Wheatland Electric Cooperative, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 6, 1953

102 N.L.R.B. 1119 (N.L.R.B. 1953)

WHEATLAND ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. 1119
It appears from the record that at the time of the hearing the Em-
ployer had 365 production and maintenance employees currently
employed. It now expects to add only 300 more such employees to
its present complement, of which 150 would be employed by June 1953
when it expects that plant rehabilitation will be completed, all ma-
chinery will be installed, and production will commence. It made
no prediction as to when the remaining 150 employees would be added.
In addition, it appears that, of over 20 job classifications which will
definitely be filled, there are currently employees in all but 2 of the
classifications.8 At present, although the Employer is not producing
finished products for shipment, it is producing parts and components
for test purposes and for stockpiling.
We find, therefore, upon the entire record, that the present group of
employees is a substantial and representative segment of the em-
ployees to be employed by June 1953, when the Employer expects to
commence production 9 In any event, in view of the speculative
nature of the Employer's future expansion, we find that no further
delay in granting to the employees an opportunity to choose a bar-
gaining representative is warranted, and we will direct an immediate
election io
[Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication in this
volume.]
8 This is in contrast with the situation found to exist in the prior case involving this
plant , where the Board found that the Employer expected to add a substantial number of
new classifications and skills
General Motors Corporation, 82 NLRB 876.
'° General Motors Corporation , 94 NLRB 217 The Employer argues that because it is
not yet in production . an election is not proper at this time . We do not agree that this
is a controlling factor See Ford Motor Company, 96 NLRB 1075 ; West Coast Loading
Company, 101 NLRB 295
WHEATLAND ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE , INC. and INTERNATIONAL UNION
OF OPERATING ENGINEERS , LOCAL No. 646 , AFL. Case No. 17-CA-
468. February 6, 1953
Decision and Order
On June 18,1952, Trial Examiner Stephen S. Bean issued his Inter-
mediate Report in this case, finding that the Respondent had engaged
in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and recom-
mending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirma-
tive action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report
attached hereto. Thereafter the Respondent and the General Coun-
102 NLRB No. 109.
1120 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and supporting
briefs.,'
The Board 2 has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the In-
termediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in
the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommen-
dations of the Trial Examiner with the following modifications :
1. In the section of the Intermediate Report entitled "The Remedy,"
the Trial Examiner recommended that back pay for the eight strikers
be computed from September 13, the date of their discriminatory
discharge. However, where, as here, striking employees have been
discharged during the course of an unfair labor practice strike, it is
Board policy to provide for back pay, not from the date of their
discharge, but from the date of their application for reinstatement.'
As the eight employees did not apply for reinstatement until Sep-
tember 22, 1951, we shall require the Respondent to pay back pay from
that date.
The Trial Examiner further stated that the strikers were entitled
to reinstatement only upon application. As an unconditional appli-
cation for reinstatement was made in behalf of all these employees on
September 22, 1951, further application is not required.
Order
Upon the entire record in this case and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Wheatland Elec-
tric Cooperative, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in International Union of Operating
Engineers, Local No. 646, AFL, or any other labor organization of
their employees, by discriminatorily discharging or refusing to rein-
state any of their employees or by otherwise discriminating in regard
to their hire or tenure or conditions of employment.
(b) Refusing to bargain collectively with International Union of
Operating Engineers, Local No. 646, AFL, as the exclusive represent-
ative of Respondent's employees in the following appropriate unit :
All employees, including operators or engineers, linesmen, meter
readers, meter installers and testers, and the clerk in the warehouse,
1 The Respondent 's request for oral argument is denied because in our opinion the
record, including exceptions and briefs , adequately presents the issues and the position of
the parties
2 Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act , the Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman Herzog and
Members Styles and Peterson].
3 Kallaher and Mee, Inc., 87 NLRB 410.
WHEATLAND ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE , INC. 1121
employed by Respondent at its Scott City and Syracuse, Kansas,
plants, but excluding "right of way" purchasers, office clerical em-
ployees, professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to
form labor organizations, to join or assist International Union of
Operating Engineers, Local No. 646, AFL, or any other labor organi-
zation, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purposes
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any or all of such activities, except to the extent that
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in
a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in
Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds
will effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively concerning wages, hours,
and other conditions of employment with International Union of
Operating Engineers, Local No. 646, AFL, as the exclusive represent-
ative of all the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, and if
an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed
agreement if requested by International Union of Operating Engi-
neers, Local No. 646, AFL.
(b) Offer Clint Clark, Harry Messenger, John Halfman, Fay
Wicker, Alvin Rictor, Floyd Charles Gregory, Ralph Siegrist, and
William Horlick immediate and full reinstatement to their former or
substantially equivalent positions without prejudice to their seniority
or other rights and privileges, dismissing, if necessary, any person
hired by Respondent on or after September 12, 1951, and make them
whole, in the manner set forth in the section of the Intermediate
Report entitled "The Remedy," as modified herein above, for any
loss of pay suffered by reason of the discrimination against them.
(c) Upon request, make available to the National Labor Relations
Board, or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records,
social-security payment records, timecards, personnel records and
reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amounts of back
pay due and the right of reinstatement under the terms of this Order.
(d) Post at its plants in Scott City and Syracuse, Kansas, copies
of the notice attached to the Intermediate Report and marked "Ap-
pendix A.114 Copies of said notice, to be furnished, by the Regional
This notice shall be modified by deleting the words "upon application" from the third
paragraph thereof , and by substituting the words "A Decision and Order" for the words
"The Recommendation of a Trial Examiner ." In the event that this Order is enforced by
a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , there shall be substituted for the words
"Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order."
