Walker Die Casting, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 24, 1981

255 N.L.R.B. 212 (N.L.R.B. 1981)

212 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Walker Die Casting, Inc. and Local 259, Stove, Fur-
nace, and Allied Appliance Workers' Interna-
tional Union of North America, AFL-CIO, and
Employee Committee, Party in Interest. Cases
26-CA-8196, 26-CA-8213-1, -3, 26-CA-8227,
26-CA-8396, and 26-CA-8477
March 24, 1981
DECISION AND ORDER
On November 19, 1980, Administrative Law
Judge J. Pargen Robertson issued the attached De-
cision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,'
and conclusions 2 of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified
herein. 3
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi-
fied below, and hereby orders that the Respondent,
Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi-
bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con-
vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
2 The Administrative Law Judge found that Respondent, by posting its
August 16, 1979, notice, violated Sec. 8(a)() and (5) of the Act by com-
municating directly with employees, soliciting employees to refuse to
honor a strike if one is called, and advising employees to resign from the
Union to avoid a fine. We agree with the Administrative Law Judge, but
for reasons other than those cited in his Decision. Lehigh Lumber Compa-
ny, and Brown-Borhek Company, 230 NLRB 1122, fn. I (1977), cited by
the Administrative Law Judge in support of his conclusions, is distin-
guishable from the case at hand since the respondent in Lehigh, supra, in
an effort to induce an employee to abandon the union, promised him in-
creased wages and benefits which had not been offered the union. How-
ever, the record herein amply supports the finding of a violation of Sec.
8(aXl) and (5) of the Act. First, although Respondent advised employees
to resign from the Union to avoid a fine, the Union had made no threat
to fine employees. In addition, Respondent, after posting the August 16,
1979, notice, unilaterally raised starting wages, unlawfully withdrew its
last contract offer and ceased to bargain, made numerous coercive com-
ments including threats to "bust the Union," and finally established an
unlawful "Employee Committee" as an alternative to the Union. These
actions establish a pattern of conduct clearly intended to dissipate em-
·ployee support for the Union as the sole collective-bargaining agent. We
find that the August 16 notice was not an innocent attempt by Respond-
ent to advise employees of their rights or to give notice of the intention
to operate during the strike, but was calculated to undermine the Union
and set the stage for further attempts to bypass and ignore the Union, all
in violation of Sec. 8(a)() and (5) of the Act. See Bromine Division. Drug
Research. Inc., 233 NLRB 253, 263 (1977), enfd. 621 F.2d 806 (6th Cir.
1980); O'Land. Inc., d/b/a Ramada Inn South, 206 NLRB 210, 219
(1973).
The recommended Order and notice have been modified to remedy
all unfair labor practices found by the Administrative Law Judge and to
clarify the reinstatement rights of returning strikers. Larand Leisurelies,
Inc., 213 NLRB 197, 198 (1974), enfd 523 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1975).
255 NLRB No. 34
Walker Die Casting, Inc., Lewisburg, Tennessee,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the said recommended
Order, as so modified:
1. Substitute the following for paragraph l(a):
"(a) Interfering with, restraining, and coercing
the employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them in Section 7 of the Act, in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, by threatening not to re-
instate employees because of the employees' union
activities; threatening employees that they were to
mind their knitting when they returned to work be-
cause of their union activities; threatening to get
rid of the Union; offering wage increases in order
to induce its employees to break the strike and
return to work; telling employees that if it had to
reinstate everybody in the Union, it was in no
hurry to start back to negotiations; threatening to
shut the door of the plant rather than continuing to
deal with the union president; telling its employee
that by returning to work after engaging in the
strike she had lost her seniority status; informing
employees that they would not be considered for
employment until after the decertification election;
removing its employees' picket signs; advising em-
ployees to resign from the Union; soliciting em-
ployees to refuse to honor a strike; engaging in sur-
veillance of its employees' union activities; threat-
ening its employees that there would be no more
collective-bargaining agreements with the Union;
and telling its employees that they would have a
good place to work once the Union was defeated."
2. Substitute the following for paragraph l(f):
"(f) Unilaterally, without bargaining with Local
259, Stove, Furnace, and Allied Appliance Work-
ers' International Union of North America, AFL-
CIO, as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of the employees in the above-described
unit, changing its wages or other conditions of em-
ployment, unilaterally establishing an employee
committee, withdrawing its last contract proposal,
or communicating directly with employees instead
of bargaining with the above-named Union."
3. Add the following sentence at the end of para-
graph 2(a):
"If, after such discharges, sufficient jobs are not
available for these employees, they shall be placed
on a preferential hiring list in accordance with
their seniority or other nondiscriminatory practice
theretofore utilized by Respondent, and they shall
be offered employment before any other persons
are hired."
4. Substitute the attached notice "Appendix B"
for that of the Administrative Law Judge.
-.
-
__ ___ __ ___ - -- -------
WALKER DIE CASTING, INC. 213
APPENDIX B
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees that
we will not reinstate them because of their ac-
tivities on behalf of Local 259, Stove, Furnace,
and Allied Appliance Workers' International
Union of North America, AFL-CIO, or any
other labor organization, or because they
engage in strike activity.
WE WILL NOT tell our employees that they
are to mind their own knitting because of the
employees' union activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten to get rid of the
Union.
WE WILL NOT offer our employees higher
wages in order to induce our employees to
break a strike and return to work.
WE WILL NOT tell our employees that we
are in no hurry to resume collective-bargaining
negotiations if we have to reinstate everybody
in the Union.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with
plant shutdown because we have to deal with
the union president.
WE WILL NOT tell employees that they have
lost their seniority by engaging in a strike.
WE WILL NOT inform our employees that re-
employment will have to await a decertifica-
tion election.
WE WILL NOT remove our employees'
picket signs from public property.
WE WILL NOT advise employees to resign
from the Union nor solicit employees to refuse
to honor a strike.
WE WILL NOT engage in surveillance of our
employees' union activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees that
there will be no more collective-bargaining
agreements with the Union.
WE WILL NOT inform our employees that
they will have a good place to work once the
Union is defeated.
WE WILL NOT discharge or refuse to rein-
state our employees or otherwise discriminate
against our employees because of their strike
activities or union activities.
WE WILL NOT form, assist, support, domi-
nate, or interfere with the Employee Commit-
tee.
WE WILL NOT vary or abandon any wage,
hour, or other substantive benefit established
for our employees as a result of our dealing
with the Employee Committee.
WE WILL NOT recognize and will complete-
ly disestablish the Employee Committee, or
any successor thereto, as the representative of
our employees concerning wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment, or any other terms and
conditions of employment, including the settle-
ment of grievances.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively
concerning rates of pay, wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment
with Local 259, Stove, Furnace, and Allied
Appliance Workers' International Union of
North America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive
representative of the employees in the bargain-
ing unit described below.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally change our wage
rates, or other conditions of employment, or
establish an employee grievance committee
without first negotiating with the above-men-
tioned Union as the exclusive representative of
the employees in the bargaining unit described
below; withdraw our last contract proposal;
nor communicate directly with employees in-
stead of bargaining with the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Sec-
tion 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL offer immediate and full reinstate-
ment to: Cathy Becquet, Dickie Adkins, Lacon
Crossland, Sam Cook, Michael Cross, Robert
Hayes, Michael Holder, Larry Jones, Jimmy
Prince, Larry Peters, E. W. Woodward, David
Wentzell, Alfred Jett, Dewey Wayne Rowe,
Michael Wayne Brewer, Charles E. McCord,
Ann Derryberry, Eddie Ward, Clyde Erwin,
Sherry D. Willoughby, David Sherin, Chit
Derryberry, James D. Flowers, Gary McClen-
don, Wesley Poteete, Sandra D. Luna, Jimmy
Winchester, Raymond P. Osborne, Edel
Sparks, Eugene Pullen, Roy Rowe, Paul
Rowe, James E. Stewart, Becky Gillium, Wil-
liam Frank Stewart, Margaret Neill, Karon
Pischel Wells, Nancy Reed, John Liggett,
Stanley Galbraith, Marie Logue, Ruby Ecken-
roth, Larry S. Hopper, Shirley P. Metcalf,
Nancy Diane Smith, Sam L. Cook, Jr., Ben
Porterfield, William F. Davis, Thomas R.
Smith, Roy Garrett, Ronnie L. Burns, Wilburn
Phillips, James Stegall, Chestley H. Derry-
berry, Mark Welch, Wiliam Edwin Taylor,
Bill D. Spence, Eddie Ward, Frankie Moore,
Wendell J. Rowe, Jackie Metcalf, Mark
Welch, and Denise Luker to their former jobs
WALKER DIE CASTING, INC.
. , _
214 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
or, if their jobs no longer exists, to substantial-
ly equivalent jobs, discharging, if necessary,
any replacements hired on or after August 27,
1979. If, after such discharges, sufficient jobs
are not available for these employees, they
shall be placed on a preferential hiring list in
accordance with their seniority or other non-
discriminatory practice theretofore utilized by
us, and they shall be offered employment
before any other persons are hired, and WE
WILL make each of those employees whole,
with interest, for any loss they may have suf-
fered as a result of our discrimination against
them.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain with the
above-named Union as the exclusive repre-
sentative of all employees in the bargaining
unit described below with respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment and, if an understanding
is reached, embody such understanding in a
signed agreement. The bargaining unit is:
All production and maintenance employees,
including shipping, receiving, and tool crib
employees, excluding all office clerical em-
ployees, technical and professional employ-
ees, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
WALKER DIE CASTING, INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
J. PARGEN ROBERTSON, Administrative Law Judge:
This case was heard on June 16-19, 1980, at Lewisburg,
Tennessee. The charge in Case 26-CA-8196 was filed on
December 13, 1979, and amended on December 21, 1979.
