Venetian Casino Resort, LLC

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 30, 2005

345 N.L.R.B. 1061 (N.L.R.B. 2005)

VENETIAN CASINO RESORT
345 NLRB No. 82
1061
Venetian Casino Resort, LLC and Local Joint Execu-
tive Board of Las Vegas, Culinary Workers Un-
ion, Local 226, and Bartenders Union, Local
165, affiliated with Hotel Employees and Res-
taurant Employees International Union.1 Case
28–CA–16000
September 30, 2005
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND SCHAUMBER
On June 12, 2003, Administrative Law Judge Gregory
Z. Meyerson issued the attached decision. The Respon-
dent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The Gen-
eral Counsel and the Charging Party filed answering
briefs, and the Respondent filed reply briefs.2
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, find-
ings,3 and conclusions only to the extent consistent with
this Decision and Order and to adopt the recommended
Order as modified.
At issue in this case are the Respondent’s actions on
March 1, 1999, when, in response to a union demonstra-
tion on the sidewalk in front of the Respondent’s hotel
and casino, then under construction, the Respondent
summoned the local police, placed a union official under
“citizen’s arrest,” and took other actions to interfere with
the demonstration. At the time, the Respondent and the
Union disputed the legal status of the sidewalk: the Re-
spondent contended that it was private property, while
the Union and its supporters contended that it was public.
In non-Board litigation commenced by the Respondent
after the demonstration, the courts determined that “the
Venetian’s sidewalk constitutes a public forum subject to
the protections of the First Amendment.” Venetian Ca-
sino Resort v. Local Joint Executive Board, 257 F.3d
937, 948 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied 535 U.S. 905
(2002).
The administrative law judge found that, because the
sidewalk was a public forum and the union demonstra-

1 We have amended the caption to reflect the disaffiliation of the Ho-
tel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union from the
AFL–CIO effective September 14, 2005.
2 The Respondent has requested oral argument. The request is de-
nied as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues
and positions of the parties.
3 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
tors were involved in protected activity, the Respon-
dent’s actions in response violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. We agree.
The judge stated: “Having been unsuccessful at [ob-
taining] a ‘neutrality agreement,’ the Union obviously
decided to take its ‘labor dispute’ directly to prospective
employees and to the general public.” The “message” it
sought to convey to potential employees, the judge found,
was “that the facility should be operated under a union
contract and, that if hired by the Respondent, these new
employees should become union members and support the
Union.” The judge also found that the Union sought to
convey a message to members of the general public,
namely “to educate them as to the nature of the Union’s
dispute with the Respondent.”4 We affirm those factual
findings, and the judge’s conclusion that the Union’s at-
tempt to convey those messages was protected by Section
7.5 Accordingly, we agree with his ultimate finding that
the Respondent’s efforts to interfere with the Union’s con-
duct that day violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.6
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recom-
mended Order of the administrative law judge as modified
below and orders that the Respondent, Venetian Casino
Resort, LLC, Las Vegas, Nevada, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the Order as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1.
“The Respondent, Venetian Casino Resort, LLC, Las
Vegas, Nevada, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall
1. Cease and desist from”

4 The judge observed that the Union’s message vis-à-vis members of
the general public was “analogous to ‘area standards’ activity.” We
also note that the record reflects that the demonstrators carried signs
reading “Union Rights”; chanted slogans such as “Venetian no, Union
yes” and “Hey, hey, ho, ho, union busting’s got to go”; and speakers at
the demonstration complained that the Venetian should be operated on
a union basis and that former Sands’ employees were not offered prior-
ity hiring rights at the facility.
5 We therefore need not rely on the judge’s implicit factual finding
that a purpose of the Union’s demonstration was to persuade the Re-
spondent to enter into a neutrality agreement or his statement that “an
effort to obtain a ‘neutrality agreement’ . . . would constitute union
activity in the most basic sense.” However, assuming arguendo that the
demonstration had that purpose, the Respondent does not argue that
such a purpose is not protected by the Act.
6 Member Schaumber agrees with his colleagues that the picketing in
this case was protected union activity, and that the Respondent violated
Sec. 8(a)(1) by interfering with that activity. He agrees with Chairman
Battista that serious legal issues warranting careful consideration are
presented when a union engages in picketing to obtain a neutrality/card
check agreement. Because the Respondent has not presented these
issues to the Board, he finds it unnecessary to reach them in deciding
this case.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1062
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2.
“2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.”
CHAIRMAN BATTISTA, concurring.
I join in the decision that the picketing was protected,
and that the Respondent interfered with that activity.
However, I note that the union agent testified that the
picketing was to obtain a neutrality/card check agree-
ment. The judge found that the picketing was for that
object, and he reached the legal conclusion that picketing
for that object is protected activity.
I join my colleagues in their nonreliance on the factual
finding, and I have grave doubts about the correctness of
the legal conclusion. Where, as here, the employer has
not hired any employees, it may well be that a neutral-
ity/card check agreement would be unlawful, and/or that
picketing for such an agreement is unprotected.
However, the Respondent does not defend on that ba-
sis. Indeed, it argues that this was not the object of the
picketing. The Respondent defends on the basis that the
sidewalk was its private property. My colleagues cor-
rectly reject that defense.
Thus, the picketing was unquestionably union activity.
The element that might remove this activity from the
protection of the Act (see above) is not being relied upon
by the Respondent. In these circumstances, I agree that
the interference with the activity violated Section 8(a)(1).
Richard A. Smith, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Richard S. Rosenberg, Esq., of Universal City, California, for
the Respondent.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
GREGORY Z. MEYERSON, Administrative Law Judge. Pursu-
ant to notice, I heard this case in Las Vegas, Nevada, on April
3, 2003. Local Joint Executive Board of Las Vegas, Culinary
Workers Union, Local 226, and Bartenders Union, Local 165,
affiliated with Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees
International Union, AFL–CIO (the Union or the Charging
Party) filed an unfair labor practice charge in this case on Au-
gust 26, 1999. Based on that charge, the Regional Director for
Region 28 of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board)
issued a complaint on January 23, 2003.1 The complaint al-
leges that Venetian Casino Resort, LLC (the Respondent, the
Venetian, or the Employer) violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (the Act). The Respondent filed a
timely answer to the complaint denying the commission of the

1 A complaint in this case originally issued on November 30, 1999.
On January 7, 2003, the Acting Regional Director approved an informal
settlement agreement between the parties in this matter. However,
subsequently, the Regional Director determined that the terms of the
settlement agreement were not being complied with, and issued an
order setting aside the settlement agreement. The complaint currently
before me was then issued.
alleged unfair labor practices.
All parties appeared at the hearing, and I provided them with
the full opportunity to participate, to introduce relevant evi-
dence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to argue
orally, and to file briefs. Based on the record, my consideration
of the briefs filed by counsel for the General Counsel and coun-
sel for the Respondent, and my observation of the demeanor of
the witnesses,2 I now make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that the
Respondent is a Nevada limited liability company, with an
office and place of business in Las Vegas, Nevada (the facility),
where it has been engaged in the operation of a hotel and ca-
sino. Further, I find that during the period from on or about
May 4 through August 26, 1999, the Respondent, in the course
and conduct of its business operations, derived gross revenues
in excess of $500,000. During the same period of time, the
Respondent purchased and received at its facility goods valued
in excess of $50,000 directly from points located outside the
State of Nevada.
Accordingly, I conclude that the Respondent is now, and at
all times material has been, an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that at
all times material, the Union has been a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Dispute
The complaint alleges that on March 1, 1999,3 on the side-
walk along the front of the Respondent’s facility, the Union
conducted a demonstration against the Respondent. At the
time, the Respondent’s hotel and casino were under construc-
tion. Further, the complaint alleges that the Respondent’s secu-
rity guards4 summoned the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police and
requested that demonstrators be issued citations and excluded
from the sidewalk in front of the Respondent’s facility. It is
also alleged that the security guards caused the recording of a
trespass message and the playing of the message over a loud-
speaker during the demonstration. Additionally, the complaint
alleges that during the same demonstration the security guards

2 The credibility resolutions made in this decision are based on a re-
view of the testimonial record and exhibits, with consideration given
for reasonable probability and the demeanor of the witnesses. See
NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962). Where witnesses
have testified in contradiction to the findings herein, I have discredited
their testimony, as either being in conflict with credited documentary or
testimonial evidence, or because it was inherently incredible and un-
worthy of belief.
3 All dates are in 1999 unless otherwise indicated.
4 The parties stipulated that for purposes of the complaint allega-
tions, the security guards described in the complaint were acting at the
behest of the Respondent and, therefore, were agents of the Respondent
within the meaning of Sec. 2(13) of the Act. (Jt. Exh. 1.)
VENETIAN CASINO RESORT 1063
informed Union Business Agent Glen Arnodo that he was being
placed under citizen’s arrest, and the following day contacted
the police to make a report of the incident.5 It is the contention
of the General Counsel that this conduct on the part of the Re-
spondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in
the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
The Respondent acknowledges the actions of its security
guards as alleged in the complaint. However, it denies that
these actions in any way interfered with, restrained, or coerced
employees in the exercise of Section 7 rights. The Respondent
denies the commission of any unfair labor practices. It con-
tends that its actions of March 1, 1999, and thereafter were a
lawful exercise of its private property rights under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
For the most part, the facts in this case are not in dispute.6
What remains in dispute, however, is a legal issue. That issue
is whether the Respondent’s efforts to remove demonstrators,
who were allegedly engaged in union organized expressive
activity, from the sidewalk along the front of the Respondent’s
facility constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
B. The Facts
The Venetian Casino Resort is a luxury hotel-casino located
in Las Vegas, Nevada, on Las Vegas Boulevard, a State high-
way commonly known as the “Las Vegas Strip.” The Respon-
dent’s facility opened to the public during May 1999. Previ-
ously, the property on which the facility now sits had been
occupied by another hotel-casino. The Respondent obtained
approval to demolish the hotel-casino formerly occupying the
property and to construct a new hotel-casino. In February
1997, prior to the Respondent beginning construction on the
facility, it entered into a “pre-development agreement” with
Clark County, Nevada. Apparently, as part of that agreement,
the Respondent agreed to abide by the results of a county-
approved study assessing the effect of the new construction on
vehicular and pedestrian traffic.
The traffic study was completed in September 1997, and it
recommended widening Las Vegas Boulevard by one lane
along the front of the Respondent’s property. The additional
traffic lane would displace what had been a public sidewalk, on
State property, running alongside Las Vegas Boulevard. The
widening of the roadway would encompass the full State right-
of-way on Las Vegas Boulevard, leaving no remaining State
property for a new public sidewalk. The county approved the
traffic study7 and agreed with the Respondent that it would be

