identified as the abstract idea. Further, the
decision in McRO relied, in part, on a determination that the computer
performed a function in a distinctly different manner from a subjective
mental process, such that the computer was not merely used as a tool for
automating subjective mental activity. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314. We are not
persuaded that such a difference has been shown here. Accordingly, we are
not persuaded that claim 1 is directed to any improvement in a technology or
technological field so as to show error in the Examiner’s determination that
the additionally-recited elements are not more than a processing tool that
aids in the above-identified judicially excepted mental process.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellant has not demonstrated error in
the Examiner’s determination that the claim, as a whole, fails to recite
Appeal 2018-009184
Application 14/506,931

15
additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application.
“Significantly More than the Abstract Idea”
Having determined that the claims are directed to an abstract idea, we
next determine, under Step 2B of the 2019 Guidance, whether the additional
elements of the claim provide significantly more than the recited abstract
idea. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
The Examiner concludes that the additional processor, database, and
storage devices are conventional for storage and performing tasks with data.
Ans. 5–6. Appellant has not contended that the claims recite non-
conventional arrangements of additional elements. Appellant has not
pointed out, nor do we find in the Specification, how the combination of
steps causes the generically claimed computer to manipulate data in an
unconventional manner. The Specification, for example, describes the
invention as not being limited to a particular arrangement of databases and
servers (Spec ¶ 29), links to source databases (Spec. ¶ 30), arrangement of
source databases, data warehouse, and warehouse manager (Spec. ¶ 31), or
any particular implementation of the component parts of the warehouse
manager performing the claimed functions (Spec. ¶ 33). Furthermore, the
use of a generically claimed computer to store, retrieve, and perform
electronic recordkeeping tasks have been recognized by the courts as well-
understood, routine, conventional activity. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225
(creating and maintaining ‘“shadow’ accounts”); Ultramercial Inc. v. Hulu,
772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (updating an activity log); Versata Dev.
Grp., 793 F.3d at 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (storing and retrieving information
in memory). Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the combination of the
Appeal 2018-009184
Application 14/506,931

16
additional elements of processor, data storage, and database function
together in an unconventional way and, therefore, include an inventive
concept sufficient to provide eligibility at Step 2B.
In view of the foregoing, under the 2019 Guidance, informed by our
governing case law concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101, Appellant has not shown
the Examiner erred in concluding claim 1 is directed to a judicial exception,
i.e., an abstract idea, without significantly more, and thus is patent-ineligible
under § 101. We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 101
rejection of claim 1. Appellant has not argued claims 2–5, 7–15, 17–18, and
20–23 separately, and those claims therefore stand or fall with claim 1.
Accordingly, we therefore sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection
of those claims.

CONCLUSION
In summary:

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).

AFFIRMED

Claims Rejected Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–5, 7–15, 17–18,
and 20–23
§ 103(a) 1–5, 7–15, 17–
18, and 20–23

1–5, 7–15, 17–18,
and 20–23
§ 101 1–5, 7–15, 17–
18, and 20–23

Overall Outcome 1–5, 7–15, 17–
18, and 20–23