Visa International Service Association

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 28, 2020

14643293 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 28, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/643,293 03/10/2015 Jeanette Yoder 8223-1706194 (872US02) 9197
144885 7590 09/28/2020
The Webb Law Firm / Visa International
ONE GATEWAY CENTER
420 FT. DUQUESNE BLVD, SUITE 1200
PITTSBURGH, PA 15222
EXAMINER
BRINDLEY, BENJAMIN S
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3697
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/28/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patents@webblaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte JEANETTE YODER and NIKOLAOS STAMATIS

Appeal 2020-000027
Application 14/643,293
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, ANTON W. FETTING, and
ROBERT J. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–14 and 16–20. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM and include a new ground of rejection, pursuant to our
authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. The Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Visa
International Service Association. Appeal Br. 3.
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ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM
1. A computing system implementing a communication
protocol, the computing system comprising:
at least one first computer configured as a centralized
router, wherein the centralized router is connected to one or
more destination account controllers and one or more source
account controllers, and a set of readers are connected to the
one or more destination account controllers; and
at least one second computer configured as a data
storage, the data storage storing data linking a time limit to
identification information of a plurality of destination accounts,
wherein:
the centralized router is configured to receive a
first authorization request via the one or more destination
account controllers, the first authorization request
originated from a first reader associated with a first
destination account in the plurality of destination
accounts, the first authorization request identifying a
source identifier to request a resource transfer from a
source account identified by the source identifier to the
first destination account;
the data storage is configured to store data linking
the time limit to the source identifier identified in the first
authorization request based on the data linking the time
limit with the identification information of the plurality
of destination accounts;
the centralized router is further configured to
receive a second authorization request via the one or
more destination account controllers, the second
authorization request originated from a second reader
associated with a second destination account in the
plurality of destination accounts, the second authorization
request identifying the source identifier to request a
resource transfer from the source account identified by
the source identifier to the second destination account;
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in response to a determination that the second
authorization request is within the time limit linked to the
source identifier in the data storage, the data storage is
configured to increase an allocated resource of the source
identifier, based on the data linking the time limit with
the identification information of the plurality of
destination accounts and the data linking the time limit to
the source identifier;
the centralized router is further configured to
receive a third authorization request via the one or more
destination account controllers, the third authorization
request originated from a third reader associated with a
third destination account in the plurality of destination
accounts to request a requested resource identified in the
third authorization request to be transferred from the
source account identified by the source identifier to the
third destination account; and
from the third authorization request, the
centralized router is further configured to
determine an adjusted resource from the
requested resource and the allocated resource of
the source identifier, based on the data linking the
time limit with the identification information of the
plurality of destination accounts and the data
linking the time limit to the source identifier,
transmit a fourth authorization request, that
replaces the third authorization request, to a source
account controller of the source account identified
by the source identifier to request a transfer of the
adjusted resource from the source account to the
third destination account, and
route a response to the fourth authorization
request from the source account controller to the
third reader via the one or more destination
account controllers.
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REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Yoder et al.
(hereinafter “Yoder”)
US 2012/0066064 A1 Mar. 15, 2012
Okerlund US 2013/0080239 A1 Mar. 28, 2013
Antonucci US 2013/0231994 A1 Sept. 5, 2013

REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1–14 and 16–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
ineligible subject matter.
II. Claims 1–6, 8–11, 14, and 16–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over Yoder and Antonucci.
III. Claims 7, 12, and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Yoder, Antonucci, and Okerlund.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The findings of fact relied upon, which are supported by a
preponderance of the evidence, appear in the following Analysis.
ANALYSIS
Subject-Matter Eligibility
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
35 U.S.C. § 101. Yet, subject matter belonging to any of the statutory
categories may, nevertheless, be ineligible for patenting. The Supreme
Court has interpreted § 101 to exclude laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas, because they are regarded as the basic tools of scientific
and technological work, such that including them within the domain of
patent protection would risk inhibiting future innovation premised upon
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them. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S.
576, 589 (2013).
Of course, “[a]t some level, ‘all inventions . . . embody, use, reflect,
rest upon, or apply’” these basic tools of scientific and technological work.
