WEAVEXX, LLC

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 2, 2016

364 NLRB No. 141 (N.L.R.B. 2016)

364 NLRB No. 141
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Weavexx, LLC and Teamsters Local Union 984. 15–
CA–119783
November 2, 2016
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS MISCIMARRA
AND MCFERRAN
On August 6, 2015, Administrative Law Judge Wil-
liam Nelson Cates issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the
General Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Re-
spondent filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to reverse the judge’s decision and
dismiss the complaint.
The judge refused to defer to an arbitrator’s decision
and found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) by unilaterally changing its employees’ payday
and pay cycle without providing the Union with notice
and an opportunity to bargain. We find, for the reasons
set forth below, that deferral to the arbitral decision is
appropriate. Accordingly, we dismiss the complaint.
A. Facts
Teamsters Local Union 984 (the Union) has long rep-
resented the Respondent’s production and maintenance
employees at the Respondent’s Starkville, Mississippi
facility, where the Respondent manufactures felt used in
the production of paper products. The most recent col-
lective-bargaining agreement between the parties was
effective from March 20, 2011, to March 20, 2016, and
contained a grievance-arbitration provision. Since at
least 2002, the Respondent had paid its employees on a
weekly basis, every Thursday. In November 2013, the
Respondent’s parent company, Xerium Technologies,
decided to standardize payroll practices across its subsid-
iaries. As a result, the Respondent’s plant manager, Ross
Johnstone, informed the Union’s representatives that the
Respondent would be changing its pay cycle from week-
ly to biweekly and its payday from every Thursday to
every other Friday. It is undisputed that the Respondent
did not offer to bargain with the Union about these
changes, which were implemented in January 2014.
Many employees filed grievances protesting the
changes, including employee Mitchell Jones, who pro-
tested the change in pay cycle.1 On December 9, 2013,
Plant Manager Johnstone denied all of these grievances,
including Jones’ grievance, stating that the unilateral
changes were a legitimate exercise of the Respondent’s
management rights under article III of the collective-
bargaining agreement.2
The Union filed the initial charge in this case on De-
cember 30, 2013, alleging that the Respondent had vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing to bar-
gain with the Union about the change in pay cycle and
payday. Upon learning that the parties had agreed to
arbitrate Jones’ grievance, the Acting Regional Director
deferred the charge to arbitration on March 31, 2014. On
July 8, 2014, the arbitrator issued a decision denying the
grievance. On November 26, 2014, the Acting Regional
Director notified the Respondent she was revoking defer-
ral of the charge because the “evidence fails to reflect
that the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor prac-
tice were presented, considered, and decided by the arbi-
trator.”
B. The Judge’s Decision
The judge found that deferral to the arbitrator’s deci-
sion was not appropriate because the decision was clearly
repugnant to the Act. He reasoned that the arbitrator’s
decision was not susceptible to an interpretation con-
sistent with the Act because the arbitrator relied on extra-
contractual management prerogatives in determining that
the Respondent was privileged to implement its changes.
The judge further found that deferral was inappropriate
because one of the statutory issues alleged in the com-
plaint—the change in payday—had not been presented to
the arbitrator, who thus considered only the change in
pay cycle grieved by Jones.

1 While the judge’s decision states that Jones’s grievance protested
both the change in pay cycle and change in payday, the grievance spe-
cifically objected to the change in pay cycle. However, the grievance
reasonably encompassed both changes by broadly requesting that the
Respondent “[s]top the pay period change from one week to 2 weeks
and leave everything as is” (emphasis added).
2 Art. III provides:
The Employer retains all authority not specifically abridged, delegated
or modified by the Agreement, including, but not limited to, the right
to make and enforce work and safety rules, and the right to subcon-
tract work so long as the Employer is motivated to do so because of
economic reasons and not to displace regular employees . . . . During
the term of this agreement, the Company will not implement new
work rules or policies relating to terms and conditions of employment
without notice to the Union and the opportunity for the Union to raise
concerns and to grieve any change it deems unreasonable.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
C. Discussion
We find, contrary to the judge, that the arbitrator’s de-
cision is not repugnant to the Act and that deferral to the
decision is warranted.
The Board will defer to an arbitration award when the
proceedings appear to have been fair and regular, all par-
ties have agreed to be bound, and the decision of the ar-
bitrator is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and poli-
cies of the Act. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 NLRB 1080,
1082 (1955). An arbitration award is “clearly repugnant”
only if it is “palpably wrong” and “not susceptible to an
interpretation consistent with the Act.” Olin Corp., 268
NLRB 573, 574 (1984).3 Additionally, the arbitrator
must have considered the unfair labor practice issue that
is before the Board. The arbitrator has adequately con-
sidered the unfair labor practice issue if “(1) the contrac-
tual issue is factually parallel to the unfair labor practice
issue, and (2) the arbitrator was presented generally with
the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice.”
Id. The party opposing deferral bears the burden of
proof. Id.
It is undisputed that the arbitral proceedings here were
fair and regular and that all parties agreed to be bound by
the arbitrator’s award.
When the Board is considering—as in this case—
whether or not an arbitrator’s award is repugnant to the
purposes and policies of the Act, deferral is appropriate
where one interpretation of the arbitrator’s decision is
consistent with the Act, even if the Board would not nec-
essarily reach the same result. Smurfit-Stone Container
Corp., 344 NLRB 658, 659–660 (2005). In Smurfit-
Stone, the Board deferred to an arbitrator’s decision
where a reasonable interpretation of the decision was that
the employer was privileged to implement unilateral
changes based on the management-rights clause con-
tained in the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement.
Id. at 659. The Board reasoned: “(1) the [r]espondent
argued to the arbitrator that the management-rights
clause privileged it to unilaterally implement the new
attendance control policy; (2) the arbitrator referred to
the [r]espondent’s argument; (3) the arbitrator promi-
nently quoted the management-rights clause; and (4) the
arbitrator immediately followed his quotation of the
management-rights clause with the assertion that the
[r]espondent had the right to make rules.” Id. at 661.
Based on these factors, the Board found that the arbitra-
tor’s decision was based on his construction of the man-
agement-rights clause and was thus susceptible to an
interpretation consistent with the Act. The Board ac-

