Windsor House C & D

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 30, 1992

309 N.L.R.B. 693 (N.L.R.B. 1992)

693
309 NLRB No. 101
WINDSOR HOUSE C & D
1 The Employer has excepted to some of the hearing officer’s
credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule
a hearing officer’s credibility resolutions unless a clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Stretch-Tex Co., 118 NLRB 1359, 1361 (1957). We find no basis
for reversing the findings.
In support of the hearing officer’s finding that the prounion em-
ployees involved in the conduct alleged in Objection 2 are not union
agents, we rely additionally on S. Lichtenberg & Co., 296 NLRB
1302 at fn. 4 (1989), and NLRB v. Herbert Halperin Distributing
Corp., 826 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1987), enfg. 281 NLRB No. 1 (Aug.
11, 1986) (not reported in Board volumes).
With respect to Objections 6–8, Members Oviatt and Raudabaugh
agree with the hearing officer that the Employer failed to present
sufficient evidence at the hearing in support of its position that a pe-
tition circulated by the Petitioner, claiming support, contained sub-
stantial numbers of forged signatures. Therefore they find it unneces-
sary to rule on the hearing officer’s finding that the petition was not
objectionable whether or not all the signatures on it were genuine.
Omni Manor, Inc. d/b/a Windsor House C & D and
Service Employees International Union, Local
627, AFL–CIO, CLC, Petitioner. Case 8–RC–
14422
November 30, 1992
DECISION AND CERTIFICATION OF
REPRESENTATIVE
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS OVIATT
AND RAUDABAUGH
The National Labor Relations Board, by a three-
member panel, has considered objections to an election
held February 27, 1991, and the hearing officer’s re-
port and recommendations on their disposition (perti-
nent portions of the report are attached). The election
was conducted pursuant to a Decision and Direction of
Election by the Regional Director for Region 8. The
tally of ballots shows 67 for and 59 against the Peti-
tioner, with 2 challenged ballots, a number insufficient
to affect the results.
The Board has reviewed the record in light of the
exceptions and briefs, has adopted the hearing officer’s
findings1 and recommendations, and finds that a cer-
tification of representative should issue.
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE
IT IS CERTIFIED that a majority of the valid ballots
have been cast for the Service Employees International
Union, Local 627, AFL–CIO, CLC and that it is the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the
employees in the following appropriate unit:
All full-time and regular part-time nursing
aides/assistants, nursing aide coordinators, assist-
ant nursing aide coordinators, dietary aides, cooks,
housekeepers, infection control aides, laundry em-
ployees, physical therapy aides, occupational ther-
apy aides, activity aides, maintenance employees
and licensed practical nurses employed by the
Employer at its Windsor House C & D facility lo-
cated at 1735 Belmont Avenue, Youngstown,
Ohio, excluding all administrators, directors of
nursing, head nurses, social service consultants,
dietary supervisors, registered dieticians, aides su-
pervisors, housekeeping/laundry supervisors, ac-
tivities directors, medical record consultants, pro-
fessional employees (including registered nurses),
office clerical employees, guards and supervisors
as defined in the Act.
MEMBER OVIATT, concurring.
I concur in my colleagues’ decision to adopt the
hearing officer’s findings and recommendations to
overrule the Employer’s objections. I write separately,
however, to explore the agency issue raised in Objec-
tion 2.
Objection 2 covers two incidents where, the Em-
ployer alleges, prounion employees who were the Peti-
tioner’s agents forcibly removed buttons and other in-
signia from the clothing of antiunion employees. The
hearing officer first addressed the question whether
two of the prounion employees, Thomas and Heard,
were in fact the Petitioner’s agents. He found that
Thomas and Heard were among the 23 members of the
union organizing committee at the Company. He also
found that Thomas had participated in passing out
union buttons on one occasion, had served as the ob-
server at the election, and had, after the election, been
chosen as a member of the union negotiating commit-
tee. The hearing officer noted that Heard had been
chosen as an alternate representative on the negotiating
committee and had told two other employees that he
was trying to ‘‘organize a union.’’