5 This allegation in par. 5(b)(3) of the complaint appears as amended
by counsel for the General Counsel at the hearing.
6 In its answer, the Respondent denies the allegation in the complaint
regarding the filing and service of the charge. However, the filing and
service of the charge as alleged is established by the unrebutted admis-
sion into evidence of the original charge, docket letter, and affidavit of
service for this case. See GC Exhs. 1(a) and (b).
7 Apparently, the county approved the traffic study after a public
hearing during which a number of county commissioners raised ques-
tions about whether the public would have the right to engage in ex-
pressive activity on any sidewalk constructed in front of the Respon-
dent’s facility. While it is somewhat unclear, it appears that there was
no definitive answer given the commissioners, and no further action
taken by the county regarding this issue.
necessary for the Respondent to meet with the Nevada Depart-
ment of Transportation (NDOT) to address the matter of pedes-
trian passage along the front of the Respondent’s property on
Las Vegas Boulevard, and access to the property.
The Respondent entered into negotiations with the NDOT,
which culminated in an agreement on January 8, 1999. (Jt.
Exh. 3, “Agreement” attachment.) The agreement requires the
Respondent to “construct and maintain on its property along
Las Vegas Boulevard South a private sidewalk connecting to
public sidewalks on either side of its property.” Under the
terms of the agreement, it appears that the parties have specifi-
cally refrained from requiring the Respondent to dedicate a
public right-of-way to the State for a new public sidewalk. To
the contrary, every reference in the agreement to sidewalk ex-
plicitly affirms that it is “private.” The agreement states that
the Respondent “retains full rights inherent to the ownership of
private property to the full extent permitted by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.” Further, it emphasizes that the State
“is not taking any private property interest with this document.”
The private nature of the sidewalk is also reflected in several
other clauses in the agreement. For example, the Respondent is
required to “keep and maintain, at its sole expense, the private
sidewalk free of all weeds, noxious plants . . . and at all times in
an orderly, clean, safe, and sanitary condition.” Further, the
Respondent is required to “absolve, indemnify, and defend” the
State “from any and all cost, expense, or liability arising from
the . . . use of the private sidewalk.” The agreement offers only
one potential future scenario under which the Respondent
might be required to relinquish its property rights and to “dedi-
cate [the] necessary right-of-way to the [State]” for a public
sidewalk. That situation would arise only if the “private side-
walk” were to be “removed, altered, or abandoned.”
It is clear to me from a reading of the agreement that by its
terms the parties intended for the Respondent to construct a
sidewalk on its private property that would remain the private
property of the Respondent, but upon which the public would
have access. This would allow the public to walk along the
continuous sidewalks in front of the various hotel-casinos along
Las Vegas Boulevard, including the Respondent’s facility. It
would also provide the public with access to the Respondent’s
facility. In my opinion, the agreement intended that this be
done without requiring the Respondent to explicitly dedicate a
public right-of-way for a new public sidewalk.
Subsequently, construction began on the Respondent’s facil-
ity. As part of that process, the Respondent demolished the
public sidewalk that had existed along Las Vegas Boulevard.
This enabled the construction of the new lane of traffic as had
been provided for in the previously agreed-upon traffic study.
During the construction of the new hotel-casino, the Respon-
dent had a temporary private walkway built within its private
property in the area where the private sidewalk required by the
agreement with the NDOT would ultimately be constructed.
In February 1999, the Respondent became aware that the
Union intended to hold a demonstration at the facility to protest
the Respondent’s labor policies.8 David Friedman, assistant to

8 According to the testimony of Glen Arnodo, the Union’s political
director, the Union intended to picket the Respondent’s construction
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1064
the chairman of the Venetian, testified that he obtained this
information from a number of different sources, including vari-
ous newspaper articles. (R. Exhs. 6–9.) In anticipation of dem-
onstrators entering its private property, the Respondent sur-
veyed its property lines and had the dividing line between the
State property (Las Vegas Boulevard) and the Respondent’s
private property marked with an orange paint. Further, the
Respondent had signs posted designating the temporary private
walkway along the front of its facility as private property.
The demonstration occurred on March 1, 1999, at a time
when the facility was still an active construction site. There
were in excess of 1000 persons who participated in the demon-
stration, which was conducted over several hours in the late
afternoon and early evening.
The demonstrators carried picket signs, chanted slogans, and
walked in a loop back and forth along Las Vegas Boulevard.9
Certain of the demonstrators wore T-shirts, buttons, or carried
picket signs that designated the names of various unions, in-
cluding the Charging Party. For much of the march the demon-
strators were clearly walking on the temporary private walkway
on the Respondent’s property. (R. Exhs. 1 and 5.) Many of the
picket signs contained a picture of the Respondent’s chairman
under the words “PRIVATE SIDEWALK.” At the top and
bottom of the signs were the words “UNION RIGHTS/ CIVIL
RIGHTS/ ONE AND THE SAME.” (Jt. Exh. 4.) The chants
included the repetitive use of the word “Union,” and “USA,”
and the words, “Who owns the sidewalk? We own the side-
walk,” and “Who owns the sidewalk? Union sidewalk.” (R.
Exh. 5.) Additional chants included, “Venetian no, Union yes,”
and “Hey, hey, ho, ho, Union bustings got to go.” (Jt. Exh. 5.)
Toward the end of the demonstration, there were also speeches
given by a number of individuals. One unidentified speaker is
heard to remark to a group of demonstrators that the Venetian
should be operating the property “one hundred percent Union.”
(Jt. Exh. 5.) Another unidentified speaker complains to the
assembled demonstrators that former employees of the Sands
Hotel and Casino (the previous occupant of the property) were
not being given any greater right than the general public to
apply for jobs at the Venetian. Further, this speaker says that
although the property has a “new name,” it “should still be
Union.” (Jt. Exh. 5.)
The county had previously granted the Union a permit allow-
ing it to conduct the demonstration on March 1, 1999, on the
“sidewalk in front of the Venetian hotel and casino and one
north bound travel lane adjacent to sidewalk.” (Jt. Exh. 3,
“Application and Permit” attachment.) Further, both the Met-
ropolitan Police Department and the district attorney, upon