1122 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Director for the Seventeenth Region, shall, after being duly signed
by Respondent, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and
maintained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in con-
spicuous places, in both plants, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for the Seventeenth Region in
writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
Intermediate Report and Recommended Order
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge of unfair labor practices filed October 3, 1951, by International
Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 646, AFL, the Union herein, against
Wheatland Electric Cooperative Inc., Respondent herein, the General Counsel
of the Board caused his complaint to be issued on February 15, 1952, alleging
violations of Section 8 (a) (1), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 61 Stat. 161.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleged, in substance,
that: (1) On and after June 11, 1951, Respondent refused to bargain with the
Union, the exclusive representative of Respondent in an appropriate bargaining
unit; (2) as a consequence of Respondent's refusal to bargain and other pleaded
violations of Section 8 (a) (1), Respondent's employees went on strike on or
about September 11, 195,1 ; (3) on or about September 12, 1951, Respondent termi-
nated the employment of the employees who went on strike for the reason that
they had gone on strike and had engaged in other union and concerted activities ;
and (4) on or about September 21, 1951, the employees who had gone on strike'
unconditionally offered to return to work and were refused reinstatement because
they had struck and engaged in other union and concerted activities.
Copies of the complaint, the charge, and notice of hearing thereon were duly
served upon Respondent and the Union. Upon due notice a hearing was held at
Scott City, Kansas, from March 17 to 21, 1952, and from March 31 to April 2,
1952, before me, the duly designated and undersigned Trial Examiner. All
parties were represented at the hearing, participated therein, and were afforded
full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to intro-
duce relevant and material evidence, to engage in oral arguments, and to file
briefs. A brief was received from the General Counsel on April 28, 1952, and
a brief was received from Respondent on May 12, 1952. They have been con-
sidered. By order dated May 29, 1952, the transcript has been corrected in
accordance with a stipulation entered into by the parties.
On the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
On April 34, 1951, the Board entered in Case No. 17-RC-932 its Decision and
Direction of Election (94 NLRB 109), wherein it held that Respondent is engaged
in commerce within the meaning of the Act. The finding is as follows :
1 Clint Clark , Harry Messenger , John Halfman , Fay Wicker, Alvin Rictor, Floyd Charles
Gregory, Ralph Siegrist , and William Horlick.
WHEATLAND ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC . 1123
1. The Employer is a Kansas corporation with its principal place of busi-
ness located at Scott City, Kansas. It is financed by the Rural Electrifica-
tion Administration and is engaged in the production and distribution of
electric power to its approximately 2,900 members.'
The Employer generates its own electricity and during the year 1950, it
sold and distributed electricity to its members in an amount exceeding
$382,000 in value, part of which was purchased by commercial users engaged
in commerce and the rest by rural consumers. The Employer is in the
process of constructing 900 miles of power lines and a new generating plant
which when completed will cost in the neighborhood of $1,500,000. The
materials used in this construction are, in large part, shipped to the Employer
from points outside the State of Kansas. During 1950, the Employer also
purchased miscellaneous supplies, some of which were received from points
outside the State of Kansas.
Contrary to the Employer's contention, we find on these facts that the
Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.' We find,
further, in accordance with the Board's recently established policy to take
jurisdiction over public utilities, that it will effectuate the policies of the Act,
to assert jurisdiction in this case3
I All these members live in Wichita. Greeley, Scott, Kearny, and Hamilton counties,
Kansas.
2 Plymouth Electric Cooperative Association, 92 NLRB 1183 (and cases cited
therein).
2 See W. C. King, d/b/a Local Transit Linea, 91 NLRB 623; Cherokee County Rural
Electric Cooperative Association, 92 NLRB 1181.
It appeared at the instant hearing that the number of members to whom
Respondent distributes electric power has increased from approximately 2,900
to about 4,200 and that in addition to serving members in 5 counties in Kansas
it furnishes electricity to members in the city of Towner, in the State of Colorado.
It also now appears that Respondent supplies electric current to the Missouri
Pacific Railroad for use in the operation of the railroad's stationary signal equip-
ment and that Respondent's revenue increased from in excess of $382,000 in 1950
to in excess of $470,000 in 1951.
I find, contrary to the contention of Respondent, that it is engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of the Act, and that it will effectuate the policies of
the Act to assert jurisdiction in the instant case.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 646, AFL, is a labor
organization admitting to membership employees of the Respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
During the last 2 months of 1950, several of Respondent's employees working
in Respondent's generating plants both in Scott City and in Syracuse engaged
in discussions concerning whether or not it would be advantageous to form a
union. About the first of January 1951, employee Clint Clark arranged for a
meeting, held on January 11, between several employees and M. V. Johnson, an
assistant international representative of the Union. The meeting was attended
by from 18 to 22 employees who were given an opportunity to sign union-appli-
cation cards. All but 2 indicated a desire to be represented by the Union. On
January 12, 1951, Johnson called at the Scott City office of Frank C. Arthur,
1124 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent's manager, and requested Arthur to recognize the Union. Arthur
referred Johnson to Respondent's attorney, P. C. Frazee of Syracuse. On the
same day Johnson filed a petition for certification. A hearing on this petition
was held on March 2, 1951, in Case No. 17-RC-932. In its Decision and Direction
in this case (94 NLRB 109), issued April 30, 1951, the Board established a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining. At a Board-conducted
election held on June 1, 1951, of 18 ballots cast, 14 were in favor of the Union,
3 were opposed, and the ballot of John L. Halfman, the clerk in the warehouse,
was challenged. On June 11, 1951, the Board's Regional Director, in behalf of
the Board, certified the Union as the exclusive representative of all the em-
ployees in the established unit.