The Case 26-CA-8213-1 charge was filed on January 1,
1980. The charge in Case 26-CA-8213-3 was filed on
January 3, 1980, and amended on January 16, 1980. Case
26-CA-8227 was filed on January 16, 1980, and amended
on January 29, 1980. Case 26-CA-8396 was filed on
April 23, 1980. Case 26-CA-8477 was filed on June 9,
1980, and amended on June 12, 1980. An order consoli-
dating cases, consolidated complaint and notice of hear-
ing issued on February 22, 1980. An order consolidating
cases, amended consolidated complaint and notice of
hearing issued on May 21, 1980, and was amended at the
hearing on June 16, 1980, to allege:
(1) Respondent engaged in violations of Section 8(a)(5)
by failing to recognize and bargain collectively with the
Charging Party (the Union) by (a) proposing that em-
ployees be allowed to revoke union dues-checkoff au-
thorizations at any time within 10 days' notice; (b) sug-
gesting that union members resign their union member-
ship before crossing the picket line to avoid the possibil-
ity of a fine by the Union; (c) withdrawing its last con-
tract offer presented during negotiations; (d) unilaterally
implementing wage increases in excess of those offered
during negotiations; (e) unilaterally implementing an at-
tendance bonus; (f) making the attendance bonus applica-
ble on a weekly basis, then changing it to monthly, and
back to weekly again; (g) unilaterally establishing an em-
ployee grievance committee; and (h) refusing to recog-
nize and bargain with the Union since September 11,
1979.
(2) Respondent engaged in violations of Section 8(aX3)
by failing and refusing to reinstate numerous employees
following their unconditional offers to return to work
and by discharging numerous employees, including var-
ious probationary employees and employee Cathy Bec-
quet.
(3) Respondent engaged in violations of Section 8(a)(2)
by establishing, recognizing and bargaining with an em-
ployee committee.
(4) Respondent engaged in violations of Section 8(a)(1)
on numerous occasions.
(5) Respondent caused and prolonged a strike by its
employees, through the unfair labor practices alleged in
the complaint.
Upon the entire record, my observation of the wit-
nesses, and after due consideration of the briefs filed by
the General Counsel and Respondent, I hereby make the
following:
FINDINGS'
Since 1971, Respondent and the Union have been par-
ties to several collective-bargaining agreements. During
that period Respondent continuously represented Re-
spondent's production and maintenance employees. 2
During early 1979, Respondent asked the Union to
engage in early negotiations. The collective-bargaining
agreement in existence at that time was set to expire on
August 18, 1979.
: Neither the status of the Charging Party nor the allegation regarding
commerce is in dispute. The complaint alleges, Respondent admitted, and
I find that Walker Die Casting, Inc., is a corporation with a place of busi-
ness in Lewisburg, Tennessee, where it is engaged in the manufacture
and nonretail distribution of custom zinc and die castings. Respondent ad-
mitted, and I find, that annually, during the course and conduct of its
business operations, it has sold and shipped from its Lewisburg, Tennes-
see, facilities goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly to
points outside the State of Tennessee and it purchased and received at its
Lewisburg facility products, goods, and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from points outside the State of Tennessee. Respondent
admitted, and I find, that at all material times it was an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec. 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
The complaint alleged, Respondent admitted, and I find that the
Charging Party (the Union) is now, and has been at all times material
herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Sec. 2(5) of the Act.
The complaint also alleged and on the basis of unrebutted record evi-
dence I find that the Employee Committee constituted an employee rep-
resentation committee in which employees participated and which existed
for the purpose of dealing with Respondent concerning grievances and
conditions of work. On the basis of that allegation and the record evi-
dence, I find that the Employee Committee constituted a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Sec. 2(5) of the Act.
2 The unit, which Respondent admitted to be an appropriate unit, is
described as: "All production and maintenance employees, including ship-
ping, receiving, and tool crib employees, excluding all office clerical em-
ployees, technical and professional employees, and supervisors as defined
in the Act."
WALKER DIE CASTING, INC. 215
However, negotiations did not begin until the parties
met on June 29, 1979. Thereafter, negotiation sessions
occurred on August 7, 13, 14, 16, and 17, 1979.
On August 18, 1979, Respondent's employees struck.
The General Counsel contends that Respondent did
not engage in good-faith bargaining and that the strike
was an unfair labor practice strike. In consideration of
whether the strike was an unfair labor practice strike
from its inception, the complaint alleges two matters
which occurred on or before August 18 as contributing
causes to the strike: (I) Respondent, during contract ne-
gotiations, proposed that employees be allowed to
revoke union dues-checkoff authorizations at any time
within 10 days' notice; and (2) Respondent suggested to
employees that the union members resign their union
membership before crossing the picket line to avoid pos-
sibility of a fine by the Union.
Following the beginning of the strike, Respondent al-
legedly engaged in numerous 8(a)(1) violations beginning
in August 1979 and extending into the spring of 1980.
Additionally, Respondent allegedly engaged in other
8(a)(5) violations; 8(aX3 ) violations by refusing to rein-
state some employees and discharging others; and 8(a)(2)
violations by establishing, recognizing, and bargaining
with an employee committee.
During the strike there was very little contact between
Respondent and the Union. On September 7, 1979, the
Union submitted a contract proposal to Respondent.
However, on September 11 l, 1979, Respondent notified
the Union that it did not "feel that any further meetings
can be scheduled until the petition has been resolved."3
No further negotiations occurred between the parties
after August 17, 1979.
Conclusions
A primary question in this case is whether the August
18 strike was an unfair labor practice strike and, if so,
whether it was an unfair labor practice strike from its in-
ception, or whether it started as an economic strike but
was, at some point, converted to an unfair labor practice
strike. Therefore, I have categorized the complaint alle-
gations on the basis of prestrike allegations and on alle-
gations regarding incidents which occurred following
commencement of the strike.
3 A decertification petition (Case 26-RD-458) was filed with Region
26 on September 6, 1979. A stipulation for consent election agreement
was approved by the Regional Director on October 2, 1979. An election
was held on October 19, 1979. The tally of ballots of that election indi-
cated there were approximately 205 eligible voters; 58 votes were cast
for the Union, 70 votes were cast against the Union, and there were 36
challenged ballots which were determinative. Union objections were filed
on October 26, 1979. A hearing was directed and held on December 10-
14, 1979. However, no decision or recommendation issued as a result of
that hearing. On February 7, 1980, an order issued dismissing the Case
26-RD-458 petition. A request for review was filed by Respondent on
February 19, 1980. That request for review was denied by the Board on
April 3, 1980, without prejudice to the petition being reinstated, but de-
pending on the outcome of the instant proceeding.
A. Prestrike Allegations
I. The negotiations
The General Counsel, in his brief, contends that Re-
spondent, during negotiations with the Union, engaged in
surface bargaining. In consideration of Respondent's con-
duct prior to the employees' August 18 strike, I find little
support for the General Counsel's contention.
Respondent's president, Robert Walker, testified that
during early 1979 he asked the Union to engage in early
negotiations. No evidence was offered to contest Walk-
er's testimony in that regard. The Union's vice president,
E. Ray Sullivan, admitted that Walker contacted the
committee in January or February 1979 and indicated
that he would like to start negotiations early. Sullivan
testified that he told Walker that he was ready to start
negotiations at any time. However, Sullivan admitted
that the Local did not respond to Walker's request to
start early. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the
Union sought to start negotiations prior to June II.
On June 11 the Union wrote Respondent requesting
negotiations. On June 29 the parties met at the first nego-
tiations session. At that time the Union presented its pro-
posals. According to the testimony of Robert Walker,
the Union's June 29 proposed contract was exceedingly
long.
In early August, Respondent countered with its own
contract proposals. During the negotiations sessions of
August 13, 14, 16, and 17, proposals from both parties
were on the table. The Union's original proposal appears
to contain some 48 separate articles.
Sullivan admitted that on August 17 the only matters
left unresolved included wages, the merit system, dues
checkoff, shift preference, and temporary transfers.
During the August 17 session an agreement was reached
on a number of items including payment of the 20-cent
shift premium differential, a grievance procedure, and
the length of the agreement.
Regarding the outstanding issues, the General Counsel,
in his brief, points out that Respondent did not furnish its
wage proposal until August 14-3 days before the con-
tract expired at midnight on August 17.
The General Counsel also pointed to the temporary
transfer issue in support of his argument. During negotia-
tions Respondent argued that that provision should be
changed to avoid confusion as to its intent-confusion
which had already resulted in an arbitration case.
The General Counsel also pointed to the disagreement
regarding the merit system. As to that issue, during ne-
gotiations the Union sought to eliminate the merit system
provision of the contract on the assertion that the system
was not working. In support of its argument, the Union
pointed out that some senior employees had not reached
the top pay for their classifications. Respondent argued
that the system was working and insisted on retaining
that provision.
I find nothing in the above matters which would con-
tribute to a finding of surface bargaining. Although Re-
spondent's wage proposal of August 14 gave the Union
little time before the contract expiration, I must recall
that the Union was offered an opportunity by Respond-
WALKER DIE CASTING, NC.
216 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ent to engage in early negotiations. Also, the Union's
proposal of June 29 was extensive. Therefore, I do not
find that Respondent was dilatory in making a wage pro-
posal on August 14. As to the temporary transfer and the
merit system provisions, I find nothing improper in Re-
spondent's position.
The remaining question presented by the General
Counsel-one that is alleged as violative by the com-
plaint-was Respondent's proposal to change the con-
tract's union dues-checkoff provisions. Respondent's pro-
posal did not seek to eliminate dues checkoff but to
change the provision to permit employees to revoke
their checkoff authorization on 10 days' notice. I have
examined the cases in this regard,4 but I have found
nothing which would warrant my finding a violation. Al-
though Respondent insisted on its dues-checkoff propos-
al, it was during the same negotiations sessions agreeing
to accept various union proposals and agreeing to change
or drop proposals which it had made.
In the circumstances of Respondent's proposal there
were no other factors which demonstrated, during the
period before the strike, that Respondent was bargaining
in bad faith.