site because the Respondent had declined to enter into a “neutrality
agreement” with the Union providing for a “card check” to determine
whether a majority of the employees of the hotel-casino desired union
representation. However, it should be noted that at the time of the
events in question, apparently the only employees of the Respondent
working on the construction site were managers and security personnel.
9 The Respondent had a significant portion of the demonstration
videotaped. Introduced into evidence as Jt. Exh. 5 was an approxi-
mately 30-minute long tape of certain portions of the demonstration.
Introduced as R. Exh. 5 was a shorter version, approximately 7 minutes
long.
inquiry from the Respondent, had advised the Respondent that
in their view demonstrators on the temporary private walkway
would not be trespassing, as the walkway, although private
property, constituted a public forum pursuant to the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Of course, the Respondent viewed the situation differently.
As the demonstration commenced and the protesters began to
walk along the temporary private walkway on its property, the
Respondent had its security guards repeatedly play over loud-
speakers a recorded message advising the demonstrators that
they were trespassing on private property, were subject to ar-
rest, and citing to them a Nevada State statute. The recording
addressed the demonstrators as “culinary and union workers.”
(R. Exh. 5.) Additionally, the Respondent admits that it re-
quested that the police issue citations to the demonstrators and
exclude them from the temporary private walkway in front of
the facility. Also, the Respondent admits that one of its secu-
rity guards informed Glen Arnodo, union political director, that
he was being placed under citizen’s arrest for trespassing, and
the following day agents of the Respondent contacted the police
to make a report of the incident. (GC Exh. 2.)
Following the demonstration, the Respondent filed an action
in the U.S. District Court seeking declaratory relief against the
Government officials and the Union, alleging that their conduct
had the effect of converting the Respondent’s private property
into a public forum, and thus amounted to a taking of its prop-
erty in violation of the due process clause of the United States
Constitution. The Respondent also filed a motion for a pre-
liminary injunction against the Government officials, seeking to
bar them from authorizing demonstrations on its property and
from refusing to enforce its private property rights.
The District Court in Venetian Casino Resort v. Local Joint
Executive Board, 45 F.2d 1027 (D.Nev. 1999), framed the issue
before it as having “to consider whether a pedestrian walkway,
located on private property parallel and adjacent to the Las
Vegas Strip and connected at both ends to public sidewalks, is a
public forum for First Amendment purposes.” The court ac-
knowledged a “general rule” that the Constitution does not
apply to private conduct, citing Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S.
507, 513 (1976). However, the court also noted that
“[s]idewalks have traditionally been recognized as the quintes-
sential public forum.”
Further, the district court noted that “private property rights
are very important and should not be disregarded simply be-
cause a private owner performs a function that is sometimes
performed by the government.” Even so, citing Marsh v. Ala-
bama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), the court declared that “if ever
there was a case where the protections of the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution should be applied to private
property used for a particular public function, this is the case.”
The court noted that city sidewalks that run parallel to public
streets and which allow members of the public to move around
the city have traditionally been exclusively owned and main-
tained by the Government. Therefore, according to the court,
by owning and maintaining the sidewalk in question, the Ve-
netian was performing a public function.
In its holding, the court concluded that while the sidewalk in
question is the Venetian’s private property, as a “thoroughfare”
VENETIAN CASINO RESORT 1065
along a public street, it “serves the needs of the general public.”
As the sidewalk serves what is basically a public function, “the
Venetian does not have the right to exclude individuals from
the sidewalk based upon permissible exercises of their right to
expression under the First Amendment.” Further, the court
held that “[t]he public may use the Venetian’s sidewalk for
First Amendment purposes to the same degree that it may use
any other public sidewalk subject to content neutral and reason-
able time, place, and manner restrictions.” As a result, the
court denied the Venetian’s motion for temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction. In related matters, the court
granted the Union’s expedited motion for summary judgment,
and also entered judgment dismissing the Venetian’s claims
against the Union, Clark County,10 and the Las Vegas Metro-
politan Police Department. Finally, the court entered judgment
on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada
(ACLU), intervenor, granting its claim for a declaratory judg-
ment that the sidewalk on the Venetian’s property abutting Las
Vegas Boulevard “is a public forum.” (Jt. Exh. 2, apps. B, C,
and D.)
While this matter was pending in district court, the Respon-
dent completed construction of its hotel-casino. According to
the testimony of David Friedman, the competed facility con-
tains a large plaza area extending from the hotel frontage to Las
Vegas Boulevard, with the private sidewalk, as set forth in the
1999 Agreement with the NDOT, constituting the border of the
plaza adjacent to the street. The entire plaza area, including the
sidewalk in question, is composed of distinctively colored and
patterned tiles. It is these tiles that visibly differentiate the
sidewalk in front of the Respondent’s facility from the adjoin-
ing public sidewalks on either side of the Respondent’s prop-
erty. (Also, see R. Exh. 4.)
On appeal from the District Court, a panel of the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed.11 See Venetian Casino Resort v. Local Joint
Executive Board, 257 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2001), rehearing and
rehearing en banc denied. The court framed the issue before it
as “whether the sidewalk on private property that requires un-
obstructed pedestrian traffic is a public forum.” The court
noted that the Venetian’s sidewalk was a “thoroughfare side-
walk, seamlessly connected to public sidewalks on either end
and intended for general public use.” Citing Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988), the court indicated that historically
public streets and sidewalks have been used for public assem-
bly and debate. They constituted the “archetype of a traditional
public forum.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Noting it
was uncontested that the public sidewalk, which previously
existed in front of the Venetian, was a public forum, the court
concluded that while title to the property upon which the re-
placement sidewalk stood was held by the Venetian, the agree-
ment with the NDOT had created “a servitude imposed for
unobstructed public use of the sidewalk.” Therefore, according
to the court, “for purposes of public use it was a public side-
walk with the normal attributes of a public sidewalk.”
The Circuit Court found that the sidewalk in question “is the