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014). Accordingly,
evaluating ineligible subject matter, under these judicial exclusions, involves
a two-step framework for “distinguish[ing] between patents that claim the
buildin[g] block[s] of human ingenuity and those that integrate the building
blocks into something more, thereby transform[ing] them into a patent-
eligible invention.” Id. (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 88–89 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The first step determines whether the claim is directed to judicially excluded
subject matter (such as a so-called “abstract idea”); the second step
determines whether there are any “additional elements” recited in the claim
that (either individually or as an “ordered combination”) amount to
“significantly more” than the identified judicially excepted subject matter
itself. Id. at 217–18.
In 2019, the USPTO published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101, in accordance with judicial precedent. See 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 52 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“2019 Revised Guidance”). Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, a claim is
“directed to” an abstract idea, only if the claim recites any of (1)
mathematical concepts, (2) certain methods of organizing human activity,
and (3) mental processes — without integrating such abstract idea into a
“practical application,” i.e., without “apply[ing], rely[ing] on, or us[ing] the
judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the
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judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed
to monopolize the judicial exception.” Id. at 52–55. The considerations
articulated in MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e)–(h) bear upon whether a claim
element (or combination of elements) integrates an abstract idea into a
practical application. Id. at 55. A claim that is “directed to” an abstract idea
constitutes ineligible subject matter, unless the claim recites an additional
element (or combination of elements) amounting to significantly more than
the abstract idea. Id. at 56.
Although created “[i]n accordance with judicial precedent” (id. at 52),
the 2019 Revised Guidance enumerates the analytical steps differently than
the Supreme Court’s Alice opinion. Step 1 of the 2019 Revised Guidance
addresses whether the claimed subject matter falls within any of the statutory
categories of § 101. Id. at 53–54. Step 2A, Prong One, concerns whether
the claim at issue recites ineligible subject matter and, if an abstract idea is
recited; Step 2A, Prong Two, addresses whether the recited abstract idea is
integrated into a practical application. Id. at 54–55. Unless such integration
exists, the analysis proceeds to Step 2B, in order to determine whether any
additional element (or combination of elements) amounts to significantly
more than the identified abstract idea. Id. at 56.
In the present Appeal, the Appellant does not analyze independent
claims 9 and 10 separately from independent claim 1. See Appeal Br. 13–
21. Accordingly, we treat the independent claims as a group, selecting
claim 1 for analysis herein. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
As to Step 1 of the 2019 Revised Guidance, the Examiner determines
that the claims in the Appeal are within the statutory categories of § 101.
Final 2.
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With regard to the inquiries corresponding to Step 2A, Prong One, the
Examiner identifies the following italicized limitations of claim 1:
1. A computing system implementing a communication
protocol, the computing system comprising:
at least one first computer configured as a centralized
router, wherein the centralized router is connected to one or
more destination account controllers and one or more source
account controllers, and a set of readers are connected to the
one or more destination account controllers; and
at least one second computer configured as a data
storage, the data storage storing data linking a time limit to
identification information of a plurality of destination accounts,
wherein:
the centralized router is configured to receive a
first authorization request via the one or more destination
account controllers, the first authorization request
originated from a first reader associated with a first
destination account in the plurality of destination
accounts, the first authorization request identifying a
source identifier to request a resource transfer from a
source account identified by the source identifier to the
first destination account;
the data storage is configured to store data linking
the time limit to the source identifier identified in the first
authorization request based on the data linking the time
limit with the identification information of the plurality of
destination accounts;
the centralized router is further configured to
receive a second authorization request via the one or
more destination account controllers, the second
authorization request originated from a second reader
associated with a second destination account in the
plurality of destination accounts, the second authorization
request identifying the source identifier to request a
resource transfer from the source account identified by
the source identifier to the second destination account;
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in response to a determination that the second
authorization request is within the time limit linked to the
source identifier in the data storage, the data storage is
configured to increase an allocated resource of the
source identifier, based on the data linking the time limit
with the identification information of the plurality of
destination accounts and the data linking the time limit to
the source identifier;
the centralized router is further configured to
receive a third authorization request via the one or more
destination account controllers, the third authorization
request originated from a third reader associated with a
third destination account in the plurality of destination
accounts to request a requested resource identified in the
third authorization request to be transferred from the
source account identified by the source identifier to the
third destination account; and
from the third authorization request, the
centralized router is further configured to
determine an adjusted resource from the
requested resource and the allocated resource of
the source identifier, based on the data linking the
time limit with the identification information of the
plurality of destination accounts and the data
linking the time limit to the source identifier,
transmit a fourth authorization request, that
replaces the third authorization request, to a
source account controller of the source account
identified by the source identifier to request a
transfer of the adjusted resource from the source
account to the third destination account, and
route a response to the fourth authorization
request from the source account controller to the
third reader via the one or more destination
account controllers.