The hearing officer, in finding that Thomas and
Heard were not agents of the Petitioner, stressed that
the Petitioner’s International representative, Timko,
was responsible for the organizing campaign and that
she was present at the Employer’s facility on a regular
basis throughout the campaign and frequently passed
out literature to the employees as they arrived for
work. The hearing officer also emphasized that the or-
ganizing committee had no formal structure and that
its membership was open to anyone who attended the
Petitioner’s meetings on a regular basis. None of the
committee members was paid. The hearing officer also
observed that there was no evidence that the Petitioner
had authorized, condoned, or was aware of the actions
attributed to Thomas and Heard.
Even a cursory review of the case law makes clear
that it does not take much evidence for the Board to
find that an antiunion employee is an agent of the em-
ployer. See, e.g., Roskin Bros., 274 NLRB 413, 421
(1985) (rank-and-file employee who was perceived by
other employees as manager’s ‘‘right-hand man’’ re-
laying instructions to employees was employer’s
agent); Einhorn Enterprises, 279 NLRB 576 (1986)
694 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 All dates herein refer to 1991 unless otherwise indicated.
(clerical employee who had access to payroll records
and who relayed confidential information from man-
agement to rank-and-file employees and relayed to
management employee requests for raises was manage-
ment’s agent). See also Star Kist Samoa, Inc., 237
NLRB 238, 244–246 (1978) (five members of the
community who formed antiunion group were agents
of the employer because the employer had met with
the group and provided it with campaign literature, and
had not thereafter sufficiently disavowed the group’s
activities).
When it comes to the conduct of prounion employ-
ees, however, it would appear that the Board moves
somewhat more cautiously in deciding whether the em-
ployees are union agents. Thus, where an employee is
the original, and a principal, proponent of the union,
but does not specifically serve as the union spokesman
or as an employee contact for the union, the Board
will find that the employee is not a union agent. See,
e.g., Season-All Industries, 276 NLRB 1247, 1252
(1985). In one case where a prounion employee had
served as one of a seven-member in-house organizing
committee and had solicited support among the em-
ployees, answered their questions, given them the
union representative’s business card, distributed union
literature, kept the paid union organizer informed of
events at the plant, and served as the union’s election
observer, the Board held that the employee was not a
union agent because he did not approve the contents
of union literature and had no input into campaign
strategy. See Advance Products Corp., 304 NLRB 436
(1991).
I realize that paid union organizers cannot realisti-
cally control rank-and-file employee union advocates
to the same extent that an employer can control a su-
pervisor, for example. In my view, however, where the
union encourages the establishment of an in-plant or-
ganizing committee and directs the committee’s work,
the organizing committee members are union agents
when they proceed to do what the union has directed
them to do. In these circumstances, the union organizer
has, in my view, an obligation to advise and caution
employee union adherents that they must not threaten
or coerce their fellow employees in attempting to per-
suade them to join the union. When the union learns
of such threats and coercion, I believe that the union
has an obligation to disavow that conduct and to do
what it can to remedy it in the same way an employer
is required to remedy such conduct. In this we would
ensure that the employer and the union are provided
with a level playing field. If the union organizer does
not satisfy these minimal obligations, I would be in-
clined to attribute any in-plant organizing committee
member misconduct to the union.
In this case, I shall reluctantly go along with the
hearing officer’s determination that Thomas and Heard
are not the Petitioner’s agents. I do not rely on the
fact, however, that union organizer Timko was often
present at the plant and directed the organizing cam-
paign onsite. It is certainly possible that even with a
paid union organizer regularly present, prounion em-
ployees could be clothed with sufficient authority to
make them union agents when they solicit on the
Union’s behalf. I rely, instead, on the loosely knit na-
ture of the ‘‘organizing committee,’’ which any em-
ployee could join if he or she regularly attended the
Petitioner’s meetings, and which was in no way struc-
tured by the Petitioner. Further, although the Petitioner
apparently had available at its meetings literature and
buttons that employees could pick up and give to oth-
ers, the Petitioner did no more than that—it did not
give specific directives to the employees present with
respect to approaching their fellow employees. As did
the hearing officer, I also rely on the fact that the
Union did not condone—indeed, was not even aware
of—Thomas’ and Heard’s organizing activities. Fi-
nally, there is no evidence that Thomas and Heard
were perceived by the employees to be the main union
proponents. On these facts, I agree with the hearing of-
ficer’s conclusion that Thomas’ and Heard’s conduct
was not attributable to the Petitioner.