10 Stewart L. Bell, Clark County District Attorney, was also a named
defendant against whom the Venetian’s claim was dismissed.
11 One judge dissented from the two-judge majority opinion.
only means for pedestrians to travel north or south along the
Venetian’s side of Las Vegas Boulevard, a busy multi-lane
traffic artery.” Apparently, the court did not view the differ-
ence in paving material between the Venetian sidewalk and
adjoining sidewalks as significant, since it found “little to dis-
tinguish” the sidewalks from each other. Also, the court did not
seem impressed with the Respondent’s argument that the par-
ticular parcel of land used for the sidewalk in question had
never been a public sidewalk or forum, finding that what is
significant “is the historical use of the sidewalk adjacent to Las
Vegas Boulevard . . . not the piece of land on which the re-
placement sidewalk had to be located.” It was, therefore, sig-
nificant to the court that the sidewalk in front of the Venetian’s
predecessor was publicly owned and “historically ha[d] been a
public forum.”
According to the Circuit Court, pedestrians walking up and
down the Las Vegas Strip would have no way to determine that
the sidewalk in front of the Venetian “enjoys a different legal
status than the public sidewalks to which it is seamlessly con-
nected to the north and south.” In these circumstances, mem-
bers of the public had the right to pass across the Venetian
property along Las Vegas Boulevard and “to express them-
selves as they do so with the same freedom as on any public
sidewalk.”
The court rejected the Venetian’s argument that it had not
dedicated the sidewalk in question to public use, nor conveyed
any property interest to the county or State. Reviewing the
1999 agreement between the Venetian and the NDOT, the court
concluded that its “provisions constituted a dedication of the
sidewalk to public use.” The provisions of the agreement re-
quire the Venetian “to provide a sidewalk for general public
use, and they deprive the Venetian of its private property right
to block or otherwise impede public access to the sidewalk.” In
the view of the court, the agreement resulted in the State pos-
sessing a property interest in the sidewalk, the purpose of which
was “to guarantee unrestricted public passage along Las Vegas
Boulevard.” On the other hand, “the Venetian retains a prop-
erty interest other than that dedicated to the public” by the
agreement.
The court emphasized that the sidewalk in front of the Ve-
netian possesses “all the attributes of a public forum.” In view
of the historical public character of the predecessor sidewalk,
the replacement sidewalk’s current public use, its interconnec-
tion with the network of public sidewalks, and its dedication to
public use, the court concluded that the sidewalk in question
“constitutes a public forum subject to the protections of the
First Amendment.” Accordingly, the Court of Appeals af-
firmed the judgment of the District Court.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed a petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari to review the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. The U.S. Supreme Court denied that peti-
tion. Venetian Casino Resort v. Local Joint Executive Board,
mem. 535 U.S. 905 (2002).
C. Argument and Analysis
1. The Venetian’s sidewalk is a public forum
In his posthearing brief, counsel for the Respondent contin-
ues to argue that the sidewalk in the front of the Respondent’s
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1066
facility is “private property” and, therefore, it was within the
Respondent’s property right to exclude the union demonstrators
from the sidewalk. Of course, counsel acknowledges the deci-
sions of the District Court and Ninth Circuit, but “respectfully
submits that those decisions were in error and should not be
followed.” While the Respondent has certainly remained con-
sistent in its position, there is no longer any doubt that this issue
has now been decided. Although their analysis was somewhat
different, both the District Court and Ninth Circuit held that the
sidewalk in question was a “public forum” for purposes of First
Amendment expressive activity. This issue having been con-
clusively decided by the Federal courts, no useful purpose will
be served by discussing it further.
2. The union demonstrators were engaged in
protected activity
It is the position of the Respondent that the activities of the
union demonstrators on March 1 “fell outside the scope of Sec-
tion 7,” and, thus, were not protected so as to prohibit employer
interference, restraint, or coercion under Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. The Respondent argues that the subject matter of the
demonstration did not fall within the scope of activities typi-
cally covered by Section 7. The Respondent contends that the
stated purpose of the demonstration was to “take back the
sidewalk,” which was unrelated to traditional union activity.
Further, it is the position of the Respondent that at the time of
the demonstration the Venetian had no employees the Union
was interesting in representing, the Union’s action could not
have been related to the Respondent’s labor practices, employ-
ment standards, or otherwise related to employee interests.
The facts do not support the Respondent’s contention. As
noted earlier, Glen Arnodo, union political director, testified
that the reason the Union was picketing the Venetian was be-
cause the Respondent had not agreed to a “neutrality agree-
ment,” which would provide for a card check of majority status
prior to the opening of the facility. While David Friedman,
assistant to the chairman of the Venetian, testified that no neu-
trality proposal was ever made directly to him by the Union, he
acknowledged that he “had heard” about the Union seeking
such an agreement with the Venetian prior to the opening of the
hotel-casino. Certainly, picketing the facility in an effort to
obtain a “neutrality agreement” from the Employer would con-
stitute union activity in the most basic sense. The fact that the
Venetian had at the time of the picketing no employees the
Union was interested in representing is really not relevant, as it
was obvious that the hotel-casino was within several months of
opening, at which time it would be filled with the type of em-
ployees that the Union had traditionally represented.
Further, the actions of the demonstrators on March 1 estab-
lish beyond any doubt that they believed the Union had a “labor
dispute” with the Respondent, and wanted others, including
potential employees and the general public, to be aware of the
nature of that dispute. The videotapes of the demonstration
establish conclusively that the union demonstrators intended
principally12 for prospective employees of the Venetian and the

12 The union demonstrators also intended to publicize the Respon-
dent’s alleged improper attempt to control the sidewalk in front of the
general public to know they had a labor dispute with the Re-
spondent. The demonstrators carried picket signs, a tradition
symbol of worker protest, with the words “Union Rights” on
the signs, as well as other slogans. Their chants included the
repetitive use of the words “Union” and “Union sidewalk,” and
the refrains of “Venetian no, Union yes” and “Hey, hey, ho, ho,
Union bustings got to go.” Also, speakers at the demonstration
who addressed their comments to assembled groups of people
spoke about operating the hotel-casino “one hundred percent
Union,” and being able to apply for jobs at the facility, which
the speaker indicated should be operated “Union.” (R. Exh. 5
and Jt. Exh. 5.)
The message being addressed to prospective employees by
the union demonstrators was obvious, that being that the facil-
ity should be operated under a union contract and, that if hired
by the Respondent, these new employees should become union
members and support the Union. It is axiomatic that such an
effort on the part of the demonstrators constituted the most
basic form of union activity under Section 7 of the Act, as
“concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or pro-
tection.” Having been unsuccessful at arranging for a card
check of majority status through a “neutrality agreement,” the
Union obviously decided to take its “labor dispute” directly to
prospective employees and to the general public.
Regarding its appeal to the general public, the intent was
clearly to educate them as to the nature of the Union’s dispute
with the Respondent. Of course, the implied threat to the Re-
spondent was that if the public was in sympathy with the Union
in its labor dispute with the Respondent, members of the public
might not be willing to patronize the Respondent’s hotel-
casino. In this respect, the Union’s actions were analogous to
“area standards” activity.
In Great American, 322 NLRB 17 (1996), the Board reiter-
ated that area standards and customer boycott handbilling are
normally protected by Section 7 of the Act. The Board indi-
cated that it “normally does not look beyond the communica-
tion the union is conveying to consumers.” Further, the Board
held that the burden is on the employer “to establish if it can,
that the union’s activity is not what it appears to be and that it is
outside the sphere of Section 7 protection.” In the matter be-
fore me, the union demonstrators’ message to the public was
clear, namely that there was a labor dispute with the Venetian.
That message was conveyed to the public through the Union’s
use of picket signs, chants, and speeches, which mentioned
“union rights,” operating the hotel-casino “one hundred percent
union,” and accused the Venetian of “union busting.” While
the dispute over the sidewalk was also prominently displayed
by signs and slogans, I believe that the central message, which
members of the public received from the demonstration, was
that there was a “labor dispute” between the Union and the
Venetian. I am of the view that the Respondent has failed to

