Walt Disney World Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 26, 1999

329 N.L.R.B. 904 (N.L.R.B. 1999)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 904
Walt Disney World Co. and Actors’ Equity Associa-
tion. Case 12–CA–18484
October 26, 1999
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN,
AND BRAME
On December 23, 1998, Administrative Law Judge
Howard I. Grossman issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the
General Counsel filed an answering brief in response to
the Respondent’s exceptions, and the Respondent filed a
reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions, and
to adopt the judge’s recommended Order1 as modified.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified and orders that the Respondent, Walt Disney
World Co., Orlando, Florida, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
Order as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(a).
“(a) Failing and refusing to honor requests from Ac-
tors’ Equity Association for information necessary and
relevant to the Union’s performance of its responsibili-
ties in representing employees of Respondent for the
purpose of collective bargaining, and delaying the pro-
duction of such information.”
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a).
“(a) Furnish the Union with all the information re-
quested in its letters dated September 11, 1996, January
6, February 14, and June 27, 1997, except that which it
has already supplied.”
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize

1 We shall correct the recommended Order and notice to conform to
the violations found in the decision.
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT refuse or fail to honor requests from Ac-
tor’s Equity Association for information necessary and
relevant to the Union’s performance of its responsibili-
ties in representing employees of Respondent for the
purpose of collective bargaining, and delaying the pro-
duction of such information.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL furnish the union with all the information re-
quested in its letters dated September 11, 1996; January
6, 1997; February 14, 1997; and June 27, 1997; except
that which it has already supplied.

WALT DISNEY WORLD CO.
Michael R. Maiman, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Charles Robinson Fawsett, Esq. (Shutts & Bowen), and Deb-
orah Crumbley, Employee Relations Manager, for the Re-
spondent.
Elizabeth Orfan, Esq. (Spivak, Lipton, Watanabe, Spival &
Moss), for the Charging Party.

DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HOWARD I. GROSSMAN, Administrative Law Judge. The
original charge was filed on November 13, 1996, a first
amended charge on January 21, 1997, and a second amended
charge on August 7, 1997, by Actor’s Equity Association (Eq-
uity or the Union). A complaint issued on February 28, 1997,
and an amended complaint on July 6, 1998. As amended at the
hearing, the latter alleges that Walt Disney World Co. (Respon-
dent, or Worldco), unlawfully failed to furnish the Union with
information requested by the latter on September 11, 1996,
January 6, February 14, and June 27, 1997, and had unlawfully
delayed supplying this information.
A hearing on these matters was started before me by tele-
phone on July 27, 1998, continued in the same manner on Au-
gust 3, 1998, and concluded in person on August 5, 1998, in
Tampa, Florida. The General Counsel and Respondent filed
briefs in this matter. Thereafter, Respondent filed a “Supple-
mental Brief,” the General Counsel filed a “Motion to Strike
Supplemental Brief of Respondent or in the Alternative to Al-
low Reply Brief,” and Respondent filed an “Opposition” to the
latter. On the basis of my observation of the demeanor of the
witnesses and the entire record, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is a Delaware corporation, with an office and
place of business in Orlando, Florida, where it is engaged in the
operation of an entertainment complex. During the 12 months
preceding issuance of the complaint, Respondent received gross
329 NLRB No. 77
WALT DISNEY WORLD CO. 905
revenues in excess of $500,000 and received goods and materi-
als at its Orlando, Florida facility, valued in excess of $50,000
directly from points located outside the State of Florida. Re-
spondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the State
of Florida. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. The
Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Collective-Bargaining Agreement
The Respondent and Equity are parties to a current collec-
tive-bargaining agreement (CBA) by which the Company rec-
ognizes Equity as the exclusive bargaining representative of
“full time and casual performers of the Company in the classi-
fications of Chorus, Chorus–Stepping Out and Principal (re-
ferred to as performers), excluding non-resident aliens under an
appropriate visa, students working in the College Program or
ECPOT Institute of Arts, and third-party sub-contractor per-
formers.” The agreement further provides that students in the
College Program or ECPOT Institute of Arts will not perform
in regularly scheduled shows with full-time performers, but
may perform within separate productions as well as special
events in combination with full-time performers.
The CBA further provides that the “scope” of the agreement
is “any area within the 27,000+ acres of the WALT DISNEY
WORLD VACATION KINGDOM, including but not limited
to the MAGIC KINGDOM, EPCOT, and DISNEY-MGM
STUDIO, River Country, hotels, motels, golf facilities, camp-
sites, airport facilities, boats and boat landings, entrances, or
any other facilities, complexes or areas on said acreage.” The
agreement further provides that it applies to any Walt Disney
World performers assigned to make special appearances at
locations within the geographical jurisdiction of Equity.1
Equity’s eastern regional director, Carol Waaser, testified
that Equity’s jurisdiction comprises “the United States, includ-
ing Hawaii and Alaska,” and shows which are cast and re-
hearsed in the United States and performed in another country.
B. The Information Requests and Worldco’s Responses
1. Events precipitating the information requests
Equity was concerned that performers covered by the CBA
were engaged in work without the coverage and benefits of the
contract. Equity Official Waaser testified that bargaining unit
members called her and said that they had been cast in a show
to be performed in another state by “Disney Business Produc-
tions.” On April 22, 1996, Waaser and other Equity officials
had a meeting with Worldco Executives Bill Ford and Jerry
Montgomery. Equity inquired about “Disney Business Produc-
tions” at this meeting. Worldco’s response is not clear, but
Ward said that the Company was going to expand its interests
in live entertainment throughout the country. One of them was
a “Disney Fair,” as to which Worldco was going to subcontract
the live entertainment to “Renaissance Entertainment Corp.”
Equity received copies of audition notices for shows to be per-
formed at Disney’s Vero Beach and Hilton Head resorts, and in
Hollywood in a “special event” conducted by “Walt Disney