3 See Verizon California, 364 NLRB No. 79, slip op. at 3 & fn. 9
(2016) (collecting cases).
cordingly concluded that the decision was not repugnant
to the Act, even though the arbitrator also discussed an
inherent management prerogative theory.
The arbitrator’s decision in this case is much like the
arbitral award in Smurfit-Stone. Here, the Respondent
argued that the management-rights clause in the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement privileged it to act, the arbitra-
tor acknowledged that argument in his decision, and the
arbitrator prominently quoted the management-rights
clause in the section listing relevant contract provisions
in his decision. The arbitrator ultimately concluded that
the “Company’s use of managerial discretion was proper
and should not be seen as a violation of a binding past
practice.” Taken as a whole, the arbitrator’s decision is
thus susceptible to the interpretation that he found that
the management-rights clause sanctioned the Respond-
ent’s change in the employees’ payday and pay cycle.
We recognize that the arbitrator here also discussed the
Respondent’s noncontractual inherent management pre-
rogatives. As in Smurfit-Stone, however, the arbitrator’s
decision is not dependent on that theory but contains
sufficient textual evidence to establish that it is suscepti-
ble to the interpretation that he relied upon the manage-
ment-rights clause. We accordingly find that the arbitra-
tor’s decision is not clearly repugnant to the Act.4
Columbian Chemicals Co., 307 NLRB 592 (1992),
which the judge found to be controlling in this case, is
plainly distinguishable. There, the respondent did not
rely upon the management-rights clause in its argument,
and the arbitrator did not cite it in his decision. Id. at
594. The arbitrator in Columbian Chemicals started his
analysis from the position that the employer had a “fun-
damental right to establish reasonable plant rules,” with-
out referring to the management-rights clause, and then
found that nothing in the collective-bargaining agreement
took away the employer’s right to make attendance rules.
Id. Here, as in Smurfit-Stone, the arbitrator clearly relied
upon the management-rights clause in reaching his deci-
sion. The arbitrator laid out the relevant provisions of the
collective-bargaining agreement, including reciting the
management-rights clause, at the beginning of his deci-
sion. As in Smurfit-Stone, he described the Company’s
arguments based on the clause, and concluded that the
Company had the right to make the changes at issue.5

4 In this regard, we observe that the General Counsel bore the burden
of proving that the arbitrator did not rely on the management-rights
clause. We find that the General Counsel failed to carry his burden.
5 As our dissenting colleague correctly points out, the arbitrator did
frame the issue as whether “the Company’s decision to change the pay
period of the bargaining Unit and all non-salaried positions from week-
ly to bimonthly, despite the Union protest, violate[d] an established past
practice that effectively bound the parties.” The arbitrator did so be-
cause the parties were unable to stipulate to the wording of the issue,
WEAVEXX, LLC 3
We further find that the arbitrator adequately consid-
ered the unfair labor practice issue under the Olin stand-
ard: the contractual issue is factually parallel to the un-
fair labor practice issue, and the arbitrator was presented
generally with the facts relevant to the unfair labor prac-
tice.6 In this regard, we disagree with the judge’s finding
that the change in payday was not presented to the arbi-
trator. In reaching this conclusion, the judge relied on
Professional Porter & Window Cleaning Co., 263 NLRB
136 (1982). Professional Porter, however, is inapposite.
The Board in that case found that the issue of whether
the respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
discharging an employee was neither presented to nor
considered by the arbitrator because the union “submit-
ted no evidence to the arbitrator on whether [the employ-
ee’s] discharge was an unfair labor practice” and because
“the issue was not litigated in any respect in [the arbitra-
tion] proceeding.” Id. at 137. Here, in contrast, the fac-
tual and statutory issues presented are identical with re-
gard to the change in pay cycle and payday. Both chang-
es were implemented at the same time, prompted by the
same event, made in reliance on the same contractual
provisions, and deviated from the same past practice.
Those are exactly the facts relevant to the statutory issue
in this case with respect to both changes.7 Furthermore,

