WANG, Yibing Michelle

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 30, 2019

14992671 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 30, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/992,671 01/11/2016 Yibing Michelle WANG 2180-43
(WB-201508-009-1)
7608
124137 7590 12/30/2019
The Farrell Law Firm, P.C./SSI
290 Broadhollow Road
Suite 210E
Melville, NY 11747
EXAMINER
RATCLIFFE, LUKE D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3645
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/30/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
pto@farrelliplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte YIBING MICHELLE WANG
____________

Appeal 2019-003311
Application 14/992,671
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before LINDA E. HORNER, CHARLES N. GREENHUT, and
WILLIAM A. CAPP, Administrative Patent Judges.

CAPP, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the final
rejection of claims 1, 2, 11, 12, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as
anticipated by Kamon (US 2001/0046317 Al, pub. Nov. 29, 2001) and
claims 8, 9, 18, and 19 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Kamon.2
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., as the
Applicant and real party in interest. Appeal Br. 1.
2 Claims 3–7, 10, 13–17, and 20 are objected to as being dependent upon a
rejected base claim. Final Action 4.
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THE INVENTION
Appellant’s invention is a range sensor that uses energy in the light
wavelength spectrum to determine range. Spec. ¶ 2. Claim 11, reproduced
below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal.
11. A method of a range sensor, comprising:
projecting, by a light source, a sheet of light at an angle
within a field of view (FOV);
offsetting an image sensor from the light source;
collecting, by collection optics, the sheet of light reflected
off objects; and
determining, by a controller connected to the light source,
the image sensor, and the collection optics, a range of a distant
object based on direct time-of-flight and a range of a near
object based on triangulation.

