Whiting Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 14, 1952

99 N.L.R.B. 117 (N.L.R.B. 1952)

WHITING CORPORATION 117
maintenance employees at the Seattle works enjoy a sufficient com-
munity of interest, apart from the employees of the Employer at its
other various operations, to warrant their placement in a separate
bargaining unit, if they so desire. As the record also contains suffi-
cient evidence to justify inclusion of these employees in the existing
company-wide bargaining unit, we shall make no final unit deter-
mination now, but shall await the results of the self-determination
election hereinafter directed. If a majority of these employees select
the Petitioner or the Iron Workers, they will be taken to have indicated
their desire to constitute a separate bargaining unit, and the Regional
Director conducting the election directed herein is instructed to issue
a certification of representatives to the Petitioner or the Iron Workers,
whichever may be selected, for the unit described below, which the
Board, under such circumstances, finds to be appropriate for purposes
of collective bargaining. In the event a majority votes for the Steel
Workers, the Board finds the existing unit to be appropriate and the
Regional Director will issue a certification of results of election to
such effect.
The following employees of the Employer may constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the mean-
ing of Section 9 (b) of the Act: The production and maintenance em-
ployees at the Employer's Seattle works, Seattle, Washington, exclud-
ing draftsmen, office and clerical employees, full-time first-aid and
safety employees, watchmen, and guards, professional employees, and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
[Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication in this
volume.]
WHITING CORPORATION, SPENCER AND MORRIS DIVISION and INTER-
NATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF BOILERMAKERS , IRON SHIPBUILDERS &
HELPERS OF AMERICA, FOR AND ON BEHALF OF SUBORDINATE LODGE No.
92, AFL, PETITIONER. Case No. 21-RC-1353. May 14,1953
Second Supplemental Decision and Order
On October 18, 1950, pursuant to the Board's unpublished Decision
and Direction of Election herein dated October 2, 1950, an election
by secret ballot was conducted among the employees in the appropriate
.unit.. The tally of ballots issued after the election showed that of 35
ballots cast, 17 were for, and 16 were against, the Petitioner, and 2
were challenged?
'An intervening union, International Association of Bridge, Structural and Orna-
mental Iron. Workers, Local 509, AFL, was on the-ballot, but received no votes.
99 NLRB No. 26.
215233-53-9
118 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Regional Director investigated the challenged ballots and
recommended that both challenges be overruled. The Employer ex-
cepted to the recommendation for overruling its challenge to the ballot
of John D. Norgard (also known as Jack Norgard). After consider-
ing the Employer's exceptions, the Board adopted the recommenda-
tions of the Regional Director and directed that the two challenged
ballots be opened and counted.2 A revised tally of ballots, including
the 2 challenged ballots, showed that 18 votes had been cast for, and
17 against, the Petitioner. As the Petitioner had won the election,
the Board -certified it as bargaining representative on February 16,
1951.
Thereafter, the Petitioner requested the Employer to bargain with
it for the employees in the appropriate unit. The Employer refused
the request on March 28, 1951. The Petitioner filed an unfair labor
practice charge with the Board on April 3, 1951. The Board issued
its complaint on May 10, 1951. A hearing on the complaint was held
before a Trial Examiner on July 2 and 3, 1951. At the close of the
hearing, the Trial Examiner issued his Intermediate Report finding
that the Employer had unlawfully refused to bargain with the
Petitioner.
Thereafter, on August 6, 1951, the Employer moved to reopen-the
record in the representation case to redetermine the question of John
D. Norgard's eligibility to vote in the election. On November 1, 1951,
the Board granted the motion and remanded this representation case
to the Regional Director for the purpose of conducting a hearing on
the issue of Norgard's eligibility.
The hearing was held on January 3, 9, and 11, 1952, before Ben
Grodsky, hearing officer 3 The Employer and the Petitioner par-
ticipated in the reopened hearing and were afforded full opportunity
to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce
evidence bearing on the issues. On February 14, 1952, the hearing
officer issued his report, attached hereto, in which he found that Nor-
gard was eligible to vote and recommended that the Board affirm its
prior decision to that effect. The Employer filed timely exceptions
to the hearing officer's report together with a supporting brief.
z 92 NLRB 1851.
In its exceptions to the hearing officer 's report, the Employer for the first time objected
to the conduct of the hearing by a hearing officer , as contrary to the Administrative
Procedure Act, and moved to set aside the hearing . The motion is denied . The present
hearing was held as part of, and in connection with, the investigation Into the question of
representation initiated by the Petitioner 's filing of its representation petition . Section
5 of the Administrative Procedure Act specifically exempts from its provisions "( 6) the
certification of employee representatives ." No part of sections 5, 7, and 8 of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, including the requirement for holding hearings before a, trial
examiner , is therefore applicable to the present proceeding . See, Attorney General's
Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (1947), pp. 43, 46, 129; Clark Shoe Company
83 NLRB 782; Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company , 81 NLRB 557.
WHITING CORPORATION 119
The Board 4 has reviewed the rulings of the hearing officer made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed 5 The Board has considered the hear-
ing officer's report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in
the case, and hereby adopts the findings and recommendations of the
hearing officer with the following amplification.
In accordance with its long-established practice, which is designed
to prevent manipulation of voting lists, the Board in its Decision
and Direction of Election declared as eligible to vote in the election,
all employees in the appropriate unit.
who were employed during the payroll period immediately pre-
ceding the date of this Direction of Election, including employees
who did not work during said payroll period because they were
ill, or on vacation or temporarily laid off, but excluding those
employees who have since quit or been discharged for cause and
have not been rehired or reinstated prior to the date of the elec-
tion. . . . [Emphasis supplied.]
The Board issued its Decision and Direction of, Election on October 2,
1950. The payroll period immediately preceding that date covered
the week ending September 30, 1950. Norgard worked during the
early part of that week. He was therefore eligible to vote under
the Board's decision, unless he quit or was discharged for cause before
October 18, 1950, the date of the election itself.
The critical issue in this case is whether Norgard quit on September
26, 1950, or at any other time before the election. The events of that
period are in dispute. According to Norgard, on September 26, 1950,
he asked plant officials for a couple of months off because his leg was
bothering him and because his wife, who had just returned from the
hospital, needed his care. He understood that the officials had agreed
to give him a 2-month leave of absence. He denied that he had told
the officials that he wanted to quit or that he had any intention of
quitting during the period in question.
Plant Manager Handley and Office Manager Klise, who had the
September 26 interview with Norgard, gave a different version of
what happened. According to these two officials, Norgard said that his
ill wife required extended nursing care, and that due also to his own
"Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three -member panel [Chairman Herzog and Mem.
bers Houston and Murdock].
5 The Employer has excepted to the ruling of the hearing officer permitting the intro-
duction into evidence of a "Supplement to Exceptions" submitted by the Employer to the
Board in support of its exceptions to the hearing officer's report on challenges The
supplement is part of the record in the case It therefore W is properly placed in evidence.
120 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
physical condition he thought it best either to quit or be, laid off .6
They testified that Norgard's principal concern was that his insurance
benefits, primarily hospitalization benefits, be extended until such time
as his wife recovered from her accident, and that Handley_ told Nor-
gard that if he quit or was laid off, hospitalization benefits would cease
as of the date of termination." Thereupon Handley, according to his
and Klise's testimony, asked Norgard if he wanted to quit, be laid off,
or be given a 30-, 60-, or 90-day leave of absence, but Norgard declined
to answer. Handley admitted that Norgard had never said definitely
that he was quitting, but in the Employer's mind, according to Hand-
ley, Norgard was considered to have quit, although temporarily re-
tained on the payroll for the sole purpose of enabling him to obtain
hospitalization benefits for his wife.
