Wilbur G. Corbitt, Complainant,v.Peter D. Keisler, Acting Attorney General, Department of Justice, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 30, 2007
0120060274 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 30, 2007)

0120060274

10-30-2007

Wilbur G. Corbitt, Complainant, v. Peter D. Keisler, Acting Attorney General, Department of Justice, Agency.


Wilbur G. Corbitt,

Complainant,

v.

Peter D. Keisler,

Acting Attorney General,

Department of Justice,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01200602741

Agency No. D-03-3740

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from an agency

decision regarding his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination

in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),

as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The Commission accepts the appeal

in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

BACKGROUND

During the period at issue, complainant was employed as a Diversion

Program Manager (DPM), GS-14, at the agency's Miami Field Division

(MFD), Drug Enforcement Administration, in Miami, Florida. In July

2002, a new Miami Special-Agent-in-Charge (SAC) became his supervisor.

Believing that he was subjected to discrimination based on age, and

in reprisal for prior EEO activity, complainant sought EEO counseling.

Informal efforts to resolve complainant's concerns were unsuccessful.

On August 25, 2003, complainant filed the instant formal complaint

claiming he was discriminated against when:

(1) he was not selected for promotion to a GS-1801-15 Diversion

Program Manager position, under Vacancy Announcements OC-03-086,

OC-03-093, and OC-03-094 ;

(2) his supervisory responsibilities as the Miami DPM were removed;

(3) he received negative DEA 369 Supervisory Appraisals;

(4) agency officials inquired about his retirement plans; and

(5) agency officials retaliated against him for participating in a

legal proceeding.2

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of

the right to request a hearing before an EEO Administrative Judge or,

alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant

requested that the agency issue a final decision.

In its September 7, 2005, final decision, the agency found that

complainant did not establish that he was subjected to discrimination

based on age or reprisal. Regarding claim (1), the agency found that

complainant established a prima facie case of age discrimination.3

However, the agency determined that legitimate, non-discriminatory

reasons were presented for the selection decisions at issue. The agency

determined that although complainant made the Best Qualified List, he was

not recommended to the Career Board by any SAC. One SAC testified that

complainant lacked leadership and initiative in his management of the

MFD Diversion Program. Moreover, Board members found that the selectees

had greater variety and depth of experience, and were highly recommended.

In attempting to prove pretext, complainant argued that the promotional

opportunity should not have been competed because other individuals have

been promoted without competition when positions were upgraded due to an

accretion of duties. The agency concluded that it did not deviate from

its established practice in advertising and filling the positions in

question through the merit promotion process. According to an agency

official, while sometimes positions are upgraded, it does not happen

all the time, and the selection process allowed all eligible employees

to apply.

Regarding claim (2), in the final decision, concerning the removal of

complainant's supervisory responsibilities by the Miami SAC, the agency

noted that "the record is not clear whether complainant's supervisory

responsibilities were removed." The agency found, however, that even

assuming that complainant's responsibilities for the Tampa, Orlando,

and Tallahassee groups were removed, complainant was made the "rater"

of all Group Supervisors and Diversion Investigators, and maintained

authority over the Miami group. The agency therefore determined that

even if some supervisory responsibilities had been removed, complainant's

status as a "rater" denoted that his overall responsibilities were not

significantly less.

In claim (3), complainant alleged that he received negative DEA 369

appraisals from his supervisor as part of the selection process in claim

(1). Specifically, complainant stated that the Miami SAC provided him

with the worst appraisal he had received in twenty-eight years. In its

decision, the agency determined that "the record did not contain [a

copy of] complainant's DEA 369 appraisal with [SAC Miami's] comments."

However, the agency cited to the statement of the Miami SAC, which the

agency found to contain a legitimate justification for his criticism

in complainant--that complainant's program had the largest staff, but

mediocre performance.

Complainant also asserted, in claim (4), that agency officials inquired

about his retirement plans. In its decision, the agency acknowledged

that, in certain circumstances, retirement questions may be probative of

age discrimination. In the instant case, however, the agency determined

that the Miami SAC inquired about complainant's plans in July 2002,

approximately one year before the selection process. Additionally,

the agency noted that the Miami SAC was himself 54 years old, and there

was no evidence indicating he was predisposed to age discrimination.