facility. The demonstration was characterized in part as an effort to
“take back the sidewalk,” and similar picket signs, slogans, and chants
were used at the rally. Certainly, this characterization attracted a wider
audience, including the ACLU. However, this does not detract from
what was the Union’s principal intent in organizing the demonstration.
In my view, that was certainly the Union’s interest in advertising its
labor dispute with the Respondent.
VENETIAN CASINO RESORT 1067
establish that the union demonstrators were not involved in a
labor dispute. Accordingly, I conclude that the actions of the
demonstrators on March 1 constituted protected activity under
Section 7 of the Act. Also see Bristol Farms, 311 NLRB 437
(1993).
3. The Union had the right to rally on the
Venetian’s sidewalk
As I have mentioned above, in his posthearing brief, counsel
for the Respondent seems inclined to attempt to relitigate the
issue of the nature of the sidewalk in front of the facility.
However, as I indicated earlier, this issue has been definitively
decided by the Federal courts. The sidewalk in question, al-
though the private property of the Respondent, is a “public
forum” for purposes of First Amendment expressive activity.
The union demonstrators were engaged in just that type of ex-
pressive activity when they gathered on March 1 for the pur-
pose of communicating to prospective employees and the gen-
eral public the nature of their labor dispute with the Venetian.
It seems obvious to me that the most logical place for the Union
to have conducted the demonstration was on the temporary
construction walkway, which was situated along the front of the
Venetian’s property at approximately the same location as the
permanent sidewalk would ultimately exist. This, of course,
was the area nearest the front of the hotel-casino, which would
be the most reasonable place for the demonstrators to hold their
rally. From this point there would be no confusion in the minds
of prospective employees and the general public, the intended
audience, that the Union’s labor dispute was with the Venetian.
As a “public forum,” the sidewalk in question was the place
where the union demonstrators could legally gather and engage
in protected union activity under Section 7 of the Act. That is
precisely what they did.
4. The Respondent’s actions constituted a
violation of the Act
In its answer to the complaint, the Respondent admits that on
March 1 its agents, the security guards, summoned the Las
Vegas Metropolitan Police and requested that the demonstrators
be issued citations and excluded from the sidewalk in front of
its facility. Further, the Respondent admits and the evidence
establishes that the Respondent caused the recording of a tres-
pass message and the repeated playing of that message over a
loudspeaker during the demonstration. The Respondent also
admits that its agents informed Union Business Agent Glen
Arnodo on March 1 that he was being placed under citizen’s
arrest, and the following day its agents contacted the Las Vegas
Metropolitan Police to make a report of the incident. The Re-
spondent acknowledges that it took these actions as a direct
response to the Union’s demonstration on its private sidewalk,
which the Respondent viewed as trespassing. According to the
Respondent, these actions were “pre-litigation” activities,
which the Respondent alleges constituted “constitutionally
protected petitioning,” or were at least incidental to and inter-
twined with such petitioning. Of course, the General Counsel
contends that these actions constituted a violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
In Bristol Farms, supra, the Board stated, “It is beyond ques-
tion that an employer’s exclusion of union representatives from
public property violates Section 8(a)(1) so long as the union
representatives are engaged in activity protected by Section 7 of
the Act. See, e.g., Gainesville Mfg. Co., 271 NLRB 1186
(1984).” The Board went on to say that:
Further, an employer’s exclusion of union representatives
from private property as to which the employer lacks a prop-
erty right entitling it to exclude individuals likewise violates
Section 8(a)(1), assuming the union representatives are en-
gaged in Section 7 activities. See Polly Drummond Thrift-
way, 292 NLRB 331 (1989), enfd. mem. 882 F.2d 512 (3d
Cir. 1989); Barkus Bakery, 282 NLRB 351 (1986), enfd.
mem. sub nom. NLRB v. Caress Bake Shop, 833 F.2d 306 (3d
Cir. 1987).
As I concluded earlier, the union demonstrators were en-
gaged in activity protected by Section 7 of the Act when they
participated in the rally conducted on the Respondent’s side-
walk on March 1. The Federal courts having decided that the
sidewalk in question is a “public forum” for the purpose of First
Amendment expressive activity, the union demonstrators had a
constitutional right to conduct their rally on the sidewalk.
Therefore, regardless of whether the sidewalk was for purposes
of the demonstration considered “public property” or “private
property” upon which the Respondent lacked a property right
entitling it to exclude the demonstrators, the result would be the
same. The actions of the Respondent in attempting to have the
union demonstrators removed from the sidewalk, as alleged in
the complaint, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Bristol
Farms, supra. The Respondent’s contention that it was simply
attempting to protect its private property from trespassers is of
no avail. According to the Federal courts, while the Respon-
dent retains the sidewalk as its private property, it has lost the
right to have the demonstrators removed from what has become
a “public forum” for the purpose of expressive activity. In
other words, the Respondent lacks a property right entitling it to
exclude the union demonstrators, who were engaged in pro-
tected Section 7 activity. Without the requisite property inter-
est, the Respondent’s actions in attempting to remove the union
demonstrators violated the Act under existing Board law. See
Indio Grocery Outlet, 323 NLRB 1138 (1997).
Despite the adverse holdings by the Federal courts in the
sidewalk case litigation, the Respondent argues that its actions
in attempting to have the union demonstrators removed from
the sidewalk cannot be a violation of the Act as they constituted
“pre-litigation” activities, which were incidental to and inextri-
cably intertwined with the litigation. The Respondent relies
heavily upon the Supreme Court’s decision in BE&K Construc-
tion Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002). It is counsel for the