See Final 3.
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The Specification explains that the claims in the Appeal relate to
various electronic financial transactions, such as: “applications in the
transfer of digital tokens, digital rights, payment currencies, loyalty rewards,
etc.” Spec. ¶ 76.
The Examiner regards the identified claim limitations as describing
the “management of financial resources” — an abstract idea among the
methods of organizing human activity that comprise judicial exceptions.
Final 3. See also Answer 5–6.
The Appellant disputes the Examiner’s identification of the abstract
idea, but does not state any basis for error in the Examiner’s analysis.
Instead, the Appellant’s arguments (addressing alleged technological
improvements (see Appeal Br. 14–15)) that purport to address Step 2A,
Prong One, concern other aspects of the subject-matter eligibility analysis.
We address these arguments in the appropriate respective part of the
eligibility analysis.
The Appellant also contends that Figure 3 of the Specification
“depicts a new arrangement in which source identifiers, destination
identifiers, and time limits are utilized, all of which are recited by the
independent claims.” Id. at 16. According to the Appellant: “This alone
makes the claims eligible under the first prong of Alice.” Id. Yet, the
Appellant does not indicate what aspects of Figure 3 are technologically
embodied and employed in claim 1, or how such features would indicate
subject-matter eligibility.
Therefore, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s analyses
corresponding to Step 2A, Prong One, of the 2019 Revised Guidance, as to
independent claim 1.
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Turning to Step 2A, Prong Two, unless a claim that recites a judicial
exception (such as an abstract idea) “integrates the recited judicial exception
into a practical application of that exception,” the claim is “directed to” the
judicial exception. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53. The
analysis of such an “integration into a practical application” involves
“[i]dentifying . . . any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the
judicial exception(s)” and “evaluating those additional elements individually
and in combination to determine whether they integrate the exception into a
practical application.” Id. at 54–55. Among the considerations “indicative
that an additional element (or combination of elements) may have integrated
the exception into a practical application” is whether “[a]n additional
element reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an
improvement to other technology or technical field.” Id. at 55 (footnote
omitted). “[W]hether an additional element or combination of elements
integrate[s] the exception into a practical application should be evaluated on
the claim as a whole.” Id. at 55 n.24.
The Appellant argues that the claims provide “technological
improvements” and “recite improvements in electronic payment processing
systems.” Appeal Br. 14, 18. In support, the Appellant cites paragraph 52
of the Specification, which states: “[B]oth the source identifier (125) and
the communication reference (133) are transmitted to the destination account
controller (115) of the reader (109) for improved efficiency.” Id. at 18.
Yet, the Appellant does not explain the nature of the “improved
efficiency” referenced in the Specification, how it might be achieved, or
whether it relates to any additional element of claim 1. See Answer 3
(“[T]he specification does not address efficiency metrics, neither the claims
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nor the specification identifies elements beyond generic computer
components performing generic computer functions, and there is no
quantification of performance metrics enhancement.”) Indeed, claim 1 does
not recite a “communication reference.”
The Appellant also contends that claim 1 employs the following
“particular machines,” which integrate the abstract idea into a practical
application: “a centralized router”; “wherein the centralized router is
connected to one or more destination account controllers and one or
more source account controllers”; “a set of readers are connected to the
one or more destination account controllers”; and “at least one second
computer configured as a data storage.” Appeal Br. 18.
However, the Appellant does not indicate why any of these identified
items amounts to a “particular machine” in the meaning of the 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Indeed, the identified elements are part of
what the Examiner identifies as creating “general purpose computing
systems and environments.” Answer 4 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 140–45, 149, 156,
157, 163–65, and 169–172).
Therefore, we are not persuaded of error in the rejection, with regard
to analyses corresponding to Step 2A, Prong Two.