Therefore, the agency concluded that complainant did not suffer an

adverse action with respect to the retirement questions.

Regarding claim (5), the agency concluded that, while complainant

testified in the Diversion Investigators 6c lawsuit before an

MSPB Administrative Judge, he did not engage in prior EEO activity.

The agency noted that the case addressed retirement laws and there was

no evidence that the matter in the lawsuit concerned unlawful employment

discrimination. Consequently, the agency found that complainant could not

allege reprisal under the EEO laws. The agency determined, moreover,

that even if the activity did concern EEO matters, there was no causal

connection between the 1990 lawsuit and the 2003 adverse actions.

The agency's September 7, 2005 decision also addressed a claim that

was neither identified in the formal complaint nor investigated as a

claim: complainant's reassignment to DEA Headquarters.4 Initially, the

agency noted that "the record does not contain any evidence concerning

management's stated reasons for reassigning complainant . . . ."

Nonetheless, the agency stated that "evidence indicated" complainant's

DPM GS-14 position was upgraded to DPM GS-15, and that the GS-14 position

no longer existed. Complainant was asked to select his top three choices

from a list of offices containing GS-14 vacancies. The agency concluded

from the record that complainant did not make a selection. Thereafter,

the Career Board reassigned him to DEA Headquarters.5

On appeal, complainant contends that the agency's decision and

Report of Investigation are based on "inadequate investigations."

Complainant disputes several details presented in the agency's September

7, 2005 decision. For example, with respect to claim (1), complainant

reiterates his belief that he was not selected due to his age, because

only the youngest DPMs were selected and "only the two oldest DPMs were

denied promotion to Grade 15." Further complainant contends that seven

of the Career Board members stated that they did not see complainant's

DEA 369 application. According to complainant, this action supports

his belief that a selection had already been made.

Regarding claim (2), complainant argues that his three Group Supervisors

and the Assistant Special-Agents-in-Charge that were present at the

meeting where it was announced that he no longer had supervisory

duties should have been interviewed. Complainant notes that the

only Group Supervisor who was questioned confirmed his assertions

that his supervisory duties were removed at an August 5, 2002 meeting.

Moreover, in response to the agency's conclusion that complainant failed

to establish that his staff coordinator responsibilities were less

significant, he argues that he had supervised twenty-nine individuals

before, and did not supervise anyone as part of his reduced duties.

Also, he notes that the DPM position was being up-graded to a GS-15,

while the Staff Coordinator position was a GS-14 post that was supervised

by another GS-14.

Regarding claim (3), complainant questions why the record did not contain

his DEA 369 with the Miami SAC's comments. Complainant asserts that

the documents sent in response to his FOIA request contained completed

DEA 369s for the other applicants, while his included two blank pages

for the portions that were to be filled out by his supervisor. Further,

complainant challenges the Miami SAC's purported legitimate reason for

the negative appraisal, stating that from October 1997 through August

2003 his Miami program was ranked third out of eighteen Field Divisions.

According to complainant the last DEA Headquarters Inspector to review

his program told him that it was the best run Diversion Program he had

inspected. Complainant questions why this individual's interrogatory

is not cited in the agency's decision.

In response, the agency argues that complainant has failed to establish on

appeal that the final decision is not supported by substantial evidence.

Regarding the job vacancy in Miami, the agency states that the Miami

SAC's testimony provided sufficient non-discriminatory reasons for his

recommendations to the Career Board. Further, the agency maintains that

there is no evidence indicating that the agency's actions were motivated

by complainant's age or in retaliation for his participation in a legal

proceeding. Finally, the agency contends that complainant improperly

proffers additional testimony and evidence on appeal without establishing

that such evidence was not available during the investigation.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Claim (1)

Complainant applied to the position he occupied, Diversion Program

Manager (DPM) of Miami, which had been upgraded to GS-15. Additionally,

complainant applied to the DPM positions located in Atlanta and New

Orleans. Complainant, while rated as qualified, was not selected for

any of the positions, and believes this was due to his age (69 years

old). The selectees were younger (ages 56, 51 and 56). Therefore, we

find that complainant properly established a prima facie inference of

age discrimination.

