Visa International Service AssociationDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardDec 21, 20212021002553 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 21, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/340,344 07/24/2014 Matthew DILL 079900-0910619 (671US02) 2000 66945 7590 12/21/2021 Visa / Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22 1100 Peachtree Street Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309 EXAMINER GETACHEW, WODAJO ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3685 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/21/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): KTSDocketing2@kilpatrick.foundationip.com ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte MATTHEW DILL, PRASANNA L. NARAYAN, GLENN POWELL, JOHN F. SHEETS, and ANDREW CARPENTER ____________ Appeal 2021-002553 Application 14/340,3441 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before ANTON W. FETTING, JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, and JAMES P. CALVE, Administrative Patent Judges. FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s Final Rejection2 of claims 1, 5, 9–11, 15, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28, and 30. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies Visa International Service Association as the real party in interest (Appeal Br. 2). 2 All references to the Final Office Action refer to the Final Office Action mailed on April 15, 2020. Appeal 2021-002553 Application 14/340,344 2 SUMMARY OF DECISION We affirm. THE INVENTION Appellant states its invention relates to a “network token system provid[ing] a platform that can be leveraged by various entities such as third party wallet providers, merchants, acquirers, payment processors, etc. that use tokens to facilitate payment transactions.” Spec. ¶ 5. Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on appeal. 1. A method, comprising: receiving, by a server computer, a payment token request comprising a real account identifier from a token requestor computer; performing, by the server computer, an authentication method from among a plurality of authentication methods on the real account identifier or a holder of the real account identifier; based on performing the authentication method, determining, by the server computer, a token assurance level as a level of confidence that the payment token to represent the real account identifier was requested by a genuine account holder of the real account identifier; transmitting, by the server computer, the payment token representing the real account identifier to the token requestor computer; receiving, by an authorization module of the server computer from a merchant computer, an authorization request message comprising the payment token for a transaction; determining, by the authorization module of the server computer, the real account identifier associated with the payment token; generating, by the authorization module of the server computer, a modified authorization request message comprising Appeal 2021-002553 Application 14/340,344 3 the real account identifier and the token assurance level associated with the payment token; transmitting, by the authorization module of the server computer, the modified authorization request message including the real account identifier and the token assurance level to an issuer computer for approval, wherein the issuer computer approves of the transaction based at least upon the token assurance level, generates an authorization response message comprising the real account identifier, and transmits the authorization response message comprising the real account identifier to the server computer; receiving, by the server computer from the issuer computer, the authorization response message comprising the real account identifier; modifying by the server computer the authorization response message to include the payment token and the token assurance level; and transmitting, by the server computer, the modified authorization response message including the token assurance level and the payment token to the merchant computer. THE REJECTIONS Claims 1, 5, 9–11, 15, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28, and 30 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more. Claims 1, 5, 9–11, 15, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28, and 30 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. Claims 1, 5, 9–11, 15, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28, and 30 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA), second paragraph, as being indefinite. Appeal 2021-002553 Application 14/340,344 4 FINDINGS OF FACT We adopt the Examiner’s findings as set forth on pages 2–10, 20–30 in the Final Office Action and on pages 3–13, in the Examiner’s Answer, concerning only the 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection. ANALYSIS 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) REJECTION In rejecting claims 1, 5, 9–11, 15, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28, and 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as failing to comply with the written description requirement, the Examiner found: Claims 1 and 11 recite[] “based on performing the authentication method, determining, by the server computer, a token assurance level as a level of confidence that the payment token to represent the real account identifier was requested by a genuine account holder of the real account identifier.” . . . . The Applicant’s Specification does not describe how the server computer is determining the token assurance level based on performing the authentication method. Final Act. 26–27 (underline omitted). Appellant points to the Specification “at element 322 in FIG. 3 and ¶¶[0141] and [0170]” to show where the Specification describes the limitation in question. Appeal Br. 13. Appellant then asserts: Here, there is no question that a person of skill in the art would have known how to “determine” a token assurance level based on performing the authentication method. This would obviously involve reviewing the outcome of the authentication method, and if successful, determining that the payment token to represent the real account identifier was requested by a genuine account holder of the real account identifier. Since there is no complexity or unpredictability with respect to the process of Appeal 2021-002553 Application 14/340,344 5 “based on performing the authentication method, determining, by the server computer, a token assurance level as a level of confidence that the payment token to represent the real account identifier was requested by a genuine account holder of the real account identifier,” this feature is adequately supported by the specification. Appeal Br. 14. We agree with Appellant. We have reviewed the sections of the Specification cited by Appellant and find on balance, the Specification complies with the written description requirement. Specifically, paragraph 141 describes several factors which go into determining a token assurance level associated with the token generated by the token generation module. Among these factors the Specification lists at paragraph 141, is, “any other relevant information.” Thus, the Specification sets out no limitation in its description as to what constitutes an assurance indicator. That the Specification does not describe a specific algorithm does not make the written description fatally defective because claims 1 and 7, when reasonably broadly construed, do not recite a computer-enabled means-plus- function limitation. That is, the issue in Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008), requiring a specific algorithm to complete the written description, was based on a means-plus- function limitation.3 Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1337; and Ex parte Catlin, 90 USPQ2d 1603, 1605 (BPAI 2009). Similarly, in In re Katz Interactive Call 3 Claim 1 of US Patent 6,093,102 recites in pertinent part “the control means defining a set of predetermined arrangements for a current game comprising each possible combination of the symbol positions selected by the player which have one and only one symbol position in each column of the display means.” Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1331. Appeal 2021-002553 Application 14/340,344 6 Processing Patent Litigation, 639 F. 3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011), the Federal Circuit held only those claims that were drafted in the means-plus-function format prescribed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, …were invalid for indefiniteness because the only corresponding structure disclosed in the specification was a general purpose computer and the specification did not disclose an algorithm by which the general purpose computer performed the recited function. Id. at 1313. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) REJECTION Concerning the use of the term “genuine,” the Examiner’s concerns are a matter of claim breadth, not indefiniteness. “Breadth is not indefiniteness.” In re Gardner, 427 F.2d 786, 788 (CCPA 1970). Thus, we find no indefiniteness with the use of the word “genuine.” We also disagree with the Examiner’s finding that because claim 1 also recites function of an issuer computer in addition to the recited function of the server computer, it is indefinite. The preamble of claim 1 only generically recites a method without designation of the function of a specific computer. Nor do we agree with the Examiner that claim 11 constitutes a hybrid claim. Claim 11 effectively covers the functions of a processor similar to how a memory device covers process steps in Beauregard4 claims. 35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION We will affirm the rejection of claims 1, 5, 9–11, 15, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28, and 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 4 In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Appeal 2021-002553 Application 14/340,344 7 The Appellant argues claims 1, 5, 9–11, 15, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28, and 30 as a group (Appeal Br. 5). We select claim 1 as the representative claim for this group, and so the remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2015). An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, Appeal 2021-002553 Application 14/340,344 8 such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, Appeal 2021-002553 Application 14/340,344 9 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”).5 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51;6 see also October 2019 Update at 1. Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).7 5 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance. USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October 2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf). 6 The 2019 Revised Guidance supersedes MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 2106.04 and also supersedes all versions of the USPTO’s “Eligibility Quick Reference Sheet Identifying Abstract Ideas.” See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“Eligibility-related guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R-08.2017, of the MPEP (published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon.”). Accordingly, Appellant’s arguments challenging the sufficiency of the Examiner’s rejection will not be addressed to the extent those arguments are based on now superseded USPTO guidance. 7 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any Appeal 2021-002553 Application 14/340,344 10 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the [S]pecification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36. In so doing, as indicated above, we apply a “directed to” two prong test: 1) evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and 2) if the claim recites a judicial exception, evaluate whether the claim “appl[ies], additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application. See Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. at 54– 55. Appeal 2021-002553 Application 14/340,344 11 rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53; see also MPEP §§ 2106.04–2106.05. The Specification states: Because [a] PAN [(primary account number)] can be exposed at various points in the transaction lifecycle, some have suggested that payment “tokens” be used to conduct payment transactions. A token serves as an additional security layer to the PAN and in effect becomes a proxy/surrogate to the PAN and may be used in place of PAN while submitting transactions. The use of payment tokens instead of PANs can reduce the risk of fraudulent activity since the real PAN is never exposed. Spec. ¶ 3. Claim 1 recites in pertinent part: receiving, . . . , a payment token request comprising a real account identifier from a token requestor computer; performing, . . . an authentication method from among a plurality of authentication methods on the real account identifier or a holder of the real account identifier; based on performing the authentication method, determining, . . . a token assurance level as a level of confidence that the payment token to represent the real account identifier was requested by a genuine account holder of the real account identifier; transmitting, . . . the payment token representing the real account identifier to the token requestor . . . ; receiving, . . . from a merchant . . . , an authorization request message comprising the payment token for a transaction; determining, . . . the real account identifier associated with the payment token; generating, . . . a modified authorization request message comprising the real account identifier and the token assurance level associated with the payment token; Appeal 2021-002553 Application 14/340,344 12 transmitting, . . . the modified authorization request message including the real account identifier and the token assurance level to an issuer computer for approval, wherein the issuer . . . approves of the transaction based at least upon the token assurance level, generates an authorization response message comprising the real account identifier, and transmits the authorization response message comprising the real account identifier . . . ; receiving, . . . from the issuer . . . , the authorization response message comprising the real account identifier; modifying . . . the authorization response message to include the payment token and the token assurance level; and transmitting, . . . the modified authorization response message including the token assurance level and the payment token . . . . The Examiner found claim 1 is directed to: processing transaction . . . because the claims involve receiving a request for a payment method and authenticating account holder or account identifier, based on the authentication determining assurance level and transmitting a payment method to the reguestor and processing a transaction when the requestor uses the payment method for a transaction and approving/denying based on the assurance level which is identifying a purchaser, determining that the purchaser is authentic and is authorized to make the purchase using the payment method, providing information necessary to make the purchase and processing the transaction to approve or deny the transaction. Final Act. 7 (emphasis omitted). Accordingly, all this intrinsic evidence shows that claim 1 recites a way of paying for a transactions using authenticated payment tokens representing real account identifiers. This is consistent with the Examiner’s determination. Effecting secure payment for a transaction constitutes a commercial interaction/sales activity and hence Appeal 2021-002553 Application 14/340,344 13 are ones of certain methods of organizing human activity that are judicial exceptions. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. In addition, we find that the verbs identified above in italics in the truncated version of claim 1 are mental steps because they mimic human thought processes, perhaps with paper and pencil, where the data interpretation is perceptible only in the human mind. See In re TLI Commc’ns Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016); FairWarning IP, v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The Federal Circuit has held similar concepts to be abstract. Thus, for example, the Federal Circuit has held that abstract ideas include the concepts of collecting data, analyzing the data, and reporting the results of the collection and analysis, including when limited to particular content. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (identifying the abstract idea of collecting, displaying, and manipulating data); Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (characterizing collecting information, analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, and presenting the results of collecting and analyzing information, without more, as matters within the realm of abstract ideas). Turning to the second prong of the “directed to” test, claim 1 only generically requires a server computer, a token requestor computer, an authorization module, “server computer,” “requestor computer,” “authorization module of the server computer,” “merchant computer,” and “issuer computer.” These components are described in the Specification at a high level of generality. See Spec. ¶¶ 65–73, Figs. 1 and 2. We fail to see how the generic recitations of these most basic computer components and/or Appeal 2021-002553 Application 14/340,344 14 of a system so integrates the judicial exception as to “impose[] a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53. Thus, we find that the claims recite the judicial exceptions of a certain method of organizing human activity and a mental process. That the claims do not preempt all forms of the abstraction or may be limited to payment tokens, does not make them any less abstract. See OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“And that the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.”). Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, because we find that the claims are directed to abstract ideas/judicial exceptions, the claims must include an “inventive concept” in order to be patent-eligible, i.e., there must be an element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claim in practice amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73). Concerning this step the Examiner found the following: The claim(s) does/do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because, when analyzed under step 2B of the Alice/Mayo test (See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 52, 56 (January 7, 2019)), the additional element(s) of using a “server computer”, “requestor computer”, “authorization module of the server computer”, “merchant computer” and “issuer computer” to perform the steps amounts to no more than using a computer or processor to automate and/or implement the abstract idea . . . . Appeal 2021-002553 Application 14/340,344 15 Final Act. 24. We agree with the Examiner. “[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea . . . on a generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. They do not. Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a computer to retrieve, select, and apply decision criteria to data and modify the data as a result amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—one of the most basic functions of a computer. In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. The claims do not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. The Specification spells out different generic equipment and parameters that might be applied using this concept and the particular steps such conventional processing would entail based on the concept of information access under different scenarios. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 65–73, Figs. 1 and 2. Thus, the claims at issue amount to nothing significantly more than instructions to apply the abstract idea using some unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26. Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of Appellant’s claims add nothing that is not already present when the steps are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis and storing is equally generic and conventional or otherwise held to be abstract. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing Appeal 2021-002553 Application 14/340,344 16 access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction); Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display, and transmission was abstract); Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring was abstract). The ordering of the steps is, therefore, ordinary and conventional. As to the structural claims 11, 15, 19, 20, they are no different from the method claims in substance. The method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic computer components configured to implement the same idea. This Court has long “warn[ed] . . . against” interpreting § 101 “in ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the draftsman’s art.