Finding that Thomas and Heard were not the Peti-
tioner’s agents, the hearing officer quite properly pro-
ceeded to consider their conduct and that of other
rank-and-file employees under a third-party standard.
See Westwood Horizons Hotel, 270 NLRB 802 (1984).
He found that the incidents covered in the objection
were insufficient to support a finding that they created
an atmosphere of fear and coercion. I agree. Accord-
ingly, I concur in my colleagues’ decision to affirm the
hearing officer and to overrule the objections.
APPENDIX
THE OBJECTIONS
Objection 2
In this objection, the Employer asserts that the Petitioner
through its officers, agents, and those acting on its behalf
forcibly removed buttons and other insignia from the cloth-
ing of employees who supported the Employer, thus creating
an atmosphere of fear, intimidation, and coercion.
In support of this objection the Employer presented em-
ployees Darlene Smith, Sally Hall, and Patricia Posterli, all
licensed practical nurses employed by the Employer at the
facility.
Smith testified that sometime near Martin Luther King day
in mid-January 1991,1 while inside the home, employee Rosa
Thomas gave her a button with Martin Luther King’s picture
on it; the union name was printed on the bottom of the but-
ton. Other union supporters were wearing these buttons that
day, having received them outside the facility as they came
to work. Thomas allegedly handed a button to Smith at the
695WINDSOR HOUSE C & D
south nursing station of the facility, a patient care area fre-
quented by bargaining unit employees. Smith further testified
that LPN Sally Hall was with her at the time and that both
of them received buttons from Thomas. According to Smith
she noticed that there was a ‘‘Union logo’’ on the button
after she received it, so she put a piece of tape across that
portion of the button before putting it on. When Thomas no-
ticed the piece of tape, she allegedly took it away from
Smith, telling her that if she wasn’t going to wear it ‘‘the
way it was’’ then she couldn’t have it. Smith testified that
Thomas grabbed the button from her hand and that she also
grabbed one from Hall.
In further testimony, Smith related that she received a
mailing after the election which named Rosa Thomas as a
member of the negotiating committee. She also testified that
Thomas was known to her as one of the principal union or-
ganizers and that several unidentified employees talked to
her about the incident after it occurred.
Sally Hall testified with respect to the incident, generally
corroborating the testimony offered by Smith. However, I
note significant differences between their testimony, specifi-
cally regarding whether or not Thomas ‘‘grabbed’’ the but-
tons back from them and whether or not the piece of tape
was ever placed on the buttons. According to Hall, after she
received the button from Thomas she told Thomas that she
was going to place a piece of tape across the union words.
When she said that, according to Hall, Thomas asked her to
give it back, telling her she could not have it if she was
going to tape out the Union words.’’ Hall then handed the
button back to Thomas. Hall had no knowledge concerning
the manner in which Smith returned the button to Thomas
because she did not see the transfer. Hall further testified that
Thomas had no further conversation with her regarding the
pin after it was returned and she did not report the incident
to any of her supervisors. According to Hall, she only men-
tioned the incident to one other employee. Finally, Hall con-
firmed that they never actually put tape on the pin before she
handed it back to Thomas.
Evidence concerning a second incident came from Smith
and from LPN Patricia Posterli. According to Smith, this sec-
ond incident occurred near the beginning of February, ap-
proximately 3 to 4 weeks before the election. Smith testified
that she and Posterli had made paper signs containing the
legend ‘‘SEIU—JUST SAY NO’’ and pinned them on the
front of their blouses. As they were walking down the hall
toward the gift shop, they encountered a group of about 10
employees. As they passed the group, an unidentified em-
ployee ripped the sign from her blouse. In addition, em-
ployee Ernestine Phillips ripped the sign from Posterli’s
blouse. Smith further testified that the unidentified person ap-
proached her and asked her ‘‘What the hell I was wearing
that for’’ before taking it from her. This incident occurred
in the presence of about 10 employees, many of whom were
wearing union buttons, most of whom laughed after the inci-
dent occurred. In addition, Smith testified that after the sign
was removed the employees moved in closer to them, mak-
ing it difficult to find a path through them. After the inci-
dent, Smith testified that she and Posterli went to the office
and discussed the incident with the director of nursing. Smith
also testified concerning employees who approached her after
the incident and asked her about it. She identified orderly
Onre Richmond and nursing assistant Marge Kather, both of
whom allegedly told her that they did not support the Union
but that they were afraid to tell anyone about it. I note that
neither Richmond nor Kather were called to testify by the
Employer. Finally, Smith testified that employee Donald
Heard, an orderly at the nursing home, was among those
standing in the group. According to Smith, Heard tried to
convince her to sign a union authorization card early in the
union campaign and told her that he was the employee who
‘‘pretty much started this whole Union business.’’
Posterli testified to corroborate Smith’s testimony. Accord-
ing to Posterli, she and Smith were walking toward the gift
shop sometime in early February when Phillips approached
her, read what she had pinned on her uniform, and pulled it
off. She further testified that Phillips asked her ‘‘what she
was doing wearing that’’ before she pulled the pin off. After
the pin was removed, approximately 10 employees gathered
around them to see ‘‘what was going on.’’ After the incident,
according to Posterli, she told Phillips: ‘‘I don’t tell you
what to wear on your uniform and you don’t tell me what
to wear on mine.’’ After she said that, Phillips apologized
and handed the button back to her. She also testified that she
wasn’t physically afraid of Phillips, that she knows her, that
she felt fairly comfortable around her. However, Posterli did
admit that the other employees in the group worked the day
shift and that she didn’t know them very well. Posterli fur-
ther testified that several people, eligible voters, asked her
about the incident after it occurred and that several of those
employees, including orderly Richmond, said that they did
not support Union but were afraid to tell anyone. Posterli
also related an earlier conversation with Heard, who told her:
‘‘As you have probably heard, I am trying to organize a
Union here.’’ She testified that this conversation occurred the
first time Heard approached her about the Union in Decem-
ber 1990. On cross-examination Posterli testified that she
wore a button which said ‘‘Support the Company—Vote
NO’’ during the 10 days preceding the election. In addition,
she testified that ‘‘more than 10’’ other employees also wore
the buttons. She also testified that Phillips’ nickname is
‘‘Tiny’’ because she is a small person; she estimated her
height at ‘‘five feet.’’
The Petitioner presented Rosa Thomas, who testified con-
cerning the incident described by Smith and Hall. According
to Thomas, Smith and Hall asked her for the pins after she
started her shift. When she gave them the pins, they ‘‘started
to tape them up.’’ She asked why they were doing that and
they responded that they didn’t support the Union. Thomas
then asked them for the pins back saying that ‘‘If you are
going to tape it up, give it back.’’ Both pins were voluntarily
given back to her and she denied taking them away from the
employees. On cross-examination, Thomas testified that she
attended union meetings but did not speak during them, that
she was not aware of her election as a member of the
Union’s negotiating team, and that she did not ask employees
to support the Union during the campaign. She further testi-
fied that she was an observer for the Union during the elec-
tion and that she received the buttons from the Union. How-
ever, she did not distribute any petitions for the Union nor
did she solicit any signatures on petitions or on authorization
cards for the Union during the campaign.
The Petitioner also presented testimony from International
Organizer Debra Timko. In her testimony she indicated that
it was her responsibility to lead the organizing campaign. In
696 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
addition, she testified that negotiating committee members as
set forth in Employer Exhibit 3, were elected to those posi-
tions after the election. Specifically, she testified that a meet-
ing was held on March 5 to select negotiating committee
members and that the results of that election were commu-
nicated to the employees in the letter of March 8. On cross-
examination Timko testified that the organizing committee
was composed of approximately 23 employees. According to
Timko, the committee was a group of workers who showed
their commitment to building the Union by their regular at-
tendance at meetings in the early days of the campaign.
Their function was to build support for the Union inside the
nursing home. Timko encouraged them to distribute literature
and buttons and to persuade people to join the Union. How-
ever, there is nothing in her testimony which indicates that
members of the organizing committee had any formal duties,
nor does her testimony establish that the Union provided any
financial support to members of the organizing committee.
Finally, no evidence was offered to indicate that the mem-
bers of the organizing committee were given or possessed ac-
tual authority to act in any capacity on behalf of the Union.
The Petitioner did not present any witnesses regarding the
incident related by Smith and Posterli. Therefore, in the ab-
sence of any testimony to the contrary, I must credit the ver-
sion of that incident as related by them.
In order to resolve this objection, it is first necessary to
consider whether the evidence, as related above, supports a
finding that Thomas, Phillips, and/or Heard were agents of
the Petitioner. The only evidence offered by the Employer
regarding Thomas is her participation in passing out buttons
on one occasion, her service as Petitioner observer, and her
postelection choice as a member of the negotiating commit-
tee. Heard was chosen as an alternate representative and al-
legedly told Smith and Posterli that he was trying to ‘‘orga-
nize a union.’’ The Employer offered no evidence in an ef-
fort to establish that Phillips was an agent of the Petitioner.
With regard to this issue, I find that neither Thomas Phil-
lips nor Heard were agents of the Union. Clearly, the testi-
mony established that International Representative Timko
was responsible for the organizing campaign. Although all
three were members of the 23-member organizing committee,
the evidence establishes that this committee had no formal
structure (for example, officers or subcommittees) and that
its membership was open to anyone who attended the Peti-
tioner meetings on a regular basis. All of the members, it ap-
pears, gave their support voluntarily and without pay. In ad-
dition, Timko was present at the Employer’s facility on a
regular basis throughout the campaign and her presence and
availability was well known to the employees because she
frequently passed out literature to them as they arrived for
work. Finally, there is no eidence that the Union either au-
thorized, condoned, or was even aware of the actions attrib-
uted to Thomas, Phillips, and Heard. I therefore conclude
that this conduct, if it occurred, is not attributable to the
Union. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 256 NLRB 1135, 1139
(1981); Firestone Steel Products, 235 NLRB 548 (1978).
Therefore, the alleged conduct complained of by the Em-
ployer must be considered under the standard for third party
conduct set forth in Westwood Horizons Hotel, 270 NLRB
802, 803 (1984). In that case, the Board held that the stand-
ard is: ‘‘whether the misconduct was so aggravated as to cre-
ate general atmosphere of fear and reprisal rendering a free
election impossible.’’
In the instant case, the Employer has presented testimony
covering two isolated incidents between small numbers of
employees on opposing sides of an emotional issue during a
90-day election campaign. The incidents, even if I credit the
testimony of the Employer witnesses, occurred about 45 days
and 30 days before the election. They involved, at most,
three pro-Employer employees. There were no threats made
by prounion employees. Again, crediting Employer witnesses
Smith and Hall, I find that the Rosa Thomas incident con-
tained no coercive conduct. The testimony of Smith and Hall
is in conflict regarding whether Thomas grabbed the pins
from them when she learned that they intended to deface
them but that is immaterial. I find and conclude that the
mere act of retrieving the pins once Thomas learned that the
employees intended to cover the union name did not con-
stitute any form of conduct which would justify a conclusion
that an atmosphere of fear and coercion was created by the
employee involved especially in light of Thomas’ testimony
which I credit that the employees asked for the buttons.
In like manner, the incident involving Smith and Posterli,
while arguably more serious in nature, does not rise to a
level contemplated by the Board in Westwood, supra. Thus,
no physical violence occurred, none of the prounion employ-
ees made any threats to the employees wearing the signs, and
the one identifiable employee who removed the sign apolo-
gized and gave it back. In addition, while it did occur in the
presence of, at most, 10 other employees, it also occurred al-
most 4 weeks before the election. There is no testimony on
this record establishing that the incident became the subject
of general discussion throughout the facility in the interven-
ing weeks. In addition, the employees involved and numer-
ous other pro-Employer employees felt no fear when they
wore pro-Employer buttons for the 10 days immediately pre-
ceding the election. In those circumstances and based on the
above conclusions, I can only find that this incident, like the
first, was too minimal to have interfered with the conduct of
a free and fair election. Klean Brite Laboratories, 292 NLRB
747 fn. 2 (1989); Cafe LaSalle, 280 NLRB 379 fn. 1 (1986).