However, this initial inference of age discrimination was rebutted by

the agency's articulation of legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for

complainant's non-selection. Although complainant was on the Best

Qualified List and presented to the Career Board for consideration,

the Board found that the selectees were better candidates for the

three vacancies. Moreover, with respect to the Miami position, his

supervisor, the Miami SAC, did not recommend him for the position.

The Miami SAC stated he believed that complainant lacked leadership in

his management of the program and failed to improve the program when

given the opportunity to do so. The Miami SAC indicated to the Career

Board that new leadership was needed. By contrast, the selectee for

the Miami vacancy was highly recommended by the Miami SAC. The Deputy

Assistant Administrator also expressed in her interrogatory that the

selectee was "one of the most talented writers and investigators I have

had the pleasure to supervise. She follows directions and ensures her

staff is ready for anything." Additionally, one Board Member had worked

with the selectee and found her to be "extremely competent."

Similarly, the selectees for the Atlanta and New Orleans positions

were the top recommendations by the SACs for those offices. The record

indicates that the Board Members considered the qualifications of the

selectees and the recommendations of the SACs for Miami, Atlanta and

New Orleans in making their choices for the vacancies.

The Commission also finds that the complainant failed to present evidence

that, more likely than not, the agency's articulated reasons for its

actions were a pretext for discrimination. Complainant attempted to

show pretext by arguing that the agency did not follow established

practice when it advertised the GS-15 DPM positions, instead of simply

promoting without competition by an upgrade due to an accretion of duties.

Complainant argued that a competitive selection process was used to move

the two oldest DPMs out of their positions. The record, however, does

not adequately support complainant's assertions, and management witnesses

provided legitimate reasons for using a competitive selection process.

In addition, complainant contends that his name was never presented to

the Career Board, and that the Board merely approved previously agreed

upon decisions. The interrogatories for the Board members, however,

reflect that complainant was presented as a candidate, on the Best

Qualified List, and considered. Finally, complainant argues that the

Miami SAC ordered a review of his program just before selections were

made, with the knowledge that the Board would not select anyone whose

program was under investigation. Once again, the Commission finds that

beyond his bare assertions complainant's contentions are not supported

by evidence of record.

Accordingly, the agency's decision finding no discrimination in claim

(1) was proper.

Claim (2)

Complainant claims that he was discriminated against when, in August 2002,

his supervisory responsibilities over the diversion groups in Tampa,

Orlando and Tallahassee was allegedly removed by the Miami SAC, and the

Assistant SACs were placed as the supervisors of those respective groups.

Instead, he was made the "rater" of all Group Supervisors and Diversion

Investigators. According to complainant, this action meant that he was

responsible for the individuals, but lacked authority over them.

While the Miami SAC denied removing complainant's supervisory

responsibilities over Tampa, Orlando and Tallahassee, an Orlando Diversion

Group Supervisor stated that he was at an August 2002 meeting where

the Miami SAC removed complainant as supervisor of Tampa, Orlando and

Tallahassee. According to the Division Group Supervisor, the Miami SAC

said he was taking the action to "turn the Diversion Program around," and

that he [the Miami SAC] "did not understand why Diversion was not doing

criminal cases." The Diversion Group Supervisor added that the Miami

SAC originally proposed having the Assistant SACs serve as raters too,

but relented when they voiced their objections. Therefore, complainant

became the "rater" of the Group Supervisors and Diversion Investigators

in Tampa, Orlando and Tallahassee. Complainant did not suffer a loss of

pay, grade or title as a result of this action, and apparently retained

his direct supervisory authority over the group in the Miami office.

The agency's final decision acknowledges that "the record is not clear

whether complainant's supervisory responsibilities were removed."

The Report of Investigation shows that when questioned on the

matter, the Miami SAC provided only a general denial to the claim.