Therefore, I find that, by proposing to amend the
dues-checkoff provision to permit employees to revoke
their authorization at any time with a 10-day notice, Re-
spondent did not engage in conduct violative of the
Act. 5
2. The August 16, 1979, memo to employees
Robert Walker testified that he advised employees by
an August 16, 1979, memo as follows:
TO: All Employees of Walker Die Casting, Inc.
SUBJECT: Company Plans
As all of you know, we are currently negotiating
with our Union a new contract to replace the one
we now have, which expires at midnight, Friday,
August 17th. It is the Company's intention to do all
that is in its power to reach a mutually agreeable
contract with the Union by the above date. We are
confident that the Union negotiating committee will
reciprocate.
However, if a contract is not agreed on and there
is a strike, the Company plans to operate the plant.
Work will be available for any employees who wish
to report. Employees, who are members of the
Union, may want to resign from Union membership
before crossing the picket line in order to avoid the
possibility of a fine by the Union. You may resign
by sending a ceritfied letter to the Union, with a
copy to the Company.
In the event of a strike by the Union, the Compa-
ny plans to open for work on Tuesday, August 21,
at 7:00 a.m., for anyone who desires to report.
4 Markle Manufacturing Company of San Antonio, 239 NLRB 1353
(1979); Sweney and Company. Inc. v. N.LR.B., 437 F.2d 1127, 1129 (5th
Cir. 1971), enfg. in part 176 NLRB 208 (1969); Longhorn Machine Works,
Inc., 205 NLRB 685 (1973).
5 Midwest Casting Corporation, 194 NLRB 523 (1971).
An announcement will be put on the radio on
Sunday, August 19, stating the Union's decisions
whether to accept or reject the contract.
Anyone, who has any questions, may contact the
Company on Monday, August 20th.
/s/ R. H. Walker
R. H. Walker, President
The General Counsel alleges that by that memo Re-
spondent violated Section 8(aX)(l) and (5) of the Act. I
agree. By communicating directly with the employees,
soliciting employees to refuse to honor a strike, if one is
called, and advising its employees to resign from the
Union to avoid a fine, Respondent engaged in violative
conduct. 6
3. Was the strike an unfair labor practice strike at
its inception?
Although, as indicated above, Respondent engaged in
an unfair labor practice on the day before the employees
struck, the record contains no evidence that that unfair
labor practice contributed to the strike.7 In fact, the evi-
dence which I credit demonstrates that the strike was
caused by Respondent's failure to agree to a contract.
Employee witnesses who attended the August 18 union
meeting and were asked about that meeting testified that
they were told by the Union that the strike would be an
economic strike. There was no evidence indicating that
Respondent's August 16 memo to employees was men-
tioned or that it constituted a contributing factor. There-
fore, I find that the strike was, at its beginning, not an
unfair labor practice strike.
B. Allegations Regarding Activities During the Strike
1. The 8(a)(1) allegations
a. Allegations regarding Robert Walker
(1) Threat not to reinstate
Cathy Becquet testified concerning some conversations
she had with Plant Manager Walker regarding her re-
turning to work after the strike began. Becquet testified
that on September 12, 1979, she first called Plant Super-
intendent Kenny Atkisson and then President Walker re-
garding returning to work. Regarding her conversation
with Walker, Becquet testified that she identified herself
and told Walker that she would like to come back to
work. Walker told her that he did not want to take her
back, that he did not like the business with the scab list. s
Walker told Becquet that he would check with his
lawyer and see if he had to take her back. Becquet told
Walker she did not think she had done anything wrong
and needed to come back to work. Walker said that he
6 Lehigh Lumber Company, and Brown-Borhek Company, 230 NLRB
1122, fn. 1 (1977).
Compare Larand Leisurelies Inc., 213 NLRB 197, fn. 4 (1974).
8 Becquet, and some of the other employees on the picket line, pre-
pared a list of employees that had crossed the picket line and reported to
work, and posted that list of employees on a board which was placed on
the picket line.
WALKER DIE CASTING, INC. 217
did not want any union officers or committeemen and a
few other people back in the plant.9
Pursuant to Walker's instructions, Becquet called
Walker back on September 14. At that time, Walker told
her that he was not taking her back to work and that she
could take whatever action she wanted. Walker said that
he had not gotten in touch with his lawyer but that he
had decided that he was not going to take Becquet back.
Becquet asked about a discharge slip so she could draw
unemployment and Walker told her that he could not
give her a paper, that he did not want her to draw un-
employment. Walker told her that she had quit when she
went out on strike. Walker said he was not going to take
any of the union officers back again. Walker told Bec-
quet that she was one of the ringleaders in the Union and
that she was trying to break him or that they were
trying to break him.
On September 23, after Becquet mailed Respondent a
certified letter requesting reinstatement, Walker phoned
her home. Walker told Becquet that she had placed him
in an awkward position and that he had to take her back
to work. Walker told her that she could come in on the
second shift as a trim press operator and that she was to
mind her own knitting. Walker also told Becquet that
her seniority would start the following day when she re-
ported to work-September 24.
Walker admitted telling Becquet that he did not want
to take her back if he did not have to. Walker also ad-
mitted that he told Becquet that he did not want to take
her back because she was involved in the incident re-
garding the sign which listed the names of those people
who had crossed the picket line and returned to work.
I find Becquet to be a straightforward witness. In view
of her testimony, and Walker's admission, I shall credit
her testimony in full. I find Walker's statements to Bec-
quet constitute threats not to reinstate employees because
of the employees' union activities. I also find Walker's
comment to Becquet that she was to mind her own knit-
ting when she returned to work constitutes a violation of
Section 8(a)(l).
Walker testified that the comment regarding Becquet
minding her own knitting was intended as a warning to
her not to get involved in other people's business and
had no reference to union activity. However, I note that
that comment was made in a context which would tend
to give the impression to any reasonable person that
Walker was referring to Becquet's union activities.
Walker had on three occasions informed Becquet that he
was unhappy with her because of her activities on the
picket line and because of her other activities on behalf
of the Union. Nothing was said in any of those conversa-
tions about Becquet interfering with other people's busi-
ness. Therefore, I find that that activity also constitutes
an 8(a)(1) violation.
(2) Threat to bust the Union
Wendell Pigg testified that while he was on strike,
some 2 weeks after the strike began, he came in the plant
' Becquet had served as an alternate on the Union's negotiation com-
mittee and had been present during the negotiation and bargaining ses-
sion.
to pick up his check. As he was picking up his check, he
had a conversation with President Walker. Walker told
Pigg that he would like for him to come back to work,
that Pigg had done a good job in the past, and that
Walker was satisfied with his work. Pigg replied that he
was not planning to come back until things were settled.
Walker then told Pigg that "he would-he was-he had
liked to, or something to that nature, get rid of the
Union-let me think-and some of the people in the
Union. He said that if he did get rid of it he would like
to run the company the way he had seen fit, or the way
he would like to, and if the people that was working
there wasn't satisfied that we could get a petition to get
another Union and if we would like to. He said he would
like to run it for at least a year."
When Robert Walker was questioned regarding Pigg's
testimony, he testified that he did not recall making any
specific statement to Pigg to the effect that he was trying
to break up the Union. Walker testified that he would
not have meant to put something in that kind of context.
Then Walker went on to say, "Of course, I would say
that I sat out as best I could once the strike started-we
did want to win."
In view of Walker's testimony in this regard, I shall
credit the testimony of Wendell Pigg, whom I found to
be a straightforward, candid witness. I find that Walker's
comments to Pigg constituted violations of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
(3) Promised higher wages
Stanley Galbraith testified about a conversation with
Walker at the plant which, in his affidavit, he recalled as
occurring on September 7. Galbraith testified that he
went in to pick up his check and Walker told him that
he would like for him to come back to work. Walker
stated that they were going to make some changes and
streamline the place of business, and that if Galbraith
came back, they would give him a merit raise plus what
was offered and that would bring him up to $4 an hour.
Galbraith testified that Walker told him the employees
under 45 days would be dismissed and there would be
some other people replaced. Galbraith testified that he
was making $3.45 an hour when the strike started.
I find Galbraith to be a straightforward witness and I
credit his testimony in this regard. I find that Walker's
comments to him constitute a violation of Section 8(aX1)
by offering higher wages as an inducement to abandon
the strike.
(4) It was in no hurry to negotiate and close the
plant
Ricky James testified that, while he was on strike, he
went back to the Company and talked to Walker around
the first week of October. James testified that Walker
asked if he and Jimmy Skinner (who was also present)
knew anything about the barn burning and the tire slash-
ing. According to James, Walker told them that he was
not in a great hurry to start back negotiating because the
economy was slow and he already had enough people
back to run the production that he needed to run, James
testified that he believed that Walker said that, if he had
WALKER DIE CASTING, INC.
218 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to hire everybody in the Union back, he was in no hurry
to start back the negotiations. Walker told Skinner that
he could come back the next day, but as to James,
Walker said there were some circumstances that made it
look like James did have a lot to do with harassment, the
barn burning, the tire slashing, and the harassment out
there on the picket line. James testified that later during
the conversation Walker said that, ever since Gary
McClendon came in as union president, he had tried to
run the Company and Walker said that he was not going
to let McClendon run his Company; if he had to let him,
he would shut the door.
Robert Wells testified that, while he was working at
the plant, about 2 or 3 weeks before the October 19 elec-
tion, he attended a meeting conducted by President
Walker. Wells testified that Walker told them that, if the
Union were voted back in before negotiations could
resume, there would have to be something done about
the tire slashing, the molten metal spilled on the floor,
and the barn burning.
I find both James and Wells to be straightforward wit-
nesses and I credit their testimony. I find Walker's com-
ments regarding negotiations if he had to rehire employ-
ees from the Union and his threat to shut down the plant
because of interference from the Union's president con-
stitute an 8(a)(1) violation as alleged by the General
Counsel.
(5) Lost seniority
When Cathy Becquet returned to work, she was told
by President Walker that her seniority would start on the
day of her return, September 24, 1979. As indicated
below, I credit the testimony of Becquet in this regard.
