Weyerhaeuser Company

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 22, 2018

366 NLRB No. 169 (N.L.R.B. 2018)

366 NLRB No. 169
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Weyerhaeuser NR Company1 and Association of
Western Pulp and Paper Workers, affiliated
with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America and Association of Western
Pulp and Paper Workers, affiliated with the
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners
of America, Locals 580 and 633. Cases 19–CA–
122853, 19–CA–127089, 19–CA–127090, 19–CA–
127561, 19–CA–128688, 19–CA–128740, and 19–
CA–131148
August 22, 2018
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS PEARCE, MCFERRAN, AND EMANUEL
On March 25, 2015, Administrative Law Judge John J.
McCarrick issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The General
Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Respondent
filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.2
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,3 and conclusions4
only to the extent consistent with this Decision and Or-
der, to amend the remedy section of the judge’s deci-
sion,5 and to adopt the judge’s recommended Order as
modified and set forth in full below.6

1 The Respondent filed an unopposed motion to amend the caption
to reflect its correct legal name, “Weyerhaeuser NR Company.” We
have amended the caption accordingly.
2 Chairman Ring is recused and took no part in the consideration of
this case.
3 In the absence of exceptions, we adopt the judge’s findings that
the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by: (1) suspending Steve Collins;
(2) denying Steve Collins and Joyce Becker their right to have a union
representative present at an investigative interview; and (3) discrimina-
torily removing prounion commentary from a union-designated bulletin
board. Also in the absence of exceptions, we adopt the judge’s findings
that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) by: (1) unilaterally changing
the scheduling of trainees in its E&U Department; (2) unreasonably
delaying in furnishing Local 580 with some information requested on
April 2 and May 1, 2014, and failing to furnish other information re-
quested on those dates; (3) unreasonably delaying in furnishing Local
633 with information requested on April 24 and 30, 2014; and (5) un-
reasonably delaying in furnishing the union with some information
requested on May 1, 2014, and failing to furnish other information
requested on that date.
4 We have amended the judge’s Conclusions of Law 3 and 4 to con-
form to the violations found by the judge.
5 We amend the judge’s remedy to require the Respondent to re-
scind its unlawful unilateral changes to the schedules of its training
I. BACKGROUND
The Respondent operates a pulp and paper mill in
Longview, Washington that, among other things, pro-
duces food packaging materials. The Charging Party
Unions, Association of Western Pulp and Paper Workers,
affiliated with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America, Locals 633 and 580 (Local 633 and
Local 580), represent three bargaining units of the Re-
spondent’s employees at the Longview facility. Local
633 represents a unit of extruder department employees
(the Local 633 extruder unit) and a unit of paperboard
employees (the Local 633 paperboard unit). Local 580

operators in the E&U Department, the training evaluation process for
E&U Department employees, and the food safety and hygiene rules for
extruder unit and paperboard unit employees; to reinstate all unit em-
ployees who were discharged as a result of the unlawful changes; and
to provide make-whole relief for all unit employees who may have
suffered losses as a result of the unlawful changes, to be determined in
compliance. To the extent, if any, that employees experienced cessa-
tion of employment as a result of the Respondent’s application of its
unlawful changes, backpay shall be computed in accordance with F.W.
Woolworth, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest as prescribed in New
Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as prescribed in
Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010). For employees
who suffered losses but no cessation of employment, backpay shall be
computed in the manner set forth in Ogle Protection Service, 183
NLRB 682 (1970), enfd. 444 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1971), with interest as
prescribed in New Horizons, supra, compounded daily as prescribed in
Kentucky River Medical Center, supra. In accordance with our recent
decision in King Soopers, Inc., 364 NLRB No. 93 (2016), enfd. in
pertinent part 859 F.3d 23 (D.C. Cir. 2017), we shall order the Re-
spondent to compensate affected employees for their search-for-work
and interim employment expenses regardless of whether those expenses
exceed interim earnings. Search-for-work and interim employment
expenses shall be calculated separately from taxable net backpay, with
interest as prescribed in New Horizons, supra, compounded daily as
prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center, supra. To the extent that
the Respondent maintains that adversely affected unit employees would
have been disciplined or discharged even in the absence of its unlawful
unilateral changes, the Respondent is entitled to litigate that issue in the
compliance proceeding. See, e.g., Voith Industrial Services, Inc., 363
NLRB No. 109, slip op. at 1 fn. 3 (2016); Uniserv, 351 NLRB 1361,
1361 fn. 1 (2007). We shall also order the Respondent to remove from
its files any reference to unlawful discipline issued to or discharge of
any unit employees as a result of the Respondent’s unlawful changes,
and to notify each of these employees that this has been done and that
the discipline or discharge shall not be used against the employee in
any way.
In addition, we amend the judge’s remedy to provide that Steve Col-
lins be made whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered
as a result of his unlawful suspension in accordance with Ogle Protec-
tion Service, supra, with interest as prescribed in New Horizons, supra,
and compounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center,
supra. Further, in accordance with AdvoServ of New Jersey, Inc., 363
NLRB No. 143 (2016), we shall amend the judge’s recommended tax
compensation and Social Security reporting remedy.
6 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform to
the violations found, the Board’s standard remedial language, and in
accordance with our decision in Excel Container, Inc., 325 NLRB 17
(1997). We shall substitute a new notice to conform to the Order as
modified.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
represents a unit of utility, maintenance, fiberline, and
chip processing employees (the Local 580 unit). As rel-
evant below, the Local 580 unit includes the Respond-
ent’s Energy and Utilities Department (E&U Depart-
ment) employees. Both Charging Parties have been sig-
natories to a series of collective-bargaining agreements
with the Respondent.
For 20 years prior to 2013, training evaluations to de-
termine whether the Respondent’s E&U Department em-
ployees should advance to the next job qualification level
were assessed based on necessary job skills agreed to by
the Respondent and Local 580. These evaluations were
conducted between the employee and his or her supervi-
sor, lasted about 15 to 20 minutes, and involved the su-
pervisor posing questions or hypotheticals for the em-
ployee to solve. In fall 2013, without first notifying the
Union or giving it an opportunity to bargain, the Re-
spondent’s new E&U Department manager changed how
the department performed its training evaluations. The
employees were now tested on subject matter that had
not previously been covered, including safety and envi-
ronmental issues, and the evaluation sessions lasted up to
14 hours (over multiple sessions) which could take sev-
eral months to complete. The effect of the extended
evaluation process was to delay the movement of em-
ployees to the next classification level.
In addition, prior to February 2014, the Respondent
had a set of food safety and hygiene rules for the Local
633 extruder and paperboard units that had been in place
at the facility since 1987. Under these rules, employees
were permitted to drink coffee and beverages and chew
tobacco on the production floor and could eat lunch in
two of the production area shacks. In February 2014, the
Respondent made changes to the food safety and hygiene
rules without first notifying the Union and giving it an
opportunity to bargain.7 Among other things, the Re-
spondent permitted only clear beverages and prohibited
chewing tobacco on the production floor. In addition,
the Respondent created a new hygiene zone in the paper-
board unit where employees could not have personal
belongings, food, or beverages other than water. Further,
the Respondent added personal item restrictions and
grooming standards to the extant hygiene rules for ex-
truder department employees. Finally, the Respondent
required the paperboard and extruder unit employees to
follow and fill out a cleaning inspection checklist.8

7 The Respondent does not contend that the new rules were mandat-
ed by food safety regulations or other external laws.
8 The judge expressly found that the new rules applied to the Local
633 extruder and paperboard departments, and the record supports this
finding. However, we note that, in his legal analysis, the judge mistak-
enly stated that the rules also applied to Local 580.
II. THE JUDGE’S DECISION
The judge found that the training evaluation processes
and food safety and hygiene rules are mandatory subjects
of bargaining. In addition, the judge found it undisputed
that the Respondent made changes to how training evalu-
ations would be conducted and to its food safety and hy-
giene rules without first providing the Unions with notice
and an opportunity to bargain. As such, the judge’s
analysis focused on the Respondent’s defense that it had
no obligation to bargain over these changes because the
Unions had waived their right to bargain over them either
by contract language or inaction. As to the Respondent’s
changes to the training evaluation processes, the judge
found that the collective-bargaining agreement wording
relied on by the Respondent did not establish that Local
580 had clearly and unmistakably waived its right to bar-
gain over the method and means of evaluating the E&U
Department employees. Turning to the Respondent’s
argument that Local 580 waived its right to bargain by
failing to take any action concerning the changes from
October 2013 until April 2014, the judge found that Lo-
cal 580 could not be found to have waived bargaining
over a change that was presented as a fait accompli. Re-
garding the Respondent’s changes to the food safety and
hygiene rules governing the Local 633 extruder and pa-
perboard unit employees, the judge again found that the
collective-bargaining agreement wording relied on by the
Respondent did not establish that Local 633 clearly and
unmistakably waived its right to bargain over the chang-
es. In addition, he rejected the Respondent’s argument
that Local 633 waived its right to bargain by inaction
because the changes were implemented and presented as
a fait accompli.
III. ANALYSIS
The Respondent does not dispute the judge’s findings
that the training evaluation processes and food safety and
hygiene rules were mandatory subjects of bargaining.9
Nor does it dispute the judge’s findings that it made
changes to the training evaluation processes and food
safety and hygiene rules without first providing the Un-
ions with notice and an opportunity to bargain. Instead,
the Respondent argues only that the judge erroneously
found that the Unions did not clearly and unmistakably
waive their rights to bargain over these matters by con-

9 Although the Respondent filed an exception to the judge’s finding
that the training evaluation processes are mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining, it does not state, either in its exceptions or supporting brief,
any grounds on which this purportedly erroneous finding should be
overturned. Therefore, in accordance with Sec. 102.46(b)(2) of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, we shall disregard this exception. See
Holsum de Puerto Rico, Inc., 344 NLRB 694, 694 fn.1 (2005), enfd.
456 F.3d 265 (1st Cir. 2006).
WEYERHAEUSER NR CO. 3
tract and by inaction. We agree with the judge, for the
reasons he states, that the Respondent presented the
changes to the training evaluation processes and the food
safety and hygiene rules to the Unions as a fait accompli
and thus the Unions did not waive their right to bargain
by inaction.10 In addition, we agree with the judge that
the Unions did not clearly and unmistakably waive their
right to bargain over these matters through contract lan-
guage, for the reasons discussed below.
The Board's waiver principles are well established.
Waiver is not lightly inferred and must be “clear and
unmistakable.” See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB,
460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983); Georgia Power Co., 325
NLRB 420, 420-421 (1998), enfd. 176 F.3d 494 (11th
Cir. 1999), cert. denied 528 U.S. 1061 (1999). The party
asserting waiver must establish that the parties “unequiv-
ocally and specifically express[ed] their mutual intention
to permit unilateral employer action with respect to a
particular employment term, notwithstanding the statu-
tory duty to bargain that would otherwise apply.”
Provena St. Joseph Medical Center, 350 NLRB 808, 811
(2007). Such a showing may be based on an express
provision in the contract, the conduct of the parties (in-
cluding past practice, bargaining history, and action or
inaction), or a combination of the two. See, e.g., Ameri-
can Diamond Tool, 306 NLRB 570, 570 (1992); Chesa-
peake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. NLRB, 687 F.2d 633,
636 (2d Cir. 1982), enfg. 259 NLRB 225 (1981). In ad-
dition, the party asserting waiver bears the burden of
proof. See TCI of New York, 301 NLRB 822, 824
(1991).
A. New Training Evaluation Process
In arguing that Local 580 waived its right to bargain
over the new training evaluation processes for E&U De-

10 As to the food safety and hygiene rules pertaining to employees
represented by Local 633, we note the Respondent’s argument that it
did not present the change as a fait accompli because it trained employ-
ees on the new rules prior to implementation and thus Local 633 had an
opportunity to request bargaining prior to implementation, but did not.
As the judge found, however, the Respondent did not provide the Un-
ion with notice or opportunity to request bargaining prior to training
employees or implementing the rules. American Distributing Co. v.
NLRB, 715 F.2d 446, 450, 451 (9th Cir.1983) (“an employer must give
express notice of specific proposals before implementing unilateral
changes”), cert. denied 466 U.S. 958 (1984).
In addition, we find that the cases relied on by the Respondent to
challenge the judge’s fait accompli findings are distinguishable as they
involve situations where the employer respondents provided the unions
with notice of a change and the unions waived the right to bargain by
inaction. See Reynolds Metal Co., 310 NLRB 995 (1993); Haddon
Craftsmen, 300 NLRB 789 (1990), review denied mem. sub nom.
Graphic Communications Workers Local 97B v. NLRB, 937 F.2d 597
(3d Cir. 1991); and Kansas National Education Assn., 275 NLRB 638
(1985). The Respondent here provided no notice to the Unions prior to
implementing the changes.
partment employees, the Respondent points to the collec-
tively bargained “Local Ground Rule No. 48” and a por-
tion of the “Energy & Utilities Design Agreement”
(E&U Design Agreement) agreed to by the Respondent
and the Union. For the reasons discussed below, we find
that these agreements do not establish that Local 580
clearly and unmistakably waived its right to bargain over
the training evaluation processes.
1. Local Ground Rule No. 48
The “Pay for Skills” section of Local Ground Rule No.
48 provides:
Work is designed to encourage people to develop and
use skills, while safely working within their capability.
Pay structures will be based on broadly defined skills,
allowing team members to move easily between tasks
with minimal concern for pay issues.
Some component of pay will be based on skill, with in-
creasing pay as additional skills and capabilities are ac-
quired and used.
Processes will be developed to assure that acquired
skills are maintained and continuously improved upon.
For greater clarity, ID management shall have the right
to implement certification requirements where required
by law or when recommended by industry standards
(e.g. Black Liquor Recovery Boiler Advisory Commit-
tee, Factory Mutual). The Company and the Union
will jointly develop the means of evaluation.
Each pay level will include elements of leadership, ad-
ministration, operation, coordination, project manage-
ment and maintenance.
The new work design will define the advancement pro-
cess. The minimum qualification levels and perfor-
mance standards will be determined by mutual agree-
ment between the Company and the Union.
Employees hired into the mill after March 15, 2008
must demonstrate the capability and aptitude to eventu-
ally perform all jobs within the work system before be-
ing allowed to work in any such system. The Company
and the Union shall jointly develop the instruments to
be used to measure capability and aptitude through the
application of a structured external evaluation tool,
such as Work Keys or another mutually agreed to tool.
The judge found that the provision in paragraph 4 stat-
ing that “[t]he Company and the Union will jointly de-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
velop the means of evaluation” suggests that the parties
agreed there would be joint decision making with respect
to the training evaluation process and thus Local 580 did
not clearly and unmistakably waive its right to bargain
over the training evaluation processes. In its exceptions,
the Respondent asserts that this provision only applies to
the evaluation of new skills in connection with the “certi-
fication requirements where required by law or when
recommended by industry standards,” which are refer-
enced in the preceding sentence, and does not apply to
the evaluations at issue here, which are intended to de-
termine employees’ eligibility for higher pay grades.
However, this reading ignores the paragraph’s topic sen-
tence, which sets forth the general proposition that
“[p]rocesses will be developed to assure that acquired
skills are maintained and continuously improved upon.”
In light of this language, the sentence that calls for
“joint[] develop[ment]” of evaluation procedures may
refer broadly to all evaluations of new skills. Thus, not
only was there no waiver, but the language here suggests
that the parties in fact affirmatively agreed to bargain
over the training evaluation process. The Respondent
has therefore failed to establish that Local 580 clearly
and unmistakably waived its right to bargain over the
new training evaluation process for E&U Department
employees though the ground rule.
The Respondent further argues that, under the “expres-
sio unius est exclusio alterius” canon of construction,
Local Ground Rule No. 48 constitutes a bargaining
waiver.11 The Respondent claims that, because the pro-
vision explicitly states the conditions under which Local
580 has the right to bargain over evaluations (i.e., only
where the change is mandated by law or recommended
by industry standard, or where the evaluation is with re-
spect to a newly hired employee), and because no right to
bargain over the training evaluation process at issue here
is expressly mentioned, the Board should construe this
provision as waiving Local 580’s right to bargain over
that process. Without deciding whether the canon of
construction advanced by the Respondent could ever be
consistent with the Board’s waiver standard, application
of the canon does not establish waiver here. As previ-
ously discussed, the language of the fourth paragraph of
Local Ground Rule No. 48, one of the predicates to the
Respondent’s expressio unius argument, does not plainly
limit, as the Respondent claims, Local 580’s right to bar-
gain over the method of evaluations to only those new
skills mandated by law or industry standards. In fact, the

11 Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a principle of legal con-
struction holding that when one or more things of a class are expressly
mentioned, others of the same class that are not mentioned are exclud-
ed.
relevant language suggests that Local 580 has broadly
reserved its bargaining rights for developing the means
and processes for all evaluations.
Based on the foregoing, we find, in agreement with the
judge, that nothing in Local Ground Rule No. 48 estab-
lishes that Local 580 clearly and unmistakably waived its
right to bargain over the Respondent’s changes to the
training evaluation processes.
2. The E&U Design Agreement
The E&U Design Agreement between the Respondent
and Local 580 is an extensive document covering the
Respondent’s energy and utilities employees and ad-
dresses topics such as verification of skills and
knowledge and pay for skills and knowledge. As rele-
vant here, in a section entitled “Technical Training,” the
document states that the Respondent or the Union can
approve or veto determinations regarding “[l]evel of
skills needed,” “[s]elect/plan training,” the “[g]ap be-
tween current and needed skills,” and “[s]chedule train-
ing” for energy and utilities employees. However, the
document states that only the System Leader, an official
of the Respondent, can approve or veto determinations
“assess[ing] mastery; verify[ing] learnings” of energy
and utilities employees.
The judge found it clear from the E&U Design
Agreement that the Respondent and Local 580 contem-
plated joint decisionmaking with regard to the “level of
skills needed,” “select/plan training,” “the gap between
current and needed skills,” and scheduling of training for
E&U Department employees. The Respondent does not
challenge these findings. Instead, it points to the word-
ing in the agreement giving the System Leader authority
to “[a]ssess mastery; verify learnings” and to “ap-
prove/veto” such determinations.12 The Respondent ar-
gues that this wording establishes that Local 580 has no
role in the evaluation process or verifying whether an
individual is qualified for a position. We agree with the
judge, however, that the wording relied on by the Re-
spondent does not establish that Local 580 clearly and
unmistakably waived the right to bargain over extant
procedures for how the training evaluation processes are
to be conducted. As the judge found, this wording re-
flects only who the parties have agreed will be the person
to determine if trainees have acquired the skills necessary