OPINION
Anticipation of Claims 1, 2, 11, 12, and 21
by Kamon
Claim 11
The Examiner finds that Kamon discloses each and every limitation of
the invention. Final Action 2–3. In particular, the Examiner finds that
Kamon determines a range of a distant object based on time-of-flight and the
range of a near object based on triangulation. Id. at 2.
Appellant essentially concedes that Kamon discloses determining the
range of a distant object based on time-of-flight and the range of a near
object based on triangulation, but argues that the claim further requires that
both distant and near determinations are determined simultaneously, i.e.,
from a single sheet of light. Appeal Br. 5‒6. Appellant argues that Kamon
fails to disclose such a feature. Id.
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In response, the Examiner concedes that Kamon does not determine
the range of a distant object and the range of a near object simultaneously,
but construes the claim as not requiring such. Ans. 5. According to the
Examiner, “the claims, as written, do not limit the sheet of light to a single
sheet of light for both measurement[s].” Id.
In reply, Appellant directs our attention to the claim’s recital of
projecting “a” sheet of light and, subsequently, collecting “the” sheet of
light. Reply Br. 2. Appellant argues that the recital of “determining . . . a
range of a distant object . . . and a range of a near object” is in the context of
“the” sheet of light, which should be construed as a single sheet of light. Id.
at 3.
The dispute between Appellant and the Examiner is one of claim
construction. If the claim, properly construed, requires both near and distant
range determination from a single sheet of light, it is undisputed that Kamon
lacks such a feature. If the claim does not require such simultaneous range
determination, it is undisputed that claim 11 reads on Kamon.
During examination of a patent application, pending claims are given
their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification. In
re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under
the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, claim terms are given their
ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by one of ordinary
skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech.,
Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
The PTO is required to consult the specification during examination in
order to determine the permissible scope of the claim. In re Morris, 127
F.3d 1048, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1997). However, a claim construction analysis
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begins with, and is centered on, the claim language itself. See Interactive
Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir.
2001). In the instant case, the claimed method comprises projecting “a sheet
of light.” Claims App. Ordinarily, use of the indefinite article “a” is
interpreted as “one or more.” Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface
Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The method
then entails collecting “the sheet of light” that is reflected off objects.
Claims App. The range sensor then determines: (1) “a range of a distant
object;” – “and” – (2) a range of a near object.” Claims App. The recited
claim language presents two issues for us to resolve. First, does recitation of
the definite article “the” before the second recital of “sheet of light” narrow
the scope of the indefinite article “a” before the first recital of “sheet of
light” such that the indefinite article “a” should be construed as “one”
instead of “one or more.” Second, does recital of the conjunctive connector
“and” interposed between recitals of a direct time-of-flight technique and a
triangulation technique indicate that the range determinations are taken from
the same sheet of light or does it simply indicate that one technique is used
for distant measurements and another technique is used for near
measurements?
Turning now to the Specification, Appellant states that its disclosure
relates “generally” to an apparatus and method for determining range based
on direct time-of-flight and triangulation “simultaneously.” Spec. ¶ 2.
Elsewhere, Appellant discloses that, in step 807, collected light from distant
objects is measured and recorded using time-of-flight data. Id. ¶¶ 80–83.
Then, in step 809, collected light from near objects is measured and recorded
using triangulation data. Id. ¶¶ 84, 90. Steps 807 and 809 occur
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“simultaneously.” Id. ¶ 84. Thus, paragraphs 80 through 90 of the
Specification lend some support for Appellant’s narrower interpretation of
the claim 11.
On the other hand, paragraph 82 teaches that light is collected from
“at least” light source 101, which suggests that data may be collected from
more than a single sheet of light. Id. ¶ 82. Paragraph 85 teaches that
sections of the field of view are imaged by projecting “at least one additional
sheet of light.” Id. ¶ 85; see also id. ¶ 33 (“To illuminate more of the FOV,
the light source 100 may project at least one additional sheet of light within
another predetermined angle of the FOV.”), ¶ 37 (describing that controller
107 controls “the number and angle of additional sheets of light projected”).
In weighing the competing positions of Appellant and the Examiner,
we are mindful that claims need not encompass everything that is taught in
the Specification. See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 543 F.3d 683,
689 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining that when the claim addresses only some of
the features disclosed in the specification, it is improper to limit the claim to
other, unclaimed features). Thus, “it is improper to read limitations from a
preferred embodiment described in the specification—even if it is the only
embodiment—into the claims absent a clear indication in the intrinsic record
that the patentee intended the claims to be so limited.” Liebel–Flarsheim
Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Courts recognize
that the distinction between interpreting the meaning of a claim and
importing limitations from the Specification can be a difficult one to apply
in practice. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(en banc). Nevertheless, we determine that there is substantial merit to the
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Examiner’s position that the claims, as written, do not limit the sheet of light
to a single sheet of light for both measurements. Ans. 5.
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we determine that it is
the better approach to adopt the Examiner’s construction as a broad, but
reasonable, construction. In the final “determining” step of claim 11, there
is no mention of determining the range of distant and near objects
simultaneously. Claims App. claim 11. There is also no mention in this step
of determining the range of both distant and near objects based on “the sheet
of light” collected in the preceding step. Thus, we construe the
“determining” step as merely requiring that the range of distant objects is
based on time-of-flight and the range of near objects is based on
triangulation to be reasonable and, therefore, comports with our standard of
broad but reasonable construction. Am. Acad., 367 F.3d at 1364. Even if we
were to find that Appellant’s narrower construction is reasonable (which we
do not expressly find for purposes of this appeal), the Examiner’s broader,
but reasonable, construction controls the outcome here. In that regard, we
are mindful that construing claims broadly during prosecution is not unfair
to Appellant, because Appellant has the opportunity to amend the claims to
obtain more precise claim coverage. Id.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we determine the Examiner's
findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence and,
accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's unpatentability rejection of claim 11.
Claims 1, 2, 12, and 21
Claims 1 and 21 are independent claims and are not separately argued
apart from relying on the same arguments that we fully considered and
found unpersuasive with respect to claim 11 above. Appeal Br. 8. Claims 2
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and 12 depend from claims 1 and 11 respectively and are also not argued
separately. Id. For essentially the reasons detailed above with respect to
claim 11, we sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of claims 1, 2, 12,
and 21. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (failure to separately argue claims).
Unpatentability of Claims 8, 9, 18, and 19
over Kamon
These claims depend from either independent claim 1 or independent
claim 11 and are not separately argued apart from noting their respective
dependencies. Claims App. We sustain the Examiner’s unpatentability
rejection of claims 8, 9, 18, and 19.
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
§ Reference(s)/Basis Aff’d Rev’d
1, 2, 11, 12, 21 102 Kamon 1, 2, 11, 12, 21
8, 9, 18, 19 103 Kamon 8, 9, 18, 19
Overall
Outcome
1, 2, 8, 9, 11,
12, 18, 19, 21

DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1, 2, 8, 9, 11, 12, 18, 19,
and 21 is affirmed.
AFFIRMED