Respondent offered no explanation as to why a striking
employee should be penalized by loss of seniority upon
her return to work during the strike. Under the circum-
stances, I find in agreement with the General Counsel
that Walker's comments to Cathy Becquet constitute vio-
lation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
(6) Employees could not return to work until after
the election
David Shearin testified that during the strike, toward
the end of September, he went into the plant. Shearin
testified that, while he was there, Walker told him that
Respondent would be hiring again after the election. Mi-
chael Brewer testified that he received a notice from the
Company indicating that he had quit to return to school.
Brewer went into the plant and talked to Walker.
Brewer told Walker that he had not quit to return to
school. Walker told him not to worry about it, that it
was a form of bookkeeping. Walker said that he did not
have any work for Brewer at that time, but that he
would contact Brewer if he had work on a part-time
basis. Brewer testified that a few days before that con-
versation Walker told him that he did not have any
work, but that Brewer was to call him after the election.
Brewer testified that he attempted to vote in the October
19 election but that his vote was challenged by Respond-
ent.
Dewey Rowe testified that he talked to Walker at
Walker's home about 2 weeks before the election con-
cerning Rowe's returning to work. Rowe testified that
he asked Walker for his job back. Walker told him that
after October 191 ° he could have his job back. Accord-
ing to Rowe, Walker went on to tell him that he was not
planning on taking back the ones who stirred up trouble
on the line.
The above comments by Walker clearly give the im-
pression to employees that employment was being with-
held pending the October 19 decertification election.
Such an impression was corroborated by Respondent's
challenge to the ballot of Michael Brewer. By those
comments, Respondent was holding out to strikers that
either their future employment was conditioned upon the
outcome of the election or that employment was being
withheld until following the election, in order to permit
Respondent to limit the number of employees eligible to
vote in that election. Therefore, I find that Respondent's
comments tended to coerce employees in the exercise of
Section 7 rights and are therefore violative of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
(7) Removing picket signs
Paul Rowe testified that he was manning the picket
line on April 15, 1980. Rowe testified that he had left the
picket line and returned to see that the picket signs were
in order. As Rowe drove up to the line, he saw Robert
Walker with one picket sign under his arm and pulling
up the second picket sign. When Walker pulled the sign
up, he looked and saw Rowe. Walker walked over with
the picket signs and threw them in the back of Rowe's
truck. Rowe got out and asked Walker if he was going
to put the picket signs back. Walker walked over and
pulled up a third sign and threw it into Rowe's truck.
Rowe then said, "I guess you know you are going to put
my signs back." Walker replied, "Paul, if you want your
damn signs put up, you put them up."
Rowe also testified as to an incident he recalled occur-
ring on April 25, 1980. Rowe testified he had left the
picket line, but he circled the block and came back.
When he drove up, he observed John Walker grabbing
the picket signs and running into the plant with the signs.
Robert Walker admitted that he had pulled up the
picket signs on the occasion recalled by Paul Rowe.
Walker testified that he removed picket signs in order to
let some boys who were mowing the right-of-way area,
where the picket signs were staked, complete their
mowing. According to Walker's testimony, he told
Rowe that "you're lucky I don't take them up and tear
them up every night." Walker admitted that he threw
the signs in Paul Rowe's truck and did not replace them
where they originally staked on the right-of-way proper-
ty with joined property owned by Respondent.
John Walker did not testify.
I find the evidence supports the General Counsel's al-
legations regarding both Robert Walker and John
Walker removing picket signs. I find that that activity on
the part of Respondent tended to interfere with employ-
L' The election was held on October 19, 1979.
WALKER DIE CASTING, INC. 219
ees' rights and is therefore violative of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
(8) Surveillance
Employees Paul Rowe and Karen Wells testified that
they observed Robert Walker drive by the union hall on
several occasions on Sunday afternoon around 4 p.m.
when union meetings were being conducted. Wells testi-
fied that she attended most of the union meetings and
that on practically every occasion she had seen Walker
drive by around the time the meeting was being conduct-
ed. Wells testified that on one occasion she observed
Walker drive past the hall on three different occasions
during the same union meeting.
Robert Walker admitted that he has driven by the
union hall on Sundays and has observed employees there
for, what he believed to be, union meetings. Walker was
asked what reasons he had for driving by the meetings
and he testified that it just happened that his son lives
down Route 2 and that the street passing the union hall
is a "pretty good ways for me to go if I want to go out
there and see [my son]." Walker admitted that he knew
when the union meetings were held. Walker offered no
explanation as to why it was necessary to drive by the
union meeting on three occasions on the same Sunday
during a union meeting.
In determining this particular issue, I credit the testi-
mony of Karen Wells and Paul Rowe, both of whom I
found to be straightforward witnesses. I find Robert
Walker's testimony does not adequately explain, or sup-
port, his basis for driving past the union hall during
union meetings on such numerous occasions. I find that
his activities in that regard tend to interfere with em-
ployees' Section 7 rights and constitute violations of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
b. Allegations regarding Kenny Atkisson; informed
employees they would not be allowed to return to work
until after the election
Alfred W. Jett testified that while he was on strike
around October 10, 1979, he talked to Kenny Atkisson
about returning to work. Jett testified that Atkisson told
him that everything was slack and that everybody would
be back to work as of October 19. Atkisson was not
called to testify. Therefore, I credit the testimony of Jett.
In view of my findings above regarding the similar
comments made by Robert H. Walker, I find that Atkis-
son's comments constitute a violation of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
c. Allegations regarding Joe Wakham; no more
contracts
Herman Sparks testified that he was out on the picket
line during September when Supervisor Joe Wakham
came out to the picket line. Wakham asked Sparks to
help him pick up "nails or tacks or whatever." Wakham
asked Sparks, "Why don't you boys come back to
work?" Sparks replied that they could not come back
until they had a contract. Sparks testified that Wakham
told them, "You may as well come back, there won't be
any more contracts." Sparks testified that he told
Wakham that he felt they should get one. Wakham again
responded that "there won't be" and then he went into
the plant.
Wakham did not testify. Therefore, I credit the testi-
mony of Sparks. I find that Wakham's comments to him
constitute a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
d. Allegations regarding Buford Agent
Herman Sparks testified that he returned to work
around September 28, 1979. On the day Sparks returned
to work his assistant foreman on the second shift, Buford
Agent, talked to him at his machine. Sparks testified that
Agent told him that, after the Union got out, they were
going to have a good place to work. Agent did not tes-
tify. Therefore, I credit the testimony of Sparks. I find
that Agent's comments to Sparks constitute a violation of
Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
2. The 8(a)(3) allegations"
a. The probationary employees
On September 4, 1979, Respondent, through Robert
Walker, mailed the following letter to all its employees
who had not completed their probationary period and
who had not returned to work since the Union's August
18 strike:
TO: All Walker Die Casting Employees who have
not completed their probationary period and who
have not returned to work since the union's strike
against the Company began on August 18, 1979:
Due to the present general economic conditions,
the Company is cutting the number of people on
the work force. Therefore, effective September 5,
1979, the Company is terminating the employment
of all members of the work force who have not
completed their probationary periods and who have
not returned to work since the strike began.
If you are among these people terminated, you
may apply for re-employment as permanent replace-
ments for other employees who have not returned
to work.
Sincerely yours,
WALKER DIE CASTING, INC.
/s/ Robert H. Walker
Robert H. Walker, President
Encl.-Separation Notice
The General Counsel alleges that by terminating its
probationary employees on September 4, 1979, Respond-
ent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
" Although the following incidents are alleged as both 8(a)(3) and
8(aIl) violations, the primary basis on which the General Counsel rests
his claim of motivation as to most of the alleged discriminatees is the fact
that those alleged discriminatees did not report to work during the strike.
Therefore, technically an argument could be advanced that those matters
involved only alleged 8(a)(1) violations. However. the strike was called
by the Union. Therefore, I have extended my findings to include finding
both 8(a)3) as well as 8(a)(1) violations on the determination that, by
honoring the union-sponsored strike, the employees were engaged in
union activity.
WALKER DIE CASTING, INC. 9
220 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
It appears from the September letter itself that Re-
spondent is directing its action to all those employees
who observed the Union's strike. That assumption is
borne out by documents submitted into evidence by Re-
spondent which indicate that all the probationary em-
ployees except employee Charlie R. Williams was termi-
nated through Respondent's September 4 letter.1 2 The
document indicates that Charlie R. Williams returned to
work on August 30, 1979. Williams was not terminated.
The record reflects that, even though Respondent ter-
minated the probationary employees by its September 4
letter, there was work available in the plant. In fact, sev-
eral employees, including Wendell Pigg, Karen Wells,
and Robert Wells, testified that during that period of
time they were being asked by representatives of Re-
spondent, including Robert Walker, to return to work.
Moreover, Respondent offered no evidence demonstrat-
ing that it had a sound business reason for terminating
the probationary employees on September 4.
Therefore, I find that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(l) and (3) of the Act by terminating all its proba-
tionary employees who had not returned to work prior
to September 4, 1979.'3
b. Cathy Becquet
Cathy Becquet testified that she went out on strike
with the other employees on August 18. At the time of
the strike she was an alternate on the negotiation com-
mittee and was shop steward in the zinc department.
Becquet testified that she attended all the negotiating ses-
sions with Respondent.
On September 12, Becquet called Plant Superintendent
Atkisson and asked if she could return to work. Atkisson
responded that they did not need her then and that she
should check back with him on Friday. Becquet then im-
mediately called Robert Walker'4 and told him that she
wanted to return to work. Walker told her that he had
talked with Atkisson and that he did not want to take
her back. Walker told her that he "didn't like that busi-
ness with the scab list, and that he was going to check
with his lawyer to see if he had to take Becquet back."