Proceeding to Step 2B of the 2019 Revised Guidance (84 Fed. Reg. at
56), a claim that recites a judicial exception (such as an abstract idea) might,
nevertheless, be patent-eligible, if the claim contains “additional elements
amount[ing] to significantly more than the exception itself” — i.e., “a
specific limitation or combination of limitations that [is] not well-
understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, which is indicative
that an inventive concept may be present.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223
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(“[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-
ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”)
The Appellant argues that claim 1 recites a non-generic and non-
conventional arrangement of components. Appeal Br. 19. The identified
features encompass nearly the entirety of claim 1, including multiple
limitations that coincide with limitations that the Examiner includes in the
description of the abstract idea. See id. at 19–20. Such claim limitations
cannot constitute “additional elements.” Accordingly, the Appellant does
not identify any features of claim 1 that might amount to significantly more
than the abstract idea, per the 2019 Revised Guidance. See BSG Tech LLC
v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It has been clear
since Alice that a claimed invention's use of the ineligible concept to which
it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention
"significantly more" than that ineligible concept.”)
The Appellant argues that the dependent claims have not been
examined and that “there are no substantive rejections” for the Appellant to
address. Appeal Br. 21.
Yet, the Examiner explained that the dependent claims are directed to
the abstract idea of the respective independent claim and, further, no
dependent claim recites additional elements that give rise to patent-
eligibility. Final 6–7, 23. In addition, the Appellant presents no explanation
of any error in the rejection of the dependent claims.
In view of the foregoing, we are not persuaded of error in in the
Examiner’s analyses corresponding to Step 2B of the 2019 Revised
Guidance, such that we sustain the rejection of independent claims 1, 9, and
10, and dependent claims 2–8, 11–14, and 16–20.
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Obviousness
(New Ground of Rejection)
The Appellant advances several arguments regarding the obviousness
rejections. See Appeal Br. 22–29. As explained below, we impose a new
ground of rejection, based on indefiniteness of the claim language, which
necessitates reversing the obviousness rejections, pro forma. Except as
stated below, we do not otherwise address the merits of the obviousness
rejections.
1. “a fourth authorization request,
that replaces the third authorization request”
(Independent Claims 1, 9, and 10)
The Appellant argues that the independent claims were rejected in
error, on account of the limitation “a fourth authorization request, that
replaces the third authorization,” which appears in each of independent
claims 1, 9, and 10. See Appeal Br. 23–25.
However, before a proper review of the rejection, under § 103, can be
conducted, the subject matter encompassed by the claim must be reasonably
understood without resort to speculation. See In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862
(CCPA 1962) (a prior art rejection cannot be sustained if the hypothetical
person of ordinary skill in the art would have to make speculative
assumptions concerning the meaning of claim language); see also In re
Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (CCPA 1970) (“If no reasonably definite
meaning can be ascribed to certain terms in the claim, the subject matter
does not become obvious — the claim becomes indefinite”).
During the Office’s evaluation, a proposed patent claim violates the
definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(b), when the claim “contains
words or phrases whose meaning is unclear” — i.e., “ambiguous, vague,
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incoherent, opaque, or otherwise unclear in describing and defining the
claimed invention.” In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1310–11 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (per curiam); see also In re McAward, No. 2015-006416, 2017 WL
3669566, at *3, *5–*6 (PTAB Aug. 25, 2017) (precedential).
Such a situation arises, in regard to the recited “a fourth authorization
request, that replaces the third authorization” of independent claim 1 (and
similar recitations of independent claims 9 and 10). The term “replace[ ]”
does not appear in the Specification. Further, the Appellant’s reference to
paragraphs 68–69 and Figure 6 of the Specification, as supporting the claim
limitation (see Appeal Br. 8), does not adequately assist our understanding
of this claim language.
Because the meaning of “a fourth authorization request, that replaces
the third authorization” is unclear, independent claims 1, 9, and 10 (along
with their dependent claims 2–8, 11–14, and 16–20) violate the definiteness
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
Therefore, we do not assess the merits of the Examiner’s position, as
to whether the prior art might teach or suggest “a fourth authorization
request, that replaces the third authorization.” Rather, pursuant to our
authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), we reverse, pro forma, the claim
rejections under § 103 and enter a new ground of rejection of the claims as
being indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). This determination does not
reflect on the merits of the underlying obviousness rejections.