and therefore the arbitrator invoked the principal argument of the Union
based on the Mitchell Jones grievance. This statement, however, does
not establish that the arbitrator’s decision cannot reasonably be inter-
preted to address whether the management-rights clause privileged the
employer to implement the unilateral changes, which was the Compa-
ny’s counterargument, as set forth by the arbitrator.
In our view, the decision is susceptible to the interpretation that the
arbitrator reasoned as follows. First, under article III, section 4 of the
parties’ agreement—the management-rights provision—management
retains all authority not specifically abridged, delegated or modified by
the agreement. Second, no provision of the agreement limits the Re-
spondent’s right to make the disputed changes. Third, the grievance is
therefore to be denied unless the Union established the existence of a
past practice that effectively bound the parties. Fourth, the Union did
not establish a binding past practice. Conclusion: the grievance is
denied. In other words, the arbitrator considered the issue of past prac-
tice only in response to the Union’s principal defense to the conclusion
that would otherwise follow from the management-rights clause. Find-
ing that the Union failed to establish that defense, the arbitrator based
his decision on the management-rights clause.
6 We disagree with our dissenting colleague that the arbitrator failed
to consider the unfair labor practice issue. The Company presented the
arbitrator with arguments based on the management-rights clause,
which the arbitrator considered among other contract provisions, and
there are no facts relating to the contractual issue that do not also apply
to the unfair labor practice issue. As explained above, the arbitrator’s
decision is susceptible to an interpretation that the management-rights
clause privileged the employer to implement the unilateral changes
without bargaining, and this is determinative of the unfair labor practice
issue. See Smurfit-Stone, supra at 659.
7 See Dennison National Co., 296 NLRB 169, 170 (1989) (finding
that the parties’ contract and evidence of past practice constituted “am-
ple evidence” relevant to the statutory issue).
the Union’s representative clearly presented the change
in pay day to the arbitrator at the arbitration hearing.
There is no additional factual evidence that the parties
could have presented for the payday issue that would
have led the arbitrator to a different conclusion from the
one he reached on the pay cycle issue.
In sum, the General Counsel has failed to meet his
burden to show that the standards for deferral have not
been met in this case. Accordingly, we reverse the
judge’s decision and dismiss the complaint.
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed.
Dated, Washington, D.C. November 2, 2016
______________________________________
Philip A. Miscimarra, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CHAIRMAN PEARCE, dissenting.
Contrary to my colleagues, I would find that deferral
to the arbitrator’s decision is inappropriate. The arbitra-
tor failed to make any finding whatsoever on the key
contractual issue of whether the management-rights
clause in the collective-bargaining agreement privileged
the Respondent’s unilateral changes. To the contrary, the
arbitrator explicitly framed his inquiry around past prac-
tice and, as found by the administrative law judge, con-
centrated his analysis on the extra-contractual considera-
tions pertinent to that inquiry. Although my colleagues
speculate that the management-rights clause must have
been part of the arbitrator’s analysis, doing so is not rea-
sonable when the arbitrator himself stated that he was
focusing his analysis elsewhere. Accordingly, deferral is
unwarranted because the arbitrator failed to consider the
unfair labor practice issue. I would thus adopt the
judge’s finding, for the reasons stated in his decision,
that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act by failing to bargain with the Respondent over
the change in payday and pay cycle.
As my colleagues acknowledge, one of the conditions
for deferral is that the arbitrator adequately considered
the unfair labor practice issue. Olin Corp., 268 NLRB
573, 574 (1984). That condition is met if “(1) the con-
tractual issue is factually parallel to the unfair labor prac-
tice issue, and (2) the arbitrator was presented generally
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
with the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor prac-
tice.” Id. The unfair labor practice issue here is whether
the Respondent violated its duty to bargain with the Un-
ion by unilaterally changing employees’ payday and pay
cycle. In Dennison National Co., 296 NLRB 169 (1989),
the Board considered whether to defer to an arbitrator’s
decision that a contractual management-rights clause
gave the respondent the right to eliminate job classifica-
tions without giving the union notice and an opportunity
to bargain. Id. at 169. In finding that the contractual
issue was parallel to the unfair labor practice issue, the
Board explained:
The arbitrator considered the contractual question of
whether the Respondent’s unilateral elimination of the
. . . job classification without giving the Union advance
notice and opportunity to bargain violated the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement. The arbitrator, however,
did not limit himself to that issue but also found that
under the management-rights clause of the contract the
Respondent had the right to act unilaterally. In an un-
fair labor practice proceeding on the merits of the statu-
tory issue, the Board must consider whether the Re-
spondent’s action constituted a unilateral change in vio-
lation of its bargaining obligation under Section 8(a)(5)
of the Act. The presence of contractual authorization
for the Respondent’s action is determinative of the un-
fair labor practice allegation.
Id. at 170 (footnotes omitted). Because the arbitrator had
found that the contract authorized unilateral action, the
Board concluded that the arbitrator had adequately consid-
ered the unfair labor practice issue.
In this case, however, the arbitrator framed his inquiry
as whether “the Company’s decision to change the pay
period of the bargaining unit and all non-salaried posi-
tions from weekly to bimonthly, despite the Union pro-
test, violate[d] an established past practice that effective-
ly bound the parties?” The arbitrator’s subsequent analy-
sis focused on the common law of arbitration, consider-
ing factors such as whether the collective-bargaining
agreement explicitly forbids a change in pay cycle or
payday, whether the changes caused financial hardship to
the employees, and whether the changes were “excessive
or unnecessary.” Indeed, the judge correctly found that
the arbitrator had relied on these latter extra-contractual
considerations in reaching his decision. While the arbi-
trator’s analysis was thoroughly in line with his stated
inquiry, that inquiry did not address what Dennison Na-
tional properly described as the determinative issue un-
der the National Labor Relations Act: the presence of
contractual authorization for the Respondent’s unilateral
action.
My colleagues rely on Smurfit-Stone Container Corp.,
344 NLRB 658 (2005), in finding that the arbitrator’s
decision in this case was not repugnant to the purposes
and policies of the Act. However, the Board in Smurfit-
Stone found that it could reasonably interpret the arbitra-
tor to have concluded that “the management-rights clause
authorized [the Respondent’s] implementation” of the
change in policy at issue and “that the agreement gave
the Respondent the right to make rules as long as they
did not conflict with any provision of the agreement.”
Id. at 659. The Smurfit-Stone majority found this inter-
pretation plausible, given the arguments presented to the
arbitrator and the fact that the arbitrator followed his
recitation of the management-rights clause with the
statement that “it is the right of the Company to make the
rules.” Id. at 660 (internal quotations omitted). Here,
conversely, there is no inferential or textual link between
the arbitrator’s summary of the parties’ arguments and
quotation of the management-rights clause and any asser-
tion that the clause gave the Respondent the right to
make rules. The arbitrator’s later, isolated reference to
“managerial discretion” is, as properly explained by the
judge, simply one of the extra-contractual considerations
relied upon in the arbitrator’s past practice analysis. And
unlike the arbitrator’s decision in Smurfit-Stone, the arbi-
trator’s decision in this case is not so ambiguous that it
leaves open room for speculation. Id. Rather, the arbi-
trator’s decision clearly sets out his analysis—an evalua-
tion of past practice rooted in the common law of arbitra-
tion—and then considers the distinct contractual and
extra-contractual factors that analysis entails. The man-
agement-rights clause was simply not one of those fac-
tors.1
My colleagues read the arbitrator’s analysis to include
evaluation of the management-rights clause. Their inter-
pretation, however, contains a fatal flaw: there is no tex-
tual support for their assertion that the arbitrator first
reasoned that “under Article III, Section 4 of the parties’
agreement—the management-rights provision—
management retains all authority not specifically
abridged, delegated or modified by the agreement.” Alt-
hough the arbitrator’s analysis section does, as my col-
leagues assert, reject the Union’s contractual and past
practice arguments, it does not mention the management-
rights clause. Nor, as explained above, is it reasonable to

1 In addressing the Union’s argument that the contract specifically
prohibited changes to payday and pay cycle, the arbitrator examined
provisions relating to the official workweek and the hours an employee
must work in a given workday, the grievance procedure, and the provi-
sion preventing the Respondent from making additions to the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement without mutual consent of the parties. The
arbitrator did not examine the management-rights clause.
WEAVEXX, LLC 5
assume that the arbitrator engaged in this first analytical
step when he overtly and exclusively framed his inquiry
in terms of past practice. My colleagues’ contention that
the arbitrator’s analysis “clearly” relied upon the man-
agement-rights clause is thus without foundation.2
Under these circumstances, it is unreasonable to find
that the arbitrator made any finding on the issue of con-
tractual authorization for the Respondent’s actions. As a
result, deferral to the arbitrator’s decision is inappropri-
ate.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Dated, Washington, D.C. November 2, 2016
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Chairman
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Susan B. Greenberg, Esq., for the General Counsel.1
Barry J. Rubenstein, Esq., for the Respondent.2
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM NELSON CATES, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was tried before me in Starkville, Mississippi, on June 4,
2015.3 The charge initiating the case was filed by Teamsters
Local Union 984 (the Union) on December 30, 2013, and
amended on March 19, 2015. After an investigation, the Gov-
ernment, on March 30, 2015, issued a complaint and notice of
hearing (the complaint) against Weavexx, LLC (the Company).
The complaint alleges (the Company, a subsidiary of Xerium
Technologies, Inc., in January changed the unit employees’ pay
cycle from weekly to every other week and changed their pay-
day from Thursday to Friday; and, did so without affording the
Union an opportunity to bargain with the Company with respect
to this conduct and the effects of this conduct. It is alleged these
actions violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor
Relations Act (the Act).
The Union elected to take the case to arbitration and it was
deferred by the Regional Director for Region 15 to the parties’
grievance and arbitration procedure by letter, dated March 31.4

2 Although the Respondent raised the issue of the management-rights
clause, the arbitrator’s analysis was plainly focused elsewhere.
1 I shall refer to counsel for the General Counsel as counsel for the
Government and to the General Counsel as the Government.
2 I shall refer to counsel for the Respondent as counsel for the Com-
pany and to the Respondent as the Company.
3 All dates are 2014, unless indicated otherwise.
4 The Regional Director indicated she was deferring the matter be-
cause: the parties collective-bargaining agreement provides for final
and binding arbitration; the changes regarding moving from a weekly to
biweekly pay cycle and moving the payday from Thursday to Friday
were encompassed by the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement;
the Company was willing to process a grievance concerning the chang-
In early July, the arbitrator issued an award, denying the griev-
ance, concluding the Company’s actions fell within its man-
agement rights.5 On November 26, the Acting Regional Direc-
tor for Region 15 notified the Company in writing she was
revoking deferral of the charge.6
The Company in its answer to the complaint, at trial and in
its post trial brief denies having violated the Act in any manner
alleged in the complaint. Among other affirmative defenses, the
Company contends the matter should have remained, or again
be deferred, to arbitration and that its unilateral actions were
within its contractual management rights.
The parties were given full opportunity to participate, to in-
troduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine wit-
nesses, and to file briefs. The parties entered into a written four
page, 32 paragraph, stipulation of facts which was received into
the record,7 after which the Government called six witnesses
and then all parties rested. I have reviewed the whole record,
the post trial briefs, and the authorities cited. I conclude and
find the Company violated the Act substantially as alleged in
the complaint.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The facts set forth below are compiled from the parties
agreed and stipulated facts, as well as, from testimony, admis-
sions, documentation received in evidence, and the pleadings.
The facts are undisputed.
I. JURISDICTION
It is admitted the Company is a limited liability company,
with an office and place of business located in Starkville, Mis-
sissippi, where it is engaged in the business of manufacturing,
for nonretail sale, paper machine clothing products. Annually
the Company, in conducting its operations, sold and shipped
from its Starkville, Mississippi facility, goods valued in excess
of $50,000 directly to points outside the State of Mississippi.
The Company also purchased and received at its Starkville,
Mississippi facility, goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly
from points outside the State of Mississippi. It is admitted and I
find the Company is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
The parties stipulated and I find the Union is a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Union’s Certification and the Collective-Bargaining
Agreement
The Union was certified on December 2, 1966, as the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative of certain employees
described in the related-representation case, Case 26–RC–
002780. The unit, as described in the parties collective-