Walker also told Becquet that he did not want any union
officer or committeeman and a few other people back in
the plant. 15
Pursuant to Walker's instructions, Becquet called back
on Friday, September 14, and talked to Walker. Walker
told her that he was not taking her back. Becquet asked
if she could get a discharge slip so that she could draw
unemployment. Walker responded that he did not want
12 Uncontested evidence demonstrates that Respondent terminated
probationary employees Dickie Adkins, Lacon Crossland, Sam Cook, Mi-
chael Cross, Robert Hayes, Michael Holder, Larry Jones, Jimmy Prince,
Larry Peters, E. W. Woodward, and David Wentzell on September 5,
1979.
' See Freezer Queen Foods, Inc., 249 NLRB 330 (1980); N.L.R.B. v.
Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967); National Seal, Division of
Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc., 141 NLRB 661 (1963), enforcement
denied 336 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1964).
"' Several of Becquet's conversations with Walker were also consid-
ered supra, under the section dealing with 8(a)(1) allegations.
l' Becquet and several other employees on the picket line prepared a
board which listed all the employees that had crossed the picket line and
returned to work.
her to draw unemployment. Walker then told Becquet
that she had quit when she went out on strike. Walker
said that he was not going to take any of the union offi-
cers and committeemen back again. He said that Becquet
was one of the ringleaders in the Union and that she was
trying to break him, or that they were trying to break
him.
Subsequently, Becquet sent Respondent a certified
letter stating that she was willing to return to work un-
conditionally.
On September 23, Walker called Becquet at her home
and told her that she had put him in an awkward posi-
tion and that he had to take her back to work. Walker
told her that she could come in at 3:30 on September
24-the second shift. Walker told her that she would be
getting a 32-cent-per-hour increase plus 20-cent shift
preference and that seniority would start on September
24. Becquet asked Walker how long she would be on the
second shift. " Walker told her maybe after the election
in October; if there were an opening on days, they
would talk about switching her to the first shift. Becquet
testified that she asked him why she was on the second
shift, why she could not work days because she had five
children and it was really difficult for her to work
second shift. Becquet told Walker that she had been on
the day shift for 3 years. Walker told her that he had no
openings and that he was offering her the second shift if
she wanted that.
Becquet testified that, when she received her first
check, she received the additional 32 cents per hour plus
the 20-cent shift differential plus an additional 10 cents
for being present each workday.
On November 2, Becquet was told that her father had
suffered a stroke while in California. On November 3,
Becquet requested her vacation and a leave of absence
beginning November 7 for the purpose of going to her
father in California. Becquet was told by Plant Superin-
tendent Atkisson that he would have to check with
Walker.
On Monday and Tuesday, November 5 and 6, Becquet
attempted to contact Atkisson regarding her request for
time off. However, on each of these occasions Atkisson
was not in the plant. On November 6, Becquet checked
with Assistant Plant Superintendent Lynn Chewning.
Becquet talked with Chewning twice on that day. On the
second occasion, according to Becquet's testimony,
Chewning told her that she could go ahead and go, that
he would work it out when she got back. As Becquet
was leaving, she reminded her foreman, Wesley Lang,
that she would not be there the next day. Lang respond-
ed that he had heard that she was going on a leave of
absence. Lang said that he hoped Becquet's father would
be all right.17
16 At the time of the strike Becquet was assigned to the first shift. Al-
though the General Counsel alleged that Becquet was assigned more
onerous conditions of employment on September 24, 1 find that the Gen-
eral Counsel proved that allegation only as to Becquet's employment
without benefit of her prior seniority. Even though Becquet was assigned
to the second shift, the General Counsel did not prove the availability of
work on the first shift for Becquet on September 24.
17 Testimony of Becquet concerning her conversation with Atkisson
and Lang stands unrebutted. Neither Atkisson nor Lang testified.
WALKER DIE CASTING, INC. 221
Becquet returned home from California on Thanksgiv-
ing evening. She discovered that attached to her pay-
check, which her husband had picked up at the plant on
November 16, was a dismissal slip.
Becquet went to the plant the following Tuesday, No-
vember 27, and talked with Plant Superintendent Atkis-
son. Becquet asked Atkisson why she had been fired. At-
kisson told her "that there was a different work situation
in the plant at that time; when I left they had plenty of
work, and when I came back they didn't have any work,
they had lost a lot of orders and contracts, and that they
were contemplating a layoff." Becquet then asked Atkis-
son why she had not been laid off and did not her senior-
ity count. Atkisson responded that that was the way
Walker wanted it. Becquet told Atkisson that she had
checked with Lynn Chewning because Atkisson was not
there and that Chewning had told her to go ahead and
go. Atkisson told her that she should talk to Walker
about that. Atkisson then commented that she had been a
good worker and that he would give her a good refer-
ence.
Becquet then went to see Walker and asked Walker
why she had been fired. Walker told her that she did not
get permission to leave, that he had checked with every-
one and that no one had given her permission to leave.
Becquet then asked if he had checked with Lynn
Chewning. Walker told her no, but that he would talk
with Chewning. He then asked Becquet to leave the
office.
Becquet was called back in the office a few minutes
later. Becquet asked what Chewning had said. Walker
said that Chewning said that he did not give Becquet
permission to go. Walker told her that it would have to
stand the way it was. Becquet then asked Walker about
going back to work or getting a layoff slip. Walker told
her that he did not want her drawing unemployment on
him. Walker said something about her husband not being
able to work in this area and asked why did she not
move to California.
In considering the merits of the allegations that Bec-
quet was discharged in violation of Section 8(a)(3), I
credit her testimony. In determining to credit Becquet, I
was impressed with her demeanor. As to conflicts be-
tween her testimony and that of Respondent's witnesses,
I note that Plant Superintendent Atkisson did not testify.
Therefore, her testimony regarding conversations with
Atkisson stands unrebutted. In regards to conflicts with
Becquet and President Robert Walker, I find Walker's
testimony in that regard to be incredible. I find particu-
larly incredible Walker's testimony as to the reasons why
Becquet was discharged around November 16. In that
regard, Walker testified that Plant Superintendent Atkis-
son told him that Becquet said she wanted a leave of ab-
sence to go to California to be with her father who was
ill. Walker testified that he and Atkisson discussed the
matter and decided to grant Becquet the leave of ab-
sence. However, according to Walker, Becquet was dis-
charged because she left on her trip for California with-
out contacting Atkisson. Walker went on to testify that
they felt that, if they permitted Becquet to leave without
checking back with Atkisson, they would have set a pre-
cedent. Walker's version of the events does not explain
why Respondent could not get word to Becquet on
either Monday or Tuesday, following her request for a
leave of absence, that that leave of absence had been
granted. Under the evidence available to me, it is uncon-
tested that Atkisson was not in the plant while Becquet
was present on either Monday or Tuesday. Obviously,
under those circumstances, Atkisson was well aware that
it was impossible for Becquet to contact him personally.
No explanation was offered why Atkisson, under the cir-
cumstances, did not simply leave word for Becquet that
her leave had been approved. Therefore, I am convinced
that Walker's testimony that they discharged Becquet be-
cause she failed to check back with Atkisson is not
worthy of belief.
As to the conflicts between Becquet's testimony and
the testimony of Assistant Plant Superintendent Lynn
Chewning, Chewning admitted that Becquet asked him
on several occasions, including the day before she left
for California, whether her request for a leave of absence
had been approved. Chewning testified that, in circum-
stances like that regarding Becquet, he would "probably
state that it would be OK with me, but she would have
to check with either Mr. Walker, or Kenny Atkisson."
He was asked if that was what he said to Becquet and
Chewning responded, "I presume it was." On cross-ex-
amination, Chewning testified that he could not recall
whether Atkisson was present in the plant on those occa-
sions when Becquet asked Chewning if her leave of ab-
sence had been approved. Chewning testified that he did
not have authority to grant a leave of absence, but he
also testified that during Atkisson's absence from the
plant he took over Atkisson's duties and responsibilities.
Therefore, as in the case of Walker, I find Chewning's
testimony incredible. If Plant Superintendent Atkisson
was not present, and the unrebutted testimony is to the
effect that he was absent, the normal thing for Chewning
to have done would have been to go to whatever
sources he needed to contact, either Walker or Atkisson,
and secure an answer to Becquet's question about ap-
proval of her leave. No explanation was offered as to
why this was not done. Additionally, I note that there is
a conflict between the testimony of Chewning and
Walker. According to the testimony of Chewning, Cathy
Becquet's request for a leave of absence was not ap-
proved. However, Walker testified that the matter had
been approved. Therefore, I find that I cannot credit the
testimony of either Walker or Chewning to the extent
that their testimony conflicts with that of Becquet.
In determining the allegation regarding Cathy Bec-
quet, I note that, when she was reinstated, pursuant to
her request, on September 24, she was informed that her
seniority would only run from that day-September 24,
1979. Respondent offered no business justification for
treating Becquet as a new employee regarding seniority.
Under the circumstances, I find that Becquet was denied
proper reinstatement"s even though she was placed back
'8 In view of my finding below that the strike was converted to an
unfair labor practice strike on August 27. Becquet was entitled to imme-
diate reinstatement from September 12, the date of her unconditional
offer. Becquet should have been reinstated without loss of seniority
( L.R.B. v, Mackay Radio d Telegraph Co., 304 US 333 (1938).)
WALKER DIE CASTING, INC. 221
222 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to work on September 24, due to her participation in the
strike which began on August 18. Therefore, since Bec-
quet was never properly reinstated, she was entitled to
full remedies as an 8(a)(3) discriminatee from September
12, 1979.
Additionally, I find that Becquet's discharge on or
about November 16, 1979, was due to her union activi-
ties. The circumstances convinced me that Respondent's
asserted bases for her discharge were pretextual. In that
regard, I notice that representatives of Respondent gave
conflicting opinions as to the basis of Becquet's dis-
charge.t 9 Plant Superintendent Atkisson informed Bec-
quet that she was discharged because during her absence
there had been a reduction in available work and she
was no longer needed. However, President Walker testi-
fied that Becquet was discharged because she failed to
recheck with Plant Superintendent Atkisson in order to
determine whether her request for a leave of absence had
been granted. Moreover, under the circumstances set out
in the testimony of Walker, I find the evidence convinc-
ing that Walker's testimony did not reveal the true
reason why Becquet was discharged. I am unconvinced
that no valuable employee, like Becquet, would be dis-
charged for failing to recheck with the plant superin-
tendent regarding a request for a leave of absence under
the circumstances present in her case. The record stands
uncontested that Atkisson was not present during the last
two periods Becquet worked prior to leaving for Califor-
nia. It was apparent to Atkisson and Walker that Bec-
quet had a real need to leave during the time requested.