Even when the two ‘‘incidents’’ are considered together,
it is not possible to conclude that their cumulative effect on
unit employees was sufficient to support a finding that an at-
mosphere of fear and coercion was created. In cases when
the Board has found sufficient employee conduct to create
such an atmosphere, the threats have been numerous, and
have specified violent action: for example, in Picoma Indus-
tries, 296 NLRB 498 (1989), the prounion employees threat-
ened to blow up an employer supporter’s car, to blow up the
plant, and to beat up numerous employer supporters. In addi-
tion, such cases have involved pervasive conduct of a violent
or threatening nature which occurred very near the election;
Westwood, supra. I can find no case in which the Board con-
cluded that an atmosphere of fear and coercion was created
by two isolated incidents in a 90-day campaign, the last oc-
curring a minimum of 4 weeks before the election and with-
out any specific or even general threat of violent action made
by an prounion employee. Even crediting the record testi-
mony of the Employer witnesses, there is no basis to over-
turn the election, and I shall recommend that Employer’s Ob-
jection 2 be overruled.
697WINDSOR HOUSE C & D
OBJECTIONS 6, 7, AND 8
In those objections, the Employer alleges that the Peti-
tioner circulated a petition in the Employer’s facility, obtain-
ing signatures on it through threatening, intimidating, and co-
ercive means, forging signatures on the petition all in an ef-
fort to create the impression that the Petitioner enjoyed wide-
spread support throughout the Employer’s facility.
Before I consider the evidence offered by the Employer in
this matter I note that the Regional Director found the fol-
lowing:
With respect to Objection 6, there is nothing inherently
objectionable to the Petitioner’s circulation and distribu-
tion of a petition which demonstrates the widespread
support of the Petitioner by bargaining unit employees.
The Regional Director went on to order the hearing on
Objections 6, 7, and 8 only because Objections 7 and 8 raise
issues of fact which cannot be resolved ex parte (p. 4).
In considering those objections, I agree with the Regional
Director that the mere distribution of a petition showing em-
ployee support is not objectionable conduct. J. C. Penney
Food Department, 195 NLRB 91 fn. 4 (1972); Springfield
Hospital, 281 NLRB 643 (1986). I shall, therefore, overrule
Objection 6.
However, the question remains regarding whether the Peti-
tioner committed objectionable conduct if it coerced employ-
ees into signing the petition or if it forged the signatures of
employees on the petition, as alleged in Objections 7 and 8.
On this record, the Employer has not presented any testi-
mony establishing that the Petitioner coerced any employee
to sign the petition; in fact, the only testimony on this record
regarding the solicitation of signatures is from Timko. Ac-
cording to Timko, she instructed employees who solicited
signatures on the petition to merely ask employees if they
were going to vote for the Union. If the answer was anything
but ‘‘yes,’’ then they did not sign the petition. Timko testi-
fied that the purpose of the petition was to give the Union
‘‘a general idea . . . of what the vote will be’’ (Tr. 118).
Nothing in this record even alleges, much less establishes,
that any coercion, intimidation, or threats were used by any-
one who solicited signatures for this purpose. For that rea-
son, I shall overrule Employer Objection 7.
With respect to Objection 8, wherein the Employer asserts
that the Petitioner forged signatures of employees on this pe-
tition, the Employer offered the written, notarized statements
of two employees wherein it is asserted that they did not sign
the petition and that they believed that their signatures were
copies from another document. The Employer did not present
these witnesses to testify at the hearing; thus, the Petitioner
was unable to cross-examine their testimony. In addition, it
appears from my cursory examination of the signatures on
the affidavits and in the petition that there are significant
similarities between them. However, I conclude that it is im-
material, given the finding that the distribution of the petition
is not objectionable, whether or not all of the signatures
thereon are genuine.
In reaching that conclusion, I rely on the Board’s conclu-
sion in J. C. Penney Food Department, supra, that a union’s
polling of certain eligible voters as to how they were going
to vote in the election did not warrant setting aside the elec-
tion. The Board has further addressed that issue in
Glamonise Foundations, 197 NLRB 729 (1972), in which it
held that a union engaged in organizing employees may le-
gitimately measure its support among the work force while
an employer may not do so. Therefore, assuming arguendo
that some of the signatures on the petition are not genuine—
an assumption I am not prepared to make due to the unreli-
able nature of the evidence offered to support that allega-
tion—that fact would not establish that the Union engaged in
any objectionable conduct because the petition itself, no mat-
ter how it is used, is not objectionable. I shall, therefore, rec-
ommend that Employer Objection 8 be overruled.