William Cameron. Powell et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 27, 2019

13075903 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 27, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/075,903 03/30/2011 William Cameron Powell 23956-0006001 2589
26201 7590 09/27/2019
FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. (AU)
P.O BOX 1022
Minneapolis, MN 55440-1022
EXAMINER
NGUYEN, TRANG T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3686
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/27/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PATDOCTC@fr.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte WILLIAM CAMERON POWELL and STEPHEN TREY MOORE
____________

Appeal 2018-006222
Application 13/075,903
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, MARC S. HOFF, and
DENISE M. POTHIER, Administrative Patent Judges.

POTHIER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1,2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 1–20.
We AFFIRM.

1 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the Final Action (Final Act.) mailed
September 14, 2017, the Appeal Brief (Appeal Br.) filed January 10, 2018,
the Examiner’s Answer (Ans.) mailed April 3, 2018, and the Reply Brief
(Reply Br.) filed May 29, 2018.
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Airstrip IP
Holdings, LLC. Appeal Br. 4.
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Appellant’s invention “generally relates systems and methods for
transmitting, receiving and displaying data and/or information over wireless
communication and data processing devices, and more specifically to
systems and methods for multi-factor authentication for accessing medical
patient data and/or information from a mobile device.” Spec. ¶ 2.
Illustrative, independent claim 1 reads as follows:
A computer-implemented method for authenticating a
mobile device and a user of the mobile device to receive patient
data, comprising:
[(A)] receiving, by a data management system
comprising one or more processors, a logon request, the logon
request comprising credentials associated with the user and at
least one technical factor associated with the mobile device;
[(B)] accessing, by the data management system, a
validation database based on one of the at least one technical
factor and the credentials;
[(C)] authenticating, by the data management system, the
mobile device by determining that the mobile device is an
authorized mobile device based on information provided by the
validation database and at least one of the at least one technical
factor and the credentials;
[(D)] authenticating the user by comparing the
credentials received at the data management system with
authentication information stored at a first clinical information
system of a first medical facility and a second clinical
information system of a second medical facility that is different
from the first medical facility to validate the credentials to
ensure that the user is authorized to access the patient data
provided by the first clinical information system and the
second clinical information system, from which the mobile
device is configured to receive the patient data; and
[(E)] then, in response to authenticating the mobile
device and authenticating the user:
[(i)] establishing a session to communicate the patient
data between the mobile device and the first clinical
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information system and the second clinical information system
through the data management system,
[(ii)] integrating, by the data management system, the
patient data from a plurality of clinical information systems, by
selectively synchronizing a portion of the patient data, the
portion of the patient data being less than all of an available
patient data within the plurality of clinical information systems,
such that none of the available patient data is synchronized
prior to establishing the session and the portion of the patient
data is selectively synchronized based on one or more
configuration settings used by the plurality of clinical
information systems and a custom rule defining data elements
corresponding to the patient data that are to be synchronized,
the configuration settings defining a first arrangement of a first
set of patients within the first medical facility and a second
arrangement of a second set of patients within the second
medical facility and being automatically provided by a
configuration module to the data management system, and
[(iii)] processing, by the data management system, the
patient data communicated to the mobile device during the
session.

Appeal Br. 30–31 (Claims App’x) (bracketing, letters, numbering, and
parentheses added) (“steps (A)–(E)(iii)”).
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections3 in light of
Appellant’s arguments presented in this appeal. Arguments which
Appellant could have made, but did not make in the Brief are deemed
to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2016). On the record
before us and as explained below, we are unpersuaded the Examiner
has erred.