12 In its exceptions, the Respondent also points to testimony by the
Unions’ witness that the Respondent had the right to decide whether an
employee actually met the qualifications for a promotion. Determining
whether one has passed a promotion test, however, is a separate ques-
tion from who develops the method and processes of testing. Indeed,
that the Respondent was granted decisionmaking authority might well
explain why the Union wanted to secure a role in determining the test-
ing that provided the basis for the decision.
WEYERHAEUSER NR CO. 5
to advance, not what such qualifications will be or the
process by which they will be evaluated. Further, as the
judge found, the agreement provides for team decision-
making in the “Select/plan training” and “schedule train-
ing” categories, and that the “Company/Union” shall
have joint authority to approve/veto decisions on select-
ing, planning, and scheduling training evaluations. This
latter language cuts against the Respondent’s argument
that the E&U Design Agreement establishes a waiver
and, in fact, seems to affirmatively require bargaining
over changes to the training evaluation processes. We
therefore find, in agreement with the judge, that nothing
in the E&U Design Agreement establishes that Local 580
clearly and unmistakably waived its right to bargain over
the means of evaluating the E&U Department employ-
ees.
B. New Food Safety and Hygiene Rules
The Respondent argues that language from its collec-
tive-bargaining agreements with Local 633 authorized its
unilateral implementation of the new food safety and
hygiene rules for the extruder and paperboard unit em-
ployees. The collective-bargaining provision it cites
states, in relevant part:
Section 17—Causes for Discipline or Discharge
A. Causes for discipline or discharge are as follows:
*****
13. Refusal to comply with Company Rules:
a. Provided that such rules shall be posted in each de-
partment where they may be read by all employees and
further, that no changes in present rules or no additional
rules shall be made that are inconsistent with this
Agreement; and further provided that any existing or
new rules or changes in rules may be the subject of dis-
cussions between the Local Union Standing Committee
and the Local Mill Manager, and in case of disagree-
ment, the procedure for other grievances shall apply.
The judge found that the provision did not clearly and
unmistakably give the Respondent the right to formulate
new work rules. We agree, for the following reasons.
The first part of Section 17.A.13 states that “no chang-
es in present rules or no additional rules shall be made
that are inconsistent with this Agreement[.]” This lan-
guage effectively establishes a substantive ban on “in-
consistent” rules, such that no discipline may be imposed
for violations of rules that are inconsistent with the con-
tract. But the mere prohibition against “inconsistent”
rules does not clearly and unmistakably indicate the par-
ties’ intent to permit the Respondent to unilaterally im-
plement all other rules, notwithstanding the statutory
duty to bargain that would otherwise apply. In fact, the
statutory right to bargain over changes that are not incon-
sistent with the contract can readily coexist with a rule
that bars inconsistent changes and allows the Respondent
to enforce rules explicitly permitted by the contract or
agreed-to in bargaining with Local 633.
The second part of Section 17.A.13 provides for inter-
party “discussions” and recourse to grievance procedures
when there is disagreement over rules changes. The Re-
spondent contends that by directing any “disagreement”
over “changes in rules” to the grievance process, Local
633 has plainly traded away its statutory right to bargain
in exchange for an arbitral remedy. However, this inter-
pretation—that Local 633 traded its statutory right to
bargain over rules changes in exchange for a grievance-
arbitration remedy—is belied by the nature of the alleged
trade-off. At best, Section 17.A.13 offers a substantive
arbitral remedy for rules that are “inconsistent with” the
Agreement. For other rules changes, such as this one,
which may involve new rules or changes to the rules that
are not necessarily “inconsistent” with the Agreement,
the only contractual remedy would be permissive “dis-
cussions” between the parties, followed by grievance-
arbitration proceedings in which an arbitrator would not
be empowered to remedy the rules change. While such a
seemingly disproportionate trade-off of statutory bar-
gaining rights for a purely procedural (and substantively
toothless) remedy is possible, it should not be inferred
lightly, and not at all under a clear-and-unmistakable-
waiver standard. Cf. Rhone-Poulenc Inc. v. International
Ins. Co., 71 F.3d 1299, 1303 (7th Cir. 1995) (when par-
ties’ trade-offs in a contract appear incommensurate, this
may offer “a good clue to what the contract means”).
In arguing that Section 17.A.13 constitutes a waiver of
the Union’s right to bargain over the changes to the food
safety rules, our dissenting colleague contends that the
contractual limitations placed on the Respondent’s disci-
plinary authority by Section 17.A.13 “necessarily con-
cede” that the Respondent has the authority to create or
modify its rules. Our colleague further asserts that a
finding of waiver is appropriate because the parties
agreed to discussions over new rules or rules changes,
and Section 17.A.13, read in light of other contract word-
ing, indicates that the parties did not intend for these dis-
cussions to equal bargaining.13 In our view, our col-

13 Our colleague also contends that the zipper clause, which states
that the contract constitutes the parties’ complete agreement, supports a
finding of waiver. But it is well-established that such a general state-
ment does not insulate a party’s attempt to execute unilateral changes
not addressed in the agreement, without first engaging in bargaining.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
league’s finding of waiver is premised on assumptions
and inferences about what the parties intended that are
neither necessary nor compelled by the text. As dis-
cussed previously, it is not at all a necessary corollary
that a prohibition on rules that are inconsistent with the
parties’ agreement allows the Respondent to unilaterally
impose a wide range of rules that are neither barred nor
authorized by the agreement.14 Moreover, the right
which is claimed to be waived here by Local 633 is po-
tentially sweeping and we find it difficult to conclude
that the Union would consciously, but silently, waive that
right, and thereby consign a wide range of rules changes
affecting employees to permissive “discussions” and a
toothless grievance procedure.
More fundamentally, the dissent's analysis turns the
clear and unmistakable waiver standard on its head. A
union is not required to secure a contractual commitment
in order to preserve statutory rights. As the Board and
courts have made clear time and time again, waiver is not
lightly inferred and the burden is on the party claiming
the existence of a waiver to establish that the parties “un-
equivocally and specifically” expressed their mutual in-
tent to permit unilateral employer action. See Metropoli-
tan Edison Co. v. NLRB, supra, 460 U.S. at 708; Provena
St. Joseph Medical Center, supra, 350 NLRB at 811.
The Respondent has not met that burden here.
Section 17.A.13 contains no language expressly waiv-
ing Local 633’s bargaining rights, and the Respondent
has offered no evidence that the matter was fully dis-
cussed and that Local 633 consciously yielded its interest
in the matter. Allison Corp., 330 NLRB 1363, 1365
(2000) (“To meet the “clear and unmistakable” standard,
the contract language must be specific, or it must be

See, e.g., IMI South, LLC, d/b/a Irving Materials, 364 NLRB No. 97,
slip op. at 3 (2016).
14 Our dissenting colleague argues that our interpretation of Section
17.A.13—that it prohibits rules “inconsistent with this Agreement,”
while contemplating bargaining over rules that are neither prohibited
nor authorized – renders the provision redundant of the parties’ statuto-
ry and contractual obligations and thus unnecessary. He argues that the
better interpretation is that the provision broadly licenses the Respond-
ent to implement any rules other than those that are inconsistent with
the Agreement. Our colleague’s criticism misses the mark, however,
under the Board’s waiver standard. The question here is not whether
the Respondent (or our colleague) has offered a plausible interpretation
of Section 17.A.13, but rather whether that provision establishes that
Local 633 clearly and unmistakably waived its right to bargain over
new rules. “The clear and unmistakable waiver standard . . . requires
bargaining partners to unequivocally and specifically express their
mutual intention to permit unilateral employer action with respect to a
particular employment term, notwithstanding the statutory duty to
bargain that would otherwise apply.” Provena St. Joseph Medical
Center, supra, 350 NLRB at 811 (emphasis added.) And, “if a waiver
is won—in clear and unmistakable language—the employer's right to
take future unilateral action should be apparent to all concerned.” Id. at
813. The contract language here does not satisfy this standard.
shown that the matter claimed to have been waived was
fully discussed by the parties and that the party alleged to
have waived its rights consciously yielded its interest in
the matter.”); American Distributing Co. v. NLRB, supra,
715 F.2d at 450.
For this reason, we find unpersuasive the Respondent’s
reliance on Provena St. Joseph Medical Center, supra,
for the proposition that, where a contract gives an em-
ployer the right to act unilaterally, a union’s bargaining
right has been ceded. The Provena case involved provi-
sions explicitly stating that the employer had the right to
change reporting practices, to make and enforce rules of
conduct, and to discipline employees. The Board found
that these affirmative statements of management’s pre-
rogatives established a penumbral waiver of the right to
bargain over a new attendance policy. 350 NLRB at 815.
None of the language the Respondent points to here af-
firmatively states its right to act unilaterally. Rather,
Section 17.A.13 merely forbids rules that are inconsistent
with the agreement and establishes a grievance-
arbitration remedy. There are no affirmative statements
of management prerogatives, and thus Provena is inap-
posite.15
Based on the foregoing, we find that the Respondent
has failed to establish that Local 633 waived its right to
bargain over the changes to the food safety and hygiene
rules for the extruder unit and paperboard unit employ-
ees.
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Substitute the following for Conclusion of Law 3.
3. By engaging in the following conduct, the Respond-
ent committed unfair labor practices in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act:
(a) Implementing new training evaluation processes
for the E&U Department employees without first notify-
ing Local 580 and giving it an opportunity to bargain.
(b) Implementing changes to the food safety and hy-
giene rules without first notifying Local 633 and giving it
an opportunity to bargain.
(c) Implementing changes to the schedules of training
operators in the E&U Department without first notifying
Local 580 and giving it an opportunity to bargain.

15 In its exceptions, the Respondent briefly points to the fact that it
unilaterally adopted the current food safety rules when it purchased its
food packaging operations from another company and retained the
seller company’s rules without bargaining over them. It claims that this
establishes Local 633’s acquiescence to its right to make unilateral
changes to food safety rules. However, setting initial terms for a newly
acquired business unit is generally a purchaser’s one-time prerogative
and certainly would not establish a continuing right to make unilateral
changes. See 301 Holdings, LLC, 340 NLRB 366, 367–368 (2003).
WEYERHAEUSER NR CO. 7
(d) Refusing to provide and unreasonably delaying in
providing the Unions with information relevant and nec-
essary to their function as collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of bargaining unit employees.
Substitute the following for Conclusion of Law 4.
4. By engaging in the following conduct, the Respond-
ent committed unfair labor practices in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
(a) Suspending Steve Collins because he engaged in
protected concerted activity.
(b) Denying Steve Collins and Joyce Becker their right
to effective union representation in an interview that
could have reasonably led to discipline by telling their
representative to remain silent.
(c) Discriminatorily removing prounion commentary
from a union-designated bulletin board.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Weyerhaeuser NR Company, Longview,
Washington, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Implementing new training evaluation processes
for the E&U Department employees without first notify-
ing Carpenters Local 580 and giving it an opportunity to
bargain.
(b) Implementing changes to the food safety and hy-
giene rules for extruder unit and paperboard unit em-
ployees without first notifying Carpenters Local 633 and
giving it an opportunity to bargain.
(c) Implementing changes to the hours of training op-
erators in the E&U Department without first notifying
Carpenters Local 580 and giving it an opportunity to
bargain.
(d) Refusing to bargain collectively with Carpenters
Local 580 by unreasonably delaying in furnishing and
failing and refusing to furnish it with information re-
quested on April 2, 2014 and May 1, 2014 that is rele-
vant and necessary to the Union’s performance of its
functions as the collective-bargaining representative of
the Respondent’s unit employees.
(e) Refusing to bargain collectively with Carpenters
Local 633 by unreasonably delaying in furnishing it with
information requested on April 24, 2014 and April 30,
2014 that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s per-
formance of its functions as the collective-bargaining
representative of the Respondent’s unit employees.
(f) Suspending Steve Collins because he engaged in
protected concerted activity.
(g) Denying employees the right to effective union
representation in interviews that could reasonably lead to
discipline by telling the union representative to remain
silent.
(h) Discriminatorily removing prounion commentary
from a union-designated bulletin board.
(i) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Before implementing any changes in wages, hours,
or other terms and conditions of employment of unit em-
ployees, notify and, on request, bargain with Carpenters
Local 580 as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of employees in the following bargaining unit:
All employees of Respondent working at its Longview
facility, except those employees in Respondent’s ex-
truder, paperboard, shipping, L3 paper machine, and L3
technical departments, and those employees engaged in
administration, actual supervision, watchman duties,
sales, engineering and drafting, research and technical
occupations requiring professional training, accounting,
clerical, stenographic and other office work. Also ex-
cluded are guards, supervisors, and professional em-
ployees as defined in the Act.
(b) Before implementing any changes in wages, hours,
or other terms and conditions of employment of unit em-
ployees, notify and, on request, bargain with Carpenters
Local 633 as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of employees in the following bargaining units:
All employees of Respondent at its Longview, Wash-
ington extruder operation, except those employees en-
gaged in administration, actual supervision, watchman
duties, sales, engineering and drafting, research and
technical occupations requiring professional training,
accounting, office clerical and guards, supervisors, and
professional employees as defined in the Act.
All employees of Respondent working in its paper-
board, shipping, L3 paper machine, and L3 technical
departments at its Longview facility, except those en-
gaged in administration, actual supervision, watchman
duties, sales, engineering and drafting, research and
technical occupations requiring professional training,
accounting, clerical, stenographic and other clerical
work. Also excluded are guards, supervisors, and pro-
fessional employees as defined in the Act.
(c) Rescind and cease giving effect to the unilaterally
implemented changes to the training evaluation processes
for E&U Department employees, food safety and hy-
giene rules for the extruder unit and paperboard unit em-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
ployees, and hours of training operators in the E&U De-
partment.
(d) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer
any and all unit employees discharged as a result of the
unilateral changes in the training evaluation processes for
E&U Department employees, food safety and hygiene
rules for the extruder unit and paperboard unit employ-
ees, and hours of training operators in the E&U Depart-
ment reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs
no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions,
without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or
privileges previously enjoyed.
(e) Make any affected unit employees whole for any
loss of earnings or benefits they may have suffered as a
result of the unilaterally implemented changes to the
training evaluation processes for E&U Department em-
ployees, the food safety and hygiene rules for the extrud-
er unit and paperboard unit employees, and the hours of
the training operators in the E&U Department, in the
manner set forth in this decision.
(f) Compensate affected employees for the adverse tax
consequences, if any, of receiving lump-sum backpay
awards, and file with the Regional Director for Region
19, within 21 days of the date the amount of backpay is
fixed, either by agreement or Board order, a report allo-
cating the backpay award to the appropriate calendar
years.
(g) Within 14 days of the date of this Order, remove
from its files any reference to discipline and/or discharge
imposed on unit employees as a result of the unilaterally
implemented changes to the training evaluation processes
for E&U Department employees, the food safety and
hygiene rules for the extruder unit and paperboard unit
employees, and the hours of training operators in the
E&U Department, and within 3 days thereafter notify
each affected employee in writing that this has been done
and that any such discipline or discharge will not be used
against the employee in any way.
(h) To the extent not already provided, furnish the Un-
ions with the information they requested on April 2, 24,
and 30, 2014, and May 1, 2014.
(i) Make Steve Collins whole for any loss of earnings
and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimina-
tion against him, in the manner set forth in the remedy
section of the judge’s decision as amended in this deci-
sion.
(j) Compensate Steve Collins for the adverse tax con-
sequences, if any, of receiving a lump-sum backpay
award, and file with the Regional Director for Region 19,
within 21 days of the date the amount of backpay is
fixed, either by agreement or Board order, a report allo-
cating the backpay award to the appropriate calendar
years.
(k) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, re-
move from its files any reference to the unlawful suspen-
sion of Steve Collins, and within 3 days thereafter, notify
him in writing that this has been done and that the sus-
pension will not be used against him in any way.
(l) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel rec-
ords and reports, and all other records, including an elec-
tronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form,
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under
the terms of this Order.
(m) Permit employees to have effective representation
by a union representative at interviews that they reasona-
bly believe might result in disciplinary action against
them.
(n) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Longview, Washington facility copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix.”16 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 19,
after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized repre-
sentative, shall be posted by the Respondent and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such
as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site,
and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent custom-
arily communicates with its employees by such
means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-
ent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. If the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed the facility involved in
these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all cur-
rent employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since October 2013.
(o) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 19 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. August 22, 2018