The Union submitted a proposed contract to Respondent on July 13, 1951, at
a conference, later referred to, held at Wichita, Kansas. Bargaining conferences
were held on July 23, August 14, and August 15. On September 12, Respondent's
employees went on strike and picketed for a contract. On September 13 the
strikers were given separation notices by Respondent. At a meeting held Septem-
ber 22 the Union attempted to settle the strike and bargain a contract. It had
no success. It then ended the strike and made oral and written offers on behalf
of the strikers to return to work unconditionally. The strikers have not been
reinstated.
A subsequent meeting between the Union and Respondent was held on Novem-
ber 8, 1951. No collective-bargaining agreement has been reached. This, in
essence, is the outline of the ease.
More specific details will be discussed later. The chief issues raised were :
(1) Whether Respondent failed to bargain in good faith; (2) whether the strike
was an economic or an unfair labor practice strike ; and (3) whether Respondent
discharged the strikers ; and, if so, whether such discharges were violative of
the Act. Other issues were (1) whether Respondent was justified in discharging
the strikers by virtue of a Kansas statute providing it shall be unlawful for any
union engaged in the operation of a public utility willfully to cease operations
for the purpose of limiting production; (2) whether Respondent engaged in cer-
tain independent acts of interference, restraint, and coercion violative of the
Act; and (3) whether Respondent, since or during the strike, due to any change
in operational methods, discontinued the use of employees performing the type
of work done by the strikers.
B. The alleged refu8al to bargain
1. The appropriate unit and representative by the Union of a majority therein.
On April 30, 1951, the Board made the following unit finding :
4. We find that all employees including operators, linesmen, meter readers,
and the clerk in the warehouse, employed by the Employer at its Scott City
and Syracuse, Kansas, plants, excluding "right of way" purchasers,' office
clerical employees, professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the
Act, constitute a unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within
the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
* Upon the basis of their present duties, we shall exclude the 2 "right of way"
purchasers , V. Bowers, and J. Riemensnider, as it appears that their interests are
more closely identified with management than with the rank -and-file employees. See
Buckeye Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 88 NLRB 196. However , as the record
indicates that these 2 men will be performing other duties in several weeks, we may
then include them in the unit . If this change in job classification occurs before the
payroll period preceding the election , they may be permitted to vote under challenge.
WHEATLAND ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. 1125
As appears above, on June 11, 1951, the Union was certified as the exclusive
bargaining representatives of all the employees in this unit.
I find that all employees including operators, meter readers, and the clerk in
the warehouse, employed by the Employer at its Scott City and Syracuse, Kansas,
plants, excluding "right of way" purchasers, office clerical employees, professional
employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate
for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of
the Act:
I find that John L. Halfman was clerk in the warehouse and is expressly in-
cluded within the unit.
I find that 0. E. Robertson is a meter installer and tester and that in the ab-
sence of any substantial evidence that Robertson had any authority in the in-
terest of his employer to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, dis-
charge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly direct them,
or to adjust their grievances or effectively to recommend such action, and be-
cause Robertson is one of the group of "all employees" not excluded in the
Board's Decision and Direction of Election in Case No. 17-RC-932 (94 NLRB 109)
as a "right of way" purchaser, office clerical employee, professional employee,
or superviscr, that he should be included within the unit .3
I further find that at all times material herein the Union has been the exclusive
representative ` of all employees, including Halfman and Robertson, in said unit
for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours,
and other conditions of employment.
2. The meetings , the strike , and the discharges of the strikers
At the July 13 conference , Johnson agreed to withdraw a charge filed by
the Union on June 19, which alleged in substance that Respondent had refused'
to bargain by declining to meet with the Union until it had been determined
whether or not Halfman, whom it claimed was a clerical employee, and Robert-
son, whom it claimed was a "meter supervisor ," should be excluded from
the unit.
Ten days later the Union , represented by Johnson and members of its organiz-
ing committee , held a meeting at Syracuse with Respondent which was
represented by Frazee and Frank E. Crouch , vice president and member of its
board of directors . Frazee stated he had not studied the proposals handed
him 10 days earlier.
The parties then proceeded to go over the clauses of the contract . At this and
later meetings , the Union made various concessions which will subsequently be
referred to. Respondent 's representatives made no conclusive agreements. The
next meeting was held at Scott City on August 14. The Union was again rep-
resented by Johnson and members of its organizing committee ; Respondent by
its board of trustees , Frazee, and Arthur. All participated in a general discus-
sion . The trustees were unaware of the terms of the proposed contact ; they had
little grasp of the concept of collective bargaining ; and took the position that
employees should deal directly with them rather than through a union. It
was necessary to start discussions anew by again reading the proposal, clause
' An amplification of this finding will appear in my conclusions of law.
8 Arthur's testimony standing alone, that Robertson would supervise a helper if he were
assigned to him, does not seem to me to be sufficient , in view of the described limitations
on his authority , to warrant a conclusion that he possesses the attributes of a supervisor
within the meaning of the Act.
d Obviously the challenged ballot of Halfman and either a vote by Robertson or his
abstention from voting does not determine the results of the election.
250983-vol. 102-53-72
1126 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
by clause, from the beginning. Respondent accepted none of the proposals. The
meeting was adjourned to the following day at Syracuse. Johnson and mem-
bers of the union negotiating committee appeared in behalf of the Union ; Frazee
and Crouch in behalf of the Respondent. No headway was made. Johnson
then called for assistance from the Federal :Mediation and Conciliation Service,
one of whose commissioner's attempts to have conferences held on August 29
and September 11 were unsuccessful.