3 The Examiner has withdrawn the rejection under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(a) or § 112, first paragraph (pre-AIA). Ans. 3.
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THE PATENT INELIGIBILITY REJECTION
Claims 1–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed
invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural
phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more. Final Act. 4–
7. Appellant argues claims 1–20 as a group. Appeal Br. 15–23. We select
independent claim 1 as representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Regarding claim 1, the Examiner found that claim 1 is directed to
“[a]uthenticating a mobile device and a user of the mobile device to receive
patient data.” Final Act. 5. The Examiner identified the “non-transitory
computer readable storage device, mobile device and computer processors”
as additional elements that “serve[] to perform generic computer functions”
and “generally link the abstract idea to a particular technological
environment or field of use.” Id. at 6 (bolding omitted). The Examiner
found the additional elements perform functions that are well-understood,
routine and conventional. Id. The Examiner further stated “there is no
indication that the combination of elements improves the functioning of a
computer or improves any other technology” and “[t]heir collective
functions merely provide conventional computer implementation.” Ans. 6.
Appellant argues the Examiner did not establish a prima facie case of
patent-ineligibility and overgeneralized claim 1. Appeal Br. 20–21. More
specifically, Appellant asserts the Examiner did not identify the abstract
idea, explain how the abstract idea corresponds to those identified by the
courts as abstract ideas, and did not address any additional elements and why
they failed to amount to significantly more than a judicial exception. Id. at
20. In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues the Examiner has ignored claim
language, including the “processing” step in claim 1. Reply Br. 3.
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Appellant contends claim 1 is rooted in technology (1) arising in
computer networks and (2) that did not exist prior to the Internet. Appeal
Br. 19–20, 23. Appellant specifically asserts the “integrating” step in claim
1 addresses (1) technical challenges/constraints that “relate[] to speed,
performance, memory and display size” associated with large data amounts
(id. at 22) and (2) a concrete solution to technical problem, including
“technology work[ing] reliably and efficiently over potentially low speed,
low bandwidth, and sometimes intermittent wireless connections” (id. at 19
(quoting Spec. ¶ 3); id. at 21–22) for “service[ing] an increased number of
clients and configurations” with custom business rule logic (id. at 22
(quoting Spec. ¶ 51)). See also Reply Br. 3. Appellant further indicates the
recited “selectively synchronizing patient data for efficient remote
monitoring of patient data” in claim 1 addresses “technological problems.”
Id. at 23.

ISSUE
Under § 101, has the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 by
determining that the claims are directed to judicially excepted, patent
ineligible subject matter?

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[L]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
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Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (brackets in original) (citing Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014)
(citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In accordance with that framework, we
first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S.
at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding of rubber products” (Diehr, 450 U.S. at 193); “tanning,
dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores”
(id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267–68
(185))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v.
Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
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concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In January 2019, the USPTO published revised guidance on the
application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”). Under the
Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–54); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(MPEP) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)) (Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 53–55).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application (“Revised Step 2A”), do we then look
to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
well-understood, routine, and conventional in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
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(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, and conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56 (“Step 2B”).

ANALYSIS
At the outset, we disagree with Appellant that the Examiner did not
establish a prima facie case of patent-ineligibility. Appeal Br. 20–21. The
Examiner stated the claims are directed to abstract idea, including
“[a]uthenticating a mobile device and a user of the mobile device to receive
patient data.” Final Act. 5. The Examiner further identified additional
elements in the claims and found, when viewed as a whole, they are not
sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. Id. at
5–6. Specifically, the Examiner found the additional elements merely
perform generic computer functions and generally link the abstract idea to a
particular technological environment without improving any technology,
perform conventional computer implementations, and perform insignificant,
conventional extra-solution activities. Id. at 6; see Ans. 6. The Examiner, as
such, analyzed both steps of the Alice/Mayo framework under § 101.
Alice Step One
Claim 1 recites a method and, therefore, falls within the process category
of § 101. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–54. Despite falling
within a statutory category, we must determine whether claim 1 as a whole
is directed to a judicial exception, namely an abstract idea. See Alice, 573
U.S. at 217. To this end, we determine (1) whether claim 1 recites a judicial
exception (“Revised Step 2A - Prong 1”) and, if so, (2) whether the
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identified judicial exception is integrated into a practical application
(“Revised Step 2A – Prong 2”). See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
52–55. If both elements are satisfied, the claim is directed to a judicial
exception under the first step of the Alice/Mayo test. See id.
Revised Step 2A - Prong 1
In step, we identify claim 1’s specific limitations that recite a judicial
exception, and determine whether the identified limitations fall within
certain subject matter groupings, namely (a) mathematical concepts
(mathematical relationships, formulas, and calculations); (b) certain methods
of organizing human activity (e.g., fundamental economic practices,
commercial or legal interactions, and managing personal behavior or
interactions between people); or (c) mental processes (e.g., concepts
performed in the human mind including an observation, evaluation,
judgment, or opinion). See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. We agree
with the Examiner (see Final Act. 5) that claim 1 recites at least one judicial
exception.
Claim 1 recites a “method for authenticating a mobile device and a
user of the mobile device to receive patient data,” the method “comprising”;
limitations [A] (i.e., “receiving . . . a . . . request, the . . . request comprising
credentials associated with the user and at least one technical factor
associated with the mobile device,”), limitation (C) (i.e., “authenticating . . .
the mobile device by determining that the mobile device is an authorized
mobile device based on information . . . and at least one of the at least one
technical factor and the credentials,”), and limitation (D) (i.e.,
(D) authenticating the user by comparing the credentials . . .
with authentication information stored at a first clinical
information system of a first medical facility and a second
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clinical information system of a second medical facility that is
different from the first medical facility to validate the
credentials to ensure that the user is authorized to access the
patient data provided by the first clinical information system
and the second clinical information system . . . [).]