The hearing officer credited Norgard's version of the September 26
interview and found that he had neither quit nor been laid off, but had
requested and received a leave of absence which turned into a quit on
December 1, 1950, when Norgard formally resigned. That was 6
weeks after the election. The hearing officer, who had the advantage
of observing the witnesses, found that Norgard was a "completely
truthful and forthright witness." The Employer has excepted to this
finding. Our rule, when issues of credibility are raised in exceptions,
is to accept the findings of the hearing officer or trial examiner, unless
the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence indicates that the
resolution by the hearing officer or the trial examiner was incorrect .$
No such conclusion is warranted in this case. It is true, as the Em-
ployer points out, that Norgard was uncertain about, or could not
recall, some of the incidents of the period in question. But it must
be remembered that Norgard was about 70 years old at the time of
the hearing, and was testifying to events which had happened approxi-
mately a year and a half before. That he did not remember every-
6 Shop Foreman Weatherhead testified that Norgard had made similar renrarks to him
on September 25, 1950 . Several fellow employees of Norgard also testified that about the
same time , during conversations about his wife's condition , Norgard remarked that it
would be cheaper for him to stay at home personally to care for his wife than to hire a
nurse to do so, and that upon being asked wb^n he expected to return to work , Norgard
replied that be didn't think he would ever be back. The hearing officer found that Norgard's
remarks to his fellow employees were made in a speculative vein. We agree with this
finding.
4 The Employer did not put its group insurance policy in evidence , so that the validity of
its alleged reason for keeping Norgard on the payroll could be more objectively appraised.
According to a company pamphlet explaining the group insurance program , put into
evidence by the Petitioner, benefits for dependents consist of hospitalization and surgical
expenses . The best evidence is that Norgard 's wife returned from the hospital on or before
September 26. It would seem that under normal rules, the insurance company was liable
for the hospitalization expense which accrued before September 26 Indeed, according to
Handley, it was the possibility of future hospitalization for Norgard ' s wife which motivated
him in keeping the insurance in force for an additional 60 days. On the other hand,
according to Klise, the motivation was the desire to keep Norgard covered until after the
bills for past hospitalization came in.
8 Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F . 2d 362 ( C. A. 3) ; N. L.
R. B. v. Universal Camera Corporation , 190 F. 2d 429 (C. A. 2).
WHITING CORPORATION 121
thing does not serve to discredit the hearing officer's finding that he
was a truthful witness. Moreover, his testimony that he did not quit
but was given a leave of absence is borne out by other contemporaneous
evidence.
Norgard had his interview with top plant officials on September 26,
1950. He worked that day, but not thereafter. For the balance of
the week ending September 30, 1950, Norgard was carried on the
Employer's payroll as "sick." According to Office Manager Klise,
who was also the plant's personnel director, Norgard was carried as
sick only to gain time for ascertaining the Employer's policy on Nor-
gard's request for continued insurance coverage. On September 27
Klise telephoned Bauch, director of personnel for the entire Com-
pany, and allegedly asked for the Company's policy on Norgard's
request to quit work but to retain the privilege of filing an insurance
claim' against his group insurance. Bauch replied, according to Klise,
that he would write his answer, but that in any event Norgard was
to be sent to the doctor for a physical examination. Bauch's written
answer, dated October 5, contains no mention of Klise's supposed
request for information concerning company policy on Norgard's
alleged desire to be permitted to quit but to retain insurance benefits.
It refers to the telephone conversation regarding Norgard, and then
defines the term "suspension" as applying to the status of an employee
upon being removed from the active payroll. Among the five reasons
for placing employees in suspension was:
3. Reasons of health, in which case a leave of 30, 60 or 90 days
is granted upon presentation of sufficient evidence to substantiate
the-claim. In this event the Whiting Corporation maintains and
pays the insurance premiums.