16 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
WEYERHAEUSER NR CO. 9
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MEMBER EMANUEL, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I join my colleagues in finding that the Respondent vi-
olated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act (NLRA or Act) by implementing new train-
ing evaluation processes without first notifying Local
580 and giving it an opportunity to bargain. Applying
the Board’s existing standard for evaluating a contractual
defense to a refusal to bargain, the Respondent did not
demonstrate that Local 580 clearly and unmistakably
waived its bargaining rights based on the collective-
bargaining agreement. Contrary to the judge and my
colleagues, however, I would dismiss the allegation that
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by uni-
laterally changing its food safety rules. The Respond-
ent’s collective-bargaining agreement with Local 633 did
clearly and unmistakably waive the Union’s right to bar-
gain over the implementation of new food safety rules,
and therefore, the Respondent did not violate the Act by
implementing those rules without bargaining.
The Respondent asserts that language in its contract
with Local 580 clearly and unmistakably waived the Un-
ion’s right to bargain over the training evaluation pro-
cesses. I join my colleagues’ conclusion that the lan-
guage cited by the Respondent is simply too ambiguous
to establish a clear and unmistakable waiver. See Prove-
na St. Joseph Medical Center, 350 NLRB 808 (2007)
(setting forth the clear and unmistakable waiver stand-
ard); see also Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 US
693 (1983) (same). I write separately to note that multi-
ple circuit courts have criticized the Board’s continued
use of the “clear and unmistakable waiver” standard and
have instead adopted a “contract coverage” analysis to
contractual defenses to refusal to bargain allegations.
NLRB v. Postal Service, 8 F.3d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(adopting a contract coverage analysis); Chicago Tribune
v. NLRB, 974 F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); see also
Bath Marine Draftsmen’s Assn. v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 14
(1st Cir. 2007) (adopting the D.C. Circuit’s contract cov-
erage analysis and finding that the employer did not vio-
late the Act where its interpretation of the contract had a
“sound arguable basis”). Pursuant to the contract cover-
age analysis, when a union and employer bargain over a
subject and memorialize their agreement in the contract,
“there is no continuous duty to bargain during the term of
an agreement” since the contract demonstrates that the
parties have already fulfilled their duty to bargain and
created “a set of rules governing their future relations.”
NLRB v. Postal Service, 8 F.3d at 836-37. Under a con-
tract coverage analysis, then, the present dispute would
be resolved by interpreting the contractual language, in-
cluding consideration of the Respondent’s argument
based on the “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” can-
on of construction. Id. at 837. Nevertheless, since the
Respondent has not argued that the contract coverage
analysis applies, I will not apply it. I favor revisiting
whether the Board should adopt the contract coverage
analysis in a future appropriate case.
I dissent, however, from my colleagues’ conclusion
that Local 633 did not clearly and unmistakably waive its
right to bargain over the changes to food safety rules.
To the contrary, Section 17.A.13 clearly and unmistaka-
bly indicates that Local 633 has given the Respondent
the contractual right to create and implement new work
rules, subject to certain limitations.
Section 17.A.13, quoted in full by my colleagues
above, forthrightly authorizes the Respondent to craft
and implement new or modified work rules. Indeed, the
entire import of Section 17.A.13 is premised on this au-
thority. Section 17.A.13 first notes that the Respondent
may discipline employees for “refusal to comply with
Company rules.” Section 17.A.13 then places key limi-
tations on the Respondent’s ability to discipline employ-
ees when new rules are implemented or existing rules
modified. First, the rules must be “posted in each de-
partment,” ensuring employees procedural fairness by
providing adequate notice before discipline. Second, “no
changes in present rules or additional rules shall be made
that are inconsistent with this Agreement,” ensuring em-
ployees substantive fairness by guaranteeing that no dis-
cipline will contravene the rights in the contract. Both of
these provisions explicitly limit the Respondent’s author-
ity to impose discipline based on new or modified rules.
Such contractual limitations on the Respondent’s disci-
pline authority necessarily concede that the Respondent
has the authority to create or modify its rules.
Section 17.A.13’s third limitation on the Respondent’s
authority to discipline pursuant to work rules, namely
“that any existing or new rules or changes in rules may
be the subject of discussions . . . and in case of disagree-
ment” may be grieved, further buttresses the case for
clear and unmistakable waiver as to the food safety rules.
The language indicates that disagreements regarding
work rules may be the subject of “discussions.” The
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
“discussions” anticipated by the contract cannot be
equated with mandatory “bargaining” regarding new or
modified rules, precisely because such discussions apply
to “any existing” rules already bargained for and memo-
rialized in the contract, not just rule changes (emphasis
added). Rather, this language indicates that the Union’s
remedy for dissatisfaction with the Respondent’s exer-
cise of its contractual authority pertaining to any rules—
either the implementation of new rules or the administra-
tion of existing rules—is the contract’s grievance proce-
dures. Furthermore, Local 633 and the Respondent have
a long history of collective bargaining and no doubt are
well aware that the word “bargaining” is a term of art,
with a meaning distinct from the more general “discus-
sions.” Section 32.B of the contract demonstrates the
parties’ precise use of the term, stating “it is agreed that
this document contains the full and complete agreement
on all bargaining issues . . . and no party shall be re-
quired during the term of this Agreement to negotiate or
bargain upon any issue” (emphasis added). Section 32.B
also, of course, strengthens the case that the Union
waived its right to bargain over the implementation of
new work rules. TCI of New York, 301 NLRB 822
(1991) (the presence of a “zipper” clause does not neces-
sarily establish waiver, but may evidence waiver under
all the circumstances of the case); see also Provena St.
Joseph Medical Center, 350 NLRB at 815 (reading sev-
eral provisions of the contract together to find waiver).
My colleagues correctly note that “[a] union is not re-
quired to secure a contractual commitment in order to
preserve statutory rights.” Yet, my colleagues also con-
clude that Section 17.A.13 exists only to reinforce this
statutory right to bargain or to allow the Respondent to
enforce the rules presently contained in the contract.
Thus, under the majority’s reading of Section 17.A.13, it
is wholly unnecessary to the contract. To the extent that
my finding of waiver is, as my colleagues suggest,
“premised on assumptions and inferences about what the
parties intended,” I do indeed assume that the parties
intend contractual language to be given a reasonable
meaning, and I infer that a reasonable meaning would not
render Section 17.A.13 to be redundant and therefore
unnecessary. A collective-bargaining agreement neither
needs to reiterate the requirements of the Act for those
requirements to bind it, nor does it need to repeat that it
intends its provisions to be enforceable to render them
so. I therefore conclude that when Section 17.A.13 lists
both procedural and substantive limitations on new work
rules that may be implemented during the term of the
agreement, the parties affirmatively concede that the Re-
spondent may implement new rules subject to these pro-
cedural and substantive limitations.
In sum, Section 17.A.13 defines parameters for the Re-
spondent’s authority to discipline pursuant to work rules,
including new work rules. In so doing, it demonstrates
that the Respondent has the authority to implement these
new rules. Accordingly, I would dismiss the allegation
that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by
unilaterally implementing the food safety rules.
Dated, Washington, D.C. August 22, 2018
______________________________________
William J. Emanuel, Member
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT implement new training evaluation pro-
cesses for the E&U Department employees without first
notifying Association of Western Pulp and Paper Work-
ers, affiliated with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America, Local 580 (Carpenters Local
580) and giving it an opportunity to bargain.
WE WILL NOT implement changes to the food safety
and hygiene rules for extruder unit and paperboard unit
employees without first notifying Association of Western
Pulp and Paper Workers, affiliated with the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local
633 (Carpenters Local 633) and giving it an opportunity
to bargain.
WE WILL NOT implement changes to the hours of the
training operators in the E&U Department without first
notifying Carpenters Local 580 and giving it an oppor-
tunity to bargain.
WEYERHAEUSER NR CO. 11
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Car-
penters Local 580 by unreasonably delaying in furnish-
ing and failing and refusing to furnish it with information
requested on April 2, 2014 and May 1, 2014 that is rele-
vant and necessary to the Union’s performance of its
functions as the collective-bargaining representative of
our unit employees.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Car-
penters Local 633 by unreasonably delaying in furnish-
ing it with information requested on April 24, 2014 and
April 30, 2014 that is relevant and necessary to the Un-
ion’s performance of its functions as the collective-
bargaining representative of our unit employees.
WE WILL NOT suspend employees because they engage
in protected concerted activity.
WE WILL NOT deny employees the right to effective
union representation in interviews that could reasonably
lead to discipline by telling the union representative to
remain silent.
WE WILL NOT discriminatorily remove pro-union
commentary from a union-designated bulletin board.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL, before implementing any changes in wages,
hours, or other terms and conditions of employment of
unit employees, notify and, on request, bargain with Car-
penters Local 580 as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of employees in the following bargaining
unit:
All of our employees working at our Longview, Wash-
ington facility, except those employees in the extruder,
paperboard, shipping, L3 paper machine, and L3 tech-
nical departments, and those employees engaged in
administration, actual supervision, watchman duties,
sales, engineering and drafting, research and technical
occupations requiring professional training, accounting,
clerical, stenographic and other office work. Also ex-
cluded are guards, supervisors, and professional em-
ployees as defined in the Act.
WE WILL, before implementing any changes in wages,
hours, or other terms and conditions of employment of
unit employees, notify and, on request, bargain with Car-
penters Local 633 as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of employees in the following bargaining
units:
All of our employees at our Longview, Washington ex-
truder operation, except those employees engaged in
administration, actual supervision, watchman duties,
sales, engineering and drafting, research and technical
occupations requiring professional training, accounting,
office clerical and guards, supervisors, and professional
employees as defined in the Act.
All of our employees working in the paperboard, ship-
ping, L3 paper machine, and L3 technical departments
at our Longview, Washington facility, except those en-
gaged in administration, actual supervision, watchman
duties, sales, engineering and drafting, research and
technical occupations requiring professional training,
accounting, clerical, stenographic and other clerical
work. Also excluded are guards, supervisors, and pro-
fessional employees as defined in the Act.
WE WILL rescind and cease giving effect to the unlaw-
ful unilateral changes that we made to the training evalu-
ation processes for E&U Department employees, food
safety and hygiene rules for the extruder unit and paper-
board unit employees, and hours of training operators in
the E&U Department.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, offer any and all unit employees discharged as a
result of the unlawful unilateral changes to the training
evaluation processes for E&U Department employees,
food safety and hygiene rules for the extruder unit and
paperboard unit employees, and hours of training opera-
tors in the E&U Department reinstatement to their former
jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority
or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make any affected unit employees whole,
with interest, for any loss of earnings or benefits they
may have suffered as a result of the unlawful unilateral
changes to the training evaluation processes for E&U
Department employees, the food safety and hygiene rules
for the extruder and paperboard unit employees, and the
hours of the training operators in the E&U Department.
WE WILL, within 14 days of the date of the Board’s
Order, remove from our files any reference to discipline
and/or discharge imposed on unit employees as a result
of the unlawful unilateral changes to the training evalua-
tion processes for E&U Department employees, the food
safety and hygiene rules for the extruder and paperboard
unit employees, and the hours of training operators in the
E&U Department, and WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter
notify each affected employee in writing that this has
been done and that any such discipline or discharge will
not be used against the employee in any way.
WE WILL compensate affected employees for the ad-
verse tax consequences, if any, of receiving lump-sum
backpay awards, and WE WILL file with the Regional Di-
rector for Region 19, within 21 days of the date the
amount of backpay is fixed, either by agreement or
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD12
Board order, a report allocating the backpay award to the
appropriate calendar years.
WE WILL, to the extent not already provided, furnish
the Unions with the information they requested on April
2, 24, and 30, 2014, and May 1, 2014.
WE WILL make Steve Collins whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the
discrimination against him, less any net interim earnings,
plus interest.
WE WILL compensate Steve Collins for the adverse tax
consequences, if any, of receiving a lump-sum backpay
award, and WE WILL file with the Regional Director for
Region 19, within 21 days of the date the amount of
backpay is fixed, either by agreement or Board order, a
report allocating the backpay award to the appropriate
calendar years.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order,
remove from our files any reference to the unlawful sus-
pension Steve Collins, and WE WILL, within 3 days there-
after, notify him in writing that this has been done and
that the suspension will not be used against him in any
way.
WE WILL permit employees to have effective represen-
tation by a union representative at interviews that they
reasonably believe might result in disciplinary action
against them.
WEYERHAEUSER NRCOMPANY
The Board’s decision can be found at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/19-CA-122853 or by using the
QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of
the decision from the Executive Secretary, National La-
bor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street S.E., Washington,
D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
Susannah C.Merritt, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Richard N. VanCleave, Esq. (VanCleave & Cobrain), of Sher-
wood, Oregon, for the Respondent.
Paul Cloer, Organizing Coordinator, of Portland, Oregon, for
the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOHN J. MCCARRICK, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Portland, Oregon, from December 2 through 5,
2014, upon the order consolidating cases, consolidated com-
plaint ,and notice of hearing issued on August 22, 2014, by the
Regional Director for Region 19.
The complaint alleges that Weyerhaeuser Company, Re-
spondent, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by disciplining
employee Steve Collins for engaging in what Respondent be-
lieved were protected-concerted activities, by limiting the abil-
ity of employees’ union representatives from participating in a
disciplinary interview, and by removing a union communica-
tion from the Union’s bulletin board.
The complaint further alleges that Respondent violated sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by making unilateral changes to
its practice of how it performs training evaluations, by unilater-
ally implementing new rules related to food safety, by unilater-
ally changing its practice of scheduling the training of operators
in the Energy and Utility Department, and by refusing to fur-
nish information or refusing to furnish information in a timely
manner requested by the Union necessary and relevant to its
duties as exclusive collective-bargaining representative.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Upon the entire record herein, including the briefs from
counsel for the General Counsel and Respondent, I make the
following findings of fact.
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent admitted and I find that is a State of Washington
corporation located in Federal Way, Washington, and with a
facility located in Longview, Washington, where it operates a
paper and pulp mill. In the operation of the paper and pulp
mill, during the last 12 months, Respondent has derived gross
revenues in excess of $500,000 and has purchased goods and
services valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points out-
side the State of Washington. Respondent further admitted and
I find that it is an employer engaged in interstate commerce
within the meaning of Sections 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and
a healthcare institution within the meaning of Section 2(14) of
the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
Respondent admitted and I find that Association of Western
Pulp and Paper Workers, affiliated with the United Brotherhood
of Carpenters and Joiners of America (AWPPA) and its Locals
580 and 633 (Unions) are labor organizations within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. The Union’s representatives
relevant in this case include
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background facts
Respondent and the Unions have a long history of collective
bargaining at Respondent’s Longview, Washington paper and
pulp mill. The Unions represent Respondent’s employees in
three discreet bargaining units.
Local 633 represents a unit of Respondent’s 75 extruders
(extruder unit) including:
All employees of Respondent at its Longview, Washington
extruder operation, except those employees engaged in ad-
ministration, actual supervision, watchman duties, sales, engi-
WEYERHAEUSER NR CO. 13
neering and drafting, research and technical occupations re-
quiring professional training, accounting, office clerical and
guards, supervisors, and professional employees as defined in
the Act.
The extruder department laminates polyethylene onto paper-
board which is then shipped to the Company’s customers who
convert the product into individual drink containers. The par-
ties have been signatory to a series of collective-bargaining
agreements, for this bargaining unit, the most recent being ef-
fective from April 5, 2013–2019.
Local 633 also represents a unit of Respondent’s 125 paper-
board employees (paperboard unit) including:
All employees of Respondent working in its paperboard,
shipping, L 3 paper machine, and L 3 technical departments at
its Longview facility, except those engaged in administration,
actual supervision, watchman duties, sales, engineering and
drafting, research and technical occupations requiring profes-
sional training, accounting, clerical, stenographic and other
clerical work. Also excluded are guards, supervisors, and
professional employees as defined in the Act.
The paperboard unit includes the paper machine (identified
as L3) which produces paperboard stock, and includes the pa-
perboard shipping department and the technical department.
The parties have been signatory to a series of collective-
bargaining agreements, the most recent being effective March
15, 2007, through March 14, 2014. This agreement was ex-
tended by the parties through June 1, 2014.
Local 580 represents a unit of Respondent’s 250 energy and
utility, maintenance, fiberline, and chip processing employees
(Local 580 unit) including:
All employees of Respondent at its Longview facility, except
those employees in Respondents extruder, paperboard, ship-
ping, L 3 paper machine, L 3 technical departments, and those
employees engaged in administration, actual supervision,
watchman duties, sales, engineering and drafting, research
and technical occupations requiring professional training, ac-
counting, stenographic and other clerical work. Also exclud-
ed are guards, supervisors, and professional employees as de-
fined in the Act.
The Local 580 unit includes the Chips, Fiberline, Energy and
Utilities (E & U), and maintenance departments. The parties
have been signatory to a series of collective-bargaining agree-
ments, the most recent being effective March 15, 2007, through
March 14, 2014. This agreement was extended by the parties
through June 1, 2014.
Employees in the Local 580 unit and the paperboard units
ratified their respective successor collective-bargaining agree-
ments in August 2014. At the time of the hearing the new col-
lective-bargaining agreements for these units had not been
printed, but any changes from the parties’ previous collective-
bargaining agreements have been ratified by the units and are
contained in Respondent’s best and final proposal.1
Respondent’s liquid packaging board product is subject to
regulation by the United States Food and Drug Administration

1 GC Exh. 5.
(FDA). Respondent is audited annually by the FDA and is
required to provide documentation to its customers that the
products comply with the FDA standards. Respondent admit-
ted and I find that its management team of human resource
manager, Diane Zolotko (Zolotko), extruder department man-
ager, Matt Warthen (Warthen), assistant to the human resources
director, Terri Hurley (Hurley), team development manager
(TDM), Art Calhoun (Calhoun), energy and utilities manager,
Assaad Alsemaan (Alsemann), shift supervisor, Miles Am-
bergey (Ambergey), paper machines superintendant, Tim Ed-
wards (Edwards), central services superintendant, David Kay
(Kay), and Supervisor John Stroburg (Stroberg) are supervisors
and agents within the meaning of the Act.
Since the alleged violations do not occur in any pattern or
chronological order, I will discuss them in the order in which
they appear in the complaint.
B. The 8(a)(1) allegations
The discipline of Steve Collins
Complaint paragraph 8 alleges that Respondent violated sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act in issuing its employee Steve Collins a 3
day suspension because it believed he engaged in protected
concerted activity.
a. The facts
Steve Collins has been employed by Respondent as an opera-
tor and has worked in its extruder department for the past 37
years. In his testimony Collins explained that Respondent’s
extruder department was sold to Tetra Pak in 1993. Tetra Pak
owned and operated the extruder department for about 17 years,
then sold it back to Respondent in 2010. Collins’ supervisors
are TDMs Calhoun, Amburgey, Richard Hart (Hart), and Steve
Queckboerner (Queckboerner). The TDMs are supervised by
extruder department General Manager Warthen. Collins was a
shop steward for the extruder unit for about 2 years, about 8
years ago.
On January 27, 2014, Collins unrebutted and credited testi-
mony is that he wrote a sign on a piece of milk carton paper
with a felt pen that stated, “Please Buy Us Back!!! Tetra Pak.”2
The sign was about 18 by 20 inches. No one else was present
when Collins made the sign. After writing the sign, Collins
leaned it on the front of his console in the operator’s shack, so
that it was visible to anyone walking by.3 Collins said he made
the sign as a joke because he had heard that Tetra Pak officials
were coming through his department and he wished he could
have stayed with Tetra Pak, because he was dissatisfied with
Weyerhaeuser management. According to Collins he did not
expect that anyone from Tetra Pak would actually see his sign.
On January 27, 2014, at about 4:30 supervisory TDM Cal-
houn went to Collins in the break shack and asked him if he
made the above sign. Collins said, “On the grounds that it
might incriminate me, I can’t answer that question.” Calhoun
replied, “Does that mean ‘no’?” Collins responded, “No, on the
grounds that it could incriminate me, that means I can’t an-
swer.” Calhoun again asked Collins if he meant that he did not