Appeal Br. 30–31 (Claims App’x) (“steps (A)–(E)”).
Like the Examiner found (see Final Act. 5; see Ans. 5–6), the above
steps (A), (C), and (D), under their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite
authenticating a device and a user to ensure the user is authorized to access
and receive certain patient data from medical facilities. Appeal Br. 30
(Claims App’x). Consistent with the written description, the Specification
also states the invention relates to “multi-factor authentication for accessing
medical patient data and/or information from a mobile device.” Spec. ¶ 2.
Although claim 1 recites authenticating “based on” certain information (e.g.,
step (C)) or by comparing information (e.g., step (D)), the claim does not
sufficiently recite or limit the claimed method to a particular way of, or
algorithm, for performing its steps. Appeal Br. 30 (Claims App’x); see
Spec. ¶¶ 53, 67, Fig. 4. Thus, the scope of steps (A), (C), and (D) are broad
enough to encompass processes that would occur normally in a human’s
mind when authenticating a device and a user to receive patient data from
medical facilities.
For example, a person can merely observe a user’s credentials and a
technical factor (e.g., a user’s name and a user id/telephone number (see
Spec. ¶ 63)) by viewing the information on a screen or paper and thus
“receiv[e] . . . a . . . request, the . . . request comprising credentials
associated with the user and at least one technical factor associated with the
mobile device” as step (A) encompasses. Also, a person can evaluate
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mentally (or with pen and paper) (1) information provided within files (e.g.,
a validation data source) at different medical facilities (e.g., a doctor’s office
and a hospital), (2) the provided technical factor, and (3) the provided user
credential by comparing this data against an authorized device/user list to
ensure that the user is authorized to access the patient data as steps (C) and
(D) encompass.
Thus, with the exception of generic computer-implementations recited
in claim 1’s steps (A), (C), and (D), there is nothing in these steps that
forecloses the steps from being performed mentally or using pen and paper.
See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372–73
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (determining that a claim’s steps could “be performed in the
human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper” when neither the claim
nor the written description limited the steps to a particular algorithm), 1375
(noting “purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed
by a computer”); see Prism Techs. LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 696 F. App’x
1014, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting claims directed to receiving identity
data from a device, confirming the data authenticity, determining whether
the device is authorized to access resources, and permitting access if
authorized are abstract processes and noting T-Mobile provided “various
pre-computer-age corollaries for which humans similarly restrict and
provide access to resources”); see also EasyWeb Innovations, LLC v.
Twitter, Inc., 689 F. App’x 969, 971 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating claims reciting
“the familiar concepts of receiving, authenticating, and publishing data” are
analogous to “claims involving data collection, analysis, and publication,”
which are directed to an abstract idea) (citing Elec. Power Grp., LLC v.
Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
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Further, claim 1’s step (E)(ii), under its broadest reasonable
interpretation, recites combining certain patient data from two clinical
information systems based on configuration setting(s) and a custom rule. Id.
at 31 (Claims App’x); see also Spec. ¶¶ 51–52. This step is broad enough to
encompass acts that people can perform mentally or using pen and paper
when combining patient data from two clinical information sources.
Although step (E)(ii) recites integrating and selectively synchronizing
patient data “based on” certain setting(s) and a rule, the claim does not recite
or limit the claimed method sufficiently to a particular way of or particular
algorithm for performing the step. Appeal Br. 31 (Claims App’x); see Spec.
¶¶ 53, 67, Fig. 4. Thus, the scope of step (E)(ii) is broad enough to
encompass processes that would occur normally in a human’s mind when
integrating certain patient data from two clinical information sources.
For example, a person can evaluate mentally (or using pen and paper)
information from clinical information sources based on (1) doctor/patient
assignment (e.g., a patient arrangement) within two medical facilities (e.g.,
the recited “configuration setting”) and (2) a date range (e.g., the recited
“custom rule”) to integrate and synthesize certain patient data as step (E)(ii)
broadly encompasses. Other than the generic computer-implementations
recited in step (E)(ii), there is nothing in this step that forecloses the step
from being performed mentally or with pen and paper. See Univ. of Fla.
Res. Found. Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 916 F.3d 1363, 1366–67 (2019)
(indicating an invention directed to integrating physiologic treatment data
and “data synthesis technology” sought to automate “pen and paper
methodologies” as the specification disclosed) (citing Elec. Power Grp., 830
F.3d at 1353–54); see also Apple Inc. v. Ameranth Inc., 842 F.3d 1229,
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1240–42 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (indicating claims that synchronize data from
different sources without claiming a particular way of programming or
designing the software are directed to an abstract idea); see also Elec. Power
Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353–54 (holding the claims directed to “collecting
information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and
analysis” were abstract and treating analyzing information “as essentially
mental processes within the abstract-idea category”); see Content Extraction
and Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343,
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (noting collecting data, recognizing certain data within
a collected data set, and storing the recognized data is abstract).
For the above reasons, we conclude claim 1 as a whole recites mental
processes identified in the Revised Guidance. See Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 52. Accordingly, we determine claim 1 recites an abstract idea.
Revised Step 2A - Prong 2
Because claim 1 recites judicial exceptions, we must determine
whether the judicial exceptions are integrated into a practical application,
namely whether the claim applies, relies on, or uses the judicial exceptions
in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exceptions, such
that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
judicial exceptions. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53. We (1)
identify whether there are any additional, recited elements beyond the
judicial exceptions, and (2) evaluate those elements individually and
collectively to determine whether they integrate the exceptions into a
practical application. See id., 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55.
The additionally recited elements beyond the above-identified judicial
exceptions in claim 1 are “a mobile device,” “a data management system
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comprising one or more processors,” “a logon request,” “a validation
database,” “a first clinical information system of a first medical facility,” “a
second clinical information system of a second medical facility,” “a plurality
of clinical information systems,” “accessing, by the data management
system, a validation database based on one of the at least one technical
factor and the credentials” (i.e., step (B)), “establishing a session to
communicate the patient data between the mobile device and the first
clinical information system and the second clinical information system
through the data management system,” (i.e., step (E)(i)), “automatically”
providing the recited one or more configuration settings “by a configuration
module to the data management system” (i.e., parts of step (E)(ii)), and
“processing, by the data management system, the patient data communicated
to the mobile device during the session” (i.e., step (E)(iii)). Appeal Br. 30–
31 (Claims App’x) (emphasis added); see Final Act. 6. Independent claims
17 and 18 additionally recite a “non-transitory computer-readable storage
device encoded with a computer program” and “non-transitory computer-
readable medium” respectively. Id. at 34, 36 (Claims App’x). When
considering these elements individually or in combination, we determine
they do not integrate the above-identified judicial exceptions into a practical
application.
Rather, the additionally recited elements merely automate the
above-identified judicial exceptions (i.e., authenticating a mobile device/user
to receive patient data and arranging certain patient data based on a setting
and a rule) using generic computer elements as tools, which does not
constitute an improvement in a computer or computer technology. See Final
Act. 30; see Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044,
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1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see Alice, 573 U.S. at 221, 223, 225; see EasyWeb,
689 F. App’x at 971. For example, the claimed “mobile device,” “one or
more processor,” and the “data management system” (DMS) are merely
tools to perform the identified judicial exceptions, including steps (A), (C),
(D), and (E)(ii), but do not recite an improvement to these elements or on
how they function. Appeal Br. 30–31 (Claims App’x). The written
description also discusses these components generically. See, e.g., Spec.
¶¶ 17–18 (describing processors “perform one or more actions in accordance
with methods provided herein”), 30. Likewise, the recited “validation
database,” “first clinical information system of a first medical facility,”
“second clinical information system of a second medical facility,” and
“plurality of clinical information systems” are generic computer tools that
perform storing functions in steps (B), (C) and (E)(ii) but do not recite a
technological improvement in these elements or on how they operate.
Appeal Br. 30–31 (Claims App’x).
The claimed “configuration module” is a software component used to
provide the configuration settings automatically but does not recite an
improvement in its functionality (id. at 31 (Claims App’x), and the recited
“logon request” in claim 1 (Appeal Br. 30 (Claims App’x) (emphasis
added)) merely automates the above-identified abstract idea (e.g.,
authenticating a mobile device/user based on a user request) rather than
improve on a computer function or technology (id. (Claims App’x)).
We add that recited steps (B), (E)(i), and (E)(iii) in claim 1 can be
considered insignificant extra-solution activities. For example, recited step
(B), which accesses a validation database for information, and step (E)(iii),
which processes certain patient data communicated to a mobile device, can
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be considered insignificant data-gathering activities. See Bilski, 545 F.3d
943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350,
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and sends the information
over a network—with no further specification—is not even arguably
inventive.”). Similarly, step (E)(ii), which establishes a session to
communicate the patient data between the mobile device and the clinical
information systems through the DMS, is an insignificant pre-solution
activity that allows for the data-gathering activity in step (E)(ii) and does not
add a meaningful limitation to the abstract process of combining certain
patient data from two clinical information systems based on a configuration
setting and a custom in claim 1. Cf. Ameranth, 842 F.3d at 1242 (indicating
synchronizing data from different sources, printing features, and types of
ordering were insignificant post-solution activities); cf. Elec. Power Grp.,
830 F.3d at 1354–55 (indicating selecting data based on certain information
for collection and analysis was considered insignificant extra-solution
activities). Thus, steps (B), (E)(i), and (E)(iii) do not integrate the judicial
exceptions into a practical application for these additional reasons. See
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(g)).
Contrary to Appellant’s assertions (see Appeal Br. 18–23), the
additional elements beyond the identified judicial exceptions do not reflect
an improvement in a computer’s functioning or an improvement to other
technology or technical field as set forth in MPEP § 2106.05(a) and the
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. See Ans. 8 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 19,
25–27, 37–38). Appellant contends claim 1 is rooted in technology arising
in computer networks that did not exist prior to the Internet. See Appeal Br.
19–20 (citing Spec. ¶ 3), 23. Appellant specifically asserts the “integrating”
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step (i.e., step (E)(ii)) addresses (1) technical challenges/constraints that
“relate[] to speed, performance, memory and display size” associated with
large data amounts (id. at 22) and (2) a concrete solution to a technical
problem, including “technology work[ing] reliably and efficiently over
potentially low speed, low bandwidth, and sometimes intermittent wireless
connections” (id. at 20 (quoting Spec. ¶ 3); id. at 21–22) for “servic[ing] an
increased number of clients and configurations” with custom business rule
logic (id. at 22 (quoting Spec. ¶ 51)). See also Reply Br. 3. For the below
reasons, there is insufficient persuasive evidence to substantiate these
contentions.
First, the “integrating” step (i.e., (E)(ii)) is part of the identified
judicial exceptions (i.e., mental processes). But, an abstract idea itself
cannot integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See Trading
Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting
SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“The
abstract idea itself cannot supply the inventive concept, ‘no matter how
groundbreaking the advance.’”). To the extent step (E)(ii) has additional
elements beyond the judicial exception (e.g., a DMS, clinical information
systems, and a configuration module), we explained above how these
elements do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application
but rather are no more than (a) tools to implement the judicial exception or
(b) part of insignificant extra-solution activities to the judicial exception.
Second, many of the asserted technical advantages (e.g., improving
memory, display size, and reliability/efficiency over potentially low speed,
low bandwidth, and intermittent wireless connection (Appeal Br. 19)) are
not recited features in claim 1. Appeal Br. 30–31 (Claims App’x). To
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provide one example, claim 1, including step (E)(ii), does not recite
implementing a notification system that provides a link between software
development design and changes in software artifacts, such as source code,