It was also apparent that Atkisson could have easily left
word with Chewning or any other official that Becquet's
leave had been approved.
In view of my findings that conflicting versions were
given as the bases for Becquet's discharge, and my find-
ings at the bases asserted were pretextual, I am con-
vinced, and find, that the true reason why Becquet was
discharged was her union activities.
C. The refusal to reinstate
The complaint alleges that certain employees listed
below on Appendix A made unconditional offers to
return to work, but that Respondent has failed and re-
fused to reinstate those employees.20
The evidence supports the General Counsel's allega-
tion as to specific employees mentioned in General
Counsel's Exhibit II plus employees Cathy Becquet and
Michael Wayne Brewer. 21 Additionally, all striking em-
ployees were entitled to reinstatement upon the uncondi-
tional offer made on their behalf by the Union on Febru-
ary 11, 1980.22
I' Sam and Margaret Foods, Inc.. d/b/a Clock Restaurant No. Seven-
teen, 212 NLRB 432 (1974).
20 By amendment near the close of the hearing, the General Counsel
expanded his allegation in par. 16 of the amended consolidated complaint
to include all employees listed on G.C. Exh. 11 (a compilation of uncon-
ditional offers received by Respondent). Additionally, by that amend-
ment, the General Counsel alleged that the Union made an unconditional
offer to return all strikers by letter dated February 11, 1980.
21 As to Becquet and Brewer, see footnotes on Appendix A, below.
22 Of course, each striking employee is entitled to reinstatement on the
basis of the earliest unconditional offer made by him or on his behalf.
In view of my findings below that the strike was con-
verted to an unfair labor practice strike on August 27,
1979, each striking employee is entitled to immediate re-
instatement upon an unconditional offer to return to
work. The evidence indicates that many of the employ-
ees who unconditionally offered to return have not been
reinstated. In that regard, striking employees are entitled
to preference in employment over persons employed on
or after the date the strike was converted to an unfair
labor practice strike.23
Therefore, I find that those employees listed on Ap-
pendix A who were denied proper or timely reinstate-
ment were deprived of their rights in that regard in vio-
lation of Section 8(a)(3). 24
3. The 8(a)(2) allegations
Wendell Pigg testified that in a meeting before the Oc-
tober 19 election Robert Walker told the employees at
that meeting that he would like to try running the plant
with a committee to take care of the problems they
would have and that he would like to try that for 1 year
and then, if the people were not satisfied, he would agree
to a petition for another union. Pigg also testified that
Walker said that the committee would be made up of
some employees there inside the plant and that any of
the problems brought up would be brought up before
them (the committee) and that they would take care of
it.
Pigg testified that a committee was established some 4
to 6 weeks prior to June 16, 1980-the date he testified
at the hearing herein. Pigg testified that one of the em-
ployees on the committee was Johnny Flippen, an em-
ployee who works with Pigg.
On December 19, 1979, Respondent posted a notice to
employees in its plant which stated, in part:
To: OUR EMPLOYEES
FROM: R. H. WALKER
Immediately upon our return to work on January
2, 1980, we will begin discussing how to set up rep-
resentation for our employees and procedures to
handle grievances. You will recall a notice posted
on the bulletin board on October 11, in which we
said "it will be up to our employees as to how rep-
23 Mastro Plastics Corp.. et al. v. V.L.R.B., 350 U.S. 270, (1956).
24 Respondent discharged a number of striking employees on the asser-
tion that those employees were, according to Respondent's information,
employed by another employer during the strike. Although not specifi-
cally alleged as violative of Sec. 8(a)3), that issue bears upon the allega-
tion of refusal to reinstate. In order to justify the discharge of striking
employees, the employer has the burden of establishing legitimate and
substantial business justification for its action. "[U]nless the employer
who refuses to reinstate strikers can show that his action was due to 'le-
gitimate and substantial business justifications,' he is guilty of an unfair
labor practice. N.L.R.B. v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967).
The burden of proving justification is on the employer. N.L.R.B. v.
Fleetwood Trailer Co.. Inc., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967)." See Bromine Divi-
sion, Drug Research. Inc., 233 NLRB 253. 261 (1977). No probative evi-
dence was offered in justification of Respondent's discharge of those em-
ployees. Therefore, I find that those persons retain their status as employ-
ees and. if they were included as strikers who made. or upon whose
behalf the Union made, an unconditional offer for them to return to
work, are also entitled to immediate and full reinstatement.
WALKER DIE CASTING, INC. 223
resentation and grievance procedures may be set up
and handled after the election."
Please be thinking about how you would like to
see this done. The Company feels if we have the
input of everyone we can work out an organization
which will be efficient and fair for all of us.
R. H. Walker
On May 9, 1980, Respondent posted another notice to
employees which stated as follows:
HOTLINE!
May 9, 1980
To: OUR EMPLOYEES
FROM: R. H. WALKER
We are now setting up a temporary grievance
procedure which we plan to use until our lawyer
advises we can set up a permanent, more formal,
grievance procedure without risk of committing an
unfair labor practice. The following employees have
agreed to serve as the temporary grievance commit-
tee:
Johnny Flippen
Steve Wakham
Vivian Whitworth
Walter George
Allen Goodrich
This committee has elected Johnny Flippen,
Chairman; Walter George, Vice-Chairman; and
Vivian Whitworth, Secretary. Kenneth Atkisson,
Lynn Chewning, and R. H. Walker are working
with this committee to set up the procedure which
we will use to process grievances.
We will continue to operate, as we promised, ac-
cording to the rules and procedures of the old con-
tract, as modified by the Company's last offer to
our employees. All members of the grievance com-
mittee have copies of this and we have copies in the
office for anyone desiring one. As soon as we have
the temporary grievance procedure worked out, we
will prepare copies of it, as well as our rules and
other procedures, and distribute one copy to each
employee.
/s/ Robert H. Walker
Then, on June 6, 1980, Respondent distributed the fol-
lowing notice to employees:
To OUR EMPLOYEES
With the checks which you receive today, we are
enclosing a copy of our Temporary Grievance Pro-
cedure. Your Company wants to know your griev-
ances, problems or complaints so we may take
action to rectify them or prevent them from hap-
pening again. It is the feeling of your Company that
the Temporary Grievance Procedure is an addition-
al means which will help to make it easier for you
to let us know what your problems, complaints and
grievances are or may be. We hope very much that
you will always let us know what problems exist
for we cannot correct a problem we are not aware
of. You can be sure that we will do our best to cor-
rect and rectify problems, grievances and com-
plaints and continue to strive to make Walker Die
Casting the best place to work which can be found.
/s/ Robert H. Walker
Robert H. Walker, President
Walker testified that the above June 6, 1980, notice
was distributed to employees with their paychecks.
Robert Walker testified that the employee members of
the grievance committee were asked to serve on that
committee by him. Walker testified that the committee
has held a number of meetings and that, in addition to
the members of the committee, Assistant Plant Superin-
tendent Lynn Chewning and he (Robert Walker) were
present at the meetings. Minutes of the meetings were
typed by Respondent's receptionist. Walker testified that
members of the committee were paid for the time they
spent in committee meetings.
Walker admitted that employee complaints were
brought up during this meeting and matters relating to
employees' working conditions were discussed. Walker
testified that some of those problems relating to employ-
ees' working conditions were remedied as a result of
steps directed by supervision, following discussing of
those problems during committee meetings. During one
of the committee meetings, matters relating to employ-
ees' vacations were discussed and a procedure was estab-
lished whereby an employee could take extra days of va-
cation whenever a week's notice was given.
I find that, in accord with the above evidence and the
record as a whole, Respondent did recognize and bar-
gain with the committee of employees established by it.
The committee was established around May 9, 1980, and
the evidence indicates that Respondent has continued to
recognize and negotiate with the committee since that
time. I find in agreement with the General Counsel that
Respondent's actions in that regard constitute a violation
of Section 8(a)(2) of the Act. 25 In view of evidence that
there were no negotiations between the Union and Re-
spondent after September 11, 1979, and my finding
below that Respondent was obligated to continue to rec-
ognize the Union, I find in agreement with the General
Counsel's complaint allegation that Respondent also vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) by unilaterally implementing the
employee committee.
4. The 8(a)(5) allegations
a. Withdrawing its last offer
By memo dated August 20, which Robert Walker
posted on the bulletin board and mailed to all striking
employees, Respondent notified employees of the details
of its last contractual offer, suggested that the employees
25 N.LR.B. v. Cabot Carbon Company and Cabot Shops. Inc. 360 U.S.
203 (1959); The Carpenter Steel Company, 76 NLRB 670 (1948); Wahlgren
Magnetics. a Division of Marshall Industries, 132 NLRB 1613 (1961);
Thompson Ramo Wooldridge. Inc. (Dage Television Division), 132 NLRB
993 (1961); Oil Transport Company, 182 NLRB 1016 (1970); STR. Inc..
d/b/a Sound Technology Research, 221 NLRB 496 (1975), enfd. 549 F.2d
641 (9th Cir. 1977).
WALKER DIE CASTING, NC. 23
224 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
should inform the negotiating committee if they felt Re-
spondent's offer was reasonable, and offered to pay any
employee who reported to work the new wage rates
proposed by the Company.
On August 27, 1979, Respondent sent the following
letter:
Mr. Gary McClendon, President
Local No. 259, Stove, Furnace and Allied Appli-
ance Workers' Union
RFD #2
Cornersville, TN 37047
Dear Mr. McClendon:
The final proposal which was made to you and
the members of your negotiating committee on
August 17, 1979, was contingent on acceptance of
that offer without a work stoppage.