Respondent’s position, as set forth in his posthearing brief, that
under the holding of that case an employer’s lawsuit must be
both objectively baseless and subjectively brought for an
unlawful motive in order for the lawsuit to constitute a viola-
tion of the Act. Counsel believes that it is significant that in the
present complaint the General Counsel has failed to allege the
Respondent’s filing of the Federal litigation as a violation of
the Act. Allegedly, this is because the General Counsel must
know he could not prevail under the Supreme Court’s decision
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1068
in BE&K Construction Co. Counsel for the Respondent argues
that in an earlier complaint the General Counsel alleged such a
violation, however, following the Supreme Court’s decision,
the present complaint contained no such allegation.
It is not the proper role of an administrative law judge to
speculate as to why certain matters are not alleged in a com-
plaint. Alleging violations of the Act come within the exclu-
sive province of the Regional Director and the General Coun-
sel. As the complaint before me contains no such allegation, I
need not consider the question of whether the Respondent’s
lawsuit was a violation of the Act, or not. However, counsel
for the Respondent attempts to expand on the Supreme Court’s
decision in BE&K Construction Co., arguing that it should
include “pre-litigation” activities that are incidental to and in-
tertwined with the actual filing of the lawsuit. Counsel does
not cite any labor related cases for such a proposition, but does
attempt to draw an analogy with the Supreme Court’s holdings
in antitrust cases.
According to the Respondent, in order to safeguard its con-
stitutionally protected right to petition the Government through
its Federal court litigation on the sidewalk issue, it had to en-
gage in certain prelitigation activities. It is argued that if the
Respondent failed to do so, it would effectively waive its right
to sue. Among these prelitigation activities were the following:
(1) summoning the police and asking them to issue citations to
demonstrators and eject them from its sidewalk; (2) recording
the trespass message and repeatedly playing it to the demon-
strators over the public address system; and (3) informing Glen
Arnodo that he was under citizen’s arrest and contacting the
police to make a report of the incident. Counsel for the Re-
spondent argues that these actions were all protected as direct
petitioning of governmental entities and/or inextricably inter-
twined with such petitioning so as to be constitutionally pro-
tected. According to counsel, without being able to take this
action, the right to sue would essentially become meaningless
as the Respondent would not be able to satisfy the “necessary
prerequisite to establishing the need for injunctive relief and to
avoid being found to have waived” the right to sue.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that counsel’s theory
has some validity, this case would require the balancing of the
Employer’s right to engage in “pre-litigation activity” in de-
fense of its property rights versus the rights guaranteed em-
ployees under the Act. In the facts of this case, I believe that
employee rights under the Act should prevail. Those rights
include some of the most basic sought to be protected by the
Act, namely the right of the demonstrators to appeal to prospec-
tive employees that they should support the Union, and to ap-
peal to the general public that they should not patronize the
Venetian because it had a labor dispute with the Union. Both
prospective employees and the general public had a corre-
sponding right to receive this message. Despite the Respon-
dent’s denials, I believe that it was clear to all concerned at the
time that a genuine “labor dispute” existed, that being the re-
fusal of the Respondent to enter into a “neutrality agreement”
with the Union. Under these circumstances, the Union’s dem-
onstration was certainly a manifestation of “union activity” in
its most basic form.
In any event, however, I do not believe that a balancing test
is appropriate in this case, as the Respondent has already been
found by the Federal courts to lack the requisite property inter-
est in the sidewalk as would allow it to exclude the union dem-
onstrators. Without such a property interest, there is no “right”
of the Respondent to balance against the obvious Section 7
rights of the demonstrators. See Victory Markets, supra; Bristol
Farms, supra.
Further, I am of the opinion that if the Respondent were
permitted to have the union demonstrators removed from the
sidewalk, which sidewalk was found by the courts to constitute
a “public forum,” it would have had a profoundly chilling effect
on the demonstrators’ Section 7 rights.13 On the other hand, I
am not convinced that the Respondent would have been at all
foreclosed from exercising its right to petition the courts
through a lawsuit without first interfering with the rights of the
union demonstrators to participate in the rally on the Respon-
dent’s sidewalk. Under the facts of this case, I do not believe
that the holding in BE&K Construction Co., supra, is applica-
ble.
The Respondent argues that it actions were reasonable and
not unlawfully motivated and, thus, not a violation of the Act.
According to the Respondent, its actions were taken as a good
faith effort to protect its property rights, and not in an effort to
harm the Union or to deprive employees of their rights under the
Act. The Respondent contends that under the Nevada State tres-
pass statute,14 which it cited to the demonstrators at the rally, it
believed at the time of the demonstration that the demonstrators
were in violation of the law. Additionally, the Respondent al-
leges that at the time of the demonstration it was aware of an
earlier lawsuit in the “MGM Grand case,” which counsel for the
Respondent contends raised virtually identical questions regard-
ing a hotel-casino’s fight to exclude nonemployee demonstrators
from its privately-owned sidewalk, which was allegedly resolved
favorably to the MGM Grand. (R. Exh. 2.)15
Further, the Respondent argues that there is no evidence in the
record to suggest that the actions of the Respondent in attempting
to have the demonstrators removed from its sidewalk were a
“sham” intended to mask an unlawful motive. Counsel for the
Respondent contends that the Respondent took the actions it did,
which actions were precedent to filing the lawsuit, because it
reasonably believed, based on the Nevada trespass statute and the