1 G.C. Exhs. 3 and 4, sec. I. The prior agreement has the same pro-
visions G.C. Exh. 2.
Special Events Co.”2 A trade publication ran an article in June
1996, stating that “Walt Disney Attractions” was planning a
“$60 million attraction traveling in 60 trucks,” and that the
principals included “Walt Disney Attractions President Judson
Green” and “Disney CEO Michael Eisner.”3 A newspaper arti-
cle stated that “Disney’s live entertainment has evolved into a
“global undertaking” Judson Green, “president of Walt Disney
Attractions,” announced it had turned out to be a “giant under-
taking.”4
Wasser had another meeting with Worldco in May, and on
June 22, 1996, wrote a letter to Worldco Executive Ward refer-
ring to the Disney auditions for Vero Beach and Hilton Head
subjects which had been raised on April 22.5
2. The September 11, 1996 and January 6, 1997 information
requests—the search for Walt Disney Attractions, Inc.
On September 11, 1996, Waaser wrote to Worldco Vice
President R. G. Montgomery a letter stating that an alter ego
relationship might exist between Worldco and “Walt Disney
Attractions Entertainment Company.” Equity had received
reliable information tending to indicate this, and requested in-
formation.6
On November 13, 1996, Equity filed the original charge al-
leging Worldco’s unlawful refusal to provide this information.7
On December 17, 1996, Worldco Manager of Employee Re-
lations Carol Crumbley replied to Waaser’s September 11 letter
with a request for “the reliable information” indicating an alter
ego relationship (between Worldco and “Walt Disney Attrac-
tions Entertainment Company”), and the relevance of the re-
quested information. Crumbley also contended that compliance
with the request would be burdensome.8
On January 6, 1997, Equity Attorney Elizabeth Orfan wrote
Crumbley a letter in which Equity’s request for the employees’
history was reduced from 5 to 3 years, and the names of em-
ployees limited to performers. The letter requests Worldco to
state whether such employees are members of the Equity or a
Teamster bargaining unit, or are in neither unit. In response to
a Worldco objection that the Company’s stockholders number
“in the millions,” Orfan requested a “corporate tree” to show
the relationship between Worldco and “Walt Disney Attractions
Entertainment Company.” Disputing Worldco’s claim that
Equity’s request was burdensome, Orfan agreed to discuss pro-
duction if Worldco would state how the records were kept,
2 G.C. Exh. 9.
3 G.C. Exh. 10.
4 G.C. Exh. 11.
5 G.C. Exh. 5
6 The letter requested: (1) the name, job titles, responsibility, and
employment history of directors, officers, supervisors, and employees
of either company for the past 5 years; (2) the names of all stockholders
and the percentage of stock ownership for 3 years; (3) details of con-
tracts committing the companies to engage in business activity; (4)
contracts committing one company to utilize the services, facilities,
personnel, or equipment of the other company; (5) contracts requiring
either company to contribute equipment, services, or money to the
other; (6) bids submitted by either company to perform work for the
other; (7) the names, responsibilities, and employer of persons respon-
sible for labor relations for each company; and (8) the names of persons
responsible for hiring, firing, and supervising employees. Jt. Exh. 1.
7 G.C. Exh. 1(a).
8 Jt. Exh. 1.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 906
noting that information, not documents, was requested. How-
ever, Equity disputed that its request was burdensome.9
On February 3, 1997, Worldco Attorney Carol Pacula wrote
to Equity Attorney Orfan and denied that “Walt Disney Attrac-
tions Entertainment was a corporate entity. ‘“Walt Disney
Attractions Entertainment”’ or ‘Attractions Entertainment’ (is)
used informally from time to time to describe the entertainment
function.”10
On March 25, 1997, Pacula made the same argument to Or-
fan with respect to other entities about which Equity had in-
quired (discussed infra). “[t]hey are department names or
names in the nature of trade names, not corporate entities. . . .
Three of the names on the list are indeed separate corporate
entities that are affiliated companies of Walt Disney World Co.
but are not owned or controlled by Walt Disney World Co. . . .
(3) Walt Disney Attractions, Inc. is a marketing, merchandising
and promotional business which may hire performers from time
to time in furtherance of these activities.”11
Equity Attorney Orfan responded in a letter on June 27,
1997, to Crumbley:

In its answer to the Complaint, World Co. denies that a
legal entity entitled “Walt Disney Attractions Entertain-
ment” exists. In her correspondence dated March 25,
1997, Carol Pacula states that Walt Disney Attractions,
Inc. is a separate corporate entity and an affiliated com-
pany of Walt Disney World Co., but is not owned or con-
trolled by Walt Disney World Co. Walt Disney Attrac-
tions, Inc. is described as a marketing, merchandising and
promotional business which may hire performers from
time to time in furtherance of these activities. What, if
any, relationship exists between Walt Disney Attractions,
Inc. and Walt Disney Attractions Entertainment? Is the
Employer saying that Equity needs to request the informa-
tion set forth in its September 11, 1996 of Walt Disney At-
tractions, Inc. instead of Walt Disney Attractions Enter-
tainment? Since Equity may not know the correct names
for all of World Co.’s affiliates, subsidiaries, divisions,
departments or subcontrators, it appears it would be pru-
dent for the Union to request that World Co. provide a list
to the Union setting forth the names of all affiliates, sub-
sidiaries, divisions and departments of World Co. so that
Equity can police its contract. And so, Equity hereby re-
quests that information. 12

On June 30, 1998, Equity Business Representative Richard
Delahanty wrote to Worldco Representative Crumbley and
requested the names and other data concerning all individuals
hired by or cast through either “Walt Disney Attractions Enter-
tainment” or “Attractions Entertainment” since June 1, 1997,
and the correct names of other divisions or departments who
engaged such performers.13
On July 22, 1998, Worldco Representative Crumbley replied
to Delehanty’s letter. The first sentence reads: “Regarding the
above requests, let me first reemphasize that there are no legal
entities known as “Walt Disney Attractions Entertainment” or
“Attractions Entertainment.” Crumbley’s letter includes some