2 GC Exh. 46.
3 ALJ Exh. 1.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD14
make the sign, to which Collins responded, “No, Art, that
means yes, I did do it.”4 Five minutes later, Calhoun came
back and told Collins to get a shop steward for a meeting to be
held in General Manager Warthen’s office.
A fact finding meeting was conducted at the end of Collins’
shift on January 27 and another on February 13, 2014, that are
discussed below.
After conducting the fact finding interviews, on March 24,
2014, General Manager Warthen called Collins into his office
and issued him a 3-day suspension for dishonesty and insubor-
dination due to not answering the questions from the fact find-
ing honestly. The suspension letter5 states in pertinent part:
. . . .
Upon first glance at the poster, the company noticed that there
were different hand writings represented. The words “Buy us
Back!” were in a female’s handwriting. “Tetra Pak” and the
middle exclamation mark were in a man’s handwriting and
the final exclamation mark was written in what appeared to be
a man’s handwriting.
February 13th a second fact finding meeting was conducted
with you and your Union Representative, Jeff McGlone, to
provide you a second opportunity to be truthful regarding the
three people who participated in writing the poster. During
this meeting, you shared that you had written the final excla-
mation mark, but someone else had filled it in with the heavy
felt pen markings. So at this meeting you identified that there
were, in fact, at least two employees who participated in writ-
ing the sign.
When asked did you write the word “Tetra” on this poster?
You responded “Yes.” When asked if you wrote the word
“Pak” on this sign, you responded “Um huh.” When asked if
you wrote the exclamation mark in the middle on the poster,
you replied “Um huh.” When asked if you wrote the excla-
mation mark to the far right on the poster, you answered
“Yes.” The Company has determined these answers to be
truthful based on your handwriting.
When asked, did you write the word, “Please” on the poster,
you responded, “Yes”. When asked, did you write the word
“Buy” on the poster, you responded, “Yes”. When asked, did
you write “Us” on the poster, you responded, “Yes.” When
asked, did you write the word “Back” on this poster, you re-
sponded “Um huh.” When asked did you write the exclama-
tion mark on the left of the poster, you responded “Yes”.
When asked, did you write the phrase “Please Buy Us Back!”
you softly responded, “Yes”. The Company had determined
these answers to be untruthful based on your handwriting and
the handwriting of a female who matches the handwriting on
the poster.
Upon review of the facts, it is determined that you have vio-
lated the collective bargaining agreement specifically Section
16: Causes for Discipline or Discharge; subsection 7 dishon-
esty. Further, you were insubordinate due to not answering

4 Tr. p. 251, line 25 to p. 252, line 19.
5 GC Exh. 47.
the questions honestly as you were instructed to do.
It appears you are willing to “take one for the team.” Unfortu-
nately, your teammates were unwilling to come forward to
take ownership in their part of the sign. Since you are all in
stated or non-stated agreement, that you should take full
blame, you are hereby issued a 3-day suspension, on a non-
precedent setting basis, as a reminder for you to understand
that we are in business because of our valued customers. . . .
Additionally, being dishonest and insubordinate during fact
findings will not be tolerated.
Warthen told Collins he would be suspended for 3 days
without pay and had supervisory TDM Queckboerner escort
him to his car.
b. The analysis
Counsel for the General Counsel contends that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it suspended Collins in
retaliation for what it believed was his protected concerted
activity of writing and displaying the Tetra Pak sign.
Respondent argues that there is not a scintilla of evidence to
support the allegation that Respondent believed Collins en-
gaged in protected concerted activity. Respondent further con-
tends that the sign was not protected activity and the complaint
was directed at a third party and disparaged Respondent, citing
NLRB v. IBEW Local 1229 (Jefferson Standard Broadcasting),
346 U.S. 464 (1953), and Elko General Hospital, 347 NLRB
1425 (2006).
Usually employee activity is concerted when it is “engaged
in with or on the authority of other employees,” and a respond-
ent violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act if, having knowledge of
an employee’s concerted activity, it takes adverse employment
action that is “motivated by the employee’s protected concerted
activity.” Meyers Industries (Meyers I), 268 NLRB 493, 497
(1984). However, even in the absence of concert by employ-
ees, an employer’s mistaken belief that an employee engaged in
protected concerted activity is controlling. CGLM, Inc., 350
NLRB 974, 979–980 (2007), citing Henning & Cheadle, 212
NLRB 776, 777 (1974).
To be protected under Section 7 of the Act, employee activi-
ty must be pursued for union related purposes or for other mu-
tual aid or protection. The Board has long held that employee
activity may be protected where there is an appeal about work-
ing conditions to outside agencies, including where an employ-
ee sent a letter to his employer’s client critical of the employer.
M.V.M., Inc., 352 NLRB 1165, 1172 (2008). Activities includ-
ing sending emails to fellow employees about working condi-
tions have been found to be protected. Timekeeping Systems,
Inc., 323 NLRB 244 (1997).
In analyzing alleged discriminatory conduct for engaging in
protected concerted activity the test is the same as for violations
of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. In mixed motive cases, under
Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd., 662 F.2d 899 (1st
Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982), the General
Counsel has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that animus against protected conduct was a motivat-
ing factor in the adverse employment action. If the General
Counsel makes a showing of discriminatory motivation by
proving protected activity, the employer’s knowledge of that
WEYERHAEUSER NR CO. 15
activity, and animus against protected activity, then the burden
of persuasion shifts to the employer to prove that it would have
taken the same action even in the absence of the protected ac-
tivity.
The Board has inferred unlawful motive where the employ-
er’s action is “baseless, unreasonable, or so contrived as to raise
a presumption of unlawful motive.” Montgomery Ward, 316
NLRB 1248, 1253; ADS Electric Co., 339 NLRB 1020, 1023
(2003); Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466,
470 (9th Cir. 1966); and J.S. Troup Electric, 344 NLRB 1009,
1015 (2005).
Where the employer’s defense is found to be pretextual, the
employer fails to establish that it would have disciplined the
employee for a lawful, nondiscriminatory reason. Aero Metal
Forms, 310 NLRB 397, 399 fn.14 (1993). A pretextual reason
supports an inference of an unlawful one. Keller Mfg Co., 237
NLRB 712, 717 (1978). Moreover, in the case of pretext there
is no mixed motive and the Wright Line test does not apply.
In the instant case, I find that Collins engaged in what Re-
spondent believed was concerted activity. Contrary to Re-
spondent’s assertion that there is no evidence that Respondent
believed Collins engaged in protected concerted activity, the
language of Respondent’s suspension letter reflects that it be-
lieved that Collins had engaged in concerted activity when he
made the Tetra Pak sign. As the suspension letter recites: “It
appears you are willing to ‘take one for the team.’ Unfortu-
nately, your teammates were unwilling to come forward to take
ownership in their part of the sign. Since you are all in stated
or non-stated agreement, that you should take full blame, you
are hereby issued a 3-day suspension.” From the language of
this letter, it is clear that Zolotko believed that the sign was
created by Collins and his fellow employees. Further, as
demonstrated below in the Weingarten interviews, Zolotko took
the position that Collins alone did not write the sign but that
others, including a female were involved.
Moreover, I find Collins’ activity in preparing and displaying
the Tetra Pak sign was protected. Here, Collins sign was essen-
tially a protest of working conditions at Respondent’s facility as
it urged Tetra Pak to resume its operation of the extrusion oper-
ation. While Collins said he wrote the sign as a joke because
he did not think Tetra Pak officials would see the sign, he dis-
played the sign because he was dissatisfied with Respondent’s
management. Timekeeping Systems, Inc., 323 NLRB 244
(1997); M.V.M., Inc., 352 NLRB 1165, 1172 (2008). Thus I
find Collins was engaged in protected-concerted activity that
was known to Respondent.
Respondent’s reliance on Elko General, supra, is not war-
ranted here. In Elko General at 1427 the Board found the re-
spondent had met its burden of showing it would have fired the
employee for disloyalty and insubordination despite the em-
ployee’s protected activity.
However here, the first time disloyalty is raised is in Re-
spondent’s brief. Apparently at the time of the suspension Re-
spondent had not considered disloyalty a reason for suspending
Collins as the suspension letter mentions only dishonesty and
insubordination for not answering truthfully as grounds for the
suspension. Moreover, there is nothing disparaging of Re-
spondent’s product or business mentioned in the sign. Thus, it
never lost the protection of the Act. M.V.M., Inc., supra at
1172. I find Respondent’s contrived argument that Collins
engaged in an act of disloyalty is pretext.
In its defense, Respondent contends that Collins was not dis-
ciplined for writing the sign, but rather, that he was suspended
for being dishonest during the investigative meeting as well as
being insubordinate by not answering the questions honestly.
Initially, Respondent’s Wright Line defense fails as it has
presented no evidence that Collins lied about drafting the sign.
The record reflects that Collins consistently told Respondent
that he alone wrote the entire sign. Moreover, as discussed
below, employee Becker denied she had any part in making any
part of the sign. In the suspension letter Zolotko asserts that
Collins was lying based on handwriting analysis of the sign.
No evidence of any expert handwriting analysis was proffered
for the record. Thus, the reasons asserted for Collins’ suspen-
sion are baseless.
Moreover, as noted above, I find Respondent’s reasons for
suspending Colins are pretextual. This pretext supplies the
unlawful motivation for Respondent’s suspension of Collins.
Respondent’s pretext also eliminates the need for the mixed
motivation analysis of Wright Line, as it has presented no valid
defense. I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act in suspending Collins.
The Weingarten allegations
a. The facts
i. The February 13, 2014 fact finding meeting with
employee Collins
Complaint paragraph 9 alleges that on about February 13,
2014, Respondent put restrictions on employee Collins’ union
representative’s ability to speak and to remain present during an
investigative interview.
As noted above, at the end of his shift on January 27, 2014,
Collins and shop steward Rich Murray (Murray) went to Gen-
eral Manager Warthen’s office for a fact finding meeting.
Warthen, TDM Calhoun, Collins, and Shop Steward Murray
attended the meeting. Warthen told Collins that this was a fact
finding meeting regarding the Tetra Pak sign. Warthen asked
Collins if he wrote the sign and Collins admitted that he had.
Warthen then asked Collins if he knew that the sign could hurt
Weyerhaeuser’s reputation, and Collins answered that he had
only intended for the sign to be a joke. Warthen then asked
Collins if it was right for him to make a sign that soiled Weyer-
haeuser’s reputation with the customer and he said, “No.”
Warthen asked if Collins was happy with his employment with
Weyerhaeuser and Collins responded that he was not satisfied
with the way that Weyerhaeuser treated its employees.
Warthen also asked Collins if he knew that there were 50 open-
ings with Tetra Pak on Tetra Pak’s website and Collins re-
sponded that he did not know that Tetra Pak had a website.
ii. Collins’ February 13, 2014 fact finding meeting
On February 13, 2014, a second fact finding meeting was
held with Collins. The meeting took place in the operator
shack in the extruder department. Present were Collins, Shop
Steward Jeff McGlone (McGlone), Respondent’s human re-
source manager Zolotko, Amburgey, Warthen, and human re-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD16
sources assistant Hurley. It is unrebutted and I credit both Col-
lins and McGlone that the following discussion took place dur-
ing this fact finding meeting. At the outset of the meeting
Zolotko stated that this was a fact finding meeting involving the
Tetra Pak sign and that the results could lead to discipline, up to
and including termination. Union Steward McGlone asked
Zolotko what section of the contract was violated and Zolotko
said that it was section A(8) regarding dishonesty. Then Col-
lins asked Zolotko if she was accusing him of being dishonest.
When Zolotko did not answer Collins’ question, McGlone
asked Zolotko if she was accusing Collins of lying. Zolotko
told McGlone to sit down and be quiet, that this was her meet-
ing and she would be asking the questions. Then Zolotko
showed the Tetra Pak sign to Collins. Zolotko then asked Col-
lins about each word written on the sign. Each time Zolotko
pointed at a word on the sign and asked Collins if he had writ-
ten it, he admitted he had. Then Zolotko claimed she had a
handwriting expert analyze the sign and the handwriting on the
sign was done by two different people, one of whom was a
woman.6 When McGlone asked her how she knew that some
of the handwriting on the sign was done by a woman, Zolotko
once again replied that this was her meeting and that she would
be asking the questions. McGlone stopped asking questions
during the meeting. Near the end of the meeting, Collins told
Zolotko, “I wrote this. The whole thing. All three exclamation
marks.” 7 Then, after looking more carefully at the sign, Col-
lins told Zolotko that it looked like the third exclamation mark
had been changed.
iii. The February 17, 2014 fact finding meeting with employee
Joyce Becker
Complaint paragraph 10 alleges that on about February 17,
2014, Respondent put restrictions on employee Becker’s union
representative’s ability to speak and to remain present during an
investigative interview.
Respondent has employed Joyce Becker as a reel operator in
the extruder department for 25 years. On February 17, 2014,
during the investigation regarding the Tetra Pak sign, Becker
was also called into a fact finding meeting. Shop Steward Luke
Johnson (Johnson) represented Becker at this meeting. Zolotko
ran the meeting with Warthen, Calhoun, and Hurley also pre-
sent.
According to the testimony of Becker and Johnson, whose
testimony was largely unrebutted and credible, the following
occurred at this meeting. At the outset of the meeting Zolotko
told Becker that this fact finding could lead to discipline up to
termination for being dishonest. Zolotko asked Becker if she
had been at the facility on January 27, 2014. Becker said she
had not been at the facility that day but Warthen reminded
Becker that she had been at a quality meeting at the facility that
day. Becker admitted that she had forgotten that she had at-
tended the quality meeting at the facility. Zolotko asked Beck-
er when she had arrived and when she had left the facility.
Then, Steward Johnson told Zolotko that Respondent already

6 As it turns out the handwriting expert was Zolotko herself. I find
no basis in the record for establishing Zolotko to be a handwriting
expert.
7 Tr. p. 264, lines 7–10.
had that information since that information is recorded at Re-
spondent’s front gate. Becker told Zolotko that she had come
in the side gate at 6:45 in the morning and had left immediately
after the meeting was over at about 10:30 to 10:45 a.m. Zolot-
ko then asked Becker if she had heard about the Tetra Pak sign.
Becker replied that she had heard about the sign, but that she
had not seen it. Zolotko showed Becker the sign and asked her
if she had written it. Becker said she had not written the sign.
Zolotko asked Becker if she thought the third exclamation point
on the sign looked like a phallic symbol. Steward Johnson said
he understood that another employee had already admitted to
writing the sign and he asked Zolotko for a copy of the minutes
from the Collins’ fact finding meeting. Zolotko told Johnson
that he could ask for the information once the meeting was
over, but she was not there to discuss Collins. Johnson replied
that he had the right to ask for these minutes. Zolotko told
Johnson that she was going to ask the questions, that Johnson
was to be quiet and if he kept asking questions she would stop
the meeting, ask him to leave and get a new shop steward.
TDM Calhoun admitted that Zolotko told Johnson that he need-
ed to be quiet during the meeting. Calhoun further admitted
that Johnson told Zolotko that she was not letting him act as
Becker’s representative.
After a caucus between Johnson and Becker, Zolotko asked
Becker if she had written any part of the sign. After Becker
again told Zolotko that she had not written any part of the sign,
Zolotko asked Becker if she would ever do anything that would
hurt Respondent’s relationship with its customers. When
Becker did not understand the question, she asked Zolotko to
repeat her question. After an exchange between Zolotko and
Becker, that was not producing any results, Johnson attempted
to explain Zolotko’s question to Becker. Then Zolotko once
again told Johnson that she would be asking the questions.
Zolotko then turned to Johnson and said, “Thanks a lot Luke,”8
and then asked him to step into the hall with her. In the hall
Zolotko reminded Johnson of the seriousness of the meeting
and accused Johnson of telling Becker to be combative. John-
son denied this accusation. When Zolotko and Johnson came
back into the room, Zolotko asked Becker again if she would
ever do something to make Respondent look bad. Becker re-
sponded that she would not and that she always put out a quali-
ty product. Zolotko asked her again if she had written any part
of the sign and Becker denied she had. Zolotko then said one
person had written, “Please Buy Us Back!!!” and another had
written “Tetra Pak.” Becker said that she did not write the sign
and she told Warthen that if she had written the sign, she would
have admitted it. .
Johnson said again that someone already admitted to writing
the sign. Zolotko told Johnson that that she would be asking
the questions, this was her investigation, and that Johnson
needed to be quiet.
While Respondent alleged Johnson was loud and disruptive
during the meeting, according to Becker and Johnson, Johnson
did not raise his voice or interrupt Zolotko during the meeting.
This is consistent with the testimony of Respondent’s TDM
Calhoun who admitted that during the meeting Johnson never