es, and, if necessary, arbitrate the grievance and waive time limitations
to ensure arbitration; and, since the issues of the charge appear to be
covered by the collective-bargaining agreement it was likely the matter
may be resolved through the grievance/arbitration procedure. GC Exh.
10.
5 GC Exh. 9.
6 GC Exh. 8.
7 GC Exh. 16.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
bargaining agreement, consists of the following employees:
All production and maintenance employees including group
leaders, employed at the Company’s plant located at Highway
12, Starkville, Mississippi, excluding office clerical employ-
ees, professional employees, managerial employees, watch-
men, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
There are approximately 200 employees in the bargaining
unit. The most recent collective-bargaining agreement is effec-
tive by its terms from March 20, 2011, to March 20, 2016. The
agreement includes a management-rights clause at article III,
which reads, in pertinent part, that the Company retains all
rights not specifically “abridged, delegated or modified by the
Agreement, including, but not limited to, the right to make and
enforce work and safety rules.”8 Section 4 of article III states:
“[d]uring the term of this agreement, the Company will not
implement new work rules or policies relating to terms and
conditions of employment without notice to the Union and the
opportunity for the Union to raise concerns and to grieve any
change it deems unreasonable.” Additionally, article XIII, sec-
tion 48, sets forth a grievance procedure as well as a provision
for the Company and the Union to have regular monthly meet-
ings. The scope of authority for an arbitrator is outlined in arti-
cle XIII, section 48, as follows:
The jurisdiction and authority of the arbitrator and his opinion
and award shall be exclusively limited to disputes arising un-
der the express terms of this Agreement. The arbitrator shall
have no power to add to, subtract from or modify any of the
terms of this Agreement or any Agreements supplemental
hereto. The arbitrator shall not have jurisdiction or authority to
substitute his judgment or discretion for that of management
in any area that has not been delegated him by the parties and
the terms of this Agreement.9
B. Changes to Pay Period and Payday
For at least 12 years prior to the January 10 payday, the
Company paid its bargaining unit employees on a weekly basis;
every Thursday. Commencing with the January 10 payday, the
Company paid its bargaining unit employees every other Fri-
day.
On November 6, 2013, Plant Manager Ross Johnstone, Hu-
man Resources Manager Jennifer Lanier, Chief Steward Fara
Sue Brooks, and Shift Stewards Darryl Grace and Kenny Jack-
son met at the Company's facility for a monthly meeting as
provided for at article XIII of the parties collective-bargaining
agreement.10 At this meeting, Johnstone informed the Union's
representatives the Company would be changing its pay cycle

8 GC Exh .2, p. 5, secs 3–4.
9 GC Exh. 2, p. 17.
10 The parties admit or stipulate that Plant Manager Ross Johnstone
and Human Resources Manager Jennifer Lanier are supervisors and/or
agents of the Company within the meaning of Sec. 2(11) and (13) of the
Act. It is specifically stipulated that on November 6, 2013, Johnstone
and Lanier held those positions and that Terry Lovan was union presi-
dent, Fara Sue Brooks was the chief steward, Darryl Grace the swing-
shift steward, Bruce Spencer the first-shift steward and Kenny Jackson
the second-shift steward. As of the trial herein Byron Myers serves as
plant manager.
from weekly to every other week and payday would be every
other Friday instead of every Thursday. Johnstone told the Un-
ion's representatives the Company was implementing the new
pay cycle and Friday payday as part of a corporate wide change
effective the first pay period after January l. The Company did
not tell the Union's representatives there were any exigent cir-
cumstances necessitating implementation of the changes to its
pay cycle from weekly to every other week or its payday from
Thursday to every other Friday, nor did the Company explain
that any exigent circumstances existed at the time the changes
were implemented.11 The parties stipulated that the changes to
the pay cycle and the payday are a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining and, the Company did not afford the Union an oppor-
tunity to bargain about the implementation of the changes to the
pay cycle and payday of the bargaining unit employees.12
On November 14 and 15, 2013, the Company held meetings
with its employees to announce the Company was implement-
ing a new pay system effective January 1. At these meetings,
the Company distributed a memorandum from Mike Bly, exec-
utive vice president for Global Human Resource for Xeriurn
Technologies, Inc. The memorandum, dated November 11,
2013, announced to the bargaining unit employees the Compa-
ny was implementing a new pay system effective January 1,
and bargaining unit employees would be paid every other week
on Friday beginning January 10. On November 27, 2013, the
Company issued a memorandum dated November 26, 2013, to
“Starkville Unit Team Members” from ''Xerium Human Re-
sources” with the subject “Response to Questions You Raised.”
The last weekly pay date was December 26, 2013, and the next
payday for the bargaining unit employees was January 10.
On November 18, 2013, unit employee Mitchell Jones filed a
grievance protesting the announced implementation of changes
to the pay cycle and payday of bargaining unit employees. Ad-
ditional bargaining unit employees subsequently filed grievanc-
es protesting the announced implementation of changes to the
pay cycle and payday of bargaining unit employees.
On December 9, 2013, Plant Manager Johnstone issued a
third-step answer to the grievances filed by bargaining unit
employees, denying the grievances. The answer, signed by
Human Resources Manager Lanier on Johnstone’s behalf,
reads, in part: “The change to a biweekly payroll schedule is a
legitimate exercise of the Company's Management Rights un-
der Article III of the contract.”
On December 5, 2013, the Company and the Union met to
discuss work-related issues at a contractually sanctioned
monthly meeting. At the meeting, the Union again did not
agree to the announced changes to the pay cycle and payday of
bargaining unit employees. The Company again did not afford
the Union the opportunity to bargain about the implementation
of the changes to the pay cycle and payday of bargaining unit
employees.