2. “time limit”
(Independent Claims 1, 9, and 10)
The Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent
claims, because the cited references do not teach or suggest the claim
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limitations reciting a “time limit.” See Appeal Br. 22–23, 25–28. However,
the Appellant asserts the deficiency of each of the Yoder and Antonucci
references, individually, whereas the Examiner relies upon the combined
teachings of Yoder and Antonucci for the position that the identified “time
limit” limitations would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in
the art at the relevant time. See Final 6–9, Answer 7–8. “[O]ne cannot show
non-obviousness by attacking references individually where, as here, the
rejections are based on combinations of references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d
413, 426 (CCPA 1981). In particular, the Examiner relies upon Antonucci
for the disclosure of the “time limit” feature. See Final 9 (citing Antonucci
¶¶ 54, 62, Fig. 2).
The Appellant also argues that the “time limit” feature relates to
several claim limitations and “it is unclear how the individual steps of the
claims can be divided up” such that Antonucci may be cited for all these
features, because Antonucci “merely mentions a time limit in a general
way.” Appeal Br. 25.
Yet, the Appellant does not explain why the asserted disclosure of the
claimed “time limit” feature “in a general way” (id.) might render Antonucci
insufficient for the rejections. In any event, Antonucci refers to a “time limit
rule” in the context of handling “loyalty points”:
Conversion rules 285 may include a points ratio rule,
time limit rule, maximum point conversion rule, restrictions on
conversion of general loyalty points into certain merchant
dollars and/or any other restriction or rule which is followed in
the conversion process.
Antonucci ¶ 54 (emphasis added). Antonucci’s disclosure corresponds to a
similar implementation (loyalty program) described in the Specification:
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“The loyalty program may run in a predetermined time period (e.g., 4 to 8
weeks, during the weekends of 3 weeks in the summer, etc.).” Spec. ¶ 81.
The Appellant also argues that there is no reason to combine the
Yoder and Antonucci references, contending that “the motivation is not
provided by any of the references.” Appeal Br. 28. The Appellant states:
The only stated motivation in the Office Action is that
both Yoder and Antonucci “relate to financial services and
accounts, consumer/merchant transactions, customer analytics
and customer offers, with the motivation being to enhance
management and access of consumer loyalty programs and
accounts.”
Id. (quoting Final 9).
Yet, the Appellant omits, from the above quotation of the Final Office
Action, the Examiner’s statement of the precise reason for combining the
teachings of Yoder and Antonucci, by identifying the features of Antonucci
that would have been perceived as beneficial to the Yoder system: “It would
have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to include in the
transactions, payments, commerce and offers of Yoder, multi-merchant,
rewards and incentives aspects of Antonucci.” Final 9.
In view of the foregoing, the Appellant’s arguments, relating to the
“time limit” limitations, do not persuade us of error in the rejection of
independent claims 1, 9, and 10, or any of the associated dependent claims.
3. Dependent Claim 2
The Examiner relies upon Yoder for teaching the limitations added by
dependent claim 2:
at least one third computer configured as a portal
connected to the data storage;
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wherein the data storage is further configured to store, in
association with the source identifier, a communication
reference of a mobile device in response to the first
authorization request; and
wherein the portal is configured to communicate, to the
mobile device using the communication reference, a status of
the allocated resource via a communication connection that
does not go through the one or more destination account
controllers.
See Final 9–10 (citing Yoder ¶¶ 42, 43, 46, 134, 135, 142, 145, 153–55, 158,
163, 164, 169, 170, 178, 198, 200, 450, Figs. 4, 8, 9).
According to the Appellant, the Examiner’s mappings are
“inappropriate and, nevertheless, inapplicable in view of the cited portions
of Yoder.” Appeal Br. 29.
The Appellant’s statement is not sufficiently precise to “explain why
the examiner erred” (37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)) in rejecting claim 2.
4. Dependent Claim 3
The Examiner relies upon Yoder for teaching the limitations added by
dependent claim 3:
wherein the centralized router is further configured to provide,
in a response to the first authorization request, a portal address
that is presented by the first reader; and
wherein the portal is further configured to receive, via the
portal address provided in the response to the first authorization
request, the communication reference of the mobile device to
store the communication reference of the mobile device in
association with the source identifier.
See Final 9–10 (citing Yoder ¶¶ 42, 43, 46, 90–94, 104–107, 135, 145, 153–
55, 158, 163, 200, 308, 450, 472, Figs. 4, 8, 9, 15).