8 Tr. p. 331. Line 1.
WEYERHAEUSER NR CO. 17
screamed and to the extent that Johnson did raise his voice, he
was doing so in order to get his point across to represent Beck-
er. Calhoun also admitted that the only time when Johnson
could be said to be interrupting Zolotko was when Johnson
asked why Becker was being questioned when another employ-
ee had already admitted to writing the sign. In this regard, to
the extent Hurley and Zolotko’s testimony is inconsistent with
that of Becker Johnson and Calhoun, I will credit Becker, John-
son and Calhoun. After the meeting, Johnson followed up with
Zolotko and requested that Zolotko provide him with the notes
from Becker and Collins’ fact findings, but she did not provide
them to Johnson.
b. The analysis
General Counsel argues that under NLRB v. J. Weingarten,
420 U.S. 251, 262–263 (1975), the role of the union representa-
tive is to provide assistance and counsel to an employee who is
being interrogated. An employer may not, therefore, silence a
union representative.
Respondent contends that in the Collins and Becker fact
finding meetings, Zolotko did not try to silence the union repre-
sentatives but was merely asserting her right to conduct an
investigation without interference from union officials, citing
Manville Forest Products, 269 NLRB 390 (1984); Cook Paint
& Varnish, Co., 246 NLRB 646 (1979); and New Jersey Bell
Telephone Co., 308 NLRB 277 (1992).
Under NLRB v. J. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251 (1975), the
Board has held an employee has a right to union representation
in an investigative interview when the employee reasonably
believes the interview may result in discipline.
The right to a representative includes the right to an effective
representative who is present to give assistance and counsel.
An employer may not, therefore, silence a union representative.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 251 NLRB 612, 613 (1980).
Accordingly, an employer may not tell a union representative to
remain silent during an interview. USPS, 355 NLRB 368, 397
(2010).
Contrary to Respondent’s assertion, Zolotko went well be-
yond merely informing the union representatives that she was
asserting her right to conduct the interviews. During the Febru-
ary 13, 2014 interview with Collins, Zolotko told union repre-
sentative McGlone to sit down and be quiet. During the Febru-
ary 17, 2014 interview with Becker, Zolotko told Union Repre-
sentative Johnson that she was going to ask the questions, that
Johnson was to be quiet and if he kept asking questions she
would stop the meeting, ask him to leave and get a new shop
steward. Later during this interview Zolotko again told John-
son that that she would be asking the questions, this was her
investigation, and that Johnson needed to be quiet.
Moreover, contrary to Respondent’s assertion, there is no ev-
idence that either McGlone or Johnson were disruptive during
the interviews. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co., 308 NLRB 277
(1992), cited by Respondent is inapposite. In New Jersey Bell,
the union representative objected to all repetitive questions
asked by the employer. The Board found this disruptive of the
investigatory process. Here there is no evidence that McGlone
or Johnson engaged in any such disruptive conduct. While they
both asked questions and tried to provide assistance and coun-
sel, there was no disruption of the interview, verbal abuse, in-
sulting interruptions, or demeaning conduct. Yellow Freight
Systems, 317 NLRB 115, 124 (1995).
By her orders to McGlone and Johnson to be silent, Zolotko
effectively prevented them from giving effective assistance and
counsel to Collins and Becker, thereby denying Collins and
Becker their right to have a union representative present in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Complaint paragraph 11 alleges that on about June 5, 2014
Respondent removed a union communication form a union
bulletin board.
a. The facts
In June 2014, former Local 580 Officer Rex Osborne (Os-
borne), placed a cartoon9 on a Local 580 union bulletin board in
Respondents’ E & I maintenance shop in the E & U depart-
ment. The cartoon had a definition of bad faith bargaining and
showed parties sitting down at the bargaining table with Re-
spondent representatives shown wearing ear plugs while telling
the union representatives: “We’re listening.” After Osborne
posted the cartoon, TDM John Strouburg (Strouburg) told Os-
borne that he was going to have to take the cartoon down. Os-
borne asked Strouburg who told him to take the cartoon down
and Strouburg replied that no one had. Osborne told Strouburg
he could not take it down because it was a union posting. Then
Strouburg admitted that he had been told to take all derogatory
cartoons down.
The parties’ collective-bargaining agreements provide that
Respondent will “supply adequate enclosed locked bulletin
boards for the use of the Local Union in posting of official
bulletin boards.”10 There are union designated bulletin boards
throughout Respondent’s facility that contain Union and other
nonunion related postings. For example, for the past 3 years,
pamphlets on charter fishing trips have been posted on the un-
ion designated bulletin boards and these have not been removed
by management.
b. The analysis
General Counsel contends that an employer may not remove
notices from a union bulletin board.
Respondent contends there is no violation since the cartoon
remained posted for 2 months and Osborn was not an officer of
the Union at the time of the posting and there was no evidence
that he was authorized to post a union communication.
In Marriott Management Services, Inc., 318 NLRB 144, 153
(1995), the Board affirmed the administrative law judge who
found:
It is well established that there is no statutory right of employ-
ees or a union to use an employer’s bulletin board. However,
it is also well established that when an employer permits, by
formal rule or otherwise, employees and a union to post per-
sonal and official union notices on its bulletin boards, the em-
ployees’ and union’s right to use the bulletin board receives
the protection of the Act to the extent that the employer may
not remove notices or discriminate against an employee who

9 GC Exh. 54.
10 GC Exhs. 3 and 4 at p.22.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD18
posts notices, which meet the employer’s rule or standard but
which the employer finds distasteful. Citing, Container Corp.
of America, 244 NLRB 318 (1979).
Here, it is uncontested that Supervisor Strouburg removed
Osborne’s cartoon from one of union designated bulletin
boards, even though other personal items had also been posted
on those bulletin boards without being removed. As noted in
Marriott, supra, it is immaterial whether it was the union or an
employee who posted the notice. Once the employer has given
permission to use a bulletin board it may not remove union
related items it finds distasteful. As the cartoon constituted a
statement about the conditions of collective bargaining with
Respondent, it was protected under section 7 and Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) when it discriminatorily removed this
pro union commentary from the bulletin board.
c. The 8(a)(5) allegations
1. The October 2013 change in training evaluations
Complaint paragraph 12(a) alleges that in October 2013 Re-
spondent changed its practice with regard to how it performs
training evaluations in its E & U department without the
agreement of the Union.
a. The facts
The record reflects that the parties have bargained for and
memorialized contract language that method and means of
evaluation of employee skills shall be jointly agreed upon. The
March 15, 2007, through March 14, 2014, collective-bargaining
agreement in the Local 580 unit provides in pertinent part under
580 Local Ground Rule No. 48 the subheading 8. Pay for
skills11:
. . . .
Some component of pay will be based on skill, with increas-
ing pay as additional skills and capabilities are acquired and
used.
Processes will be developed to assure that acquired skills are
maintained and continuously improved upon. For greater clar-
ity, management shall have the right to implement certifica-
tion requirements where required by law or when recom-
mended by industry standards (e.g. Black Liquor Recovery
Boiler Advisory Committee, Factory Manual). The Compa-
ny and the Union will jointly develop the means of evalua-
tion.
Each pay level will include elements of leadership, admin-
istration, operation, coordination, project management and
maintenance.
The new work design will define the advancement process.
The minimum qualification levels and performance
standards will be determined by mutual agreement be-
tween the Company and the Union.
Employees hired into the mill after March 15, 2008 must
demonstrate the capability and aptitude to eventually perform
all jobs within the work system before being allowed to work

11 GC Exh. 4, pp. 176–177.
in any such system. The Company and the Union shall
jointly develop the instrument(s) to be used to measure
capability and aptitude through the application of a struc-
tured external evaluation tool, such as Work Keys or an-
other mutually agreed to tool. (emphasis added)
This provision of the Local 580 collective-bargaining agree-
ment has been retained in the parties’ successor agreement.
Dan Sauer (Sauer), who has conducted all of Respondent’s
classroom training for employees in the E & U department
since 2010, testified without contradiction, and I credit his tes-
timony, that the parties’ 1999 E & U final design agreement,12
referred to in the Local 580 collective-bargaining agreement as
the “new work design,”13 reflects that Local 580 and Respond-
ent have joint decision making authority with regard to the
“level of skills needed,” the “gap between current and needed
skills,” and scheduling training for E & U employees.
Under the E & U final design agreement the areas listed as
“Assess mastery; verify learnings” are to be decided by the
system leader and system leader has the sole authority to “Ap-
prove/Veto” such determinations.14
Sauer testified without contradiction that Respondent’s E &
U department is broken down into two discreet sections, the
power house and effluent department. Power house employees
are either in recovery or power jobs. The E & U department is
part of the Local 580 bargaining unit. Local 580 and Respond-
ent have agreed on the skills that employees at each level must
have mastered in order to move up to the next qualification
level. These skills are contained in the parties March 15, 2007,
through March 14, 2014, collective-bargaining agreement as
modified in the current agreement, reflected in Respondent’s
best and final offer.15 The job positions and pay rates in the
recovery and power side range from D (lowest) to A (high-
est).16 Each time an employee goes from one level to the next,
they receive a raise of $1 to $4.
Sauer said that before October 2013, in order for an employ-
ee to move from the entry position to the next higher level in
the E & U department, the employee had to go through both
formal classroom and on-the-job-training of 2 to 12 weeks from
an experienced employee (OJT). The employee is given an
OJT check list17 that sets forth all the job functions that the
trainee is responsible for learning. The employee checks off
each item in the list as it is completed.
According to Sauer, before October 2013 after several weeks
of classroom training and OJT, the employee would meet with
their supervisor, to discuss the employees’ qualifications to
perform the job for which they were training. Sauer stated that
before October 2013, the typical meetings between supervisor
and employee lasted about 15 to 30 minutes where the supervi-
sor asked the employee questions or posed hypothetical prob-
lems for the employee to solve. If the supervisor found the
employee qualified, the employee was promoted into the next

12 GC Exh. 37, p. 26.
13 GC Exh. 4,p. 177
14 GC Exh. 37, pp. 24-26.
15 GC Exhs. 5, and 37 pp. 12–14.
16 GC Exh. 37, p. 2.
17 GC Exhs. 27–34.
WEYERHAEUSER NR CO. 19
higher job position and got a raise. There is no dispute that
Respondent’s evaluation system had operated in this way for at
least the past 20 years.
Sauer stated that in about August of 2013, Respondent hired
Alsemaan as its E & U manager. According to Sauer’s un-
contradicted testimony, in the fall of 2013, Alsemaan changed
the way E & U employees were evaluated and promoted. The
meetings to evaluate employees’ skills went from 15–30 minute
sessions to four 14 hour sessions.18 The meetings now included
not only the employee and immediate supervisor but also Al-
semaan and Sauer. Rather than the immediate supervisor, the
meetings were now run by Alsemaan. These new evaluation
meetings were broken into 2 hour increments and could last for
up to seven sessions. According to Sauer, because these meet-
ings involved multiple meetings they became difficult to
schedule and resulted in the evaluation process taking months
longer to complete than it had before the Fall of 2013. Sauer
said that Alsemaan began testing employees on subject matter
that had not been previously covered, including safety and en-
vironmental issues.
On April 2, 2014, Local 580 President Michael Silvery (Sil-
very) wrote a letter to human resources manager Zolotko re-
questing that Respondent meet and bargain about the changes
in the E & U department employees’ evaluation process and
requesting documentation regarding the changes.19 On April 8,
2014, Zolotko responded by email stating only that the bargain-
ing issue should be addressed by the parties’ grievance proce-
dure.20
b. The analysis
It is General Counsel’s position that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act when it failed to notify or bargain
with Local 580 of its intention to change the method by which
it was going to be conducting the training evaluations or the
effect that these changes would have on its bargaining unit.
Respondent contends that the Union clearly and unmistaka-
bly waived its right to bargain over any changes to the training
evaluations of bargaining unit employees in the E & U depart-
ment.
The Board and Courts have long held that Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act requires an employer to provide its employees’ repre-
sentative with notice and an opportunity to bargain prior to
making material, substantial, and significant changes with re-
spect to terms and conditions of employment that are mandato-
ry subjects of bargaining. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962);
Toledo Blade Co., 343 NLRB 385, 387 (2004). Evaluations
that have the potential to affect the wage rate an employee
might receive, are a mandatory subject of bargaining. Saginaw
Control & Engineering, 339 NLRB 541 (2003).
Wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment generally survive the expiration of a collective-bargaining
agreement. Hen House Market No. 3, 175 NLRB 596 (1969).
In addition, “an employer’s regular and longstanding practices
that are neither random nor intermittent become terms and con-

18 GC Exhs. 35 and 36.
19 GC Exh. 6.
20 GC Exh. 8.
ditions of employment even if these practices are not required
by the collective bargaining agreement.” Prime Healthcare
Services, 357 NLRB 653, 660 (2011). The Board has held that
an employer cannot change established past practices without
notifying and offering to bargain with the union. Id.
The changes here to a mandatory subject of bargaining and
long-established practice are significant as these evaluations are
directly related to significant wage increases. Significantly, the
parties’ collective-bargaining agreement itself specifically
states that Respondent and Local 580 will jointly develop the
means of evaluation and that the minimum qualification levels
and performance standards will be determined by mutual
agreement between Respondent and Local 580.
It is uncontested that Respondent significantly changed the
way that the E & U department performed its training evalua-
tions beginning in October 2013. There is no dispute that be-
fore October 2013 and for the past 20 years, the training eval-
uations consisted of the operator’s TDM asking a few general
questions about the performance of the new position and that
such questioning would last anywhere from 15 to 30 minutes.
When the TDM had any concerns about the trainees’ qualifica-
tions after their interview, the trainee would be sent back for 1
or 2 weeks of OJT to work on their skills and then the trainee
would be to moved up to the next classification.
The change in manner of evaluating trainees resulted in de-
lays in moving up to the next classification, because the coordi-
nation in the schedules of several different managers for a se-
ries of meetings took more time than setting up a single 15-
minute evaluation. In addition, the content of the information
that was tested changed from a focus on job duties to include
Respondent’s safety and environmental policies.
Respondent does not deny that it neither notified nor bar-
gained with Local 580 prior to its implementation of this
change. In its defense Respondent argues that the Union
waived its right to bargain over any changes to the evaluation
procedures in the E & U department through the terms of the
collective-bargaining agreement.
A waiver of the duty to bargain may result from action or in-
action, through contractual language specifically waiving the
right of a party to bargain about a particular subject or in the
failure of a party to protest unilateral action. Ador Corp., 150
NLRB 1658 (1965); U.S. Lingerie, 170 NLRB 750 (1968).
However, the Board and the courts have construed the waiver
doctrine narrowly and have been reluctant to infer waiver in the
absence of clear and unmistakable conduct. Metropolitan Edi-
son Co., v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983). The clear and
unmistakable test applies where the waiver is claimed in con-
tract language. In this regard in Amoco Chemical Co., 328
NLRB 1220, 1121–1122 (1999) the Board held:
Either the contract language relied on must be specific or the
employer must show that the issue was fully discussed and
consciously explored and that the union consciously yielded
or clearly and unmistakably waived its interest in the matter.
Respondent refers to its collective-bargaining agreement
with Local 580 to establish that there was a waiver by the Un-
ion of its right to bargain over the E & U department evaluation
process. In support of its waiver argument, Respondent cites
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD20
local ground rule (LGR) No.48 which provides in part:
580 LOCAL GROUND RULE NO. 48
Subject: Work Design Principles, Processes and Roles
1. All Work systems will have these main elements included
in their designs:
-work teams
-job function rotation
-pay for skills and knowledge
-verification of skills and knowledge
-training processes
-operator-maintenance interface
-team administrative roles
-communication with and between teams21
Respondent also cites that the E & U Work design agree-
ment22 includes provisions for pay for skills and knowledge and
verification of skills and knowledge; that it establishes required
skill blocks that must be verified before moving on to the next
skill block; and that it assigns the authority and responsibility to
assess mastery and verify learnings to the system leader who is
Department Manager Alsemaan.
Notwithstanding Respondent’s citations to the negotiated
agreements between it and Local 580, the language of those is
agreements is clear that the parties agreed in their collective-
bargaining agreement23 that there would be joint decision mak-
ing with respect to such items as:
The Company and the Union will jointly develop the means
of evaluation.
The minimum qualification levels and performance standards
will be determined by mutual agreement between the Compa-
ny and the Union.
The Company and the Union shall jointly develop the instru-
ment(s) to be used to measure capability and aptitude through
the application of a structured external evaluation tool, such as
Work Keys or another mutually agreed to tool.
It is also clear from the work design agreement implemented
pursuant to the terms of the above cited collective-bargaining
agreement that the parties contemplated joint decision making
authority with regard to the “level of skills needed,” “select
plan needed,” the “gap between current and needed skills,” and
“schedule training” for E & U employees.
Although the work design agreement provides that the au-
thority and responsibility to “assess mastery” and “verify learn-
ings” resides with the system leader, this language cannot be
viewed as a clear and unmistakable waiver by the Union of its
right to bargain over changes to extant procedures of evalua-
tion. This language only reflects who the parties have agreed
will be the person to determine if trainees have acquired the
skills necessary to advance. It is the language of the collective-
bargaining agreement that is clear that the parties shall together
develop, “The minimum qualification levels and performance
standards . . .” and “shall jointly develop the instrument(s) to be

21 GC Exh. 4, p. 173.
22 GC Exh. 37.
23 GC Exh. 4, pp.176–177.
used to measure capability and aptitude through the application
of a structured external evaluation tool, such as Work Keys or
another mutually agreed to tool.” Id.
I find no evidence from the terms of the collective-
bargaining agreements between the parties that Local 580 clear-
ly and unmistakably waived its right to bargain over the means
of evaluating the E &U department employees.
Respondent argues further that the Union essentially waived
its right to bargain over the changes to the evaluation process
because it took no action concerning the changes from Octo-
ber 2013 until April of 2014 and that while the parties were in
negotiations from February 2014 to July 2014, the Union never
made any proposals regarding the changed evaluation process.
The evidence reflects that Respondent implemented the
changes to the E & U department evaluation process in about
October 2013 without notice to or bargaining with the Union.
The Board has long held that a union cannot be held to have
waived bargaining over a change that is presented as a fait ac-
compli. In this regard, in Intersystems Design & Technology
Corp., 278 NLRB 759 (1986), the Board cited Gulf States Mfg.
v. NLRB, 704 F.2d 1390, 1397 (5th Cir 1983):
In Gulf States, the court dealt not only with the adequacy of
the notice, but also with the related waiver issue (704 F.2d
1397): It is . . . well established that a union cannot be held to
have waived bargaining over a change that is presented as a
fait accompli. . . "An employer must at least inform the union
of its proposed actions under circumstances which afford a
reasonable opportunity for counter arguments or proposals."
Notice of a fait accompli is simply not the sort of timely no-
tice upon which the waiver defense is predicated. [Citations
omitted.]
Respondent also argues that the language of the collective-
bargaining agreement precludes a finding that the evaluation
process prior to October 2013 was an existing term and condi-
tion of employment.
Respondent cites section 32 C of the collective-bargaining
agreement24 which provides:
The failure of the Union to enforce any of the provisions of
this Agreement or exercise any rights granted by law, or the
failure of the Company to exercise any right reserved to it, or
its exercise of any such right in a particular way, shall not be
deemed a waiver of any such right or waiver of its authority to
exercise any such right in some other way not in conflict with
terms of this Agreement.
This section of the collective-bargaining agreement is similar
in nature to a management rights clause which the Board has
uniformly held will not constitute a waiver by the union of its
right to bargain over a mandatory subject of bargaining in the
absence of evidence that the particular subject involved was
knowingly discussed and waived by the union. Dubuque Pack-
ing Co., 303 NLRB 386 (1991).
Respondent appears to argue that this language permits it to
enforce rights it has under the collective-bargaining agreement
despite a contrary practice. The problem with this argument is

24 GC Exh. 4, p. 52.
WEYERHAEUSER NR CO. 21
that, as noted above, the collective-bargaining agreement has
never given Respondent the sole right to determine the “instru-
ment(s) to be used to measure capability and aptitude. . .”
There is no evidence that the Union has waived its right to
bargain over the evaluation process of unit employees in the E
& U department.
I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act
when it unilaterally changed the length, content, and format of
E & U department bargaining unit employees’ evaluations
without first notifying and bargaining with the Union about
these changes. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); Saginaw
Control & Engineering, 339 NLRB 541 (2003).
2. The January 2014 changes in rules regarding food safety
Complaint paragraph 12(b) alleges that in January 2014 Re-
spondent implemented new rules related to food safety without
the agreement of the Union.
a. The facts
Respondent adopted its predecessor Tetra Pack’s food safety
hygiene rules in early 2010 after reacquiring the extruder facili-
ty. In February, 2014, Respondent implemented hygiene stand-
ards known as Food Safety System Certification (FSSC) 22000.
The FSSC 22000 consisted of two parts: International Stand-
ards Organization (ISO) 22000 and Publicly Available Standard
(PAS) 223. ISO 22000 is a food product quality management
system. ISO 22000’s predecessor was ISO 9001, a generic
process quality management system. Respondent had operated
under ISO 9001 since 1987. Tetra Pak had also operated under
ISO 9001 and when Respondent reacquired the extruder de-
partment it adopted and incorporated Tetra Pak’s ISO 9001
documentation.
In February 2014, Respondent implemented a new set of hy-
giene standards at its facility as set forth in “FSSC 22000 Food
Safety Training—new hygiene standards” training material25
introduced to employees through a series of food safety training
sessions which took place in late January 2014. These new
rules were implemented immediately following the training
sessions in February 2014.26 These rules applied to the Local
633 paperboard and extruder units.
The Unions first became aware that there could be changes
in Respondent’s food safety rules was in early February 2014
from their members.
In June 2014 a summary of the rules27 for the rewinder hy-
giene zone and the L3 paper machine hygiene in the paperboard
unit was posted on the facility bulletin boards.
According to the unrebutted and credited testimony of Re-
spondent’s advanced lab technician in the paperboard depart-
ment and Local 633 recording secretary, Lowell Lovgren (Lov-
gren), prior to February 2014 paperboard and extruder bargain-
ing unit employees were permitted to drink coffee and beverag-
es and chew tobacco on the production floor including the pa-
per machine, the winder, the wrap line, the back tender control
room, the winder control room and the wrap line control station
and employees could eat lunch in the winder break shack and

25 GC Exh. 23.
26 GC Exh. 25, p. 2.
27 GC Exh. 26.
the back tender shack. After February 2014 only clear bever-
ages were permitted on the production floor and the rewinder
area was cordoned off as a hygiene area and no food or bever-
ages were allowed in the shacks. Chewing tobacco was also
prohibited throughout the production area.
Lovgren also testified without contradiction that a new hy-
giene zone was created in April 2014 around the rewinder area
in the paperboard unit and demarcated by a blue line painted on
the floor. In this hygiene zone employees could have no per-
sonal belongings, food, or beverages other than water.
While Respondent’s January 2014 training materials28 reflect
there were extant hygiene rules in the Local 633 extruder bar-
gaining unit, including no use of tobacco products, no gum or
candy, no food or drink, according to Lovgren’s unrebutted and
credited testimony, prior to February employees could drink
coffee and eat food in the extruder hygiene zone so long as it
was in the shack which is part of the hygiene zone. After April
2014 employees could no longer drink coffee or eat food in the
hygiene zone. Respondent’s customer in technical service
manager Scott Donaldson (Donaldson) admitted that new re-
strictions were added to the extruder department in February
2014, including the prohibition of personal items such as purs-
es, lunchboxes, backpacks, coats, toothpicks in mouths, nail
polish, false nails, false eyelashes, and loose clothing above the
waist.29
Donaldson admitted that Respondent began strictly enforcing
the water only restrictions for the five shacks located in the
extruder department starting in February 2014. It is unrebutted
that Respondent has also now restricted any food or beverage
on the floor even during a shutdown, contrary to its past prac-
tice.
Zolotko advised the Union that employees could be disci-
plined for noncompliance with the new rules.30
b. The new cleaning requirements of the hygiene standards
As part of Respondent’s new hygiene standards it required
bargaining unit employees to ensure that specific areas of the
facility were cleaned by filling out “Cleaning Inspection
Checklists.”31 To verify the cleaning had taken place. In Janu-
ary 2014, Respondent gave bargaining unit members these
check lists32 and told them to fill them out and hand to their
supervisors daily. New checklists were created for the follow-
ing areas: rewinder, winder, wet end, stock prep, roll line, dry
end, starch deck, dry end backtender, roll line operations, starch
deck operators, stock prep, machine tender—wet end, rewind
storage area, loading dock/warehouse, loading dock 5, 3 rail
line, 2 rail line, fine paper cleaning, west end shredder, extruder
winder, #6 extruder, #6 extruder unwind, and #7 extruder un-
wind. Donaldson admitted that these checklists and employee
responsibilities associated with the checklists were implement-
ed for the first time in February 2014 and that, prior to February
2014, employees were not responsible for this kind of inspec-
tion or cleaning. Donaldson further admitted that Respondent’s

28 GC Exh. 23, p. 8.
29 Ibid. at p. 9.
30 GC Exh. 25, p. 2.
31 GC Exh. 24, points 8–10 and Exh.25, points 8–10.
32 GC Exhs. 56–103.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD22
rule that employees inspect to ensure that there was no glass or
brittle plastic in any of the hygiene zones was also part of the
new food safety expectations and had not been previously re-
quired. He further admitted that the housekeeping standards in
the Extruder department were increased and now required new
inspections and checklists.
It is undisputed that in February 2014, Respondent imple-
mented new job duties in requiring employees to fill out check-
lists ensuring that certain areas of the facility were clean. In
addition, if those areas were not clean, the employee would be
responsible for cleaning those areas. It is also unrebutted that,
as of February 2014, Respondent required employees, such as
employees who work in the rewinder area, to spend the last
hour of their 4-day shift thoroughly cleaning each of the areas
listed on the checklist, a job duty that was not previously re-
quired.
Respondent’s paperboard unit employee Gabe Lovingfoss
(Lovingfoss) testified about the new cleaning requirements and
new forms33 certifying the Langston Rewinder is clean. The
back side of the form sets forth a list of 13 different glass and
plastic fixtures (such as windows, gauges, and mirrors) that the
employee is responsible for checking to make sure they are
intact and not broken. The new checklist on its front side sets
forth the following requirements:
Employee Responsible for Cleaning: Langston Operator
Frequency: Every shift and after maintenance down
Clean Winder frame until free of loose dust and debris. Use
compressed air.
Clean floor under Winder until free of dust and debris. Use
compressed air.
Clean Control room until free of dust and debris. Use com-
pressed air, Wipe down with a Wypall towel use cleaners
Clean Unwind Stand until free of dust and debris. Use com-
pressed air, wipe down with Wypall towel and use cleaners.
Clean all Paper rolls and Winder drums until free of dust, de-
bris and tape. Wipe down with a Wypall towel and use clean-
ers.
Clean all dust and floor debris around Langston area. With
Factory Cat Sweeper, broom and dust pan
Bug light OF-25A is working, southwest of Langston
No food or food waste in the Control room or Hygiene Zone
Operator to use clean gloves when processing product
No food waste in process waste
Complete the Glass & Brittle Plastics checklist on the back-
side
If down for maintenance, wipe down Langston frame with
simple green.
Lovingfoss credibly testified without contradiction that
Managers Greg Jasmer and Mike Haas provided Lovingfoss
and his coworkers with the above checklist after the January
2014 training sessions and explained that now the operators
were responsible for cleaning the machines, checking off each
item on the checklists and providing the completed list to their
TDM each day after they had done so. In addition to filling out
these checklists on a daily basis, Respondent directed employ-

33 GC Exh. 56.
ees to spend the last hour of each 4-day shift performing a thor-
ough cleaning in each of the areas on the checklists. These
requirements were new.
Respondent asserts Lovingfoss testified that the only new
task required as a result of the FSSC 22000 rules is that the day
shift operator of the Langston Rewinder is required to thor-
oughly clean the machine at the end of their four day week.
Contrary to Respondent’s assertion, Lovingfoss testified that in
addition to cleaning the machine he now, for the first time after
January 2014, had to fill out the above forms certifying he had
cleaned the machine.34
c. The analysis
General Counsel argues that Respondent failed to notify or
bargain with Local 580 regarding their intention to implement
changes to their food safety regulations or the effect that these
changes would have on its bargaining unit employees.
On the other hand, Respondent contends that the Union has
waived its right to bargain over changes in the food safety regu-
lations by contract language or by inaction.
As noted above, Section 8(a)(5) of the Act requires an em-
ployer to provide its employees’ representative with notice and
an opportunity to bargain prior to making material, substantial,
and significant changes with respect to terms and conditions of
employment that are mandatory subjects of bargaining. NLRB
v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); Toledo Blade Co., 343 NLRB
385, 387 (2004). The Board has found tobacco bans and food
restrictions to be material and constitute a unilateral change in
terms and conditions of employment, especially where those
new work rules could be grounds for discipline. W-I Forest
Products Co., 304 NLRB 957, 959 (1991); King Soopers, Inc.,
340 NLRB 628 (2003); Toledo Blade Co., Inc., 343 NLRB 385
(2004). Also employee job assignments are a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining. Flambeau Airmold Corp., 334 NLRB 165,
171–172 (2001). The Board has found that an increase in job
duties is a mandatory subject of bargaining. Bundy Corp., 292
NLRB 617, 678 (1989).
An employer may however, unilaterally implement changes
to working conditions where the Union has waived its right to
bargain over specific terms and conditions of employment. A
waiver of the duty to bargain may result from action or inac-
tion, through contractual language specifically waiving the
right of a party to bargain about a particular subject. When a
“management-rights” clause is the source of an asserted waiver,
it is normally scrutinized by the Board to ascertain whether it
affords specific justification for unilateral action. Mt. Sinai
Hospital, 331 NLRB 895, 895 fn. 2 (2000); Johnson-Bateman
Co., 295 NLRB 180, 184 (1989). It is well settled that the
waiver of a statutory right will not be inferred from general
contractual provisions; rather, such waivers must be clear and
unmistakable. New York Mirror, 151 NLRB 834, 839–840
(1965).
Similarly, the failure to protest unilateral action may result in
a waiver. Ador Corp., 150 NLRB 1658 (1965); U.S. Lingerie,
170 NLRB 750 (1968). However, the Board and the Courts
have construed the waiver doctrine narrowly and have been

34 Tr. at p. 607, lines 12–14.
WEYERHAEUSER NR CO. 23
reluctant to infer waiver in the absence of clear and unmistaka-
ble conduct. Metropolitan Edison Co., v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693,
708 (1983). Only where the collective-bargaining agreement
provides a clear and unmistakable waiver of the union’s right to
bargain may an employer unilaterally implement rules. Prove-
na St. Joseph Medical Center, 350 NLRB 808 (2007).
There is no dispute that Respondent failed to notify or bar-
gain with Local 580 in February 2014 regarding their intention
to implement changes to their food safety regulations or the
effect that these changes would have on its bargaining unit
employees. Respondent unilaterally implemented new job du-
ties in requiring employees to fill out checklists ensuring that
certain areas of its facility were clean. In addition, if those
areas were not clean, the employee would be responsible for
cleaning those areas. It is also unrebutted that, as of February
2014, Respondent required employees, such as employees who
work in the rewinder area, to spend the last hour of their 4-day
shift thoroughly cleaning each of the areas listed on the check-
list, a job duty that was not previously required.
In addition, it is uncontested that Respondent’s new re-
strictions on its employees’ ability to use chewing tobacco or
have food, drink, and other personal items on in the production
area as well as the newly designated hygiene zones were im-
plemented without first notifying or bargaining with the Union.
Respondent’s implementation of these new food safety rules
materially affected its employees’ terms and conditions of em-
ployment and constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining.
In support of its argument that Local 580 and Local 633
waived their right to bargain over new hygiene rules, Respond-
ent cites Section 17 of the collective-bargaining agreement
between Respondent and Local 58035 that applies to the extrud-
er department and the identical provisions in section 17 of its
agreement with Local 63336 dealing with the L3 department and
the Langston Rewinder which provide that:
A. Causes for discipline or discharge are as follows:
****
13. Refusal to comply with Company Rules
a. Provided that such rules shall be posted in each department
where they may be read by all employees and further, that no
changes in present rules or no additional rules shall be made
that are inconsistent with this Agreement: and further provid-
ed, that any existing or new rules or changes in rules may be
the subject of discussions between the Local Union Standing
Committee and the Local Mill Manager, and in case of disa-
greement, the procedure for other grievances shall apply.
Respondent also cites section 17 B. 337 of the collective-
bargaining agreements38 which provide:
Where a letter of reprimand, suspension or discharge is
deemed justified, the final decision will be deferred until the
appropriate Local Union representative has a reasonable op-

35 GC Exh. 4, p. 21, sec. 17, erroneously cited in R. Brf. as GC Exh.
2, sec.16.
36 GC Exh. 3, p. 21
37 Erroneously cited as sec.16.
38 GC Exhs. 3 and 4 at p. 21.
portunity to investigate the facts and then discuss the matter
with the appropriate supervisor in the presence of the employ-
ee. . . .
Citing Provena St. Joseph Hospital, 350 NLRB 808, 810,
815 (2007), Respondent argues that taken together, the above
contract provisions constitute a clear and unmistakable waiver
of the Union’s right to bargain about Respondent’s work rules.
In Provena the employer argued that the union had relin-
quished its right to bargain over two subjects, incentive pay and
a new attendance tardiness policy. The contract language in
issue was a managements-rights provision that provided, inter
alia:
(1). . . [e]xcept as specifically limited by express provisions of
this Agreement, [the Respondent] retains exclusively to itself
the traditional rights (as historically existed prior to Associa-
tion organization) to operate and manage its business and to
direct its employees; (2) the clause permitting the Respondent
“to change or eliminate existing methods, materials, equip-
ment, facilities and reporting practices and procedures and/or
to introduce new or improved ones; (3) the clause authorizing
the Respondent “to suspend, discipline and discharge em-
ployees”; (4) the clause allowing the Respondent to “make
and enforce the rules of conduct, standards, and regulations
governing the conduct of employees”; (5) Respondent’s right
“to establish and administer policies and procedures related to
research, education, training, operations, services and mainte-
nance” of the Respondent’s operations; and (6) the final sec-
tion, reserving to the Respondent the right “to determine or
change the methods and means by which its operations are to
be carried on; to take any and all actions it determines appro-
priate, including the subcontracting of work, to maintain effi-
ciency and appropriate patient care.” Id. at 810.
The Board found that the employer did not violate the Act
with respect to the newly implemented incentive pay program
but that it did not violate the Act with regard to the new disci-
plinary policy on attendance and tardiness. The Board held that
the:
Application of our traditional standard reveals that several
provisions of the management-rights clause, taken together,
explicitly authorized the Respondent’s unilateral action. Spe-
cifically, the clause provides that the Respondent has the right
to “change reporting practices and procedures and/or to intro-
duce new or improved ones,” “to make and enforce rules of
conduct,” and “to suspend, discipline, and discharge employ-
ees.” By agreeing to that combination of provisions, the Un-
ion relinquished its right to demand bargaining over the im-
plementation of a policy prescribing attendance requirements
and the consequences for failing to adhere to those require-
ments. Such a conclusion requires no resort to a “contract-
coverage” analysis, for the contract itself plainly speaks to the
right of the Respondent to act.
Contrary to the contract language in Provena and in both
Cincinnati Paperboard, 339 NLRB 1079 (2003), and Ingham
Regional Medical Center, 342 NLRB 1259 fn. 1 (2004), the
language here does not clearly and unmistakably give Re-
spondent the right to formulate new work rules. Here the lan-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD24
guage of section 17 in both contracts deals with discipline for
not following extant rules not with Respondent’s right to uni-
laterally implement new work rules. Indeed, the language of
section 17 A. 13 specifically states that there shall be discus-
sions between the Respondent and Locals 580 and 633 regard-
ing any changes to extant rules. Section17 B. 3 has nothing to
do with the Unions’ waiver of bargaining over work rules.
As to Respondent’s argument that the Unions waived their
right to bargain over the hygiene rules by inaction, no waiver
can occur where the union is presented with a fait accompli.
The evidence reflects that Respondent implemented the chang-
es to its food safety regulations in about February 2014 without
notice to or bargaining with the Union. The Board has long
held that a union cannot be held to have waived bargaining over
a change that is presented as a fait accompli. Intersystems De-
sign & Technology Corp., 278 NLRB 759 (1986). Here, since
the changes were made without notice to or bargaining with the
Unions they were presented by Respondent with a fait accompli
for which there can be no waiver.
Having found that Respondent unilaterally implemented new
hygiene rules without notice to or bargaining with the Unions
and that the Unions did not waive their rights to bargain over
the implementation of these rules, I find that Respondent there-
by violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
3. The March 2014 changes to scheduling of training operators
in the energy and utility department
Complaint paragraph 12(c) alleges that in March 2014 Re-
spondent changed its practice of how it schedules its training
operators in its E & U department. In its brief Respondent
asserted that it no longer contests paragraph 12(c) regarding
training scheduling.
a. The facts
There is no dispute that in a May 4, 2014, email Alsemaan
told employees and management in the E & U department that
“all new hires and transferred employees will work 8 hour days
5 days a week Monday through Friday 7AM-3PM.”39 Prior to
this email, new E & U department trainees worked four 12-hour
shifts each week. Therefore, after May 4, 2014 E & U trainees’
hours were reduced from 48 hours to 40 hours per week.
b. The analysis
It is uncontested that Respondent never notified or bargained
with Local 580 before implementing this scheduling change.
The Board has found the scheduling of employees to be a man-
datory subject of bargaining. Beverly Health & Rehabilitation
Services, Inc., 335 NLRB 635, 636 (2001); Raven Government
Services, 331 NLRB 651 (2000); Bentler Industries, Inc., 323
NLRB 712, 715 (1997).
I find that by unilaterally changing the scheduling of trainees
in its E & U department, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act.
4. The failure to provide information
a. The April 2, 2014 request
Complaint paragraphs 13(c) and (d) allege that since April 9,

39 GC Exh. 45.
2014, Respondent has failed to provide the Union with docu-
mentation and from April 9 to June 13, 2014, it has unreasona-
bly delayed in providing the information related to any wage
increases given to employees, disciplinary actions, probationary
actions, reassignment of employees, and disciplinary recom-
mendations that are related to these interviews and evaluations
that are now being conducted by the management team.
i. The facts
On April 2, 2014, after hearing that Alsemaan was making
changes to the E & U department employees’ evaluation pro-
cess, Local 580 President Silvery wrote a letter to Zolotko ask-
ing Respondent to meet and bargain about the changes and
requesting documentation regarding the changes.40 Silvery’s
letter requested the following information:
[A]ll records, notes, emails, test results or other documenta-
tion related to any of the interviews and evaluations. Please
make sure to also include documentation related to any wage
increases given to employees, disciplinary actions, probation-
ary actions, reassignment of employees and disciplinary rec-
ommendations that are related to these interviews and evalua-
tions that are now being conducted by your management team
by April 9, 2014, since the time you originally hired your new
power plant manager.
On April 4, 2014, in response to Silvery’s letter, Zolotko
emailed41 union area representative Anderson stating that she
did not understand Silvery’s letter. The same day Anderson
responded42 that it was quite clear that Silvery was asking Re-
spondent to cease its unilateral changes to the qualification test
in the E & U department and also provide Local 580 with in-
formation related to those changes. On April 8, 2014, Zolotko
emailed43 Anderson stating that the bargaining issue in the E &
U department should be addressed by the parties’ grievance
procedure.
On June 13, 2014, Zolotko provided the standing committee
with a response to Silvery’s April 2, 2014 information re-
quest.44 Zolotko’s response consisted of an assortment of uni-
dentified documents attached to it. Zolotko attached no cover
letter to her submission explaining either what she was re-
sponding to or why she had not attached all of the responsive
documents. A review of the attachments reveals that they in-
cluded some E & U evaluation records, notes taken during
evaluation interviews, and emails regarding the recent evalua-
tions. Absent from the response were any documents related to
any wage increases given to employees, disciplinary actions,
probationary actions, reassignment of employees, and discipli-
nary recommendations related to the evaluation interviews.
There is no dispute that Zolotko never provided these docu-
ments to Local 580, never informed Local 580 that these docu-
ments did not exist, and never presented Local 580 with a rea-
son for failing to provide these documents. Zolotko testified
that the information requested does not exist.

40 GC Exh. 6.
41 GC Exh. 7, p. 2.
42 Ibid, p. 1.
43 GC Exh. 8.
44 GC Exh. 53.
WEYERHAEUSER NR CO. 25
As the record makes clear, the only responsive documents
that were provided 2-1/2 months after Silvery’s initial request
were unduly delayed and Respondent provided no reason for
the delay.
ii. The analysis
General Counsel takes the position that Respondent was ob-
ligated to produce the information Silvery requested or to pro-
vide the Local 580 with a timely explanation for its refusal to
provide the requested information, citing USPS, 332 NLRB
635, 636 (2000). It did not do so.
Respondent argues that it had no duty to produce information
that it does not have, citing Harmon Auto Glass, 352 NLRB
152 (2008), and Whittier Area Parents Assn., 296 NLRB 817
(1989). Respondent further contends that it did not engage in
any unreasonable delay in furnishing requested information.
The Courts and Board since its inception have long held that
an employer’s duty to bargain includes, upon request, supply-
ing the union with information necessary and relevant to fulfill
its bargaining obligations. NLRB v Acme Industrial Co., 385
U.S. 432, 435–436 (1967); S.L. Allen & Co., Inc., 1 NLRB 714,
728 (1936); Industrial Welding Co., 175 NLRB 477 (1969).
Information that implicates terms and conditions of employ-
ment of bargaining unit employees is presumptively relevant.
Whitesell Corp., 355 NLRB 635 (2010); CalMat Co., 331
NLRB 1084 (2000). Once it has been determined that the em-
ployer is under an obligation to produce the requested infor-
mation, the employer is under an obligation to either produce
the information or provide an explanation for its refusal to pro-
vide the requested information. An employer’s failure to re-
spond at all is likewise a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
USPS, 332 NLRB 635, 639 (2000).
Once the duty to provide information applies, an employer
must produce the information in a timely manner. Allegheny
Power, 339 NLRB 585, 587 (2003). While the Board looks to
the totality of the circumstances in determining if the delay in
furnishing information is unlawful, it has found a 7 week and
10 week delay unreasonable. Woodland Clinic, 331 NLRB
735, 737 (2001); Bundy Corp., 292 NLRB 671, 672 (1989).
Here there is no dispute that the information Local 580 re-
quested was presumptively relevant as it applied to terms and
conditions of bargaining unit employees. Respondent did not
furnish any of the information until June 13, 2014, over 10
weeks after it had been requested. Then much of the requested
information, including documents related to wage increases,
disciplinary actions, probationary actions, reassignment of em-
ployees, and disciplinary recommendations related to the eval-
uation interviews, was not provided. No explanation for either
the delay in providing the information or the absence of the
information was given until the hearing herein when Zolotko
testified the information did not exist.
I find Respondent’s citations to Harmon Auto Glass, 352
NLRB 152, 153 (2008), and Whittier Area Parents Assn., 296
NLRB 817 fn. 2 (1989), inapposite. In neither Harmon nor
Whittier was there an issue as to whether the employer failed to
explain its failure to produce non-existent information.
Respondent was under an obligation to either produce the re-
quested information in a timely manner or to explain its inabil-
ity to produce the information. It did neither. Moreover, I find
that 10 weeks was an unreasonably long time to provide the
information furnished, particularly considering the clarity of the
request, the absence of evidence that it would be difficult to
recover the information, and the absence of any explanation for
Respondent’s failure to act in a timelier manner. Accordingly,
I find Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by failing
to explain the absence of the requested information and by
failing to provide the information furnished to the Union in a
timely manner.
b. The April 24, 2014 request
Complaint paragraph 14(c) alleges that from about May 5 to
about June 4, 2014, Respondent unreasonably delayed in fur-
nishing the Union with information regarding Respondent's
food safety training as set forth in Attachment A of the consoli-
dated complaint.
i. The facts
On February 5, 2014, when Local 633 president Lovgren
learned about the new hygiene rule changes, he sent superin-
tendent of the paper machine area Tim Edwards (Edwards) an
information request45 about the new rules. In his letter Lovgren
asked for the following information by February 18, 2014:
1. We need to know what the expected changes are,
2. We need to know the locations of the Hygiene zones are,
3. We need to know what locations of the Production zones
are,
4. We need to know what are the changes to existing job du-
ties and whose jobs will those effect,
5. Please include any check off sheets, or check off lists that
will effect [sic]those jobs,
6. We need to know if there will be any special clothing re-
quirements, i.e. clean clothes, uniforms?
Zolotko emailed46 Lovgren back that day stating: “Did you
attend the recent food safety ISO training? I believe the an-
swers to your questions are there.” After receiving Zolotko’s
response and hearing from Edwards that manager Mike Haas
(Haas) was the appropriate person to whom to direct his re-
quest, Lovgren forwarded this same request to Haas on Febru-
ary 10, 2014.47
On April 7, 2014, after receiving no response from Haas,
Lovgren sent an email to Zolotko requesting the information
once again. On April 8, Zolotko emailed Lovgren the training
materials for the new food safety rules.48 After reviewing the
training materials, Lovgren created a list of questions about the
hygiene rule changes and sent it to Zolotko on April 24, 2014.49
In the April 24, 2014 information request, the Union made a list
of 10 subjects regarding the new hygiene rules about which
they had several questions in each subject. On June 4, 2014,

45 GC Exh. 20.
46 GC Exh. 21.
47 GC Exh. 22.
48 GC Exh. 23
49 GC Exh. 24.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD26
Zolotko responded to Lovgren’s inquiry.50
ii. The analysis
General Counsel takes the position that Respondent failed to
provide the information requested on April 24, 2014, in a time-
ly manner. Respondent contends the information was provided
in a timely manner under all of the circumstances.
As already noted, an employer has the duty under Section
8(a)(5) of the Act to provide the union with relevant infor-
mation in a timely manner. Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc., 332
NLRB 635 (2000); Woodland Clinic, 331 NLRB 735 (2001).
The information sought here was presumptively relevant as it
deals with terms and conditions of employment. Lovgren re-
quested specific information regarding the new food safety
rules on April 24, 3014. Zolotko failed to provide Lovgren
with any response until June 4, 2014, 6 weeks later.
A determination of the reasonableness of a delay in supply-
ing relevant information requires a review of all the relevant
circumstances, including “the complexity and extent of the
information sought, its availability and the difficulty in retriev-
ing the information.” Allegheny Power, supra at 587. The
Board has held the absent of evidence justifying an employer's
delay in furnishing a union with relevant information, may
justify finding a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Penn-
co, Inc., 212 NLRB 677, 678 (1974).
Here, the information sought was not complex but straight-
forward. Respondent presented no evidence that the infor-
mation was unavailable or difficult to retrieve. Under these
circumstances I find that a delay of 6 weeks in furnishing the
requested information was unreasonable and therefore violated
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
c. The April 30, 2014 request
Complaint paragraph 15(c) alleges that since about May
2, 2014, Respondent has failed to provide the Union with
the exact cost and your justification for each of the costs in the
bill and invoice you sent to Local 580 and 633 for bargaining
related expenses; and explain in detail how you calculated the
amounts that are contained in the invoices you sent to Locals
580 and 633.
i. The facts
At the beginning of bargaining, the parties agreed that Re-
spondent would pay the bargaining unit employees for their
time spent in bargaining sessions and the Locals would reim-
burse Respondent for that time. This agreement was not re-
duced to writing.
On April 8, 2014, after parties had met for some time in bar-
gaining for the successor contracts, Local 633’s president, Lov-
gren wrote an email51 to Respondent’s payroll specialist, San-
dra Swogger (Swogger), requesting that she send Local 633 an
invoice for the hours that Respondent had paid for the bargain-
ing committee members’ bargaining time. Swogger sent Lov-
gren an invoice52 which provided lump-sum amounts due on
behalf of each member of the bargaining committee. When

50 GC Exh. 25.
51 GC Exh. 9, p. 4.
52 GC Exh. 10.
Lovgren received this information he sent another email53 ask-
ing if something had been added. Swogger replied54 that she
used “a fully loaded rate.” Finally on April 11, 2014, Lovgren
emailed55 Swogger and Zolotko and asked to see a break down
on the uploaded rate and what it covered.
Zolotko sent Lovgren an email56 reply stating that “. . . we
are not creating special documents to satisfy your curiosity.
We are paying the same way we paid for the Extruders.” Ac-
cording to Lovgren, he needed this itemized information in
order to understand how Respondent was billing the Union for
the bargaining committee members’ time and for the Local’s
financial records for tax purposes.
On April 15, 2014, Lovgren emailed57 Zolotko again and
asked her for a breakdown of Respondent’s fully loaded rate.
Receiving no response, Lovgren emailed58 Zolotko again on
April 24, 2014. On April 30, 2014, after still having received
no response from Zolotko, Union AWPPW representative An-
derson sent yet another letter59 to Zolotko requesting, in perti-
nent part:
. . . a written description of how the company calculated the
hourly rates that you have included in the 2 invoices you sent
to Locals 580 and 633.
a. Please identify the exact cost of your justification for each
of the costs in the bill and invoice you sent to our unions 580
and 633 for bargaining related expenses.
b. Please explain in detail how you calculated the amounts
that are contained in the invoices you sent to Locals 580 and
633.
On May 19, 2014, Zolotko emailed60 Lovgren payroll rec-
ords for the employees who were on the bargaining committees
for the specified time periods. That day, Zolotko sent an
email61 to Lovgren stating: “I just sent you the bargain board
payroll data. It seems redundant, since you all were at the bar-
gain and you all have access to your payroll records . . . so,
collectively you’ve had this data all along.”
The records Zolotko sent failed to reflect what the Locals
were requesting, however, as there was no indication as to
which benefits Respondent had added in calculating their “fully
loaded” rate and/or how those benefits were calculated.
On June 5, 2014, Anderson emailed62 Zolotko expressing
that the Locals still had not received the information requested
stating:
It is my understanding that on the original bill the Union re-
ceived, the Company was charging an amount that was great-
er than the hourly rates of the bargaining board members.
When the Union asked the Company why this was, they were
told that they were “uploaded rates.” The Union has asked for

53 GC Exh. 9, p. 3.
54 Ibid. at p. 2.
55 Ibid. at p. 1.
56 Ibid. at p. 1.
57 GC Exh. 11.
58 GC Exh. 12.
59 GC Exh. 14.
60 GC Exh. 15.
61 GC Exh. 16.
62 GC Exh. 17.
WEYERHAEUSER NR CO. 27
an itemized bill breaking down just what these uploaded rates
were comprised of. Diana has refused to give the Union this
information, only stating that this was how the Company
charged the Union during Extruder bargaining.
Zolotko responded63 that she had sent employee paystubs to
Lovgren.
On August 15, and 18, 2014, Lovgren again emailed64
Zolotko explaining that the payroll records did not break down
the amount taken into consideration by Respondent in coming
up with its lump-sum amounts and he renewed his request for
the information yet again.
On September 18, 2014, Respondent finally provided the
breakdown of what was included in the “fully loaded” rate.65
ii. The analysis
General Counsel argues that Respondent unreasonably de-
layed in furnishing relevant information to the Union. Re-
spondent contends that the issue is moot since Respondent ul-
timately furnished the requested information.
An employer is under an obligation to furnish a union with
relevant information necessary for the performance of the un-
ion's duties in representing the unit employees and for admin-
istration of a collective-bargaining agreement. NLRB v. Acme
Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351
U.S. 149 (1956); Safeway Stores, 252 NLRB 1323 (1980);
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 239 NLRB 106, 107 (1978). The
standard for determining the relevance of information sought
by a bargaining agent in conjunction with administration of a
collective-bargaining agreement was set forth in Westinghouse:
It is well established that a labor organization, obligated to
represent employees in a bargaining unit with respect to their
terms and conditions of employment, is entitled to such in-
formation from the employer as may be relevant and reasona-
bly necessary to the proper execution of that obligation. The
right to such information exists not only for the purpose of
negotiating a contract, but also for the purpose of administer-
ing a collective-bargaining agreement. The employer's obliga-
tion, in either instance, is predicated upon the need of the un-
ion for such information in order to provide intelligent repre-
sentation of the employees. The test of the union's need for
such information is simply a showing of "probability that the
desired information was relevant, and that it would be of use
to the union in carrying out its statutory duties and responsi-
bilities.” The union need not demonstrate that the information
sought is certainly relevant or clearly dispositive of the basic
negotiating or arbitration issues between the parties. The fact
that the information is of probable or potential relevance is
sufficient to give rise to an obligation on the part of an em-
ployer to provide it. The appropriate standard in determining
the potential relevance of information sought in aid of the
bargaining agent's responsibility is a liberal discovery-type
standard. Id at 107
Here Local 633 sought an explanation of the invoice Re-

63 Ibid.
64 GC Exh. 18.
65 GC Exh. 19.
spondent had provided for Local 633 to reimburse Respondent
for bargaining unit members pay during bargaining time.
While Respondent does not contest the relevancy of this infor-
mation, I find the information sought here was relevant not only
to the Union’s administration of its oral agreement with Re-
spondent for reimbursement of its members’ bargaining pay but
also for its ability to negotiate the parties’ successor collective-
bargaining agreement. The oral agreement was established to
facilitate the Local 633 bargaining committee members’ pay
during bargaining sessions and thus was of benefit to Local 633
in engaging in bargaining for a successor contract with Re-
spondent. Local 633 requested information to ensure the ap-
propriate amount of money for bargaining committee members
had been included in Respondent’s invoice for the Union’s
reimbursement, per the parties’ agreement. While Zolotko
claimed in her email that the information could be ascertained
from the bargaining committee members’ paystubs, the exact
breakdown of the lump-sum amounts set forth in Respondent’s
invoice, including which employee benefits were included,
could not be established from general paystub information pro-
vided.
Thus, Respondent failed to provide the Locals with the
breakdown of those numbers until after the complaint issued
herein 20 weeks after the information was requested. No ex-
planation was offered as to why Respondent failed to produce
the requested information for 20 weeks. Respondent’s sole
defense is that it ultimately gave the information to the Union.
Under these circumstances I find that Respondent’s failure to
provide the requested information until September 18, 2014,
was an unreasonable delay and violated its duty to provide the
Locals with information in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the
Act.
d. The May 1, 2014 request
Complaint paragraph 16(a) alleges that since about May 1,
2014, the Union has requested the following information of
Respondent: (i) The questions asked at the fact finding; (ii) The
answers as recorded by Dave Kay and Bob Montgomery at the
fact finding; (iii) The reasons for these questions; (iv) Emails
about this incident; (v) A list of all complaints against Rick
Olsen; and (vi) Who complained—what was said and personal
notes/conversations about the incident.
Complaint paragraph 16(c) alleges that since about May 8,
2014, Respondent has failed and refused to furnish the Union
with (iii) The reasons for these questions; (iv) Emails about this
incident; (v) A list of all complaints against Rick Olsen.
Complaint paragraph 16(d) alleges that from May 8, 2014, to
about June 5, 2014, Respondent unreasonably delayed in fur-
nishing the Union with (i)The questions asked at the fact find-
ing; (ii) The answers as recorded by Dave Kay and Bob Mont-
gomery at the fact finding; (vi) Who complained—what was
said and Personal notes/conversations about the incident.
i. The facts
On April 28, 2014, Local 580 Shop Steward Mike Mirenta
(Mirenta) participated in a fact finding meeting, representing E
& I Tech Rick Olson (Olson). Central services Superintendent
Kay and TDM Bob Montgomery (Montgomery) were also
present during the meeting. During the meeting, Kay asked
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD28
Olson a series of questions about a call that he received while
he was on duty in the power house. At the end of the meeting,
Mirenta asked Kay who had made the complaint about employ-
ee Olson. Kay replied that Mirenta would have to ask the hu-
man resources department for that information. Mirenta also
asked for a copy of the questions that Kay had asked Olson
during the fact finding as well as any notes of Olson’s respons-
es made during the interview. Again Kay said that Mirenta
would have to go through human resources to get that infor-
mation.
After the meeting Mirenta went to the human resources of-
fice to follow up on his information requests. Mirenta asked
Zolotko if he needed to fill out a specific form in order to make
an information request. Zolotko told Mirenta that if he wanted
the form, he could get one from Local 580. When Mirenta
asked Zolotko if he could send her an email asking for the in-
formation, Zolotko replied that she did not think an email
would work.
Later Mirenta spoke with Local 580 President Silvery, who
told Mirenta that email was an appropriate way to make an
information request. On May 1, 2014, Mirenta emailed66 Zolot-
ko an information request for the following information regard-
ing the Olson fact finding:
The questions asked at the fact finding; The answers as rec-
orded by Dave Kay & Bob Montgomery at the fact finding;
The reasons for these questions; E-mails about this incident;
List all the complaints against Rick Olson; Who complained;
What was said Personal notes/conversations about the inci-
dent
On June 5, 2014, Zolotko responded67 to Mirenta’s infor-
mation request. Zolotko attached two sets of fact finding notes
for Olson and James Pruitt to an email sent to the Local 580
Standing Committee with a copy to Mirenta.68 Zolotko failed
to provide the reasons behind the questions asked in Olson’s
fact finding, emails about the incident, or complaints against
Olson. It is undisputed that Zolotko never provided the re-
quested items, never told Local 580 that the information re-
quested did not exist, and never explained why she was not
providing Local 580 with the requested information.
In its brief Respondent contends that the investigation into
Olson’s conduct had not been completed at the time of Miren-
ta’s request and on June 5, 2014, when the investigation was
completed, it responded to the information request and provid-
ed all available documents.
ii. The analysis
General Counsel takes the position that Respondent unrea-
sonably delayed in furnishing and refused to furnish requested
information. Respondent argues the investigation was not com-
pleted until June 5, 2014, and that it provided all available doc-
uments.
The Union requested information concerning a fact finding
regarding a bargaining unit member that could lead to disci-
pline and ultimately a grievance. The information requested

