0120083614
02-15-2012
Winifred Davis, Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southwest Area), Agency.
Winifred Davis,
Complainant,
v.
Patrick R. Donahoe,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Southwest Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120083614
Agency No. 4G-752-0390-06
DECISION
Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from a final
decision by the Agency dated July 21, 2008, finding that it was in
compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement into which the
parties entered. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the
Agency’s final decision.
BACKGROUND
On October 25, 2006, Complainant and the Agency entered into a settlement
agreement. The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that:
Once [Complainant] produces proof of permanent light duty status, she
will be entitled to compensation for the same number of hours that she
averaged the six months prior to August 8, 2006. She will resubmit
her request for light duty in accordance with Article 13 of the CBA.
Initiation of back pay will be the responsibility of [Agency employee],
Labor Relations Specialist.
Complainant subsequently alleged that the Agency was in breach of
the settlement agreement, and requested that the Agency specifically
implement its terms. Specifically, Complainant alleged that management
withdrew her limited duty assignment when it placed her off the clock
in a non-duty status in March 2008.1 She also stated that management
failed to provide her with a reasonable accommodation when she was placed
off duty and she claimed that management refused to honor the settlement
agreement giving her permanent light duty.
In its July 21, 2008 decision, the Agency concluded that it did not breach
the terms of the settlement agreement. The Agency noted that Person A,
the Acting Station Manager at the time, was a signatory to the agreement;
however, he was not sure of the date she was sent home and told not to
report to work because there was no light duty work available at the
Inwood Station. Person A stated that in the EEO discussion surrounding
her complaint, Complainant claimed she had been given a "Permanent Light
Duty" job offer twelve years earlier. Person A stated that neither he
nor Person B, also a signatory to the agreement, had ever heard of a
"Permanent Light Duty" job offer but they agreed if Complainant could
present proof of such, she would be returned to work and any compensation
would be initiated by the Labor Relations Specialist. Person A stated
that he later received instruction to return Complainant to work.
He stated that he did not see proof of Complainant's job offer, but he
did return her to work as instructed. Person A noted that when he left
the Inwood Station on April 4, 2007, Complainant was still working at
the Inwood Station.
The record contains a statement dated April 15, 2007, from Person C, a
Union Representative, stating that he recalls that sometime in 1996, the
light duty committee awarded Complainant a permanent light duty position.
He stated that at the time all parties on the light duty committee were
in agreement with this decision.
On appeal, Complainant states that she was awarded a permanent modified
duty assignment under the settlement agreement. She reiterates her
position that management breached the EEO settlement when it withdrew her
limited duty assignment and placed her off the clock in a non-duty status.
Complainant also notes she is disabled and that management failed to
provide her a reasonable accommodation when they placed her off duty
in March 2008. Complainant notes that Inwood Station was a very busy
station and at the time she was placed off duty, she had been working
ten hour days, sometimes six days a week. She alleges there was no
shortage of mail and no reason was given for placing her in a non-duty
status other than they could no longer accommodate her with work.
ANALYSIS
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement
agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached
at any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.
The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a contract
between the employee and the Agency, to which ordinary rules of contract
construction apply. See Herrington v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Request
No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further held that
it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract, not some
unexpressed intention, that controls the contract’s construction.
Eggleston v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795
(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard
to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally
relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states that
if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face, its
meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument
without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery
Elevator Co. v. Building Eng’g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).
In the present case, we find Complainant failed to show that the Agency
breached the terms of the October 25, 2006 agreement. According to the
terms of the agreement, once Complainant produced proof of her permanent
light duty status, the Agency would compensate her for the same number
of hours that she averaged the six months prior to August 8, 2006.
The agreement noted that back pay would be initiated by the Labor
Relations Specialist. The agreement also provided that Complainant
would resubmit her request for light duty in accordance with Article 13
of the CBA. Despite Complainant's contention, we find the settlement
agreement did not provide that Complainant would be placed indefinitely
in a permanent light duty assignment. Additionally, we find that the
statement from Person C did not conclusively show that Complainant was
awarded a permanent light duty assignment as a result of the October 25,
2006 settlement agreement. Thus, we find Complainant did not show the
Agency breached the agreement.
We note Complainant also alleges that she is disabled and that the Agency
denied her a reasonable accommodation when it placed her off the clock in
a non-duty status in March 2008. Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(c),
allegations that subsequent acts of discrimination violated a settlement
agreement must be processed as a separate complaint. Therefore, if
Complainant wishes to pursue this matter through the EEO process, she is
advised, if she has not already done so, to contact an EEO Counselor.
We note that Complainant's date of initial EEO contact should be the
date she first advised the Agency's EEO office or the Commission that
he was being subjected to subsequent acts of discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Agency’s final decision is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the
policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive
for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).
All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency
head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full
name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal
of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the
national organization, and not the local office, facility or department
in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a
civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative
processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that
the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also
permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other
security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,
29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within
the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with
the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.
Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits
as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File a Civil Action”).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
February 15, 2012
__________________
Date
1 The exact date Complainant was placed off duty is unclear. We note
in a March 12, 2008 letter to the Agency’s District Reasonable
Accommodation Committee (DRAC) Complainant claimed she was placed off the
clock on March 10, 2008. In her appeal statement dated April 22, 2008,
Complainant stated the Agency placed her off the clock on March 3, 2008.
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01-2008-3614
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
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0120083614