as argued. Id. at 21–22. To the extent the intelligent agent (see id.)
discussed in the Specification (Spec. ¶ 51) is recited in step (E)(ii), the
written description indicates the custom rule, which is part of the abstract
idea, allows the DMS to function more efficiently and to serve more clients
(see id.), thus at best improving on the identified abstract idea rather than a
computer/technological improvement.
Appellant further contends that the claimed invention is necessarily
rooted in computer technology and overcomes a problem specifically arising
in computers as in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245,
1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Appeal Br. 19–20. We disagree. Claim 1’s step
(E)(ii), at best, is directed to nothing more than the performance of a judicial
exception on the Internet using conventional computer components to
execute its steps, which are insufficient for patent eligibility. See DDR, 773
F.3d at 1256 (stating “recitation of generic computer limitations does not
make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible”). Also, as previously
noted, the problem of authenticating a device/user for receiving patient
information and combining certain patient data from two sources based on
configuration setting(s) and a custom rule, is not necessarily rooted in, or a
problem that arose in, the realm of computer or networking technology but
had pre-computer-age corollaries for which humans similarly restricted and
provided access to resources. See Prism Techs., 696 F. App’x at 1017; see
also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1094 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (discussing implementing an old practice of analyzing records of
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human activity to detect suspicious behavior in a new environment). Thus,
for the above reasons, we further disagree that claim 1’s step (E)(ii) provides
a concrete technical solution to address a problem rooted in computer
technology as asserted. Appeal Br. 22.
Third, “merely adding computer functionality to increase the speed
or efficiency of the process does not confer patent eligibility on an otherwise
abstract idea.” Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792
F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015). As such, Appellant’s assertion that
custom business rule logic used during synchronizing data permits the DMS
to function more efficiently to “service an increase number of clients and
configurations” (id. at 21–22 (quoting Spec. ¶ 51); id. at 23 (arguing the
“synchronizing patient data” step permits “efficient remote monitoring of
patient data”)) is not sufficiently persuasive to demonstrate the additional
elements in claim 1 integrate its additional elements into a practical
application. Notably, the Specification states that “subsequent reviews . . .
are much faster, because the patient data and/or information has been
synchronized” (Spec. ¶ 51) but this feature is not claimed (Appeal Br. 31
(Claims App’x)). We further note that the Specification indicates the
configuration module in the “integrating” step “reduces, or obviates manual
effort in entering the configuration information” (Spec. ¶ 52), which
suggests the additional elements are used merely to automate the
above-identified judicial exceptions and is insufficient to constitute an
improvement in a computer or computer technology.
For the above-stated reasons, we determine the additional elements
recited in claim 1 beyond the judicial exception, whether considered alone or
in combination, are not integrated into a practical application.
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Alice Step Two, Step 2B
Because we determine claim 1’s additional elements do not integrate
the recited judicial exception into a practical application, we need to
consider whether the additional elements add a specific limitation or
combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine, or
conventional activity in the field. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
If so, this indicates that an inventive concept may be present. If, instead, the
additional elements simply append well-understood, routine, and
conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exceptions, this indicates that an inventive
concept may not be present. Id.
The Examiner finds certain functions performed by the additional
elements are well-understood, routine, and conventional activities. Final
Act. 6, 30 (citing Alice); see Ans. 6. Appellant asserts that claim 1 recites
“features that . . . operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an
improvement in computer functionality” (Appeal Br. 19; id. at 23 (stating
“[a]s discussed above, the features of claims 1–20 . . . operate in an
unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer
functionality”)) and “provide a non-conventional and non-generic
arrangement of known, conventional pieces” (id. at 20). At best, Appellant
refers to the “integrating” step (i.e., step (E)(ii)) as features that are operate
in an unconventional manner to achieve an improved computer
functionality. However, as previously noted, many of step (E)(ii)’s
limitations are not additional elements beyond the abstract idea, but rather
are directed to the identified abstract idea as noted previously. See
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Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56 (instructing that additional recited elements
should be evaluated in Alice/Mayo step two).
Moreover, Appellant does not challenge any specific, additional
elements recited in step (E)(ii) (e.g., the DMS, the clinical information
systems, and the configuration module) that add a specific limitation or
combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine, or
conventional activity in the field. See Appeal Br. 19–20, 22–23. We thus
are not persuaded. In any event, the Specification discusses these additional
elements as at a high level of generality and as computer components
performing conventional activities that do not satisfy the inventive concept
requirement. See Spec. ¶¶ 36, 40, 52; see, e.g., Mort. Grader, Inc. v. First
Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see
Alice, 573 U.S. at 225; see buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350,
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
In the Reply Brief, Appellant discusses Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881
F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) and quotes from the related Office memorandum,
“Memorandum - Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject
Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v.
HP, Inc.)” published on April 19, 2018, arguing the Examiner has “fail[ed]
to satisfy the requirements of step 2B analysis as indicated by USPTO’s
Memorandum.” Reply Br. 3–4. However, Appellant does not challenge
sufficiently any specific position taken by the Examiner (see id.), and thus
the argument is unpersuasive.
For the above reasons, Appellant fails to show sufficiently the recited
additional elements in claim 1 add a specific limitation or combination of
limitations that is not well-understood, routine, or conventional activity in
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the field. As such, the additional recited elements—considered individually
and as an ordered combination—do not add significantly more than the
abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step two.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us the
Examiner erred in the rejecting independent claim 1 and claims 2–20, which
are not separately argued with particularity.

THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER WELLS, TING, TRAN,
AND MATHUR

Claims 1–5, 8, and 11–19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Wells, US 2003/0200226 A1, published Oct. 23,
2003, Ting, US Patent 9,118,656 B2, issued Aug. 25, 2015, Tran, US
2008/0004904 A1, published Jan. 3, 2008, and Mathur, US 2008/0109447
A1, published May 8, 2008. Final Act. 9–22. Appellant argues independent
claims 1, 17, and 18 as a group and do not separately argue claims 2–5, 8,
11–16, and 19. Appeal Br. 23–28. We select independent claim 1 as
representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Regarding claim 1, the Examiner finds that Wells and Ting teach
many of its limitations. Final Act. 9–13. The Examiner turns to (1) Tran to
teach authenticating a user’s identity and automatically synchronizing data
are known to ordinary skilled artisans (id. at 13–14 (citing Tran ¶¶ 54, 71,
99–100, 224, 252, 403)) and (2) Mathur to teach synchronizing portions of
healthcare data based on configuration settings and rules are known to
ordinary skilled artisans (id. at 14–15 (citing Mathur ¶¶ 26, 104–108, 235)).
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Appellant argues Tran teaches synchronizing a network at the same
time as the network connections, which differs from the limitation “none of
the available patient data is synchronized prior to establishing the session” as
recited. Appeal Br. 26 (discussing Tran ¶ 403). Appellant also asserts
Mathur fails to teach selectively synchronizing portions of patient data based
on (1) one or more configuration settings and (2) a custom rule as recited in
claim 1. Id. at 26–27. Specifically, Appellant contends Mathur’s teachings
differ from “the portion of the patient data” as selectively synchronized
“based on one or more configuration settings . . . and a custom rule”
limitations in claim 1. Id. (discussing Mathur ¶¶ 105–109, 235).