66 GC Exh. 50.
67 GC Exh. 51.
68 GC Exh. 52.
was therefore presumptively relevant. Island Creek Coal Co.,
292 NLRB 480, 487 (1989). Zolotko provided some of the
requested materials, two sets of fact finding notes, 5 weeks
after the initial request on June 5, 2014. There is no evidence
that the fact finding notes were difficult to obtain. In its June 5,
2014 partial production69 of information, Respondent asserted
that “Our investigation is now complete.” In its brief Respond-
ent asserts that, when the investigation was completed, it re-
sponded to the information request and provided all available
documents. However, the record is devoid of any evidence as
to when Respondent completed its investigation or that this in
some way absolved it of its duty to furnish the requested infor-
mation before June 5. Further there is no record evidence that
there was no other information responsive to the May 1 infor-
mation request or that Respondent ever so notified the Union.
Under all of the circumstances, including the clarity and lack
of complexity of the request, the relative ease of recovering the
information and the absence of a rationale for the delay in
providing the requested information, I conclude that Respond-
ent unreasonably delayed in providing the information for over
5 weeks and thereby violated section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc., 339 NLRB 871 (2003); USPS, 332
NLRB 635, 638 (2000); Overnight Transportation Co., 330
NLRB 1275 (2000).
Further, Respondent’s failure to provide all of the infor-
mation in the May 1 information request violates Section
8(a)(5) of the Act. Respondent’s bare assertion in its brief that
it provided all available documents is insufficient explanation
for its failure to provide the requested documents. By failing to
provide all of the requested documents and by failing to inform
the Union in a timely manner that it had no further documents,
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. USPS, 332
NLRB 635, 639 (2000).
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
The evidence having established that the Respondent sus-
pended its employee Steve Collins, my recommended order
requires the Respondent to make him whole without loss of
seniority and other privileges previously enjoyed, and to make
him whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered
as a result of the discrimination against him. My recommend-
ed order further requires that backpay shall be computed in
accordance with F.W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950),
with interest as prescribed in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173
(1987), plus daily compound interest as prescribed in Kentucky
River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010).
The recommended Order also requires that the Respondent
shall expunge from its files and records any and all references
to the unlawful suspension and to notify Collins in writing that
this has been done and that the unlawful discrimination will not
be used against him in any way. Sterling Sugars, Inc., 261
NLRB 472 (1982). Further, the Respondent must not make any

69 Ibid.
WEYERHAEUSER NR CO. 29
reference to the expunged material in response to any inquiry
from any employer, employment agency, unemployment insur-
ance office, or reference seeker, or use the expunged material
against them in any other way.
The Respondent shall be required to post a notice that as-
sures its employees that it will respect their rights under the
Act. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices
shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on
an intranet or internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the
Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by
such means. J. Picini Flooring, 356 NLRB 6 (2010).
The Board has held that discriminatees be reimbursed for
any excess taxes owed as a result of a lump-sum backpay award
and that Respondent be ordered to complete the appropriate
paperwork as set forth in IRS Publication 975 to notify the
Social Security Administration what periods to which the back-
pay should be allocated as requested in the remedy section of
the complaint herein.
In Don Chavas LLC d/b/a Tortillas Dan Chavas, 361 NLRB
101 (2014), Board ordered that it will routinely require the
filing of a report with the Social Security Administration allo-
cating backpay awards to the appropriate calendar quarters.
The Board also held that it will routinely require respondents to
compensate employees for the adverse tax consequences of
receiving one or more lump-sum backpay awards covering
periods longer than 1 year. The Board concluded that it is the
General Counsel’s burden to prove and quantify the extent of
any adverse tax consequences resulting from the lump-sum
backpay award and that such matters shall be resolved in com-
pliance proceedings.
Pursuant to Tortillas Dan Chavas supra, I will order that Re-
spondent shall file a report with the Social Security Administra-
tion allocating any backpay awards to the appropriate calendar
quarters.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent Weyerhaeuser Company is an employer en-
gaged in commerce and in an industry affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Association of Western Pulp and Paper Workers, affiliat-
ed with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America (AWPPA) and its Locals 580 and 633 (Unions) are
labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act and are the exclusive collective bargaining representative
of Respondent’s employees in the following appropriate collec-
tive bargaining units:
Local 633 represents a unit of Respondent’s 75 extruders (ex-
truder unit) including:
All employees of Respondent at its Longview, Washington
extruder operation, except those employees engaged in ad-
ministration, actual supervision, watchman duties, sales, engi-
neering and drafting, research and technical occupations re-
quiring professional training, accounting, office clerical and
guards, supervisors, and professional employees as defined in
the Act.
Local 633 also represents a unit of Respondent’s 125 paper-
board employees (paperboard unit) including:
All employees of Respondent working in its paperboard,
shipping, L 3 paper machine, and L 3 technical departments at
its Longview facility, except those engaged in administration,
actual supervision, watchman duties, sales, engineering and
drafting, research and technical occupations requiring profes-
sional training, accounting, clerical, stenographic and other
clerical work. Also excluded are guards, supervisors, and
professional employees as defined in the Act.
Local 580 represents a unit of Respondent’s 250 energy and
utility, maintenance, fiberline, and chip processing employees
(Local 580 unit) including:
All employees of Respondent at its Longview facility, except
those employees in Respondents extruder, paperboard, ship-
ping, L 3 paper machine, L 3 technical departments, and those
employees engaged in administration, actual supervision,
watchman duties, sales, engineering and drafting, research
and technical occupations requiring professional training, ac-
counting, stenographic and other clerical work. Also exclud-
ed are guards, supervisors, and professional employees as de-
fined in the Act.
3. By engaging in the following conduct, the Respondent
committed unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act:
(a) Refusing to recognize and bargain in good faith with As-
sociation of Western Pulp and Paper Workers, affiliated with
the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America
(AWPPA) and its Locals 580 and 633 (Unions),the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of its employees in the
following collective-bargaining units:
The Local 633 unit of Respondent’s 75 extruders (extruder
unit) including:
All employees of Respondent at its Longview, Washington
extruder operation, except those employees engaged in ad-
ministration, actual supervision, watchman duties, sales, engi-
neering and drafting, research and technical occupations re-
quiring professional training, accounting, office clerical and
guards, supervisors, and professional employees as defined in
the Act.
The Local 633 unit of Respondent’s 125 paperboard employ-
ees (paperboard unit) including:
All employees of Respondent working in its paperboard,
shipping, L 3 paper machine, and L 3 technical departments at
its Longview facility, except those engaged in administration,
actual supervision, watchman duties, sales, engineering and
drafting, research and technical occupations requiring profes-
sional training, accounting, clerical, stenographic and other
clerical work. Also excluded are guards, supervisors, and
professional employees as defined in the Act.
The Local 580 unit of Respondent’s 250 energy and utility,
maintenance, fiberline and chip processing employees (Local
580 unit) including:
All employees of Respondent at its Longview facility, except
those employees in Respondents extruder, paperboard, ship-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD30
ping, L 3 paper machine, L 3 technical departments, and those
employees engaged in administration, actual supervision,
watchman duties, sales, engineering and drafting, research
and technical occupations requiring professional training, ac-
counting, stenographic and other clerical work. Also exclud-
ed are guards, supervisors, and professional employees as de-
fined in the Act.
(b) Unilaterally implementing food safety rules without no-
tice to or bargaining with the Unions.
(c) Unilaterally implementing new evaluation processes for
the E & U department employees without notice to or bargain-
ing with the Unions.
(d) Unilaterally changing the hours of E & U department
employees without notice to or bargaining with the Unions.
(e) Refusing to provide and unreasonably delaying in
providing the Unions with information relevant and necessary
to its function as collective-bargaining representative of bar-
gaining unit employees.
4. By engaging in the following conduct, the Respondent
committed unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
(a) Suspending Steve Collins because he exercise his right
to bring issues and complaints to Respondent on behalf of him-
self and other employees.
(b) Denying Steve Collins and Joyce Becker their right to
effective union representation in an interview that could rea-
sonably lead to discipline by telling the representative to remain
silent.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended70
ORDER
Respondent, Weyerhaeuser Company, located in Federal
Way, Washington, and with a facility located in Longview,
Washington, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall:
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to recognize and bargain in good faith with As-
sociation of Western Pulp and Paper Workers, affiliated with
the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America
(AWPPA) and its Locals 580 and 633 (Unions),the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of its employees in the
following collective bargaining units:
The Local 633 unit of Respondent’s 75 extruders (extruder
unit) including:
All employees of Respondent at its Longview, Washington
extruder operation, except those employees engaged in ad-
ministration, actual supervision, watchman duties, sales, engi-
neering and drafting, research and technical occupations re-
quiring professional training, accounting, office clerical and
guards, supervisors, and professional employees as defined in
the Act.

70 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Section 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections shall be waived for all purpos-
es.
The Local 633 unit of Respondent’s 125 paperboard employ-
ees (paperboard unit) including:
All employees of Respondent working in its paperboard,
shipping, L 3 paper machine, and L 3 technical departments at
its Longview facility, except those engaged in administration,
actual supervision, watchman duties, sales, engineering and
drafting, research and technical occupations requiring profes-
sional training, accounting, clerical, stenographic and other
clerical work. Also excluded are guards, supervisors, and
professional employees as defined in the Act.
The Local 580 unit of Respondent’s 250 energy and utility,
maintenance, fiberline and chip processing employees (Local
580 unit) including:
All employees of Respondent at its Longview facility, except
those employees in Respondents extruder, paperboard, ship-
ping, L 3 paper machine, L 3 technical departments, and those
employees engaged in administration, actual supervision,
watchman duties, sales, engineering and drafting, research
and technical occupations requiring professional training, ac-
counting, stenographic and other clerical work. Also exclud-
ed are guards, supervisors, and professional employees as de-
fined in the Act.
(b) Unilaterally implementing food safety rules without no-
tice to or bargaining with the Unions.
(c) Unilaterally implementing new evaluation processes for
the E & U department employees without notice to or bargain-
ing with the Unions.
(d) Unilaterally changing the hours of E & U department
employees without notice to or bargaining with the Unions.
(e) Refusing to provide and unreasonably delaying in
providing the Unions with information relevant and necessary
to its function as collective-bargaining representative of bar-
gaining unit employees.
(f) Suspending you because you exercise your right to bring
issues and complaints to us on behalf of yourself and other
employees.
(g) Denying your right to effective union representation in
an interview that could reasonably lead to discipline by telling
the representative to remain silent.
(h) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) The Respondent shall be required to post a notice that
assures its employees that it will respect their rights under the
Act. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices
shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on
an intranet or internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the
Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by
such means. J. Picini Flooring, 356 NLRB 6 (2010).
(b) Provide AWPPW Locals 580 and 633 with the infor-
mation they requested on April 2, 24, and 30, 2014.
(c) Make Steve Collins whole for any loss of earnings and
other benefits suffered as a result of his suspension, less any net
interim earnings, plus interest.
WEYERHAEUSER NR CO. 31
(d) Remove from our files all references to the discipline of
Steve Collins and notify him in writing that this has been done
and that the suspension will not be used against him in any
way.
(e) Provide the AWPPW Locals 580 and 633 with the in-
formation they requested on April 2, 24, and 30, 2014, and
May 1, 2014.
(f) Upon the request of AWPPW Local 580, rescind any or
all changes to your terms and conditions of employment that
we made without first bargaining with the Union, including
changes made to the way we conduct training evaluations (also
known as “qualification reviews”) and changes to our trainees’
work schedules.
(g) Upon request of AWPPW Local 580 and/or AWPPW
Local 633, rescind any or all changes to your terms and condi-
tions of employment that we made without first bargaining with
the Union, including the new food safety rules implemented in
January and February 2014 at our Longview facility.
(h) Restore our training evaluation/qualification review sys-
tem for our Energy and Utility employees to as it was prior to
October 2013.
(i) Arrange for any Energy and Utility employees who are
currently in the process of going through such evalua-
tions/qualification reviews to be interviewed, evaluated, and
promoted under our evaluation process in place prior to Octo-
ber 2013.
(j) Pay employees for the wages and other benefits lost be-
cause of the changes to terms and conditions of employment
that we made without bargaining with AWPPW Local 580
and/or AWPPW 633.
(k) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi-
tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause
shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment rec-
ords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due under the terms of this Order.
(l) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at facili-
ties in Longview, Washington copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”71 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 19 after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as
by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates
with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event

71 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent
has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since June 10, 2013.
(m) Within 21 days after service by the Region, filed
with the Regional Director for Region 19 a sworn certifica-
tion of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region
attesting to the steps that Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. March 25, 2015
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
After a trial at which we appeared, argued, and presented evi-
dence, the National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has directed us
to post this notice to employees and to abide by its terms.
Accordingly, we give our employees the following assurances:
WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize and bargain with the Asso-
ciation of Western Pulp and Paper Workers Union, affiliated
with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America, Local 580 (“AWPPW Local 580”), as the exclusive
representative of our employees in the following appropriate
unit (“580 Unit”):
All our employees working in our Longview facility, except
those employees in our extruder, paperboard, shipping, L 3
paper machine, and L 3 technical departments, and those em-
ployees engaged in administration, actual supervision,
watchman duties, sales, engineering and drafting, research
and technical occupations requiring professional training, ac-
counting, clerical, stenographic and other office work. Also
excluded are guards, supervisors, and professional employees
as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize and bargain with the Asso-
ciation of Western Pulp and Paper Workers Union, affiliated
with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America, Local 633 (the “AWPPW Local 633”), as the exclu-
sive representative of our employees in the following appropri-
ate unit (“Paperboard Unit”):
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD32
All our employees working in its paperboard, shipping, L 3
paper machine, and L 3 technical departments at our
Longview facility, except those engaged in administration, ac-
tual supervision, watchman duties, sales, engineering and
drafting, research and technical occupations requiring profes-
sional training, accounting, clerical, stenographic, and other
clerical work.
Also excluded are guards, supervisors, and professional em-
ployees as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize and bargain with the
AWPPW Local 633, as the exclusive representative of our em-
ployees in the following appropriate unit (“Extruder Unit”):
All our employees at our Longview, Washington extruder op-
eration, except those employees engaged in administration,
actual supervision, watchman duties, sales, engineering and
drafting, research and technical occupations requiring profes-
sional training, accounting, office clerical and guards, super-
visors, and professional employees as defined in the Act.
YOU HAVE THE RIGHT to freely bring issues and complaints to
us on behalf of yourself and other employees and WE WILL NOT
do anything to interfere with your exercise of that right.
WE WILL NOT suspend you because you exercise your right to
bring issues and complaints to us on behalf of yourself and
other employees.
WE WILL NOT deny employees effective union representation
at fact finding interviews that could reasonably lead to disci-
pline by telling the representatives to be silent.
WE WILL NOT unreasonably delay in providing AWPPW Lo-
cals 580 and 633 with information that is relevant and neces-
sary to its role as your bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT refuse to provide AWPPW Locals 580 and 633
with information that is relevant and necessary to its role as
your bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT refuse to meet and discuss in good faith with
AWPPW Locals 580 and 633 any proposed changes in your
wages, hours and working conditions before putting such
changes into effect.
WE WILL NOT remove union fliers from facility bulletin
boards designated for use by AWPPW Locals 580 and 633.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with
your rights under Section 7 of the Act
WE WILL provide AWPPW Locals 580 and 633 with the in-
formation they requested on April 2, 24, and 30, 2014.
WE WILL pay Steve Collins for the wages and other benefits
he lost because we disciplined him.
WE WILL remove from our files all references to the disci-
pline of Steve Collins and WE WILL notify him in writing that
this has been done and that the suspension will not be used
against him in any way.
WE HAVE provided the AWPPW Locals 580 and 633 with
the information they requested on April 24 and 30, 2014.
WE WILL provide the AWPPW Locals 580 and 633 with all
of the information they requested on April 2, 2014, and May 1,
2014.
WE WILL, if requested by AWPPW Local 580, rescind any or
all changes to your terms and conditions of employment that
we made without first bargaining with the Union, including
changes made to the way we conduct training evaluations (also
known as “qualification reviews”) and changes to our trainees’
work schedules.
WE WILL, if requested by AWPPW Local 580 and/or
AWPPW Local 633, rescind any or all changes to your terms
and conditions of employment that we made without first bar-
gaining with the Union, including the new food safety rules
implemented in January and February 2014 at our Longview
facility.
WE WILL restore our training evaluation/qualification review
system for our Energy and Utility employees to as it was prior
to October 2013.
WE WILL, arrange for any Energy and Utility employees who
are currently in the process of going through such evalua-
tions/qualification reviews to be interviewed, evaluated, and
promoted under our evaluation process in place prior to Octo-
ber 2013.
WE WILL pay employees for the wages and other benefits lost
because of the changes to terms and conditions of employment
that we made without bargaining with AWPPW Local 580
and/or AWPPW 633.
WEYERHAEUSER CORP.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/19-CA-122853 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273-1940.