9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
data on Worldco, but states that Worldco does not have the
remainder of the requested information.14
On the same date, July 22, 1998 (5 days before the opening
of the hearing in this matter), Crumbley wrote a 21-page letter
to Equity Representative Waaser, and traces the correspon-
dence outlined above. Crumbley deals with other information
requests, but maintains her position that there is no legal entity
named “Walt Disney Attractions Entertainment” or “Attrac-
tions Entertainment.” Nonetheless, Crumbley supplies infor-
mation about “Walt Disney Attractions, Inc.” Judson Green is
listed as the president of both Worldco and Walt Disney Attrac-
tions, Inc. Eighteen other individuals are named with identical
or similar executive titles and job descriptions in both compa-
nies.15
The outstanding stock of “Walt Disney Attractions, Inc.” is
owned by Disney Enterprises, which also owns the stock of
Worldco and two other corporate enterprises (discussed infra).
Worldco has no contract to engage in business activity with any
of the listed corporations. Worldco may furnish advice and
assistance to the three corporate entities, including Walt Disney
Attractions, Inc., but on an infrequent basis. Crumbley consid-
ers the request for information on bids submitted by one com-
pany on behalf of another to be “overbroad,” and declines to
answer it in detail. “Only Worldco has ‘labor relations’” be-
cause none of the other corporations has collective-bargaining
relationships. No corporate tree has been provided because
“there is no such thing describing the non-existent relationship
between Worldco and ‘Walt Disney Attractions Entertainment
Company.’” Worldco has no obligation to provide information
as to any other entities, because the request is based on mere
suspicion, and the information sought is privileged and confi-
dential. Crumbley declined to give further information re-
quested subsequent to September 11, 1996.16
3. The November 8, 1996 information request about
subcontracting
On November 8, 1996, Equity Representative Waaser wrote
to Worldco Representative R. G. Montgomery about possible
illegal classification of performers as independent contractors.
The letter requests information about EPCOT.17
Crumbley responded to this request on January 21, 1997,
with a list of all EPCOT performers, alien performers, third
party contractors working at EPCOT, and talent contracted
through International Talent Booking.18
14 Id.
15 Randy Garfield, Frank Ioppola, Ronald F. Logan, Philip Lengyel,
Larry Billman, Ed Fouche, Lee Schmudde, Jeffrey H. Smith, Linda K.
Warren, Barbara Ishfin, James Lomonosoff, Norman Merritt, Howard
Pickett, Andrew Rusinack, Anne L. Buettner, Janet Santoro, Sanford
M. Litback, and Marsha L. Reed.
16 Id.
17 (1) The name, pay rate and date, classification, and date of hire of
every nonsupervisory employee; (2) the same information for any non-
supervisory employee working at EPCOT under an individual employ-
ment contract with International Talent Booking; (3) the same informa-
tion as to alien performers not signed to an Equity individual employ-
ment contract; (4) for all employees not included in the foregoing para-
graphs, the name and address of the employee’s employer;and (5) the
same information for all performers subcontracted through Interna-
tional Talent booking to work at Boardwalk, Disney/MGM Studios, the
Magic Kingdom, or any other location described in the scope clause of
the CBA. Id.
18 Id.
WALT DISNEY WORLD CO. 907
4. The February 14, 1997 information request for a corporate
tree involving multiple entities
On February 14, 1997, Equity Representative Waaser wrote
to Worldco Representative Crumbley, and requested a corpo-
rate tree showing Worldco and all affiliated entities. Waaser
expressed the belief that employees who should be covered by
the CBA were not being covered. Waaser presented a list of 17
“corporate entities” employing individuals who should be cov-
ered by the CBA.19
Worldco Attorney Carol Pacula’s letter to Waaser dated
March 25, 1997, previously referred to, lists all the entities
named in Waaser’s letter. Pacula asserts that all the entities,
except three, are divisions, departments, categories of activities,
or functions. The corporate entities, in addition to Walt Disney
Attractions, Inc., are Disney Vacation Development, Inc.,
which operates Worldco’s Vero Beach Resort and Hilton Head
Island Resort, and Disney Special Programs, Inc., d/b/a Disney
Business Productions, which uses Worldco performers to pro-
vide entertainment, and provides communications services to
various companies and businesses throughout the world.20
On June 11, 1997, Worldco representative Crumbley wrote
to Equity Representatives Orfan and Waaser that she was un-
aware of any employee covered by the CBA who had been
employed by any of the firms listed by Waaser. Accordingly,
Crumbley asked for the names and dates of performances.
Once she had received this information, she could evaluate the
information request.21
5. The June 27, 1997 information request
Equity Attorney Orfan replied on June 27, 1997, that Equity
would provide whatever information it had. “However, it is
precisely because the Employer has access to all of this infor-
mation and Equity does not (other than whatever anecdotal
information it comes across) that Equity needs the Employer to
provide the information requested in the letters of September
11, 1996, and February 14, 1997 . . . . Ultimately, all the Union
wants is to have its contract applied to those to whom it should
be applied.”22
Crumbley’s July 22, 1997 letter to Waaser listed the execu-
tives common to the remaining two entities admitted to be cor-
porations. For Disney Vacation Development, Inc., there was
one.23 However, Worldco and Disney Special Programs had