ISSUES
Under § 103, has the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 by
determining that Wells, Ting, Tran, and Mathur collectively would have
taught or suggested
[I] selectively synchronizing a portion of the patient data, the
portion of the patient data being less than all of an available
patient data within the plurality of clinical information systems,
. . . and the portion of the patient data is selectively
synchronized based on one or more configuration settings . . .
and a custom rule defining data elements corresponding to the
patient data that are to be synchronized, the configuration
settings defining a first arrangement of a first set of patients
within the first medical facility and a second arrangement of a
second set of patients within the second medical facility and
being automatically provided by a configuration module to the
data management system,

(“the ‘selectively synchronized’ step”) and

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[II] “none of the available patient data is synchronized prior to
establishing the session”?

Id. at 31 (Claims App’x) (bracketing added).

ANALYSIS
I.
Appellant argues Mathur teaches agent 108 processing “information
in the physician office topic object to get rules for handling the HL7 [and]
the agent 108 automatically processes the information” (id. at 27) to
distribute to another agent, which differs from the “selectively
synchronizing” step in claim 1. Id. (citing Mathur ¶ 235). This argument is
unavailing.
Appellant argues Mathur differs from
the portion of the patient data is selectively synchronized based
on one or more configuration settings used by the plurality of
clinical information systems . . . , the configuration settings
defining a first arrangement of a first set of patients within the
first medical facility and a second arrangement of a second set
of patients within the second medical facility and being
automatically provided by a configuration module to the data
management system