Bauch was not called to testify.
Klise received Bauch's memorandum on October 6. The same day,
according to Klise, he telephoned Norgard, asked again what the latter
wished to do, received no reply, and then informed Norgard that he
was being placed in "voluntary suspension" for a period of 60 days to
expire on December 4. Norgard 's payroll records were so marked the
same day, retroactive to October 2, 1950.
Meanwhile, on October 3, at Klise's request, Norgard reported to
the company doctor for a physical examination. The report from the
doctor to Klise, dated October 11, opens with the statement that Nor-
gard was examined "as you requested for consideration of disability,"
recounts Norgard 's complaints and the result of the examination and
then concludes:
Due to his age and arthritic changes it is recommended that he
[Norgard] have a temporary disability for six to eight weeks with
the possibility of permanent retirement.
122 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On October 11, 1950, Klise wrote Bauch that :
Mr. Norgard has been given a 60 day suspension with the ap-
proval of our doctor .9
We feel that there is some possibility that this will turn into a
retirement at the end of the 60 days, since the doctor advises us
that Mr. Norgard most likely would be unable to pass a physical
examination like the ones given to new employees.
On December 1, 1950, Norgard appeared at the Employer's office
and announced that he had decided to resign. Klise thereupon had
him sign a termination form which, Klise admitted, is usually signed
at the time an employee quits or is discharged. His name was then
dropped from the payroll as of December 1, 1950, rather than any
earlier date.
All this contemporaneous evidence fully supports, we believe, Nor-
gard's testimony that he did not quit on September 26, 1950, but asked
for and subsequently received an extended leave of absence for reasons
of health, under terms outlined in Bauch's October 5 memorandum to
Klise.lo
Eligibility to vote in an election is determined by the facts as they
exist on the eligibility date and on election day.1' Employees other-
wise eligible to vote do not become ineligible because they may intend
to quit immediately after the election 12 "The essential element in
determining their eligibility to vote is their status on the eligiblility
date and on the date of the election." 18
Under the Board's practice, an employee on sick leave,14 or other
9 Ruse testified that he had received an oral report from the doctor during the week of
October 2, to the effect that Norgard was suffering from an advanced case of arthritis and
a recommendation that Norgard work no more. He denied that the Information from the
doctor had any effect on what he did concerning Norgard's status with the Employer.
This appears to be contrary to the statement above in his report to Bauch.
10 Superintendent Handley testified that the term "voluntary suspension" given to
Norgard on the payroll was not applied In the sense described in Bauch's memorandum, but
was intended to show that Norgard had quit, but was being retained on the payroll for
insurance purposes only. We discredit this explanation. It is directly contrary to a
statement contained in an affidavit of Handley's submitted to the Board on November 24,
1950, in connection with exceptions filed to the Regional Director's report upholding
Norgard's right to vote. In this affidavit dated November 2, 1950, Handley swore that
the term "voluntary suspension" was applied on the basis of the sick leave provision in
Bauch's October 5 memorandum. Moreover it seems strange that Kilse did not mention
the unusual use of the term "voluntary suspension" in his letter of October 11 to Bauch, his
superior. Finally, the medical examination, the doctor's report, and Klise's letter strongly
support the inference that the steps taken in respect to Norgard literally followed the
requirements for sick leave suspension outlined in Bauch's letter.
11 Sioux City Brewing Company, 85 NLRB 1164.
19 Bill Heath, Inc., 89 NLRB 1555.
13Idem.
14 Sexton Welding Company, 96 NLRB 454; Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Company, 74 NLRB
1401.