11 The parties specifically stipulated the Union did not agree to the
announced changes to the pay cycle and paydays of the bargaining unit
employees.
12 The parties also stipulated, for purposes of this hearing, the change
to the pay cycle from weekly to every other week and of the paydays
from Thursday to Friday were material, significant, and substantial
changes.
WEAVEXX, LLC 7
The parties agreed to arbitrate the grievance filed by Jones.
Arbitrator Samuel J. Nicholas Jr. conducted the arbitration on
Apri1 25. Company counsel and the president of the Union
represented the parties at the arbitration. Arbitrator Nicholas
issued his decision, denying the grievance, on July 8. On July
11, Company counsel transmitted a copy of Arbitrator Nicho-
las' decision, by email, to an agent of Region 15 of the Board.
On November 26, Acting Regional Director Susan Crochet
issued a letter revoking deferral of the charge in this case. Por-
tions of Acting Director Crochet’s letter follow:
Subsequent investigation has revealed that the grievance was
taken to arbitration and the arbitrator issued his decision.
However, after review of the arbitrator’s decision, it has been
determined that the decision in this matter does not meet the
standards set out in Spielberg Manufacturing Co., 112 NLRB
1080 (1995) and Olin Corporation, 268 NLRB 573 (1984) in
that the evidence fails to reflect that the facts relevant to re-
solving the unfair labor practice were presented, considered,
and decided by the arbitrator. Therefore, deferral to the arbi-
trator’s decision is not appropriate. See, e.g., Columbian
Chemicals Company, 307 NLRB 592 (1992) (deferral inap-
propriate when arbitrator based his decision on an extra-
contractual residual rights theory inconsistent with the Act).
Consequently, you are hereby advised that the Region is re-
voking its deferral action and will resume processing the
charge.
III. DISCUSSION, LEGAL ANALYSIS, AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Unilateral Changes In Pay Cycle and Payday
It is undisputed the Company changed the timing of the pay
cycle form weekly to biweekly and the payday from every
Thursday to every other Friday on January 10. It is also undis-
puted the Company did not give prior notice nor offer to bar-
gain with the Union regarding the changes.
Under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, it is an unfair labor practice
for an employer “to refuse to bargain collectively with the rep-
resentatives of his employees.” NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736
(1962). Since NLRB v. Katz, it has been unlawful under Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) for an employer to circumvent its bargaining obli-
gation with the 9(a) representative of its employees by making
unilateral changes in their wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment.13 A unilateral modification or repu-
diation of such provisions during a contract term is a violation
of Section 8(a)(5). Rapid Fur Dressing, 278 NLRB 905 (1986)
(the company unilaterally discontinued its contractually re-
quired payments to the pension plan and vacation fund in viola-
tion of Sec. 8(a)(5)).
A unilateral change of a mandatory subject of bargaining is
unlawful only if it is “material, substantial, and significant.”
Alamo Cement Co., 281 NLRB 737, 738 (1986). It is admitted
company employees were subjected to unilateral changes with
respect to their payday schedule and pay cycle. The Company
simply announced the changes without any effort to bargain

13 The Supreme Court reiterated this rule of law in Litton Financial
Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 198 (1991) (“an employer com-
mits an unfair labor practice if, without bargaining to impasse, it effects
a unilateral change of an existing term or condition of employment”).
with the Union. The parties stipulated the changes were manda-
tory subjects of bargaining and that changes to the pay cycle
from weekly to every other week and payday from Thursdays
to Friday were material, significant and substantial changes.
The Union was entitled to notice and an opportunity to bar-
gain over the changes to the payday and pay cycle. See Aber-
nathy Excavating, 313 NLRB 68, 68 fn. 1 (1993) (unilateral
change of payday from Thursday to Friday was a mandatory
bargaining subject and, when made without notice and bargain-
ing, violated the Act); Also see American Ambulance, 255
NLRB 417, 421 (1981), enfd. 692 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1982);
King Radio Corp., Inc., 166 NLRB 649, 654 (1967) (Board
adopted the judge’s finding that changing unit employees pay
cycle from weekly to biweekly without notice to and bargaining
with the union violated the Act). Accordingly, I find the Com-
pany violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act when it unilat-
erally, without notice or bargaining, changed unit employees
pay cycle from weekly to biweekly and changed unit employ-
ees’ paydays from Thursday to every other Friday.
B. The Management-Rights Clause and Other Defenses14
The Company failed to establish any exigency that would
justify, without notice or bargaining, the unilateral changes
made here and the Company so stipulated. Although all ele-
ments necessary to constitute unlawful unilateral changes have
been established, as set forth above, the Company denies its
actions violated its duty to bargain collectively because its con-
duct was within its contractual rights outlined in the manage-
ment-rights section of the parties collective-bargaining agree-
ment and/or its conduct was within the parameters of one or
more exceptions that would allow for unilateral changes by an
employer without violating the Act.
One of the exceptions allowing unilateral changes, the Com-
pany advanced, involves the issue of waiver. Did the Union
here waive its right to bargain about the payday and pay cycle
by its agreement to the management-rights clause of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement? I find it did not. Management-rights
clauses typically reserve for an employer the right to act unilat-
erally with respect to specified topics which may sometimes be
construed as a waiver. Allison Corp., 330 NLRB 1363, 1365
(2000). The Board in Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 NLRB 180,
184 (1989), however, noted “It is well settled that the waiver of
a statutory right will not be inferred from general contractual
provisions; rather, such waivers must be clear and unmistaka-
ble. Accordingly, the Board has repeatedly held that generally
worded management rights clauses or ‘zipper’ clauses will not
be construed as waivers of statutory bargaining rights [foot-
notes omitted].” Here, the management-rights clause makes no
explicit, or even general, reference to payday or pay cycle nor
does the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement even mention
changing the pay cycle or payday. That portion of the manage-
ment-rights clause stating the Company “retains all authority
not specifically abridged, delegated or modified” by the parties
collective agreement is an overbroad general clause and will
not, in itself, constitute a waiver of statutory rights, especially
where, as here, the subject of the purported waiver is not ex-