as recited in claim 1, without identifying sufficiently what particular
elements in this limitation are not taught by Mathur’s paragraph 235. Id.
Also, although Appellant discusses Mathur’s paragraph 235 (id.), the
Examiner relies on several other passages in Mathur to teach the disputed
feature. Final Act. 14–15 (citing Mathur ¶¶ 26, 104–108, 235).
Mathur teaches reconciling healthcare data between multiple
distributed computing nodes involving intelligent agents which “determine
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portions of healthcare data to be synchronized with other nodes.” Mathur
¶ 26, Fig. 1. This at least suggests “selectively synchronizing a portion of
the patient data” from clinical information systems as claim 1 recites.
As for the recited “one or more configuration settings” on which the
“selectively synchronizing” step in claim 1 is based, the Specification
provides an example of configuration settings to include “all of the patient
beds of a particular facility 40, and to which unit(s) they belong” (Spec.
¶ 52), but we decline to import such an embodiment into claim 1. That is,
claim 1 does not specify the “one or more configuration settings” beyond
that they “defin[e] a first arrangement of a first set of patients within the first
medical facility and a second arrangement of a second set of patients within
the second medical facility.” Appeal Br. 31 (Claims App’x).
Mathur further teaches agent 108, which can determine portions of
data to synchronize (Mathur ¶ 26), processes “the information in the
physician office topic object to get rules for handling the HL7” (e.g., a
configuration setting for handling a HL7 message). Id. ¶ 235. Mathur
shows in Figure 10 a physician office topic object (e.g., 260) having filters
capsule object 268, and this filters object provides specific data to the results
agent for receiving Electronic Medical Records (EMR) (e.g., a portion of
patient data). Id. ¶¶ 3, 173, Fig. 10. For example, filters (e.g., configuration
settings) can be specific to result types, such as laboratory, radiology,
pathology, and dictated reports, which can come from different medical
facilities. See id. We therefore disagree that Mathur’s teachings do not at
least suggest the disputed “selectively synchronizing” step based on
configuration settings as claim 1 recites.
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Although recognizing Mathur teaches a result agent (e.g., 142) can
further process information according to specific rules (Appeal Br. 27 (citing
Mathur ¶¶ 105–109)), Appellant contends Mathur differs from “the portion
of the patient data is selectively synchronized based on a custom rule
defining data elements corresponding to the patient data that are to be
synchronized as recited in claim[] 1.” Id. We are not persuaded.
Similar to the “configuration settings” recitation, the Specification
only provide an example of a custom rule. Spec. ¶ 51. Also, as noted by the
Examiner (Ans. 7) and Appellant (Appeal Br. 27), Mathur teaches the result
agent (e.g., 142) processes information, including portions of data
selectively synchronized previously discussed, “according to specified
rules” (Mathur ¶ 105 (emphasis added)). These rules include a “mapping”
rule, an “adding” rule, a “removing or modifying” rule, and a “discarding”
rule (e.g., processing a portion of patient data according to custom rules).
See id. ¶¶ 105–109. Adding information not present in the original HL7 or
removing/modifying data from the original HL7 also defines data elements
(e.g., the added, removed, or modified information) corresponding to the
patient data to be synchronized. See id. As such, Mathur teaches or
suggests “the portion of the patient data is selectively synchronized based on
. . . a custom rule defining data elements corresponding to the patient data
that are to be synchronized” as claim 1 recites.
II.
Appellant also argues that Tran fails to teach the “integrating” step in
claim 1, which includes the limitation “none of the available patient data is
synchronized prior to establishing the session,” because Tran teaches
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“network synchronization is established at the same time as the network
connections.” Appeal Br. 25–26 (citing Tran ¶ 403). We are not persuaded.
The offending passage addresses network synchronization (Tran
¶ 403)—not data synchronization or “synchronizing a portion of the patient
data” as claimed. Also, the Examiner relies on several passages in Tran to
teach the disputed feature, which address data synchronization separate and
apart from network synchronization. Final Act. 13–14 (citing Tran ¶¶ 71,
99–100, 252, 403). Appellant does not dispute these teachings in paragraphs
71, 99–100, and 252. See Appeal Br. 25–26. Tran further teaches
synchronizing data automatically “to maintain a consistent state of the
devices” (Tran ¶ 71) and “perform[ing] data synchronization to ensure that
all base stations have access to the latest information” using a server (id.
¶ 100). Tran also teaches the user is “an authorized user” that can access a
patient’s latest information from numerous base stations remotely through
the server and the user’s computer (id.). Based on these teachings, Tran
suggests “synchronizing . . . patient data, . . . such that none of the available
patient data is synchronized prior to establishing the session” as claim 1
recites.
For the first time in the Reply Brief, Appellant asserts that OSI (Open
Systems Interconnection) has four “lower” layers and three “upper” layers.”
Reply Br. 4–5 (quoting Tran ¶¶ 110, 403). Appellant contends the
synchronization time discussed in Tran’s paragraph 403 relates to a lower
layer separate from a session layer in the upper layer. Id. at 5. Appellant
then argues the Examiner’s interpretation of disputed “none of the available
patient data is synchronized prior to establishing the session” limitation
teaches away from Tran. Id. These arguments were not raised in the Appeal
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Brief. Appeal Br. 25–26. Nor has Appellant presented good cause for
presenting these arguments for the first time in the Reply Brief. The
arguments are thus waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(a)(2). Accordingly, we
will not consider these contentions except to note that to the extent these
arguments are considered to respond to arguments raised by the Examiner’s
Answer, we refer to the above discussion related to Tran.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in
the rejection of independent claim 1 and claims 2–5, 8, and 11–19, which are
not argued separately.

THE REMAINING OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS
Claim 6 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Wells, Ting, Tran, Mathur, and Bagepalli, US 2009/0063701 A1,
published Mar. 5, 2009. Final Act. 22–23. Claim 7 is rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Wells, Ting, Tran, Mathur, and
Rice, US 2007/0204044 A1, published Aug. 30, 2007. Final Act. 23–24.
Claims 9 and 10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Wells, Ting, Tran, Mathur, and Holla, US 2008/0021834 A1, published
Jan. 24, 2008. Final Act. 24–25. Claim 20 is rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Wells, Ting, Tran, Mathur, and Graves,
US 2005/0066061 A1, published Mar. 24, 2005. Final Act. 25–26.
Appellant argues these claims are “patentable” over the prior art “for the
same reasons” as discussed for independent claims 1, 17, and 18. See
Appeal Br. 28. We are not persuaded for the above-stated reasons.

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CONCLUSION
In summary:

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20
1–5, 8, 11–19 103 Wells,
Ting, Tran,
Mathur
1–5, 8, 11–19
6 103 Wells,
Ting, Tran,
Mathur,
Bagepalli
6
7 103 Wells,
Ting, Tran,
Mathur,
Rice
7
9–10 103 Wells,
Ting, Tran,
Mathur,
Holla
9–10
20 103 Wells,
Ting, Tran,
Mathur,
Graves
20
Overall
Outcome
1–20

AFFIRMED