19 (1) Walt Disney Entertainment; (2) Walt Disney Attractions; (3)
Walt Disney Attractions Entertainment; (4) Disney World Co. Talent
Booking; (5) CBC Creative, Inc.; (6) Disney Business Productions; (7)
Disney’s Vero Beach Resort—(what entity or entities employ(s)
performers employed at this location?); (8) Disney’s Hilton Head
Resort—(what entity or entities employ(s) performers employed at this
location?); (9) Creative entertainment. Please let us know if Creative
Entertainment became Attractions Entertainment effective May 19,
1996 (or on any other date and provide the date and circumstances of
the change); (10) Disney Entertainment Productions; (11) Disney
Development Company (a) Magic Kingdom, (b) Pleasure Island); (12)
Walt Disney Engineering; (13) Imagineering; (14) Vacation Disney
Development Company; (15) Magic Kingdom Entertainment; (16)
Studio Entertainment; and (17) EPCOT Entertainment. International
Talent Booking was also listed in the letter, but the General Counsel
withdrew it from the complaint. Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Matthew A. Ouimet.
the same president and director,24 while 13 out of 14 of the
remaining executives of Disney Special Programs, Inc. have
titles and job descriptions identical or similar to those they held
with Worldco.25 As indicated in Worldco Attorney Carol Pa-
cula’s letter of March 25, 1997, Worldco agrees that Disney
Vacation Development, Inc. and Disney Special Programs, Inc.
are corporations. Worldco Representative Crumbley stated in
her letter of July 22, 1998, to Equity’s representative, Waaser,
that all of the stock of these two corporations, as well as that of
Worldco and Walt Disney Attractions, Inc., is owned by Disney
Enterprises, Inc.
C. Legal Conclusions
1. Applicable principles
An employer is obligated to furnish information needed by
the bargaining representative of its employees in order to per-
form its representational duties. NLRB v. Truitt, 351 U.S. 149
(1956). One of these duties is contract administration. Bar-
nard Engineering Co., 282 NLRB 617, 619 (1987).
There is a presumption of relevance of the requested infor-
mation if it deals with employees in the bargaining unit, or
pertains to wages and other benefits. However, if the request
does not relate to bargaining unit personnel, the requesting
party must prove the relevance of the requested information.
Reiss Viking, 312 NLRB 622, 625 (1993); Duguesne Light Co.,
306 NLRB 1042 (1992).
A “liberal discovery-type standard” is utilized in determining
whether relevance has been established. NLRB v. Acme Indus-
trial, 385 U.S. 432, 437 (1967). A union has satisfied its bur-
den when it demonstrates a reasonable belief supported by ob-
jective evidence for requesting the information. Knappton
Maritime Corp., 292 NLRB 236, 238–239 (1988). Postal Ser-
vice, 310 NLRB 391 (1993). Potential or probable relevance is
sufficient to give rise to an employer’s obligation to provide
information. Reiss Viking, supra; Children’s Hospital, 312
NLRB 920, 930 (1993); Pfizer, Inc., 268 NLRB 916, 918
(1984), enfd. 763 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1985). An information
request may be based on hearsay. Magnet Coal, 307 NLRB
444 fn. 3 (1992); Leonard B. Herbert Jr, 259 NLRB 881, 885
(1981), enfd. 696 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 464
U.S. 817 (1983).
2. The September 11, 1997 and January 6, 1997 information
requests
The complaint alleges that the information requested in the
Union’s September 11 and January 6, 1997 request, is relevant,
and that Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
Act by delaying or refusing to supply the information.
A summary of the evidence shows that Worldco executives
told Equity in April 1996, that the company planned an expan-
sion into live entertainment. The Union received audition no-
tices by entities with names sounding like Disney organiza-
tions, “Walt Disney Attractions.” On September 11, 1996, the
Union sent Worldco a request for information on “Walt Disney
Attractions Entertainment,” saying that it had reliable informa-
tion that it might be an alter ego of Worldco. The latter replied
24 Judson Green.
25 Randy Garfield, Diana Morgan, Ronald F. Logan, Gene Aguel,
Robert M. Allen, Ric Florell, Valerie Oberle, Anne L. Buettner, An-
drew P. Rusinak, Janet Santoro, Marsha L. Reed, Lee Schmudde, and
Sanford M. Litback.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 908
with a demand for the “reliable information.” On January 6,
1997, the Union repeated the request, and asked for a “corpo-
rate tree” showing the relationship between Worldco and “Walt
Disney Attractions Entertainment Company,” together with
information on whether certain employees were within the
Equity or a Teamster bargaining unit.
On February 3, 1997, Worldco informed the Union that nei-
ther “Walt Disney Attractions Entertainment” nor “Attractions
Entertainment” was a corporate entity, but were merely phrases
describing an entertainment function. On March 25, 1997,
Worldco agreed that “Walt Disney Attractions Inc.” was a cor-
poration affiliated with but not owned by Worldco. Equity
responded on June 27, 1997, with a request for the relationship
between “Walt Disney Attractions, Inc.” and “Walt Disney
Attractions Entertainment” and information on the “affiliates,
subsidiaries, divisions, departments, and subcontractors” of
Worldco. The latter sent two letters on July 22, 1997, 5 days
before the start of the hearing. The first repeated Worldco’s
position that there was no legal entity named “Walt Disney
Attractions Entertainment” or “Attractions Entertainment.”
Nonetheless, on the same date, Worldco wrote a letter to Equity
giving information on “Walt Disney Attractions, Inc.,” which,
it had agreed, was a corporation. This information shows that
the two corporations have the same president, and 18 execu-
tives with the same or similar titles and job descriptions. In
addition, all of the stock of Worldco and “Walt Disney Attrac-
tions, Inc.” is owned by Disney Enterprises.
The General Counsel argues that Equity has advanced a rea-
sonable basis for the information request, citing Shoppers Food
Warehouse, 315 NLRB 258, 259 (1994).26
Respondent argues that the request attempts to determine
whether an alter ego relationship exists between corporations
and mere “names.” Respondent agrees that Equity may have
“subsidiary” concerns about noncoverage of some of its repre-
sented employees, but believes that this is based upon its alter
ego theory. Equity has not presented any “objective facts” to
supports its request, and is the victim of its own “self-
confusion.”27 Respondent’s witnesses argued that “Walt Dis-
ney Attractions Entertainment” and “Attractions Entertain-
ment” were not legal entities, and that Worldco could not have
an alter ego relationship with itself.
The significant fact in this dispute is the close similarity be-
tween “Walt Disney Attractions Entertainment,” “Attractions
Entertainment” (called mere phrases by Respondent), and
“Walt Disney Attractions, Inc.,” an admitted corporation. As to
the latter, Respondent did supply some information.28 Defects
in complaints are not held to be bars to a finding of unlawful
conduct where no prejudice resulted, and the Respondent was
prepared for, and participated in the hearing. NLRB v. Dredge
Operators, 19 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 1994). The same reasoning
applies herein. Equity’s original request was sufficient to put
Worldco on notice that Equity was actually inquiring about
Walt Disney Attractions, Inc., which has a common parent and
interlocking executives with Worldco. Equity protested that it
did not know the numerous names under which Worldco did

26 G.C. Br. 9.
27 R. Br. 3–7.
28 Although the issue of alter ego relationship is not before me,
merely the information request, I note that the information which Re-
spondent did supply shows common officers and ownership of the
stock of both corporations by Disney Enterprises.
business, and asked for them—a request to which Worldco did
not respond.
I conclude on the authority cited above that Equity has sup-
plied a reasonable basis for its information request, and that
Worldco did not purport to answer the request until about 10
months after the initial request. Even at that date, Worldco
asserted that it had “no knowledge” of any contracts between it
and Walt Disney Attractions, Inc. Yet Worldco Attorney
Pacula stated on March 25, 1997, that Walt Disney Attractions,
Inc. “may hire performers from time to time”—presumably
Worldco performers. Worldco’s denial of knowledge is in-
credible. As to the fourth requested information item—
commitments to use the personnel or equipment of the other
company, Worldco first denies that there are any such com-
mitments, and then admits that it furnishes services to Walt
Disney Attractions, Inc, and that the latter furnishes services to
Disney entities such as Walt Disney World Resort. This re-
sponse is contradictory and incredible. Worldco’s responses to
the remaining requests are similarly doubtful or ambiguous. If
Worldco did not actually know the answers to some of the
questions, it had the obligation to inquire—of its corporate
cousins, departments, divisions, or ”phrases”—and transmit the
information to Equity. Arch of West Virginia, 304 NLRB 1089
fn. 1 (1991). This it did not do.
Finally, I reject Worldco’s claim that the information request
was overly burdensome, or requested confidential material.
Respondent has not advanced any reason for its assertion that
the request was burdensome, and was able to provide a multi-
tude of computerized pages 5 days before the hearing. Crum-
bley testified that this took 30–40 hours. Respondent has not
advanced any reason for its claim of confidentiality or come
forward with any ways to solve this asserted problem. Public
Service Co. of Colorado, 301 NLRB 238 (1991).
I conclude that Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and
(5) by refusing to provide a substantial number of the informa-
tion requests made by Equity on September 11, 1997, and by
unlawfully delaying partial responses. Endicott Forging &
Mfg., 319 NLRB 180 (1995); Samaritan Medical Center, 319
NLRB 392 (1995).
Respondent has also raised a procedural issue. On Septem-
ber 25, 1998, the due date for briefs, it filed by facsimile a sup-
plemental brief in which it argues, inter alia, that the allegations
based on the January 6, 1997 information request are barred by
Section 10(b) of the Act. On September 30, 1998, the General
Counsel filed a motion to strike the supplemental brief on the
ground that it was improperly filed. In the alternative, the Gen-
eral Counsel points out that the first amended charge was filed
on January 21, 1997, and alleges that Respondent has violated
the Act “since September 11, 1996.” The General Counsel also
argues that the first amended charge is closely related to the
allegations in the original charge under the criteria set forth in
Redd-I, 290 NLRB 1115 (1988). Respondent then filed an
objection to the General Counsel’s motion to strike. Respon-
dent also made the same argument with respect to later infor-
mation requests, considered infra.
The original charge was filed on November 13, 1996; the
first amended charge, filed on January 21, 1997, after the Un-
ion’s January 6, 1997 letter, repeats essentially the same allega-
tions in the original charge. Further, the issues in the allega-
tions of the January 6, 1997 letter, although made more than 6
months before the second amended charge on August 7, 1997,
are closely related to the issues in the latter charge under the
WALT DISNEY WORLD CO. 909
criteria announced in Redd-I. Accordingly, I reject Respon-
dent’s argument that the allegations in the January 6, 1997 let-
ter are barred by Section 10(b). I deny the General Counsel’s
motion to strike Respondent’s supplemental brief.