14 GC Ehx. 2, art. III, secs. 3 & 4.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
plicitly stated. See: Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S.
693, 708 (1983). The Board has repeatedly held that a generally
worded management-rights clause does not constitute a clear
and unmistakable waiver of statutory rights. See, e.g., Hi-Tech
Cable Corp., 309 NLRB 3, 4 (1992) (“general” contractual
right to make “reasonable rules and regulations” insufficient to
constitute clear and unmistakable waiver), enfd. mem. 25 F.3d
1044 (5th Cir. 1994). In summary, on the waiver issue, I find
the language “retains all authority not specifically abridged,
delegated or modified by the Agreement” to be too broad and
vague to find the Union clearly and unmistakably waived the
right to bargain over any change in working conditions, such as
payday and pay cycles, not covered in the parties collective-
bargaining agreement and the language in no way permits the
Company to make the unilateral changes it made, without vio-
lating the Act.
Another exception allowing unilateral changes, in limited
circumstances, is where there is an established or traditional
past practice that a company would be following. Was the
Company here privileged to make the unilateral changes it did
in keeping with an established past practice? I find it was not.
The change in pay cycle and payday did not result from a tradi-
tional practice existing prior to any negotiations or collective-
bargaining agreement; in fact, the change was a significant
deviation from a longstanding (12 year) practice of unit em-
ployees being paid every week on Thursday.
C. Arbitrator’s Decision
The Company, in its post trial brief, limited its analysis of
the case exclusively to the deferral issue. It argues this matter
has already been resolved by the parties’ arbitration mecha-
nisms and the decision of the arbitrator, finding no violation on
behalf of the Company, should be upheld, as the Regional Di-
rector originally deferred the matter to arbitration.
In Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 NLRB 1080 (1955), the Board
ruled it would give deference to an arbitrator’s resolution of an
unfair labor practice claim if certain conditions are met. The
Board’s policy to defer has been refined in subsequent cases
following Spielberg; however, Spielberg remains the seminal
statement of the Board’s deference policy. The Board’s condi-
tions are: (1) the unfair labor practice was presented to and
considered by the arbitrator; (2) the arbitration proceedings
were fair and regular; (3) the parties agreed to be bound by the
arbitration award; and (4) the arbitration award was not clearly
repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act. The Board in
Olin Corp., 268 NLRB 573, 574 (1984), spoke to the consid-
erations necessary with regard to the unfair labor practice being
presented to and adequately considered by the arbitrator and
stated in part as follows:
Accordingly, we adopt the following standard for deferral to
arbitration awards. We would find that an arbitrator has ade-
quately considered the unfair labor practice if (1) the contrac-
tual issue is factually parallel to the unfair labor practice issue,
and (2) the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts
relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice. In this respect,
differences, if any, between the contractual and statutory
standards of review should be weighed by the Board as part of
its determination under the Spielberg standards of whether an
award is “clearly repugnant” to the Act. And, with regard to
the inquiry into the “clearly repugnant” standard, we would
not require an arbitrator's award to be totally consistent with
Board precedent. Unless the award is “palpably wrong,” i.e.,
unless the arbitrator's decision is not susceptible to an inter-
pretation consistent with the Act, we will defer. Finally, we
would require that the party seeking to have the Board reject
deferral and consider the merits of a given case show that the
above standards for deferral have not been met. Thus, the par-
ty seeking to have the Board ignore the determination of an
arbitrator has the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the
defects in the arbitral process or award.
I am persuaded the Government affirmatively demonstrated
the standards for deferral here have not been met.
First, the arbitrator did not consider one of the two unfair la-
bor practices alleged in the complaint. The issue of the Compa-
ny’s changing the payday from Thursday to Friday was not
presented to, considered, or decided by the arbitrator. The arbi-
trator’s description of the “issue” before him: (“The parties
were unable to stipulate to the wording concerning the issue of
the grievance. Therefore, your Arbitrator has framed the is-
sue(s) as follows: did the Company’s decision to change the
pay period of the bargaining Unit and all non-salaried positions
from weekly to bimonthly, despite the Union protest, violate an
established past practice that effectively bound the parties?”);
reflects he did not consider the change in the payday issue. The
Board will not defer where a statutory issue is not presented to
the arbitrator. Professional Porter & Window Cleaning Co.,
263 NLRB 136, 136–137 (1982).
Second, the arbitrator did not base his decision on contractu-
al provisions but rather on extra-contractual considerations.
The arbitrator concluded the change in the payroll period from
weekly to biweekly was a “managerial decision” that allowed
the Company to make “an institutional change” and was a
proper use of “managerial discretion” and should not be seen as
a violation of “a binding past practice.” The arbitrator’s deci-
sion, simply stated, is not “susceptible to an interpretation con-
sistent with the Act.” The arbitrator, while setting forth the
management-rights provisions of the collective-bargaining
agreement, did not discuss and/or address whether, or how, any
provision(s) of the two sections of the management-rights
clause authorized the Company to take the action it did or that
the Union waived its right to bargain about pay periods or cy-
cles which are mandatory subjects of bargaining. Stated differ-
ently, there is no indication in the arbitrator’s decision that he
found any language in the management-rights clause that con-
stituted, or that he considered constituted, a waiver of bargain-
ing rights by the Union. The arbitrator found, without explana-
tion, a managerial right not contained in the applicable provi-
sions of the collective-bargaining agreement that conveyed to
the Company the right to change pay cycle, a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining. The Board has long held that deferral is not
appropriate where a respondent’s defense is not reasonably
based on an interpretation of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment. See Oak Cliff-Golman Baking Co., 202 NLRB 614,
616–617 (1973). The arbitrator here did not look to any par-
ticular language in the management-rights clause that might
WEAVEXX, LLC 9
support the Company’s position, but did note that section 58
of the contract limited the Union's position. That section of the
collective-bargaining agreement states: “The specific provi-
sions of this Agreement are the sole source of any rights
which the Union or any member of the bargaining unit may
charge that the Employer has violated in raising a grievance.”
The arbitrator concluded the pay cycle was not part of the
agreement, and its absence it allowed the Company to “make
an institutional change” that did not affect the agreement. The
Board in, Columbian Chemicals Co., 307 NLRB 592, 592 fn.1
(1992), rejected recognition by an arbitrator of a right that was
not in the contract which afforded the employer “a basic man-
agement prerogative” to take unilateral action. The Board
specifically stated: “we note particularly that the arbitrator did
not rely on the management-rights clause to find the Respond-
ent’s conduct privileged. Instead, quite apart from the con-
tract, he found that there was a ‘basic management preroga-
tive’ to take the action. He then found nothing in the contract
to take away that prerogative. In these circumstances, it is
clear that the arbitrator did not rely on the management-rights
clause to find the managerial prerogative [emphasis in origi-
nal].” In agreement with counsel for the Government, Colum-
bian is applicable and controlling here. Managerial discretion,
or prerogative, outside the contract, as the arbitrator here
found, will not legally permit an employer to unilaterally
change mandatory working conditions. See also Ciba-Geigy
Pharmaceuticals Div., 264 NLRB 1013 (1982), enfd. 722 F.2d
1120 (3d Cir. 1983). The case here is distinguishable from
Smurfit-Stone Container Corp., 344 NLRB 658, 659–660
(2005), on which the Company seeks to have the matter de-
ferred. In Smurfit-Stone, the Board found the arbitrator’s deci-
sion, while not a model of clarity, was at least susceptible to
the interpretation that it was based on his construction of the
management-rights clause. Here, as in Columbian Chemicals,
the arbitrator’s decision is clearly repugnant, in that it is based
on extra-contractual management prerogatives not susceptible
to an interpretation consistent with the Act and is palpably
wrong.
Additional facts indicate the arbitrator considered extra-
contractual rights in arriving at his decision. He concluded he
“must address whether the change in pay period was excessive
or unnecessary.” The arbitrator presumed “the vast majority of
hourly workers in present day bargaining units are paid on a
bimonthly basis.” And, because the Company “imple-
ment[ed]” the change on a nationwide scale, the arbitrator
“presumed” that said change “was for the purpose of improv-
ing efficiency of operations and did not require the approval
of the Union.” Further the arbitrator also considered, outside
the contract, whether the change in pay periods “negatively”
affected the employees’ compensation or caused any loss of
employment benefits. Concluding no losses he found the
change to the pay period “a managerial decision” that did not
adversely affect the unit employees.
In summary the arbitrator’s decision is repugnant to the Act
and may not be deferred to. Thus, the unfair labor practices
found here must be remedied.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Company, Weavexx, LLC, Starkville, Mississippi, is
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union, Teamsters Local Union 984, is a labor organ-
ization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. At all times material, Teamsters Local Union 984, has
been and continues to be, the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive for the purposes of collective bargaining within the mean-
ing of Section 9(a) of the Act the employees employed by
Weavexx, LLC, in the following unit:
All production and maintenance employees including group
leaders, employed at the Company’s plant located at Highway
12, Starkville, Mississippi, excluding office clerical employ-
ees, professional employees, managerial employees, watch-
men, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
4. Failing to provide Teamsters Local Union 984 with notice
or an opportunity to bargain concerning any changes to the unit
employees pay cycle or payday which are mandatory subjects
of bargaining Weavexx, LLC, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act.
5. The unfair labor practices of Weavexx, LLC, affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Company has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, find it must be ordered to cease and desist
therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
I specifically recommend the Company be ordered to bargain
with the Union concerning any changes to the unit employees’
pay cycle and payday and if requested by the Union, rescind the
changes in the pay cycle and/or payday the Company unilater-
ally made on or about January 10, 2014, and make unit em-
ployees whole for any loss suffered as a result of the unilateral
changes. The money due shall be computed in accordance with
Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enfd. 444 F.2d
501 (6th Cir. 1971), with interest as prescribed in New Hori-
zons, 283 NLRB 1171 (1987), compounded daily as prescribed
in Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB No. 8 (2010).
Additionally, I recommend the Company be ordered, within 14
days after service by the Region, to post an appropriate “Notice
to Employees” in order that employees may be apprised of their
rights under the Act and the Company’s obligation to remedy
its unfair labor practices.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended15
ORDER
The Company, Weavexx, LLC, Starkville, Mississippi, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from