WHITING CORPORATION 123
temporary leave of absence,15 is eligible to vote in an election. Simi-
larly, an employee temporarily laid off is entitled to vote', Despite
their not working, such individuals retain their employee status and
are therefore considered to have sufficient interest in the outcome of
the election to be permitted to vote. Sometimes it is difficult to as-
certain whether an employee is permantly or only temporarily laid off,
or in other words, whether he has lost or retained his status as an
employee. In such cases, the Board applies the "reasonable expecta-
tion of further employment" standard as an aid in resolving the ques-
tion." When the retention of employee's status on election day is
clear, as we have found it to be in this case, the Board does not make
further inquiry as to the expectation of future employment. Em-
ployee status having been established, the right to vote is simi-
larly established. The Board will no more inquire into the pros-
pects or expectations of an employee temporarily on leave on the
day of the election, than it will into the similar prospects or ex-
pectations of an employee who is actually working on election day.
This rule may not be a perfect one to determine eligibility, but in the
B.oard's opinion it is the only practicable one, if election results are
not to be held back by endless investigations into states of mind or of
future prospects,
Accordingly we find, as did the hearing officer, that as John D.
Norgard had worked during the eligibility period and was on tempo-
rary leave of absence on election day, he was eligible to vote in the
election and his vote was properly counted. We shall therefore affirm
the Board's previous decision 1s
Order
IT Is HEREBY ORDERED that the Board's "Supplemental Decision
and Direction" issued in the above-entitled matter on February 2, 1951
(92'NLRB 1851), be, and it hereby is, affirmed.
Hearing Officer's Report, Findings of Fact, and Recommendations
On February 16, 1951, the Board issued a certification of representatives in
the above-entitled proceeding. Thereafter, on August 5, 1951, counsel for the
'a Siouo City Brewing Company, 85 NLRB 1164. In this case , an employee who had
purchased a tavern asked for and received a 30-day leave of absence from his employer,
upon the representation that he would return to work after the expiration of his leave.
He did not , however , return to work thereafter. The Board held that he was eligible to
vote in the election held during the period that he was on leave, because he retained his
employee status on the eligibility date.
"a-Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 296.
"Clippard Instrument Laboratory , Inc., 86 NLRB 424; United States Rubber Company
86 NLRB 338; Lima Hamilton Corporation, 85 NLRB 455.
u 92 NLRB 1851.
124 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Employer filed a "Motion to Reopen Record and Set Hearing." The Board,
deeming it necessary to receive further evidence in the record with respect
to the eligibility of John D. Norgard' to vote in the election conducted herein
on October 18, 1950, ordered that the record be reopened , and that a further
hearing be held for the purpose of taking evidence on that issue . The under-
signed was designated as hearing officer by the Regional Director for the purpose
of conducting the hearing and preparing and causing to be served upon,the
parties a report containing resolutions of the credibility of witnesses , findings
of fact, and recommendations to the Board as to the disposition of the issue.
The hearing was held on January 3, 9, and 11, 1952 , before the undersigned
hearing officer , at which time the Employer and the Petitioner appeared and
participated and were afforded full opportunity to be heard , to examine and
cross-examine witnesses , and to introduce evidence bearing upon the issues.
Upon the entire record in the case and from his observation of the witnesses,
the undersigned makes the following:
FINDINGS or FACT
The sole issue here, as limited by the Board's order directing hearing, is
whether Norgard was eligible to vote at the election conducted on October 18,
1950. Under the terms of the Board's Decision and Direction of Election of
October 2, 1950, employees within the appropriate unit on the payroll who were
in the employ of the Employer during the payroll period ending September 30,
1950, were eligible to vote.
During September 1950, Norgard was in charge of the Employer's steelyard
and his duties consisted of keeping the steel stored properly and supplying it
to the various employees as they needed it. The job was physically very de-
manding and Norgard had a regular helper, Campbell, who operated a crane at
Norgard's direction and in other ways assisted Norgard in the placement of
the steel. Norgard was about 68 years of age at the time and had an arthritic
condition which apparently gave him trouble from time to time. In July 1950
Norgard was examined by a company physician with reference to a complaint
concerning a pain in the lower part of his back. Because the physician recom-
mended that Norgard be taken off the heavy work lie was doing, Norgard was
instructed to permit Campbell to do the heavy work and for himself to perform
the relatively lighter tasks of his helpers, but after several weeks Norgard
disregarded this order and continued to perform the same work which he had
previously performed until September 26, 1950, to the knowledge and without
further advice from the Employer
Sometime about the middle of September 1950, Norgard's wife suffered an
accident and was hospitalized. Several employees testified that Norgard told
them, during this period, that when his wife came home from the hospital she'
would require nursing care, and that lie would be money ahead if he stayed
home and took care of her rather than engage the services of a nurse. He-,also
indicated that he did not know how long he would be off and speculated about
the possibility of retiring and of securing his old age and social security benefits.
On September 25, Norgard told Robert W. Weatherhead, shop foreman, that
his leg was hurting, that his wife was coming home from the hospital, and that
' Referred to in the Board's order as Jack Norgard.
WHITING CORPORATION 125
he wanted an extended leave of absence.2 Weatherhead promised to arrange
for Norgard to discuss this with Plant Manager Handley and later reported the
matter to Woodside, the general plant foreman. The following morning, Norgard
was interviewed by Handley, Woodside, and Office Manager Klise in Handley's
office.' At this meeting, Norgard asked for a couple of months off from work be-
cause his leg was bothering him and because his wife had just come home from
the hospital. Handley agreed to let him have the requested leave. Norgard also
asked information concerning keeping his hospitalization insurance in force dur-
ing this period. After this conference, he returned to work and finished out the
day; he has not worked at the plant since then .4
Handley testified that at the time the interview with Norgard was completed
on September 26, he had firmly fixed in his mind a conclusion that Norgard
would no longer work for the Employer, but admitted that he did not communi-
cate this to Norgard. He further stated that shortly thereafter he instructed
Woodside to notify Campbell that he would thereafter be a permanent replacement
2 Weatherliead also testified that in the course of this conversation Norgard said that
he would be better off "just quitting and drawing his unemployment" ; that "he was
going to have to quit or have the Company lay him off"; and that he was "getting too
damn old to work " Norgard, who impressed the undersigned as a completely truthful
and forthright witness, testified that lie recalled having a conversation with Weatherhead
but did not testify as to its details. In view of the discussions of the following day between
Norgard and Weatherhead's superiors, set forth more fully below, I find that, while
Norgard.mav have mentioned these matters to Weatherhead, it was in a speculative vein
and iiot as a decided upon course of action; and that the only request Norgard had in
mind was to secure an extended leave of absence. Moreover, inasmuch as Norgard later
approached Woodside independently, his conversation with Weatherhead, while appro-
priate background, and while apparently. communicated by Woodside to Handley, does not
constitute the request upon which Plant Manager Handley acted.
3 Norgard testified, without contradiction, that he first approached Woodside alone and
stated his request. that Woodside then took him into Klise's office where he repeated his
request to Woodside and Klise and that thereafter the three went to Handley's office.
Inasmuch as the matters discussed at these earlier meetings were again discussed at the
meeting In Fiandley's office, I find it unnecessary to make detailed findings concerning the
substance of these preliminary discussions
4 Handley and Khse testified that Norgard stated at this meeting that he wanted to quit
or be laid off and that the only thing which stood in his way was the matter of insurance.
For the reasons and in view of the circumstances to be discussed below, the undersigned
believes, and finds, that Norgard only sought a leave of absence. It should be noted, in
passing, that the Employer's witnesses do not claim that a quit or layoff took place but
that they contend that the meeting ended inconclusively The subsequent behavior of both
Klise and Norgard belie this, and I find that Noigard was in fact granted the leave he
requested , subject to modification as to its duration after consultation with the Employer's
head office.