Since Local 259 elected to reject that offer and
calls a strike on August 18, 1979, the Company's
last offer is hereby withdrawn.
Yours truly,
WALKER DIE CASTING, INC.
/s/ Robert H. Walker
Robert H. Walker, President
The General Counsel alleged that, by withdrawing its
last offer on August 20, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) and (5). 1 agree with the General Counsel. While
Respondent's obligations under Section 8(a)(5) are limit-
ed, both the courts and the Board have continuously
held that employers have an obligation to negotiate in
good faith. The parties negotiated in progressive fashion
throughout August. Although the employees decided to
strike when the past contract expired on August 18, that
act did not release Respondent from its obligation to
continue to bargain in good faith. However, Respondent,
by the above-quoted letter, effectively terminated negoti-
ations.
The Board in the case of Randle-Eastern Ambulance
Service, Inc., etc.,2 6 found that an employer violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) by withdrawing all its contract proposals. In
Randle-Eastern, the employer withdrew its proposals
during a negotiation session in which it, the employer,
offered to present a new proposal which would include
an entire package. Here, Respondent made no such offer.
Respondent's letter offered nothing more than removal
of its entire negotiation package-in effect, Respondent
rescinded all the progress achieved during its summer
negotiations with the Union. Moreover, while it rescind-
ed the negotiation progress, Respondent made no offer
to negotiate further. The record shows that as late as
June 19, 1980, when this hearing closed, Respondent had
not resumed negotiations with the Union.
It is true that an RD petition was filed and processed
during the interval between Respondent's August 27
letter and June 19. However, that petition which was
filed on September 6, 1979, was dismissed by the Region
26 230 NLRB 542 (1977), enforcement denied in part 584 F.2d 720 (5th
Cir. 1978).
on February 7, 1980. Nevertheless, no negotiations have
occurred since that date.
During the interval since February 7, Respondent
formed a labor organization among its employees. (See
sec. B,3, above.)
Under those circumstances, I find the evidence persua-
sive that Respondent, by its August 27 letter to the
Union, engaged in bad-faith bargaining in violation of
Section 8(a)(5).
b. Unilateral changes
The General Counsel alleged that Respondent unilater-
ally implemented a wage increase in excess of those of-
fered during negotiations. Undisputed evidence supports
that allegation.
As indicated above in section B,l,a,3, I found that Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by offering striking em-
ployees higher wages as an inducement to break the
strike and return to work. President Robert Walker ad-
mitted that he decided to raise the starting pay to a mini-
mum of $4 an hour after the strike commenced on
August 18, 1979. Walker testified that the increased mini-
mum rate went into effect on September 5, 1979.
There is no dispute regarding the General Counsel's
contention that the $4 minimum starting rate was in
excess of what Respondent offered during negotiations.
Respondent, in its brief, admits that Respondent's August
14, 1979, economic proposal proposed a $3.30-per-hour
minimum rate. However, Respondent argues that the
Union evidenced no interest in negotiating a minimum
starting rate and that, in any event, the Union waived
any claim of unilateral minimum rates because Respond-
ent had during the existence of the bargaining agreement,
which expired in August 1979, regularly employed few
employees at rates above those set forth in the agree-
ment. The contract provided starting rates ranging from
$2.40 to $3 per hour, but Respondent regularly hired em-
ployees from $3.30 to $3.40 per hour and employed some
new die casters at rates as high as $4 and $4.15 per hour
approximately 30 days before the strike. The Union ad-
mittedly knew Respondent hired employees at higher
rates.
President Walker, when he admitted that Respondent
decided to pay $4 as a minimum starting rate, testified
that he did so in order to get better employees.
The General Counsel also alleged that Respondent
unilaterally implemented an attendance bonus and unilat-
erally made the attendance bonus applicable on a weekly
basis, then changing it to monthly, and back to weekly
again. Respondent points out that it did propose a
monthly attendance bonus of 10 cents per hour during
negotiations. However, Respondent does not contest that
it did implement a 10-cent-per-hour monthly attendance
bonus after the strike which was expanded to include
giving company jackets to employees who earned the at-
tendance bonus in December 1979. In January 1980, Re-
spondent began paying the bonus on a weekly basis. Nei-
ther the awarding of jackets nor the change from month-
ly to weekly basis of computing the attendance bonus
was mentioned during negotiations with the Union.
WALKER DIE CASTING, INC. 225
Both the Board and the courts have expressed concern
with an employer's ability to undermine the negotiations
process through unilateral changes. That concern has
been voiced especially in situations involving wage in-
creases where the increase is contemporaneous with a
strike.2 7 Such unilateral action is a strong indication that
the employer is not bargaining with the required good
faith.
I find the circumstances here particularly alarming in
that regard. Upon its employees striking over the parties
inability to reach a collective-bargaining agreement be-
cause of disputes involving, among other things, wages,
Respondent, on August 27, withdrew completely its last
proposal. Shortly thereafter, on September 5, Respond-
ent, without further negotiations or notice to the Union,
instituted a minimum wage substantially higher than its
offer to the Union during negotiations.
I find little support for Respondent's arguments in de-
fense of its unilateral actions. Although the Union had,
during harmonious relations, during existence of the last
agreement, permitted minimum rates in excess of the
contract provisions, there is no indication that the Union
intended thereby to waive its right to bargain over
wages. In fact, just the opposite occurred. During
August the Union and Respondent negotiated with re-
spect to wages. Moreover, I place little significance in
testimony from Respondent that the Union showed little
interest in negotiating the minimum rates. Obviously, a
union is more concerned from a tactical standpoint,
during negotiations, with first reaching agreement on the
higher level of wages. Since the parties had not agreed
on those higher levels, I do not find it surprising that the
Union appeared uninterested in discussing the minimums.
I do not view that testimony as demonstrating that the
Union had no interest in negotiating minimum rates, es-
pecially since the last contract contained minimum rate
provisions. Therefore, I find that the Union did not
waive its bargaining rights regarding minimum wages.
No evidence was offered which would demonstrate
that the Union ceased to be the exclusive representative
of the unit employees.2 8 Respondent, by implementing
changes in its minimum rates, changing the attendance
bonus system, and awarding company jackets to employ-
ees that earned the attendance bonus, without first noti-
fying the Union and offering to negotiate those items, en-
gaged in unilateral acts in violation of Section 8(aX5).
c. Refusal to bargain since September 1, 1979
Respondent does not dispute that it notified the Union
on September 11, 1979, that no further negotiations
could be scheduled until the petition in the recently filed
decertification case was resolved.2 9
The law is clear that the filing of a decertification peti-
tion is not sufficient basis to justify an employer's refusal
to bargain when, as here, Respondent's action occurred
in context with unlawful conduct.3 0 Respondent's Sep-
27 See N.LR.B. v. Fitzgerald Mills Corporation, 313 F.2d 260 (2d Cir.
1963); Trinity Valley Iron and Steel Company. etc., 127 NLRB 417 (1960).
28 See sec. B,4,c, below.
29 See fn. 3, supra.
30 Autoprod. Inc., 223 NLRB 773 (1976); Lammert Industries. a division
of Componetrol. Inc.. etc., 229 NLRB 895 (1977).
tember I I termination of negotiations occurred in a con-
text of numerous 8(a)(1) and (5) violations. As shown
above, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) on various
occasions before September 11, and Section 8(a)(5) on
August 16, when it advised its employees to resign from
the Union and cross the picket line. On August 27, Re-
spondent illegally withdrew its last contract offer. On
September 5, Respondent unilaterally instituted an illegal
increase in its minimum wage rate. In this regard, I note
that President Walker actually suggested to employees
that he would like to get rid of the Union. (See above.)
"Such conduct directly affected all unit employees and
could have reasonably been predicted to cause employee
disaffection." Autoprod, Inc., supra.
No negotiations have occurred since Respondent ter-
minated negotiations on September 11. Moreover, its
subsequent illegal conduct, especially its recognition of
another labor organization in May 1980, is totally incom-
patible with its obligation to negotiate with the Union.
Additionally, no evidence was offered which demon-
strated that, when Respondent terminated negotiations,
reasonable grounds existed for believing that the Union
had lost its majority status. Autoprod, Inc., supra at 779.
Therefore, I find that Respondent, by terminating ne-
gotiations on September 11, and thereafter continuing to
refuse to negotiate with the Union, violated Section
8(a)(5) of the Act.
C. Was the Strike Converted to a ULP Strike?
Under the circumstances herein, I find the evidence
proves that the employees' strike was converted to an
unfair labor practice strike on August 27, 1979, when Re-
spondent withdrew its last contract proposal.
Repondent's action on that occasion and subsequently,
as outlined above, seriously impeded the success of the
negotiations and thus prolonged the strike and its settle-
ment (Randle-Eastern Ambulance Service, 230 NLRB
542).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent, Walker Die Casting, Inc., is an employ-
er engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Local 259, Stove, Furnace, and Allied Appliance
Workers' International Union of North America, AFL-
CIO, and Employee Committee are labor organizations
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent, by threatening not to reinstate employ-
ees because of the employees' union activities; threaten-
ing employees that they were to mind their own knitting
when they returned to work because of their union activ-
ities; threatening to get rid of the Union; offering wage
increases in order to induce its employees to break the
strike and return to work; telling employees that, if it
had to reinstate everybody in the Union, it was in no
hurry to start back to negotiations; threatening to shut
the door of the plant rather than continuing to deal with
the union president; telling its employee that, by return-
ing to work after engaging in the strike, she had lost her
seniority status; informing employees that they would
not be considered for employment until after the decerti-
WALKER DIE CASTING, INC.