By contrast, the Diversion Group Supervisor from the Orlando District

Office attests that he attended an August 5, 2002 meeting and confirms

that the Miami SAC removed complainant as the supervisor of Orlando,

Tampa and Tallahassee. However, even assuming complainant's supervisory

duties were significantly diminished by the actions of the Miami SAC at

the August 2002 meeting, the record provides an articulated legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for the action. As already noted, the Orlando

Group Supervisor stated that the Miami SAC said at the meeting he was

doing it because he wanted to turn the diversion program around and

was dissatisfied to the fact the diversion investigators were not doing

criminal investigations. Complainant confirms that, at the August 2002

meeting, the Miami SAC revoked "my prior direction that no criminal

investigations were to be done." Complainant has not provided evidence

to prove that it was age or reprisal discrimination that motivated the

removal of his supervisory responsibilities rather than the Miami SAC's

dissatisfaction with how the diversion programs in those offices were

being run. Consequently, the Commission finds that complainant has not

established his claim of discrimination with respect to claim (2).

Claim (3)

In claim (3), complainant asserted that he received negative DEA

369 Supervisory Appraisals, which were part of his applications for

the three DPM positions. In its decision, the agency admits that the

appraisal, with the Miami SAC's comments, is absent from the record, and

the Commission is troubled by this omission. However, the Miami SAC's

statement reflects that he believed his appraisal reflected complainant's

mediocre performance. Specifically, he asserted that during the 2002/2003

year, the Miami Office only made seven arrests despite having a large

staff, the lowest number for the four Florida offices in the Diversion

Program. Moreover, an attachment to the Miami SAC's statement provided

the statistics he noted. The complainant has failed to establish that

the reasons provided by the Miami SAC for the critical DEA 369 appraisal

were a pretext to mask age or reprisal discrimination.

Claim (4)

Complainant alleges that he was discriminated against when agency

officials inquired about his retirement plans. In particular, complainant

claims that during his first meeting with the Miami SAC, in July 2002,

the Miami SAC asked about retirement. The Commission agrees with

the agency, that complainant has failed to establish a nexus between

this inquiry and any subsequent actions, such as the non-selections or

negative appraisals. Based on the instant record, we do not find that

complainant has shown that he was discriminated against when the RMO

inquired about complainant's retirement plans.

Claim (5) / Basis of Reprisal

We note that the matter identified as "claim (5)" should not be addressed

as a separate claim, but rather as a basis for complainant's entire

complaint.6 According to complainant, agency officials retaliated

against him for participating in a "6c lawsuit." Complainant explained

to the EEO Investigator that he is one of approximately 230 Diversion

Investigators who filed suit, in approximately 1989, alleging that

"the basic retirement law covering DEA Investigators applied equally

to Diversion Investigators as well." Complainant was asked to testify

before a Merit Systems Protection Board Administrative Judge on the

matter. There is no indication that the lawsuit raised matters of

discrimination. Therefore, we do not find that complainant has engaged in

"protected activity". Moreover, the legal proceeding occurred in 1990,

more than ten years after the allegedly discriminatory actions.

CONCLUSION

After a careful review of the record, including complainant's contentions

on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence not

specifically addressed in this decision, the Commission AFFIRMS the

agency's decision, which concluded that the evidence of record does not

support a finding of age and/or reprisal discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous

interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact

on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

October 30, 2007

__________________

Date

1 Due to a new data system, this case has been re-designated with the

above referenced appeal number.

2 The Commission has numbered these claims for ease of reference.

3 The agency noted that although the selectees were all over the age

of 50, complainant was 69 years old.

4 The Report of Investigation Summary makes reference to the reassignment

as "background information."

5 The agency noted that complainant chose to retire rather than transfer

to DEA Headquarters. The agency determined that because complainant has

not alleged he was compelled to transfer, he did not raise a constructive

discharge claim. Complainant does not dispute this categorization.

6 This observation is also made by the EEO investigator and noted in

complainant's affidavit.

??

??

??

??

2

01A61788

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036

9

0120060274