13 The Board case law makes it clear that it is the demonstrators’
Sec. 7 rights that are violated by the Respondent’s unlawful action. See
Bristol Farms, Inc., supra; Gainesville Mfg. Co., supra.
14 Nevada Revised Statutes Section 614.160, Picketing. (R. Exh. 3.)
15 I admitted into evidence, over counsel for the General Counsel’s
objection, a document from the MGM Grand case entitled stipulation
for judgment of dismissal with prejudice and findings of fact and con-
clusion of law. I admitted the document because I was of the opinion,
and continue to believe, that it is “marginally” relevant since it is part
of the Respondent’s defense that its actions against the demonstrators
were taken in good faith. However, because of my ultimate conclusion
regarding the Respondent’s “motive” defense, it is unnecessary for me
to closely analyze the document in question. Further, I would add that
no two lawsuits involving different plaintiffs are ever identical, and my
admission of the document into evidence should not be construed as my
agreement with counsel for the Respondent’s contention that the MGM
Grand case raised “virtually identical questions” regarding a privately
owned sidewalk, as in the Venetian case.
VENETIAN CASINO RESORT 1069
MGM Grand case, that its private property claim was valid and
its actions were necessary to protect its property rights. The Re-
spondent argues that there is no evidence of “ill will” on its part.
While the Respondent may well have acted in “good faith” in
this matter, its motives are not dispositive of the issue of whether
its actions violated the Act. It is well established that in an
8(a)(1) case it is unnecessary to prove that an employer acted in
bad faith or with improper motives. In NLRB v. Burnup & Sims,
Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964), the Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals, which had refused to reinstate two discharged employ-
ees because it concluded the employer had acted in good faith in
discharging them. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the
employer had violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, regardless of its
motive.
In reiterating its long-held position, the Board stated in Phoe-
nix Newspapers, 294 NLRB 47, 50 fn. 19 (1989), that, “we note
that in many cases involving employer sanctions against arguably
protected activity . . . the employers raise sincere and quite ten-
able grounds for the argument that their actions were not moti-
vated by the mere fact that employees were engaged in protected
activities but rather were induced by alarm at the injurious effects
of the protected activity. The Board did not take issue with the
employers asserted motives but nonetheless found the alleged
violations.” Further, it is significant to note that neither Indio
Grocery, supra, nor Bristol Farms, supra, contains any findings
by the Board that the respective employers did not honestly be-
lieve in their asserted property rights.
Under the facts of this case, it is simply not pertinent whether
the Respondent had a good-faith belief that its property right
claim was meritorious. As decided by the Federal courts, the
Respondent did not have a property interest in the sidewalk suffi-
cient to overcome the right of the union demonstrators to engage
in expressive activity on the sidewalk, which had acquired the
attributes of a “public forum.” While the Respondent may very
well have had a genuine good-faith belief in the legal correctness
of its position, it acted at its own peril when it sought to remove
the demonstrators from the sidewalk in question. Its actions had
a chilling effect on the Section 7 rights of the demonstra-
tors/employees to engage in union activity. The Respondent
should not be able to violate the Act, merely because it desires to
test a legal principle. As I noted, I do not view the Respondent’s
actions in attempting to have the demonstrators removed from
the sidewalk as incidental to and inextricably intertwined with its
lawsuit. I am not convinced that the Respondent would have
been foreclosed from a lawsuit to settle the issue of whether the
sidewalk was a “public forum,” without first taking the actions it
did to have the demonstrators removed. Good-faith motive or
not, those actions violated the Act.
D. Summary
Based on the above, I conclude that the Respondent’s conduct
as described in paragraphs 5(b)(1), (2), and (3) of the complaint
interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise
of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. As such, the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Venetian Casino Resort, LLC is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union, Local Joint Executive Board of Las Vegas, Cu-
linary Workers Union, Local 226 and Bartenders Union, Local
165, affiliated with Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees
International Union, AFL–CIO, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By the following acts and conduct the Respondent has vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act:
(a) Summoning the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police and re-
questing that demonstrators on behalf of the Union, who were
engaged in a peaceful demonstration, be issued trespass citations
and excluded from the sidewalk in front of the Respondent’s
facility.
(b) Causing the recording of a trespass message and the play-
ing of the message over a loudspeaker directed to demonstrators
on behalf of the Union, who were engaged in a peaceful demon-
stration on the sidewalk in front of the Respondent’s facility.
(c) Informing Union Business Agent Glen Arnodo, who was
engaged in a peaceful demonstration on behalf of the Union on
the sidewalk in front of the Respondent’s facility, that he was
being placed under citizen’s arrest, and the following day con-
tacting the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police to make a report of the
incident.
4. The above unfair labor practices affect commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the en-
tire record, I issue the following recommended16
ORDER
1. The Respondent, Venetian Casino Resort, LLC, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall cease and desist from
(a) Summoning the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police and re-
questing that demonstrators on behalf of the Union, who are en-
gaged in a peaceful demonstration, be issued trespass citations
and excluded from the sidewalk in front of the Respondent’s
facility.
(b) Causing the recording of a trespass message and the play-
ing of the message over a loudspeaker directed to demonstrators
on behalf of the Union, who are engaged in a peaceful demon-
stration on the sidewalk in front of the Respondent’s facility.
(c) Informing Union Business Agent Glen Arnodo, or any
other demonstrator on behalf of the Union, who is engaging in a
peaceful demonstration on the sidewalk in front of the Respon-
dent’s facility, that he is being placed under citizen’s arrest, and
contacting the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police to make a report of
the incident.

16 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1070
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. The Respondent, Venetian Casino Resort, LLC, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the following affirma-
tive action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its ca-
sino-hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”17 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 28 after being signed by the
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the

17
If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the
event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Re-
spondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved
in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at
its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since
March 1, 1999.
(b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.