In crediting Norgard's version that the interview of September 26, 1950, ended with him
being given a leave rather than his quitting or being laid off, in addition to the facts
set out in other parts of this Report, I am further mindful of the fact that on December 1,
a few days before the leave would have expired by his understanding, as discussed below,
Norgard went to the plant and told Klise that he would be unable to return to work.
I am in addition mindful of the fact that at one point in testifying, Norgard placed a date
at "it was after I quit my work, I think," (transcript, page 247, line 2) when he meant
thereby "after September 26 " In view of the totality of Norgard's testimony, I find that
he used the phrase "I quit my work" in the instance quoted to denote that he had ceased
physically working and not that he had severed his employment relations with the
Employer.
Handley testified that he asked Norgard whether he desired to quit, be laid off, or be
granted a leave of 30, '60, or 90 days and' that Norgard was noncommittal. From the
subsequent events. which 'are recited below I infer, and find, that the September 26 con-
ference ended with Norgard being granted a leave of indefinite duration , and that there-
after Klise advised Norgaid that the leave would expire on December 4.
126 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
for Norgard. Neither Woodside nor Campbell testified,' nor were any records
adduced to show any change in status for Campbell during this period.'
Handley and Klise also testified that their sole concern was to retain Norgard
formally on the payroll so that his wife could continue to benefit from the hos-
pitalization insurance. I discredit this testimony because of the subsequent be-
havior of the Employer in securing Norgard's physical reexamination , because of
the treatment of Norgard's status for payroll purposes and because Norgard's act
of returning to the plant on December 1, 1950, to resign discloses that, after he
left the plant on September 26, and that after he spoke to Klise by telephone
on October 6, he still considered himself an employee.'
After September 26, for the balance of the week, Norgard was retained on
the company payroll as "sick." Thereafter, sometime during the week of Octo-
ber 2, Klise had the payroll entry altered to "voluntary suspension" for the
period beginning October 2. Norgard's name remained on the payroll with the
notation "voluntary suspension" until December 4, 1950. Klise telephoned
Norgard on October 6 and advised him of the decision to retain him in the status
of "voluntary suspension" until December 4. From the fact that the leave was
for a period of 60 days and would expire December 4, 1950, I infer, and find,
that he was placed in that status on October 4, 1950. Norgard's next contact
with the Employer (after the October 6 telephone call) was on December 1,
when he saw Klise at the plant and advised him that he was resigning forth-
with. Among the several reasons specified by the Employer for the placement
of employees on "voluntary suspension" are reasons of health. I find that Nor-
gard was placed in that status because he reported that he was unable to per-
form his work due to the impairment of his leg.8
Summing up the evidence, I find that Norgard asked for an indefinite period
of time off during the interview of September 26; thereafter, on or about Octo-
ber 6, Klise telephoned him and advised him that he could only be granted until
December 4, 1950, and still be retained on the company payroll ; that on Decem-
ber 1, 1950; Norgard had decided that he could not return to work by December 4,
1950, and therefore advised the Employer that he was quitting as of that time.
I further find that at no time prior to December 1, 1950, was Norgard told that
he was no longer an employee of the Employer. I further find that Norgard
was an employee of the Employer during the payroll period ending September 30,
1950, within the appropriate bargaining unit, and therefore eligible to vote.
[Recommendations omitted from publication in this volume.]
5 Campbell apparently is no longer employed by the Employer.
6 Handley testified that there was no reason to change his job classification and that
Campbell was notified that when he gained in experience he would receive an increase in
rate.
' I place no significance in the fact that Norgard also requested information concerning
his possible old age benefits and social security benefits in view of his understanding that
he could thereafter relinquish them and return to his job.
As additional support for that finding, I note the fact that on October 3, 1950, at the
Employer's Instructions , Norgard submitted to an examination by the Employer 's physician,
and that on October 27 the Employer made further inquiry from the doctor concerning
Norgard 's health , at which time the doctor stated that he did not believe that on or about
December 4, 1950 , Norgard would be in a position to resume his former duties.