226 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
fication election; removing its employees' picket signs;
engaging in surveillance of its employees' union activi-
ties; threatening its employees that there would be no
more collective-bargaining agreements with the Union;
and telling its employees that they would have a good
place to work once the Union was defeated, violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. Respondent, by discharging its probationary em-
ployees on or about September 5, 1979; by refusing to re-
instate its employee Cathy Becquet on September 12,
1979, by refusing to reinstate Cathy Becquet on Septem-
ber 24 without loss of seniority privileges, and discharg-
ing Cathy Becquet on November 16 because of her
union activities; and by refusing to reinstate its employ-
ees, who were engaged in an unfair labor practice strike,
following unconditional offers to return to work by or
on behalf of those employees, violated Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act.
5. Respondent, by soliciting and appointing employees
to an employee grievance committee, and recognizing
and bargaining with the Employee Committee since on
or about May 9, 1980, has dominated and interfered with
the formation or administration of a labor organization in
violation of Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act.
6. Respondent, by advising its employees to resign
from the Union; by withdrawing its last contract propos-
al; unilaterally changing its minimum wage rates; unilat-
erally changing other conditions of employment; unilat-
erally establishing an employee grievance committee; and
by refusing to negotiate with the Union since September
11, 1979, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
7. The strike among Respondent's employees which
commenced on August 18, 1979, was converted to an
unfair labor practice strike by Respondent's unfair labor
practices on August 27, 1979.
8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1), (2), (3),
and (5) of the Act, and having found that the strike of
Respondent's employees was converted to an unfair
labor practice strike on August 27, 1979, I shall recom-
mend that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist
therefrom and to take certain affirmative actions de-
signed to effectuate the policies of the Act. My recom-
mended Order will require Respondent to offer employ-
ees Cathy Becquet, Dickie Adkins, Lacon Crossland,
Sam Cook, Michael Cross, Robert Hayes, Michael
Holder, Larry Jones, Jimmy Prince, Larry Peters, E. W.
Woodward, David Wentzell, and those employees named
in Appendix A, reinstatement to their former jobs or, if
those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent po-
sitions, without prejudice to their seniority or other
rights and privileges. I shall further recommend that Re-
spondent be ordered to make whole the employees men-
tioned above for any loss of earnings they may have suf-
fered as a result of the discrimination against them,31 and
that it post appropriate notices. Loss of backpay shall be
computed and interest thereon shall be added in the
manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90
NLRB 289 (1950), and Florida Steel Corporation, 231
NLRB 651 (1977).32
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following:
ORDER3 3
The Respondent, Walker Die Casting, Inc., Lewis-
burg, Tennessee, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interfering with, restraining, and coercing the em-
ployees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed to them
in Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act by threatening not to reinstate employees be-
cause of the employees' union activities; threatening em-
ployees that they were to mind their own knitting when
they returned to work because of their union activities;
threatening to get rid of the Union; offering wage in-
creases in order to induce its employees to break the
strike and return to work; telling employees that, if it
had to reinstate everybody in the Union, it was in no
hurry to start back to negotiations; threatening to shut
the door of the plant rather than continuing to deal with
the union president; telling its employee that, by return-
ing to work after engaging in the strike, she had lost her
seniority status; informing employees that they would
not be considered for employment until after the decerti-
fication election; removing its employees' picket signs;
engaging in surveillance of its employees' union activi-
ties; threatening its employees that there would be no
more collective-bargaining agreements with the Union;
and telling its employees that they would have a good
place to work once the Union was defeated.
(b) Refusing to reinstate its employees and discharging
its employees and thereafter failing and refusing to rein-
state those employees because of the employees' concert-
ed activities or union activities.
(c) Dominating, assisting, and contributing to the sup-
port of, or interfering with, the Employee Committee,
provided, however, that nothing in this Order shall re-
quire or authorize Respondent to vary or abandon any
wage, hour, seniority, or other substantive benefit it has
established for its employees because of the aforesaid
agreement, or to prejudice the assertion by its employees
3a As to employees Adkins, Crossland, Cook, Cross, Hayes, Holder.
Jones, Prince, Peters, Woodward, and Wentzell, backpay should run
from the date of their discharge. September 5, 1979. See Abilities and
Goodwill, Inc., 241 NLRB 27 (1979). Although employee Cathy Becquet
was also discharged, her backpay should be computed from September
12, 1979, when she was first denied reinstatement pursuant to her uncon-
ditional offer to return to work.
3Z See, generally, Isis Plumbing d Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
3 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided
in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
WALKER DIE CASTING, INC. 227
of any rights they derived as a result of said agreement;
and further provided that nothing herein shall be con-
strued as prohibiting its employees from forming, joining,
or assisting any labor organization.
(d) Recognizing the Employee Committee, or any suc-
cessor thereto, as a representative of its employees con-
cerning wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or
any other terms and conditions of employment.
(e) Refusing to recognize or bargaining collectively
with Local 259, Stove, Furnace, and Allied Appliance
Workers' International Union of North America, AFL-
CIO, as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative
of the employees in the unit described below:
All production and maintenance employees, includ-
ing shipping, receiving, and tool crib employees, ex-
cluding all office clerical employees, technical and
professional employees, and supervisors as defined
in the Act.
(f) Unilaterally, without bargaining with, Local 259,
Stove, Furnace, and Allied Appliance Workers' Interna-
tional Union of North America, AFL-CIO, as the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative of the employ-
ees in the above-described unit, changing wages or other
conditions of employment or unilaterally establish an em-
ployee committee.
(g) In any other manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
deemed to be necessary to effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Offer Cathy Becquet, Dickie Adkins, Lacon Cross-
land, Sam Cook, Michael Cross, Robert Hayes, Michael
Holder, Larry Jones, Jimmy Prince, Larry Peters, E. W.
Woodward, David Wentzell, and the employees listed
herein in Appendix A, immediate and full reinstatement
to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to
substantially equivalent positions without prejudice to
their seniority or other rights and privileges, discharging,
if necessary, any replacements hired on or after August
27, 1979.
(b) Make the above-named employees whole for any
loss of pay they may have suffered as a result of the dis-
crimination against them in the manner set forth in the
section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(c) Withdraw and withhold recognition from and com-
pletely disestablish the Employee Committee or any suc-
cessor thereto as a representative of its employees for the
purpose of collective bargaining, including the settlement
of grievances. 3 4
(d) Upon request, bargain with Local 259, Stove, Fur-
nace, and Allied Appliance Workers' International Union
of North America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive repre-
sentative of all the employees in the aforesaid appropri-
ate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment.
(e) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, time-
34 Sound Technology Research, supro.
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other re-
cords necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
(f) Post at its Lewisburg, Tennessee, plant copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix B." 35 Copies of
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 26, after being duly signed by an authorized
representative of Respondent, shall be posted by it imme-
diately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for
60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, in-
cluding all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Re-
spondent to insure that said notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material.
(g) Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
35 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX A
Employees and their dates of unconditional offers re-
ceived by Respondent
Cathy Becquet'
Alfred Jett
Dewey W. Rowe2
Michael W. Brewer 3
Charles E. McCord
Ann Derryberry
Eddie Ward
Clyde Erwin
Sherry Willoughby
David Sherin
Chit Derryberry
James D. Flowers
Gary McClendon
Wesley Poteete
Sandra D. Luna
Jimmy Winchester
Raymond Osborne
Edel Sparks
Eugene Pullen
Roy Rowe
Paul Rowe
James Stewart
Becky Gillium
William F. Stewart
Margaret Neill
Karon P. Wells 4
Nancy Reed
John Liggett
Stanley Galbraith
Marie Logue
Ruby Eckenroth
Larry S. Hopper
9-12-79
10-23-79
10-5-79 &
10-23-79
10-17-80
10-23-79
10-23-79
12-05-79
10-23-79
10-24-79
10-23-79 &
1-23-80
10-23-79
1-10-80
11-01-79
10-24-79
10-27-79
10-31-79
10-31-79
1-05-80
10-23-79
10-23-79
10-23-79
10-23-79
10-23-79
10-23-79
10-23-79
10-23-79
10-23-79
10-23-79
10-24-79
10-24-79
10-26-79
10-30-79
WALKER DIE CASTING, INC.
228 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Shirley P. Metcalf
Nancy Diane Smith
Sam L. Cook, Jr.
Ben Porterfield
William F. Davis
Thomas R. Smith
Roy Garrett
Ronnie L. Burns
Wilburn Phillips
James Stegall
Chestley Derryberry
Mark Welch
William E. Taylor
Bill D. Spence
Eddie Ward
Frankie Moore
Wendell J. Rowe
Jackie Metcalf
10-31-79
1-10-80
1-10-80
1-11-80
1-11-80
1-11-80
1-19-80
1-21-80
1-21-80
1-21-80
1-23-80
1-23-80
1-23-80
1-23-80
1-28-80
2-11-80
2-12-80
2-22-80
Mark Welch
Denise Luker
3-31-80
2-12-80
I Although Cathy Becquet is not included on Respondent's list
of employees who made unconditional offers, testimony which I
have credited shows that Becquet first unconditionally offered to
return to work to Respondent orally on September 12, 1979.
2 Dewey Rowe testified that he offered to return to work about
2 weeks before the election. I have credited that testimony.
3 Michael W. Brewer was not listed on Respondent's list of em-
ployees who have made unconditional offers. However, the evi-
dence, which I credit, demonstrates that Brewer talked with both
Plant Superintendent Atkisson and President Walker on October
17 or 18, 1979, about returning to work after he (Brewer) had re-
ceived a separation slip from Respondent. I find that Brewer's in-
quiry on that date constitutes an unconditional offer to return to
work.
4 Karon P. Wells may be the same person that testified during
the hearing herein-Karen Wells. If so, the record reflects, and I
find, that Wells was terminated on October 3, 1979, pursuant to
Respondent's policy (which was included in the last collective-bar-
gaining agreement) not to employ both husband and wife. Mrs.
Wells' husband, Robert L. Wells, had returned to work from the
strike on September 25, and was working at the time of his wife's
termination. I find that Mrs. Wells was terminated for legitimate
and substantial business reasons. Therefore, if she is Karon Wells,
she is not entitled to reinstatement following her October 23 offer.
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