3. The February 14 and June 27, 1997 information requests
The complaint alleges that the information requested by the
Union on February 14 and June 27, 1997, was not supplied, or
was unlawfully delayed by Respondent.
The evidence shows that, on February 14, 1997, the Union
requested a “corporate tree” from Respondent, showing all
affiliated entities. Seventeen such “corporate entities” were
named, and the Union stated the belief that they employed indi-
viduals covered by the CBA. Respondent replied that it was
unaware of any such instances, but would respond if Equity
could supply the names and dates of performances. The Union
replied that it did not have access to this information, but that
Respondent did know the facts. Equity simply wanted to have
the CBA applied to individuals to whom it should apply.
Respondent advances a series of arguments. First, it argues
in its brief that the “entity” involved in the prior information
requests, “World Disney Attractions Entertainment (Com-
pany)” is “merely a division of Worldco.”29 Worldco Attorney
Pacula stated in a letter that the other entities about whom the
Union inquired were Worldco departments or trade names. If
this is correct, then the employees were Worldco employees,
and any information concerning them was as presumptively
relevant under the authority cited above, without any independ-
ent proof of relevance.
Worldco responded that it was unaware of any employee
covered by the CBA who had been employed by any of these
entities (its own departments), and demanded that Equity sup-
ply Worldco with the names and dates of the performances.
Equity replied that this information was available to Worldco,
not the Union, and that all it wanted was that the CBA apply to
employees covered by it.
Worldco obviously knew the job assignments of its own em-
ployees, and its response to Equity was a sham. The Board has
found that refusals to provide similar information about em-
ployees were unlawful.30
Worldco next returns to its basic argument—that Equity’s in-
formation request was based on an erroneous belief that there
was an alter ego relationship between Worldco and entities
which are not corporations. “Although Equity’s subsidiary
concern is possible noncoverage under the CBA of unnamed
individuals, that concern is based exclusively on the suspicion
that there may be an alter ego relationship between Worldco
and one or more other employers.31
This argument has no merit in light of Equity Attorney Or-
fan’s letter of June 27, 1997, in which she states that Equity
simply does not know the names of Worldco’s affiliates, sub-
sidiaries, divisions, departments, or subcontractors, and re-
29 R. Br., 12.
30 Hospitality Care Center, 307 NLRB 1131 (1992) (employees’
name, addresses, wage rates, dates of hire, and job classifications);
Beverly Enterprises, 310 NLRB 222 (1993) (use of “pool nurses,” and
work schedules for holidays); Yeshiva University, 315 NLRB 1245
(1994) (lists of union members who worked on a day before a holiday,
dates of hire, number of hours worked, and rates of pay); National
Broadcasting Co., 318 NLRB 1166 (1995) (structure and management
of subsidiaries, employee interchange, and integration of operations).
31 R. Br. 4.
quests this information. This request is scarcely a statement
that the entities are corporations. If Equity’s belief that they
might be corporations was erroneous, it was Worldco’s obliga-
tion to answer Equity’s request about the assignments of
Worldco employees. This it did not do. Worldco frankly ad-
mits that Equity had a concern (which it calls “subsidiary”)
about noncoverage of employees.
I conclude that Worldco has unlawfully refused to supply
Equity with information about the job assignments of its own
employees covered by the CBA. As I have found above, it also
unlawfully delayed supplying Equity with information about
entities which it acknowledged were corporations, and failed to
supply other requested relevant information.32
4. Summary of Respondent’s partial responses to Equity’s
information requests
The General Counsel acknowledges receipt of the following
information from Respondent on July 23, 1997:

(1) Worldco’s exempt or salaried employees for 1993–
1997;
(2) Employees represented by the Teamsters for 1993–
1997 (“Characters”);
(3) A list of bargaining unit employees for 1993 to
1997;
(4) A list of talent contracts which applies only to
Worldco;
(5) Limited information about the supervisors and cor-
porate directors of Worldco, Walt Disney Attractions;
Disney Vacation Development, and Disney Special Pro-
grams d/b/a Disney Business Productions;
(6) A list of 3 performers who performed at the Hilton
Head Resort.33

The General Counsel argues that these submissions are in-
sufficient in the following respects:

(1) The information referred to in (1) above is insuffi-
cient because it does not provide specific information, i.e.,
job duties34 and refers only to Worldco and not Walt Dis-
ney Attractions Entertainment Co.35 I have found above
that the latter designation was sufficient to put Respondent
on notice that Walt Disney Attractions, Inc., an admitted
corporation, was the entity intended by the information re-
quest.
(2) The information listed in (2) above is insufficient
because it does not list employees in the unit represented
by the Union, or who were not in any unit, and refers only
to Worldco employees, not to Walt Disney Entertainment
Co. (see above). 36
(3) The information listed in (3) above is insufficient
because it refers only to bargaining unit employees, not to
those in Walt Disney Attractions Entertainment Co. (see
above).
32 In its supplemental brief, Respondent argues that the allegations
regarding failure to supply information on February 14 and June 27,
1997, were also barred by Sec. 10(b). This argument is without merit,
as both of these alleged infractions took place within 6 months of the
second amended charge on August 7, 1997.
33 G.C. Br. 5.
34 G.C. Exh. 1(w), par. 6(a).
35 G.C. Br. 6.
36 G.C. Exh. 1(w), par. 7(b); G.C. Br. 5.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 910
(4) The information listed in (4) above is insufficient
in that it refers only to Worldco employees, and does not
list the employees of the 17 entities mentioned in the com-
plaint.37
(5) The information listed in (5) above is insufficient
in that it refers only to four companies, and does not list
information about the current directors of the 17 entities.38
(6) The information listed in (6) above is insufficient
in that it lists performers “at only one entity” (Hilton
Head), and does not list those performing at the 16 other
entities.39

With the exception of the foregoing submissions of evidence
by Respondent, the General Counsel contends that Respondent
has not supplied the information requested by the Union.
5. Final conclusions
The Union has requested information about employees in the
bargaining unit, information which is presumptively relevant.
It has also requested information on employees in other corpo-
rations, and has satisfied the Board’s standards for relevance of
this information. Respondent has failed to supply some of the
requested information and has unduly delayed supplying the
remainder.
Respondent argues that the Union’s information requests
were made in bad faith. This argument has no merit. As the
Union pointed out, it was simply trying to determine whether
the provisions of the CBA were being applied to employees
covered by it. Respondent’s contentions that the requested
information was too burdensome to supply, or confidential,
have not been supported by evidence.
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire
record, I make the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Walt Disney World Co., is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
2. Actors’ Equity Association is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. At all times material, the Union has been and continues to
be the exclusive representative of Respondent’s employees
described in section II(A) of this Decision, which constitutes an
appropriate unit for collective bargaining.
4. By refusing on and after September 11, 1996, to furnish
the Union with relevant information, and by delaying the pro-
duction of such information, Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
5. The foregoing unfair labor practice affects commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair la-
bor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist there-

37 G.C. Exh. 1(w), par. 8(e); G.C. Br. 6.
38 G.C. Exh. 1(w), par. 7(c), 8(f); G.C. Br. 7.
39 G.C. Exh. 1(w), par. 8(e); G.C. Br. 7.
from, and take certain affirmative action necessary to effectuate
the purposes and policies of the Act.
I shall recommend that Respondent be required to supply the
information requested by the Union, as described in this deci-
sion, except information which it has already supplied. The
latter issue can be decided in a supplemental proceeding.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended: 40
ORDER
The Respondent, Walt Disney World Co., Orlando, Florida,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to honor requests from Actor’s Eq-
uity Association for information necessary and relevant to the
Union’s performance of its responsibilities in representing em-
ployees of Respondent for the purpose of collective bargaining.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative actions necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Furnish the Union with all the information requested by it
since September 11, 1996, except that which it has already
supplied.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Or-
lando, Florida facility, copies of the attached notice marked
“Appendix.”41 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 12, after being signed by the Re-
spondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In
the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since September 11, 1996.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
40 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
41 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”