15 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
(a) Failing and refusing to bargain with Teamsters Local
Union 984 concerning changes to the unit employees pay cycle
and payday.
(b) Failing and refusing to bargain collectively in good faith
with Teamsters Local Union 984 as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of our employees in the following
appropriate unit:
Including all production and maintenance employees includ-
ing group leaders employed at the Company’s plant located at
Highway 12, Starkville, Mississippi, excluding office clerical
employees, professional employees, managerial employees,
watchmen, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Bargain with Teamsters Union Local 984 concerning any
changes to the unit employees’ pay cycle and payday.
(b) Upon request of Teamsters Local Union 984, rescind the
changes to the Unit employees pay cycle and payday we unilat-
erally made on/or about January 10, 2014.
(c) Make Unit employees whole for any losses suffered as a
result of the unilateral changes.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility at Starkville, Mississippi, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”16 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 15, after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Company and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as
by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the Company customarily communicates
with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Company to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that,
during the pendency of these proceedings, the Company has
gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Company shall duplicate and mail, at its own
expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and for-
mer employees employed by the Company at any time since
January 10, 2014
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 15 in writing
within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Com-
pany has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. August 6, 2015

16 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT do anything to prevent you from exercising the
above rights.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively in good faith
with Teamsters Local Union 984 as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of our employees in the following
appropriate unit:
Including all production and maintenance employees includ-
ing group leaders employed at the Company’s plant located at
Highway 12, Starkville, Mississippi, excluding office clerical
employees, professional employees, managerial employees,
watchmen, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT refuse to provide notice to and afford an oppor-
tunity to bargain in good faith with Teamsters Local Union 984
concerning any changes to Unit employees pay cycle or pay-
day.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce our employees in the rights guaranteed to them
by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL bargain in good faith with Teamsters Local Union
984 as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of our
employees in the above-described appropriate unit.
WE WILL, upon request of Teamsters Local Union 984, re-
scind the changes to the Unit employees pay cycle and payday
we unilaterally made on/or about January 10, 2014.
WE WILL make unit employees whole for any losses suffered
as a result of the unilateral changes.
WEAVEXX, LLC
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/15-CA-119783 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273–1940.
WEAVEXX, LLC 11