Disputing the rejection of dependent claim 3, the Appellant states:
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[T]he Office Action glosses over the “portal address” feature
and the language concerning storing “the communication
reference of the mobile device in association with the source
identifier.” The generic recitation to a portal and data storage,
from Yoder, is simply not enough.
Appeal Br. 29.
Yet, the Appellant does not adequately explain what is intended by the
assertion that the Examiner “glosses over” the identified claim features, or
why Yoder’s disclosures are purportedly “generic” and “simply not
enough.” Id.
5. Dependent Claim 4
Dependent claim 4 recites: “The computing system of claim 2, where
the first authorization request includes the communication reference; and the
response to the first authorization request identifies the time limit.”
In rejecting claim 4, the Examiner relies upon Antonucci (¶¶ 54, 62,
Fig. 2) for the teaching “the time limit” and Yoder for teaching the other
limitation. Final 10–11.
Disputing the rejection, the Appellant states:
The rejection for claim 4 is particularly glaring because
claim 4 specifies, among other features, that “the first
authorization request identifies the time limit.” There is
absolutely no evidence of this in the art. The Office Action
again cites to the same two paragraphs of Antonucci, discussed
above, which do not come close to the specifically recited
features of claim 4. Again, mere reference to a “time limit” in a
reference does not permit the rejection of specifically claimed
features involving a time limit.
Appeal Br. 29.
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The above discussion, regarding the “time limit” limitations of the
independent claims, also applies to the Appellant’s position on the rejection
of dependent claim 4.
In addition, the Appellant improperly parses the language of claim 4.
Claim 4 does include the words “the first authorization request identifies the
time limit,” as the Appellant states in the quotation appearing on page 29 of
the Appeal Brief. However, these words span distinct features of claim 4.
Specifically, in claim 4, it is “the response to the first authorization request”
that “identifies” the “time limit.” (Emphasis added). By contrast, the
Appellant alleges that, in claim 4, it is “the first authorization request” that
“identifies” the “time limit.” (Emphasis added).
Accordingly, the Appellant does not persuasively argue that the
Examiner erred in rejecting dependent claim 4.
6. Dependent Claim 6
Dependent claim 6 recites: “The computing system of claim 1,
wherein the third authorization request is determined to be within the time
limit linked to the source identifier in the data storage, prior to the
determining of the adjusted resource.”
Disputing the Examiner’s rejection of claim 6, the Appellant states:
Bizarrely, the Office Action does not even cite to Antonucci for
this, relying entirely on Yoder. Because the Office Action
admits that Yoder does not disclose a time limit, the Office
Action itself admits that this rejection is deficient.
Appeal Br. 29.
The Appellant is mistaken. Like the other claims that recite the “time
limit” feature, the Examiner explicitly cites Antonucci (¶¶ 54, 62, Fig. 2), in
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Application 14/643,293

20
combination with Yoder, as teaching the “time limit” feature of claim 6.
Final 11.
Accordingly, the Appellant does not persuasively argue that the
Examiner erred in rejecting dependent claim 6.
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed New
Ground
1–14,
16–20
101 Eligibility 1–14,
16–20

1–6, 8–
11, 14,
16–20
103 Yoder,
Antonucci
1–6, 8–11,
14, 16–20

7, 12, 13 103 Yoder,
Antonucci,
Okerlund
7, 12, 13
1–14,
16–20
112(b) Indefiniteness 1–14,
16–20
Overall
Outcom
e
1–14,
16–20
1–14,
16–20

This Decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides that “[a] new ground of
rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial
review.” Section 41.50(b) also provides:
When the Board enters such a non-final decision, the appellant,
within two months from the date of the decision, must exercise
one of the following two options with respect to the new ground
of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected
claims:
(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate
amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating
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Application 14/643,293

21
to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter
reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the prosecution
will be remanded to the examiner. The new ground of rejection
is binding upon the examiner unless an amendment or new
Evidence not previously of Record is made which, in the
opinion of the examiner, overcomes the new ground of rejection
designated in the decision. Should the examiner reject the
claims, appellant may again appeal to the Board pursuant to this
subpart.
(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be
reheard under §41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. The
request for rehearing must address any new ground of rejection
and state with particularity the points believed to have been
misapprehended or overlooked in entering the new ground of
rejection and also state all other grounds upon which rehearing
is sought.
Further guidance on responding to a new ground of rejection can be
found in the MPEP § 1214.01.
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)