Although the Union withdrew its original charges after the July 13 conference
when Respondent agreed to negotiate with respect to the status of Halfman
and Robertson, Respondent continued to insist that Robertson should not be
included within the unit and maintained that since neither his name nor a
description of his job appeared in the Board's order there was nothing to dis-
cuss or negotiate upon. Frazee ultimately agreed that Halfman should be
included but Arthur continued to adhere to the position that he should be
excluded.
To relate every detail of the conferences of July 23 and August 14 and 15 would
sink the salient features of this case under the weight of minutiae.
In general, it appears that the only clause in the proposal the Union sub-
mitted which was accepted without reservation or change by Respondent was
the recognition clause. The Union on its part, however, acceded to (1) Re-
spondent's insistence that the contract should run for a period of 1 year only,
rather than become automatically renewable as proposed. The Union made con-
cessions to Respondent with respect to (2) vacations, (3) a no-lockout pro-
vision, (4) the length of time during which new employees should remain on a
probationary basis, (5) the manner in which seniority rights should accrue, (6)
the seniority of supervisors who might be reduced to such work classification as
would restore them to membership in the bargaining unit, (7) the rights of em-
ployees whose jobs might be discontinued, (8) the seniority rights of employees
residing in one area of Respondent's operations over employees residing in
another area, and (9) promotions to jobs that might become vacant.
By and large no definite commitments on behalf of Respondent were made with
respect to even these nine concessions. Rather, was it indicated that all mat-
ters would have to be discussed with and approved by the trustees.
On August 14 the various members of the board of trustees made it clear that
their comments were merely expressions of their individual opinions. Although
at the conclusion of this meeting it was announced that Arthur and Frazee
were authorized to bargain for the Cooperative, Arthur did not appear at the
next meeting and Crouch, who was called in, while expressing his personal atti-
tude, emphasized the fact that the Board disagreed with him, and Frazee, who
stated that all he was obligated to do was to meet with the Union, avoided
making any definite comment relating to any proposal, apart from a statement
concerning wages and hours, by saying that Respondent, as it had written on
February 13, 1951,5 contemplated reducing hours from 48 to 40 without reduc-
tion in weekly pay.
5 This letter, written directly to all employees, after the Union had requested recogni.
tion on January 12, 1951, stated that in contemplation of an early removal of operations
from its old plant to a new one, Respondent intended to follow its previonsly expressed
policy of placing its present personnel in the new plant in positions as nearly comparable
to those then held as skills and qualifications warranted , and reads in part :
In order to place all of the present employes , the board of trustees is considering
the adoption of the generally prevailing and almost universal policy of the forty-hour
week. To do this without imposing any monetary hardship upon the individual, the
board of trustees will adjust hourly wages to meet the situations thus created by
changed conditions.
WHEATLAND ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC . 1127
On August 15 Frazee stated that the next meeting of the trustees would take
place at the time of the annual meeting of all members of the Cooperative about
a week later and suggested that Johnson could be given a place on the program
to speak to the members. Believing that attendance at so large a gathering
could not possibly lead to a collective-bargaining agreement, Johnson did not
accept Frazee's suggestion. At the three conferences held up to August 15, it
appeared that the persons connected with Respondent who were in attendance
had acquired relatively little knowledge of the Union' s demands ,' although by
August 15 the proposal had been in their hands for over a month.
On each occasion it became necessary to start discussions anew and go over
the proposed contract, clause by clause.
Respondent at no time, tentatively or otherwise, either accepted or made
counterproposals to (although on August 15 Frazee told Johnson he would make
some proposals) the Union's overtures with respect to such matters as overtime
pay, walkouts, standby time, arbitration of grievances, holidays, supply of pro-
tective equipment, and benefits for accident, sickness, and death. Its discussion
of supplying equipment was limited to an assertion that employees would better
protect their persons if they owned their equipment, and its discussion concern-
ing benefits was confined to indicating it would talk the subject over with an
insurance man. As to the other proposals, the Union, particularly on August 15,
was unsuccessful in eliciting any expressions of attitude.
Late on September 11, 1951, the employees having felt that no substantial
progress had been made in arriving at an agreement during the several months
since they first organized in January, and having observed that no meeting had
been held despite the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service's intercession,
decided to strike. The old Scott City plant was shut down and the strike com-
menced shortly after midnight on September 12. The Respondent's two Scott
City plants were peacefully picketed until September 22. On that date the
Union, in the persons of its international representative, Arland B. Canny,
and two members of its negotiating committee, met with Frazee and the Fed-
eral Mediation and Conciliation Service commissioner. Frazee replied to the
Union's request that an attempt to negotiate a contract be made that he did
not have authority to negotiate at that time, that he was going to check to de-
termine whether or not Respondent was legally obliged to negotiate, and told
Canny he would have to communicate with Arthur. Before leaving the meet-
ing, Canny made Frazee an unconditional offer on the part of the strikers to
return to work. Canny then telephoned Arthur, to whom lie also made the same
unconditional offer. Arthur stated that he had all the employees he needed, he
did not need any additional employees, and "that is my final say right now."
Then Canny wrote Arthur the following letter :
This is to confirm our telephone conversation of the above date, during
which conversation I officially made the offer to return the striking em-
ployees of your co-operative back to work unconditionally.
Trusting you will give this matter your immediate attention, I remain,
On October 16 a meeting was held between a Board field examiner and Re-
spondent and on November 8 a meeting took place between the Conciliation
Service commissioner, Johnson, Frazee, and Arthur. Nothing was accomplished.
Now to return to the time of the strike : Respondent's office manager , William
Gies, upon being informed that a strike was taking place, went to the plant and
9 Indeed Frazee in substance testified that as late as April 1, 1952 , there were still a lot
of things in the union proposal that were unfamiliar to him and everytime he read it he
would find something new.
1128 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
talked to Clark, who had become a member of the negotiating committee and
the strikers' spokesman.' Clark told him that the strike had been called because
the employees wanted a contract. Gies told Clark that Arthur was out of town.
Clark informed Gies that the strikers would talk to the board of trustees, its
president, or anyone who might have authority to enter into a contract in behalf
of Respondent. Later in the day, the trustees came to Scott City but none of
the strikers was informed either of their availability or that the trustees would
talk to them.
On September 13 and 14, the eight strikers (see footnote 1) were each handed
a similar paper dated September 13, 1951, and headed "Separation Notice."
The notice set forth each employee's social-security number, the date of the
last day of work as September 11, 1951, and a paragraph entitled "explanation"
which reads as follows :
Employee quit employment and went on strike. Engines were shut
down in Scott City Plant about 12: 30 a. in., September 12, 1951: Switches
were pulled throwing system in darkness. This was done without any
previous or subsequent notice to Cooperative officials or authorization.
At the same time the strikers were handed final paychecks ; Arthur told one
or more of the strikers that the strikers were no longer employees.
On September 14 Respondent sent word to the strikers through the Mediation
and Conciliation Service commissioner that they were discharged.
3. Conclusions respecting the allegation of a refusal to bargain and the effect of
discharging the strikers
The obligation to bargain is not necessarily satisfied by a willingness to
attend the conference room and engage in endless discussion. The real ques-
tion is whether Respondent dealt in good faith with an open mind and a
sincere purpose of finding a basis for a mutually satisfactory agreement or
merely engaged in "surface bargaining" without any intent of concluding an
agreement on a give-and-take basis.8
Respondent's failure to make concessions, accept compromise proposals, or
offer any of its own, does not, of course, prove its bad faith any more than its
mere willingness to meet and confer necessarily establishes its good faith.
The obligation to bargain neither compels agreement nor requires the making
of concessions, and no inference of bad faith may be drawn from such circum-
stances standing alone. Yet these circumstances are relevant in evaluating
Respondent's entire course of conduct, for while they do not themselves estab-
lish bad-faith dealing, in conjunction with other evidence, they may aid in
determining whether Respondent in fact negotiated with a closed mind and a
fixed determination not to deviate from its trustees' original position that em-
ployees of the Cooperative should deal directly with them concerning rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment, rather
than through the Union.
Other evidence throwing light on the question of whether the minds of the
trustees, their manager, and their attorney were sealed against or whether they
were unwilling to resign themselves to an acceptance of the mandate of Sec-
tion 8 (d) of the Act is not lacking.
° Johnson was in Satanta , Kansas, at the time.
8N. L. R. B. v. Whittier Mills, 111 F. 2d 474, 478 (C. A. 5) ; N. L. R. B. v. Athena
Manufacturing Co., 161 F. 2d 8 (C . A. 5) ; N. L. R. B. v. Tower Hosiery Mills, Inc., 180
F. 2d 701, 705 (C. A. 5) ; Singer Mfg. Co., 24 NLRB 444, 464, enfd. 119 F. 2d 131 (C. A.
7), cert . denied , 313 U. S. 595. See also N. L. R. B. v. Griswold Mfg. Co., 106 F. 2d 713
(C. A. 3) ; N. L. R. B. v. Pilling, 118 F 2d 32 (C. A. 3).
WHEATLAND ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC . 1129
Two days before the representation election of June 1, 1951, Respondent
-without consultation with or notice to the Union increased pay for holidays
from time-and-a-half to double time; on August 15 at a meeting called for the
.purpose of attempting to agree on a contract Frazee read to the two employees
who were present an account of high salaries paid to top union officials ; ° Re-
spondent asserted that there would be no negotiations until the position of
Robertson was designated ; 10 and, after the strike and without notification to
the Union, Respondent, on September 18, 1951, hired a service employee at $1.38
an hour to take over work comparable to that of a striker who had been paid
$1.15 an hour, linemen at $1.38 an hour to take over the work of striking line-
men who had been paid at $1.25 an hour, and on September 12 raised the pay
of an oiler from $1.10 per hour to $1.29 an hour and assigned him to take over
the work of striking operators who had been paid $1.10 an hour.11
These circumstances and the entire background of the Respondent's relations
with the Union satisfy me that Respondent was intent upon avoiding an agree-
went rather than reaching one and has fallen short of fulfilling its duty to
bargain with the Union. Viewing the whole record, I find therefore that Re-
spondent has failed and refused to bargain in good faith with the Union con-
cerning rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of em-
ployment. Respondent has thereby violated Section 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (5)
,of the Act.
Respondent's employees engaged in a strike and picketed in protest of the
failure of Respondent to bargain with the Union. Inasmuch as this failure and
refusal to bargain constituted an unfair labor practice, the strikers who struck
in protest thereof became unfair labor practice strikers.
IIt is not to be inferred that I consider this conduct other than a legitimate expression
of Respondent's agent's right of free speech. However, the reading of material In-
tended to be critical of unions to employees whose union had been recently certified by
the Board as their collective -bargaining representative was completely extraneous to the
matter at hand and constituted not only an indication of Respondent's attorney's oppo-
sition to the Idea of collective bargaining but also had a tendency to distract the atten-
tion of the negotiators from their objective.
10 If Respondent had really intended In good faith to bargain out a contract with the
Union, It might well have taken advantage of the Union's constantly expressed willing-
ness to negotiate the matter of Robertson's status, and suggested to the Union that this
subject be left to Respondent 's unilateral determination. Nothing In the Act would
have prevented the Union from waiving its right to require Respondent to bargain about
certain subjects if the Union felt that such a compromise would enable it to secure
compensating concessions. "Collective bargains need not and do not always settle or
embrace every exception. It may be [between the bargaining parties] that particular
situations are reserved for Individual contracting, either completely or within prescribed
limits." Oder of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Empress Agency, Inc., 821 U. S.
342, 347.
"The Supreme Court held In N. L. R. B. v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U. S.
217, 224-225, where the employer unilaterally effected a wage increase, that the "oc-
casion is so appropriate for collective bargaining that it is difficult to infer an intent
to cut off the opportunity for bargaining and yet be consistent with the purposes of
the • * * Act." The Court upheld the Board's finding that the employer's unilateral
action demonstrated that he "was not acting in good faith during the negotiations"
and stated that his conduct was "manifestly inconsistent with the principle of collective
bargaining."
Although at an informal meeting during April 1951, Johnson (as was quite natural)
stated to Respondent' s representatives that the Union would not object to any general
wage increase , it is apparent that individually and unilaterally increasing wages of re-
placements, when the Union had been unavailingly seeking raises, made in the face of
such attempts and the discharge of employees engaging in a concerted protected activity,
was in complete disaccord with the Company's obligation to confer with respect to wages
and was calculated to discredit the Union among its members.
1130 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
It is admitted that the board of trustees terminated the employment of the
eight strikers and it is clear that Respondent discharged them because they
struck . I accordingly find that Respondent discriminatorily discharged the
eight strikers on or about September 13, 1951.
When unconditional application for reinstatement was made in their behalf,
this request was refused . Being unfair labor practice strikers , it is established
law that their right to reinstatement was absolute , irrespective of whether their
positions had been filled in the interim . I accordingly find that Respondent
discriminatorily denied reinstatement on and after September 22, 1951, to the
eight strikers . N. L. R. B . v. Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co., 304 U. S. 333;
Y. L. R. B . v. Remington Rand, Inc., 130 F. 2d 912 (C. A. 2) ; N. L. R. B. v.;
Greensboro Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 180 F. 2d 912 (C. A. 2 ) ; N. L. R. B . v. Greens-
boro Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 180 F. 2d 840 ( C. A. 4) ; Olin Industries v. N. L. R. B.,
191 F. 2d 613 ( C. A. 5) ; and N. L. R. B . v. Sunshine Mining Co ., 110 F. 2d 780
( C. A. 9), cert. denied 312 U. S. 678.
Moreover , even assuming that the strike was economic in its inception, the
discharge of the strikers , who were engaging in a protected concerted activity
under the Act, constituted , as alleged , interference , restraint , and coercion within
the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act and discrimination in regard to hire
or tenure of employment within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act,
and such conduct and such violations of the Act on the part of Respondent
converted the strike into an unfair labor practice strike. In either event, it
follows that Respondent' s failure to reinstate the strikers after their abandon-
ment of the strike and upon their request to return to work unconditionally is
violative of Section 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
In view of the foregoing , I find that Respondent has discriminated with respect
to the hire and tenure of employment of the eight complainants who were members
of the Union and who had engaged in a concerted aetlvity protected by the Act and
that Respondent has thereby engaged in conduct violative of Section 8 (a) (1)
of the Act . Under the circumstances present herein , I further find that the
discharges tended to discourage adherence to the Union and were consequently
violative of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act X. L. R. B. v. Kennametal , Inc., 182
F. 2d 817 ( C. A. 3). Furthermore , it is immaterial whether these discharges be
termed violative of Section 8 (a) (1) or 8 ( a) (3), for , in either event, the
remedy applied by the Board is identical . Smith Victory Corporation , 90 NLRB
2089, enfd . 190 F. 2d (C. A. 2), and Ohio Oil Company , 92 NLRB 1597.
C. Respondent 's contentions
I find without merit Respondent ' s contention that because of the provisions of
sections 44-614 to 44-620 of the General Statutes of the State of Kansas , prohibit-
ing strikes among employees of public utilities , its discharge of and failure to re-
instate the strikers was not violative of the Act . In Amalgamated Association of
Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America , Division 988, et
at v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U. S. 383, the Supreme Court
held that by the Act , Congress denied to the States the regulation of strikes in
industries affecting commerce. In rejecting the petitioner 's contention that a
distinction should be drawn between the administration of the Act in a private
industry and in a local public utility, the Court said :
Congress drew no such distinction but, instead , saw fit to regulate labor
relations to the full extent of its constitutional power under the commerce
clause, National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601, 607,
83 L. Ed. 1014 , 1019, 59 S. Ct . 668 [4 LRR Man 535] (1939). Ever since
the question was fully argued and decided in Consolidated Edison Co. v.
WHEATLAND ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. 1131
National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197, 83 L. Ed. 126, 59 S. Ct. 206
[3 LRR Man. 646] (1938), it has been clear that federal labor legislation,
encompassing as it does all industries "affecting commerce," applies to a
privately owned public utility whose business and activities are carried on
wholly within a single state. The courts of appeal have uniformly held
enterprises similar to and no more important to interstate commerce than
the Milwaukee gas and transit companies before use in these cases subject
to the provisions of the federal labor law. No distinction between public
utilities and national manufacturing organizations has been drawn in
the administration of the federal Act, and when separate treatment for
public utilities was urged upon Congress in 1947, the suggested differentia-
tion was expressly rejected. Creation of a special classification for public
utilities is for Congress, not for this Court.
Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 306, cited by Respondent, was decided 9 years
before the date of approval of the National Labor Relations Act on July 5,
1935, and has no application here.
Respondent further contended that at about the time the strike was in
progress, due to the presence of more complicated machinery in a new generating
plant to which it was moving, it began to require employees of higher qualifica-
tions than possessed by those among the strikers' who had operated the
machinery in the old plant and that consequently it could no longer avail
itself of the services of the latter. The record is unclear concerning the identity
of persons who operated the machinery in the new plant once it was put into
full operation or just when after the strike the use of the machinery in
the old plant was finally entirely discontinued. There is no testimony con-
cerning the ability, training, or qualifications of Wilbur Holden or any of the
five unnamed people, including one apprentice, who have been hired since the
strike to run the machinery. It is manifest from Arthur's letter of February
13. 1951, that he then contemplated retaining the machinery operators in the
old plant to run the machinery in the new plant. There is no doubt that the
machinery in the new plant is more modern than that in the old. The great
weight of the credited testimony of such employees as Clark, who had ac-
companied Arthur to the plant where the new machinery was manufactured
for the purpose of being of assistance in giving advice concerning its ship-
ment to Scott City and of Siegrist, Horlick, Wicker, and Rictor, is that the
job of "operator" in the old plant was virtually the same as that which
Respondent chose to denominate "engineer" in the new plant; that operators
and engineers are interchangeable ; that running the machines at the old plant
was more complicated than at the new plant where the operation is more or
less of a pushbutton job; that the new plant runs on the same principles as
the old ; and that the work at the new plant could be learned in a week or 10
days. Moreover, Arthur told various operators when he discharged them
on September 13, that with the exception of Clark, they could all be rehired.
I am satisfied that there is no substantial difference between the nature
of the work performed by men Respondent had called "operators" in the old
plant and that done by employees who at the time of the hearing, Arthur chose,
by a species of euphemism, to call "engineers" in the new plant. Accordingly,
I find without merit the corporation's contention that the striking operators
were not suitably qualified for reinstatement.
'a But five of the strikers are operators, i. e , Clark, Wicker, Rictor, Siegrist, and Horlick.
Gregory is a lineman, Messenger is a meter reader and "trouble shooter," and Halfman is
a warehouse clerk.
1132 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
D. Interference , restraint , and coercion
The complaint alleges in part that in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) Respond-
ent has questioned its employees about their union and other concerted
activities , has engaged in surveillance and has created the impression of sur-
veillance of such activities , has threatened and intimidated its employees
because of their pursuit of such activities , and has made promises of bene-
fit upon condition of the abandonment of such activities . I have found that
Respondent violated Section 8 ( a) (1) as well as Section 8 (a) (5) of the
Act because of its failure to bargain in good faith and violated Section 8
(a) (1) as well as Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act by discharging the strikers
because of their engaging in a protected concerted activity and by its failure
and refusal to reinstate them after the abandonment of the strike and upon
their request to return to work unconditionally.
As bearing on the question whether Respondent engaged in further independent
violations of Section 8 (a) (1), we must consider the impact of Arthur's in-
quiry of Halfman as to why he thought he was eligible to join the Union, and
whether , if he did join, he knew that he would have two bosses , and his statements
that Halfman's vote would probably be contested at the election , that there
would probably be a better opportunity for Halfman if he remained neutral, that
Halfman had joined the Union despite Arthur 's efforts to keep him out; state-
ments that the strikers were a bunch of saboteurs , that they should consider them-
selves lucky that Respondent was able to energize the lines after the strikers had
shut down the generators as otherwise the farmers would have come in and
shot the strikers down ; Arthur's jibe to Clark concerning "working in a cafe
as a hasher ," during the strike and his statement to Troughton that Clark
was one of his "ex-boys " but that he just could not have him around because
he had organized the group , caused them to go into the Union , and had called
the strike ; Arthur's statement to Siegrist when he handed him his separation
notice and paid him off on the picket line that he did not have any choice other
than to do so ; Arthur 's statement to Horlick and Gregory when he handed
them their separation notices and paid them off on the picket line that he thought
all the strikers could get reinstated , with the exception of Clark who couldn't
go back to work ; and, Crouch 's statement to Gregory that if he were in
Gregory's position and he did not like his job he would quit and that Gregory
should quit if he did not like his job.
The conduct furnishes supporting proof of Respondent 's opposition to the Union
and of its lack of good-faith bargaining , but I am disinclined to find that it is of
sufficient consequentiality to sustain the 8 ( a) (1) allegations.
I fail to see apything in these statements which supports the allegation and
contention that Respondent has engaged in surveillance of its employees union
and other concerted activities, and has created the impression of such surveil-
lance. I do not feel that Arthur 's detached inquiries of Halfman , concerning
whose unit status there cannot be said to have been an unreasonable doubt until
such time as the Board included him, as to why he considered himself eligible
and if he knew that once he became a union member, he would have two bosses,
are questions of a nature that under the circumstances of this case warrant a
finding of an independent 8 (a) (1) violation.
The only remaining conduct disclosed by the record which in my opinion may
be regarded as encroaching upon the proscriptions of Section 8 (a) (1) are
Arthur's hint that Halfman probably would be better off if be remained neutral
and that Clark had organized the Union , called the strike, and could not go
back to work . Taken in the context of Respondent 's entire course of action in
WHEATLAND ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. 1133
failing to bargain in good faith, and its denial of reinstatement to the strikers,
what was said in these two conversations cannot be regarded as entirely isolated
bits of coercive conduct. Nevertheless, because the fragmentary nature of the
evidence relating to this aspect of the case is insufficient to establish a clear-
cut pattern of interference, restraint, and coercion, I am of the opinion that it
should not be necessary and that it would be unwarranted, in order to make
effective the policies of the Act, to issue a remedial order. Moreover the issuance
of such an order would be superfluous, since in view of the previously made
findings of derivative 8 (a) (1) violations, the remedy to be recommended for
application will be of sufficient breadth to include the proscription of all inter-
ference, restraint, and coercion. Therefore I shall recommend that all allega-
tions of independent (8) (a) (1) violations be dismissed.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in con-
nection with Respondent's operations set forth in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices in vio-
lation of Section 8 (a) (1), (3), and (5) of the Act, I shall recommend that It
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act. It has been found that Respondent has re-
fused to bargain collectively with the Union. I will therefore recommend that
Respondent upon request bargain with it.
It has been found that Respondent has discriminated against the eight strikers
by discharging and refusing to reinstate them as a result of their union and
concerted activities. I will therefore recommend that Respondent offer them
full and immediate reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent
positions without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges.
See Chase National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan, Puerto Rico,
Branch, 65 NLRB 827. It will further be recommended that Respondent make
them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the dis-
crimination against them. Said loss of pay, based upon earnings wrich they
normally would have earned from September 13, 1951, the date of discrimina-
tion, to the date of Respondent's offer of reinstatement, less net earnings, shall
be computed on a quarterly calendar basis in accordance with the formula
adopted by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289. See Crossett
Lumber Co., 8 NLRB 440.
It has been found that the strike which began September 12, 1951, was caused
and prolonged by Respondent's unfair labor practices. I will therefore recom-
mend, since the strikers are, therefore, entitled to reinstatement, upon applica-
tion, irrespective of whether or not their positions have been filled by Respond-
ent," that in order to restore the status quo as it existed prior to the time Re-
spondent engaged in the unfair labor practices, Respondent be ordered, if neces-
sary to provide positions for the eight strikers, to dismiss any person hired on
or after September 12, 1951.
13 Rubin Brothers Footwear, Inc., 91 NLRB 10, 15 ; Julian Freirich Co., 86 NLRB 542;
American Thread Company , 44 NLRB 970, 979.
1134 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In view of the nature of the unfair labor practices found, it will be recom-
mended, in order to afford the employees of Respondent the full rights guaran-
teed them by the Act, that Respondent cease and desist from in any manner
interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in
the case I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAw
1. International Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 646, AFL, is a
labor organization.
2. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of the
employees named above, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Act.
3. All employees including operators or engineers, linesmen, meter readers,
meter installers and testers, and the clerk in the warehouse, employed by Re-
spondent at its Scott City and Syracuse, Kansas, plants, exclusive of "right of
way" purchasers, office clerical employees, professional employees, and super-
visors as defined by the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining.
4. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 646, AFL, was on
June 11, 1951, and at all times thereafter has been, the exclusive representative
of the employees in the appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining.
5. By refusing to bargain collectively with the Union, Respondent has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)
(1) and (5) of the Act.
6. The strike of September 12, 1951, was caused and prolonged by Respondent's
unfair labor practices.
7. Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning
of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act, by independently interfering with, restraining,
and coercing its employees.
8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication in this volume.]
Appendix A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our em-
ployees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor or-
ganizations, to join or assist INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS,
LocAL No. 646, AFL, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring member-
ship in a labor organization as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
All our employees are free to become or remain members of this union, or
any other labor organization.
ALLIS CHALMERS MANUFACTURING COMPANY 1135
WE WILL bargain collectively upon request with the above-named union
as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit de-
scribed herein with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody
such understanding in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is :
All employees including operators or engineers, linesmen, meter read-
ers, meter installers and testers, and the clerk in the warehouse, em-
ployed at our Scott City and Syracuse, Kansas, plants, exclusive of
"right of way" purchasers, office clerical employees, professional em-
ployees, and supervisors as defined by the Act.
WE WILL offer to all employees who went on strike on or about September
12, 1951, immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights
and privileges, and make them whole for any loss of pay they may have
suffered as a result of our refusal to reinstate them upon application. These
employees are Clint Clark, Harry V. Messenger, John L. Halfman, Fay
Wicker, Alvin Rictor, Floyd Charles Gregory, Ralph Siegrist, and William
N. Horlick.
All of our employees are free to become, remain, or to refrain from becoming
,or remaining members in good standing in NATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING EN-
-GINEERS, LOCAL No. 646, AFL, or any other labor organization, except to the
,extent that this right may be affected by an agreement in conformity with
Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
WHEATLAND ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.,
Employer.
By --------------------------------------------
(Representative ) (Title)
Dated ----------------------------------
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof and must not
be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
ALLIS CHALMERS MANUFACTURING COMPANY WEST ALLIS PLANT)
and LOCAL 248, INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, Am-
CRAFT & AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO,
PETITIONER. Case No. 13-RC-9927. Feb' nary 6, 1953
Decision and Order
Upon a petition duly filed, a hearing was held before Joseph Cohen,
hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are
free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. '
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
1. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Company is.a Delaware corpora-
tion engaged, among other things, in the manufacture of farm equip-
ment, earth moving equipment, road grading equipment, industrial
type machinery, and electrical equipment. Its main office is at West
Allis, Wisconsin. At the West Allis plant, involved in this proceed-
102 NLRB No. 116.