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 226 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72). As a corollary, the claims are not directed to any particular machine. We have reviewed all the arguments Appellant has submitted concerning the patent eligibility of the claims before us that stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (Appeal Br. 5–13; Reply Br. 2–5). We find that our analysis above substantially covers the substance of all the arguments, which have been made. But, for purposes of completeness, we will address various arguments in order to make individual rebuttals of same. Appellant argues: “The claims recite a specific messaging and data protection scheme that takes place in a distributed computer system, and do not recite a ‘method for organizing human activity.’” Appeal Br. 7. Although Appellant and the Examiner describe, at different levels of abstraction, to what the claims are directed, it is recognized that “[a]n abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction.” Appeal 2021-002553 Application 14/340,344 17 Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). That need not and, in this case does not, “impact the patentability analysis.” See id. at 1241. We further note the Examiner on page 7 of the Final Action gives detailed reasoning supporting his finding as to why claim 1 is directed to an underlying processing a transaction. We find this analysis reasonable and adopt it as our own. Appellant asserts: [T]he claims clearly provide for a “practical application”[;] [as] explained above, embodiments of the invention improve upon existing, conventional payment systems that use a PAN to conduct payment transactions. Instead of using a PAN to conduct a transaction, embodiments of the invention can use a token and a token assurance level to conduct a transaction. Appeal Br. 8. The problem with the argument as to practical application is that it presents no evidence that any technological implementation details are recited in claim 1. All steps are generic receiving, processing, and analyzing data. At that level of generality, the claims do no more than describe a desired function or outcome, without providing any limiting detail that confines the claim to a particular solution to an identified problem. The purely functional nature of the claim confirms that it is directed to an abstract idea, not to a concrete embodiment of that idea. Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Simply automating steps so no humans perform them is insufficient to confer eligibility. “When claims like the Asserted Claims are directed to an abstract idea and merely require generic computer implementation, they do not move into section 101 eligibility territory.” Appeal 2021-002553 Application 14/340,344 18 Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Authority, 873 F.3d 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citations and internal quotations omitted). As we found above, claim 1 only generically requires a “server computer,” “requestor computer,” “authorization module of the server computer,” “merchant computer,” and “issuer computer,” which are described in the Specification at a high level of generality such that these generic recitations of these most basic computer components and/or of a system fail to integrate the judicial exception as to “impose[] a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” The Guidance makes clear that merely including instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely using a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea; adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception; or only generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field are not sufficient to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Although we agree with Appellant that the claims must be read, as a whole (Appeal Br. 10, 12), we nevertheless find, on balance, that claim 1 is directed to a way of paying for a transaction using authenticated tokens for the reasons specified above with respect to our “directed to” findings. As found supra, claim 1 only includes the following generically recited device limitations: “server computer,” “requestor computer,” “authorization module of the server computer,” “merchant computer,” and “issuer computer.” What remains in the claim after disregarding these device limitations, are abstractions–mental steps, i.e.: Appeal 2021-002553 Application 14/340,344 19 determining, . . . a token assurance level as a level of confidence that the payment token to represent the real account identifier was requested by a genuine account holder of the real account identifier; receiving, . . . from a merchant . . . , an authorization request message comprising the payment token for a transaction; determining, . . . the real account identifier associated with the payment token; generating, . . . a modified authorization request message comprising the real account identifier and the token assurance level associated with the payment token; generates an authorization response message comprising the real account identifier, and transmits the authorization response message comprising the real account identifier . . . ; modifying . . . the authorization response message to include the payment token and the token assurance level . . . . “[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.” Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90). To the extent Appellant is arguing that these are additional elements constituting an inventive concept, such features cannot constitute the “inventive concept.” Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring) (“It is clear from Mayo that the ‘inventive concept’ cannot be the abstract idea itself, and Berkheimer . . . leave[s] untouched the numerous cases from this court which have held claims ineligible because the only alleged ‘inventive concept’ is the abstract idea.”); see also BSG Tech. LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It has been clear since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.”). Appeal 2021-002553 Application 14/340,344 20 Appellant argues “the Examiner has the burden of supplying evidence that the following limitations were well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry.” Appeal Br. 12. We disagree with Appellant. The Federal Circuit has made clear that “not every § 101 determination contains genuine disputes over the underlying facts material to the § 101 inquiry.” Berkheimer v. HP, 881 F.3d at 1368. In fact, the Federal Circuit in Berkheimer did not require evidentiary support for independent claim 1 because “[t]he limitations [of claim 1] amount to no more than performing the abstract idea of parsing and comparing data with conventional computer components.” Id. at 1370. For the reasons identified above, we will sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of claims 1, 5, 9–11, 15, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28, and 30. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1, 5, 9–11, 15, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28, and 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We conclude the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 5, 9–11, 15, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28, and 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) and (b). Because we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection with respect to each claim on appeal, the Examiner’s decision is affirmed. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1). Appeal 2021-002553 Application 14/340,344 21 DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 5, 9– 11, 15, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30 101 Eligibility 1, 5, 9– 11, 15, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30 1, 5, 9– 11, 15, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30 112 Written Description 1, 5, 9– 11, 15, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30 1, 5, 9– 11, 15, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30 112 Indefiniteness 1, 5, 9– 11, 15, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30 Overall Outcome 1, 5, 9– 11, 15, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation